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Abstract 
In Latin America, a region with particular problems and challenges, anti-discrimination 
legal provisions have been rapidly growing, although without much scholarly attention. 
Recent reforms can be framed as mere improvements of the right to equality, as 
guarantees required to smooth market interactions or, alternatively, as cynical progress 
that prevent more radical understandings. Against these approaches, this thesis provides 
an account of the emancipatory potential of anti-discrimination law (ADL) in Latin 
America and its place within progressive political projects. Rather than providing a 
doctrinal reconstruction, a complete theoretical account, or a detailed legal framework of 
this field of law, this research builds on contemporary constitutional debates and critical 
social theories to see how the practice of ADL in Latin America provides ‘spaces of 
anticipatory illumination’ of what a transformative account of ADL would look like. For 
this purpose, I develop two main argumentative lines, which structures this work in two 
parts. According to the first, we need a constitutional conception of ADL that can make 
sense of the recent constitutional (trans)formations in the region, committed at tackling 
discrimination. Taking into account the raw materials we have at hand, the vast repertoire 
of anti-discrimination provisions enacted in the last decades, it develops a constitutional 
conception of ADL that can create the conditions for an effective enforcement of the 
generous anti-discrimination commitments. The second argumentative line rests on the 
need to advance a critical social theory of ADL in Latin America. Without it, the first 
argumentative line is doomed to fail. In concrete terms, this second line rests on the need 
to critically understand the phenomenon under study, in this case, discrimination in Latin 
America, and the role of law in addressing it. By looking at the recent practice of ADL in 
Latin America through the lens of a critical social theory, we can understand the strengths 
and limits, the opportunities and dangers that derive from this emergent field of law. 
Drawing mainly on the work of Nancy Fraser, I argue that ADL in Latin America could 
be an example of ‘nonreformist reform’, which ‘changes more than the specific 
institutional features they explicitly target’, and ‘alter the terrain upon which later 
struggles will be waged.’ A ‘normative reconstruction’ of recent reforms and practice in 
ADL allows us to develop six principles that set the case for a transformative approach 
suitable for the challenges the region is currently facing: state intervention, group 
dimension, challenging stance, socio-economic lens, political axis, legal 
empowerment/mobilization. In particular, this research starts from existing anti-
discrimination provisions in the region, and seeks a roadmap of further legal reforms 
within a transformative approach. 
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Impact Statement 
The thesis constitutes a significant contribution to the scarce literature on anti-
discrimination law in Latin America. Avoiding the image of the ‘failed law’ of Latin 
America, this work recovers the possibility that this region can have a say in comparative 
equality law. In that regard, it constitutes a contribution to anti-discrimination legal 
scholarship, which underestimates the precise ways in which it constitutes a legally-
driven field of social change. 
 
The principles of a transformative approach to anti-discrimination law, developed in the 
second part of this thesis, can play a crucial role for one of the tasks of ‘normative 
reconstruction’, that is, the design of political strategies that seek to change current legal-
institutional arrangements and the imagination of alternative institutional choices for the 
advancement of human freedom in all its forms. 
I 
n general, these principles could be better characterised as normative standards that are 
immanent in legal practices and that illustrate the character of anti-discrimination law as 
a case of ‘non-reformist reform’. They are separate normative standards through which 
to evaluate different aspects of anti-discrimination law, specially crafted to evaluate 
current reforms that are being discussed in Latin America and provide a roadmap for the 
much needed consolidation of these regimes of law. For example, by resorting to the 
principle of the challenging stance, we may want to loosen rules of evidence, allowing 
victims of discrimination to resort to the social context in order to understand the 
expressive meaning of discriminatory practices. Or, by studying the different ways in 
which Latin American anti-discrimination law observes a socio-economic lens, we may 
develop a more detailed account of the ways in which class, poverty, or other social 
conditions could be incorporated as grounds of protection, or to understand better the 
possibility of implementing public sector equality duties to address socio-economic 
issues. Although considered as separate normative standards, the principles together 
constitute a normative framework to which we can resort for discussing the ability of anti-
discrimination law to address structural issues or widespread practices of discrimination. 
In concrete, these principles can help us in the translation of the transformative approach 
of anti-discrimination law into concrete rules, institutions, procedures or schemes for 
tackling discrimination. Moreover, these principles could be considered as the backdrop 
against which to consider the application of doctrinal issues that require resolution. In 
that sense, although immanent, they are available to orientate or serve as a source of 
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arguments for strategic litigation or judicial resolution, and thus have a practical impact 
even in the absence of concrete reforms in positive law. In a way, these principles are 
legal principles that constitute the backdrop against which many of the most progressive 
landmark cases are built. 
 
In the near future, the contributions of this work could be further reinforced by developing 
studies that explore concrete institutional articulations of anti-discrimination law in the 
region. The thesis will be developed into several different papers with more detailed 
studies about particular anti-discrimination regimes, including a collective work with 
authors from the Latin American countries included as examples here. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Picket lines  
School boy-cots 
They try to say it's a communist plot 
All I want is equality 
for my sister my brother my people and me  
 
Nina Simone, Mississippi Goddam Blues  
 
 
1.1. The context (1): recent boom in anti-discrimination legislation 
Discrimination constitutes a central problem in the agenda of Latin American 
governments and regional organisations, and appears frequently in social struggles. 
Furthermore, it constitutes a widespread phenomenon, experienced by Latin Americans 
in households, workplaces, public facilities, the media, and their dealings with authorities. 
For the last two decades, Latin American governments of all political ideologies have 
enacted particular anti-discrimination provisions and, in some cases, special and unified 
bodies of legislation.1  Recent constitutional transformations have created the perfect 
conditions for a Latin American boom in anti-discrimination legislation. To start with an 
example, in 2012, after a tragic hate crime against a gay young man, Chile enacted its 
first anti-discrimination law. In the presidential speech to launch this new law, Sebastian 
Piñera, a right-wing millionaire, stated that ‘despite the clarity of the constitution in 
protecting equality, we had until today no integral norm to protect and promote the 
principle of non-arbitrary discrimination and no adequate judicial action to sanction acts 
of discrimination’.2 Moreover, he added, ‘finally Chile decided to take this step that will 
make a more just, plural, inclusive and tolerant society’.3 After six years, different social 
actors and scholars that had participated in the legislative proceedings are now frustrated 
with the impact of this law in tackling or redressing discrimination. 4  This case is 
representative of a wider regional trend because of several notable features: along with 
                                               
1 see appendix (tables 1-2).   
2 ‘Piñera recuerda a Daniel Zamudio durante promulgación de la Ley Antidiscriminación’ Emol (Santiago, 
12 July 2012) <http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2012/07/12/550327/pinera-recuerda-a-daniel-
zamudio-durante-promulgacion-de-la-ley-antidiscriminacion.html> accessed 12 October 2017. All of the 
bibliographical sources in Spanish that have no published translation in English are my own.  
3 ibid. 
4 L Casas and C Lagos, ‘Análisis crítico de la acción de no discriminación arbitraria a la luz de los primeros 
casos’ (2014) 10 Anuario de Derechos Humanos 127; MOVILH, Informe Anual de Derechos Humanos: 
Diversidad Sexual y de Género en Chile 2016 (December 2016). 
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dignity or the rule of law, a commitment to non-discrimination now constitutes a crucial 
element of how governments define themselves before their domestic constituencies and 
the broader international community; the principle of non-discrimination no longer seems 
to be a patrimony of progressive social movements and left-wing political parties; it 
acknowledges that the constitutional protections of equality and non-discrimination are 
not enough for an effective fight against discrimination; moreover, the Chilean case is 
representative because of the constant frustration and ineffectiveness of even the most 
progressive reforms of anti-discrimination law (hereafter, ‘ADL’) in Latin America.  
 
The recent boom in anti-discrimination legislation has not met the heightened 
expectations of Latin American civil societies, which have seen a decade of stability, 
democratic consolidation and economic progress. Despite its constitutional support, Latin 
American ADL has met with a social/cultural backlash, a lack of institutional capacities, 
insufficient doctrinal consolidation, and other factors that constrain its emancipatory 
potential, that is, the capacity to improve the lives of the subjects of those laws. Although 
Latin American ADL prohibits all forms of discrimination, includes some of the most 
extended lists of protected grounds, and provides several remedies for addressing it, the 
consolidation and effectiveness of the recently created legislation is constantly being put 
into question.  
 
1.2. The context (2): the perils and possibilities of anti-discrimination law 
Even in this scenario, however, those who are disadvantaged by institutional 
arrangements or social practices deploy the means of ADL, either by using special judicial 
actions to redress discrimination, resorting to constitutional or legislative anti-
discrimination provisions, or complaining before the special bodies or commissions for 
tackling discrimination at the local or regional levels. ADL seems to cover everything 
that progressive political projects require: distribution, recognition and political equality. 
It seems that we can resort to equality and anti-discrimination provisions in any of our 
justice claims. And, in some sense, that is the way in which it works, at least rhetorically, 
in the ‘mouths’, and practically, in the ‘hands’, of those who are economically 
disadvantaged, or who lack enough resources to sustain their living; of those who are 
permanently disrespected by cultural value patterns, made invisible, or subject to alien 
cultural paradigms; and those who see themselves as taking no part in the basic definition 
of what constitutes equal membership in the political community or in the debate on how 
should we address our shared concerns. A common picture, in this regard, portrays 
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individual and social movements basing their broader social claims or interests on the 
constitutional or legislative clauses of equality and non-discrimination. There seems to 
be an important moral and social weight in resorting to equality and non-discrimination 
in the struggles of our age.  
 
Considering what I said before, ADL seems to be at risk of promising more than what it 
can deliver. This feature explains why policy-makers and legislators who craft anti-
discrimination legislation are aware of the tension between the ambitious and all-
encompassing promises of ADL, and the potential dangers it may trigger.5 As we will see 
in future chapters, there is a tension between the expectations raised by a government 
committed to the constitutional principle of equality and non-discrimination and the 
effective regulatory schemes of ADL. Notwithstanding their imperfections, equality and 
anti-discrimination clauses seem to be continually reshaped by the reality of the 
individuals and groups resorting to them. That is just the way it is, we could say, as 
equality and anti-discrimination seems to appeal to a natural language through which we 
make daily normative claims as social peers, as the lyrics of Nina Simone illustrate. It is 
precisely in this context where an analysis of both the strengths and limits of ADL is 
pressing. 
 
Latin American ADL is now in a crucial phase for its future development. It is well 
developed at the level of substantive provisions in both regional human rights law and 
domestic constitutional orders. At the sub-constitutional level, we are also witnessing a 
boom in anti-discrimination legislation across the region. Nevertheless, the region is in 
much need of an approach that can make sense of what it already has and what is needed 
for the future. The starting question is how can we make sense of the recent constitutional 
transformations, which include a vast repertoire of anti-discriminations provisions, and 
how can we move forward towards the consolidation of an emergent field of law and the 
effective enforcement of the existing provisions? In this scenario, if recent constitutional 
transformations in Latin America are reduced to improvements in the liberal guarantee of 
fair, equal or impartial treatment, then all we need is to concentrate our efforts on the 
effectiveness of the longstanding promises of the rule of law. Instead of embarking on 
ambitious projects of social engineering, we could take liberal commitments seriously 
and apply the Aristotelian formula of equality with the help of a renewed republican 
                                               
5 see 5.3.1. 
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ethos. Therefore, one possibility is to focus our efforts on developing a conception of 
ADL where strong and effective protections against discrimination and social exclusion 
can be derived from the minimum requirements of liberal standards. However, as will be 
explained in this work, the recent constitutional transformations in Latin America entail 
something more. Indeed, they are based on the idea that tackling discrimination at all 
levels entails not merely a desirable social policy, but proper constitutional imperatives, 
which commit all state institutions to redressing discrimination from a structural point of 
view.  
 
1.3 The argument: a transformative approach to anti-discrimination law in Latin 
America 
This dissertation provides a normative reconstruction of the emancipatory potential of 
ADL in Latin America and its place within progressive political projects. Rather than 
providing a doctrinal reconstruction, a complete theoretical account, or a detailed legal 
framework of this field of law in the region, this research project builds on contemporary 
constitutional debates and critical social theory to see how the practice of Latin America 
ADL provides ‘spaces of anticipatory illumination’ in terms of what a transformative 
approach to ADL would look like. In that regard, this work attempts to develop a 
particular conceptual approach to an emergent field of law, in a region with particular 
problems and challenges concerning discrimination. Considering law as a social 
construct, the concepts and arguments offered in this work assume that legal scholarship 
is not external to law, but constitutive of it, which may have an impact on reality, 
transforming and improving the lives of those who live under Latin American legal 
regimes.6 To develop my arguments, I adopt a method Nicola Lacey calls ‘normative 
reconstruction’, which refers broadly to ‘the critique of existing legal and social 
arrangements; the imagination of different ethical values, relationships and institutions; 
and the design of political strategies that seek to change current legal-institutional 
arrangements’.7 This method may seem at odds with mainstream legal scholarship, as it 
appears to neglect the tasks of doctrinal analysis, which attempts to provide a systematic 
exposition of a certain area of law, or of whole legal regimes. However, starting from 
                                               
6 The kind of legal scholarship I attempt to do here relies on the basic idea that ‘refined concepts help to 
better construct reality, organize, develop and critique the law’. A von Bogdandy and others, ‘Ius 
Constitutionale Commune en América Latina: A Regional Approach to Transformative Constitutionalism’, 
in A von Bogdandy and others (eds), Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America (OUP 2017) 5. 
7 Following Nicola Lacey, I understand ‘normative reconstruction’ to be part of the broader current of 
critical legal theories. ‘Normative Reconstruction in Socio-Legal Theory’ (1996) 5 Social & Legal Studies 
131. 
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positive law and legal practice, that is, ‘existing legal and social arrangements’, the 
method of ‘normative reconstruction’ expands the purposes of legal scholarship, 
imagining different ethical values, relationships and institutions’, and designing the 
‘political strategies’ for that to occur. Although ‘normative reconstruction’ entails the 
usage of empirical claims, the nature of these claims differs from the traditional claims 
of doctrinal analysis, which have been historically linked to the status of legal scholarship 
as science.8 Indeed, the empirical claims I make in this work are not intended at a project 
of systematically exposing ADL in Latin America, but rather to understand the starting 
points, that is, the raw legal materials from where to build a transformative approach to 
ADL. Another important part of this research project rests on normative claims, which 
are inscribed in a broader theory of law and social change, and on critical accounts of law 
and legal institutions.  
 
For the purpose presented before, I develop two main argumentative lines, which divide 
this work into two parts. According to the first, we need a constitutional conception of 
ADL that can make sense of the recent constitutional (trans)formations in the region, 
committed to tackling discrimination, which is considered a constitutional evil.9 Taking 
into account the raw materials we have at hand, the vast repertoire of anti-discrimination 
provisions enacted in the last decades, it develops a constitutional conception of ADL 
that can create the conditions for its own effective enforcement. Based on recent 
constitutional scholarship, I claim that this conception should be grounded in a 
contemporary current I call egalitarian-dialogic constitutionalism (hereafter, ‘EDC’), 
which endorses a double commitment to collective self-determination and individual 
autonomy, and advances a specific mode of enforcement of constitutional duties that 
relies on effective schemes of cooperation, participation and dialogue. 
 
The second argumentative line rests on the need to advance a critical social theory of 
ADL in Latin America. A critical social theory attempts to address reality with a practical 
aim, that is, emancipation, seeking an improvement in human freedom in all its forms. 
Without this, the first argumentative line is doomed to fail. This second part starts by 
                                               
8 A von Bogdandy, ‘The past and promise of doctrinal constructivism’ (2009) 7 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 364; R Posner, ‘The present situation in legal scholarship’ (1980) 90 The Yale Law 
Journal 1113.  
9 A constitutional conception of ADL attempts to describe, explain and justify the fact that constitutions 
provide robust support for the development of ADL. Within the classic concept-conception distinction, this 
conception stands as an alternative to others, like the employment-based conception, or the developmental 
conception. 
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asking, what do we need for a constitutional conception of Latin American ADL, 
grounded in the commitments and concerns of EDC, to develop the reforms needed to 
display its normative strength? Without a critical social theory of ADL, the commitments 
of EDC will hardly move forward, and will remain as ineffectual as the many different 
currents of ‘aspirational constitutionalism’ in the region. Specifically, this second line 
rests on the need to critically understand the phenomenon under study, in this case, 
discrimination in Latin America, and the role of law in addressing it. By looking at the 
recent practice of ADL in Latin America through the lens of critical social theory, which 
extends the scope of analysis beyond constitutional texts, we can understand the strengths 
and limits, and the opportunities and dangers that derive from this emergent field of law.  
 
Although there are many different uses of the adjective ‘transformative’ in legal 
scholarship, my use of the term points to the place of ADL within an emancipatory 
politics. For example, some scholars have used the term ‘transformative’ to describe the 
expansion of the scope of equality regimes into private relationships, 10  the merely 
instrumental role of law in achieving social change,11 or with a view to using ADL as an 
all-encompassing device for progressive politics.12 Here, drawing mainly on the work of 
Nancy Fraser, I argue that a transformative approach to ADL in Latin America could be 
an example of ‘non-reformist reforms’, which  
set[s] in motion a trajectory of change in which more radical reforms 
become practicable over time. When successful, nonreformist 
reforms change more than the specific institutional features they 
explicitly target. In addition, they alter the terrain upon which later 
struggles will be waged. By changing incentive structures and 
political opportunity structures, they expand the set of feasible options 
for future reform. Over time their cumulative effect could be to 
transform the underlying structures that generate injustice.13 
Why and how can ADL be considered as a starting point in a broader trajectory of 
emancipatory social change? In what way can ADL change the legal and political 
opportunity structures? In what way can ADL be understood to ‘expand the set of feasible 
                                               
10 E Muir, ‘The Transformative Function of EU Equality Regime’ (2013) 5&6 European Review of Private 
Law 1231, 1234. 
11 K Klare, ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 146. 
12 This is my view of Fredman’s account of ADL. S Fredman, Discrimination Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 
25-33.   
13 N Fraser, ‘Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation’, 
in Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?: A political-philosophical exchange (Verso 2003) 
79. 
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options for future reform’? In a word, is Latin American ADL a case of ‘non-reformist 
reform’? These are the main questions I will attempt to answer throughout this work. 
Through a normative reconstruction of the practice and recent reforms in the area of ADL, 
I will set out the case for a transformative approach that is suitable for the challenges the 
region is currently facing. Together, the above-mentioned argumentative lines are bound 
together through the normative reconstruction of Latin American ADL, which starts from 
recent (constitutional) transformations in positive law and the impacts on current legal 
practices. This normative reconstruction, however, attempts to move the project forward, 
placing Latin American ADL within broader progressive political projects, although 
without dismissing the advancements made within current legal arrangements. In 
particular, this research starts from current anti-discrimination provisions in the region, 
which are mainly the product of legal reforms of the last decades, and seeks the normative 
basis or orientation of further reforms within a transformative approach. In the second 
part of this thesis, I will develop six principles that I claim can provide a roadmap for 
these reforms, helping us in the translation of the transformative approach of ADL into 
concrete rules, institutions, procedures or schemes for tackling or redressing 
discrimination. The concrete institutional articulation of ADL in different parts of the 
region, however, constitutes a different object of research.  
 
Throughout the work, it will become clearer that I am arguing both against a narrow 
liberal interpretation of ADL, and against recent critical accounts of ADL that come from 
the radical left. For traditional liberal interpretations of ADL, I have in mind ideas such 
as the ‘color-blindness’ approach, which reduces the state to an impartial and blind 
arbitrer of social differences and asymmetries, or the neutrality stance that equality 
clauses seem to endorse under narrow approaches to the issue.14 Against this approach, 
which merely aspires to give effect to the basic premises of the rule of law, my approach 
starts from the fact that recent constitutional transformations go beyond liberal 
approaches, especially when we study the ways in which social mobilization has deployed 
ADL in its different struggles. In sum, I attempt to go beyond the received liberal wisdom 
of ADL. Each principle developed in the second part of the thesis constitutes a challenge 
against the way in which equality and anti-discrimination law has been understood as 
entailing state neutrality, the denial of a group dimension, the policy choice of purely 
judicial models of ADL triggered by individual causes of action, the separation between 
                                               
14 For an example of a traditional liberal account of ADL, see L Alexander, ‘What Makes Wrongful 
Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies’ (1998) 18 OJLS 167. 
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anti-discrimination claims and socio-economic issues, or as a denial of the political 
dimension of ADL. Furthermore, the thesis constitutes an attempt to answer critical 
positions against ADL that come from the radical left, which argue that the recent 
consolidation of equality regimes has provided legitimacy to unjust institutional 
arrangements, become the ‘darling of progressive neoliberalism’, foregone issues of 
redistribution, or that prevents more radical social and political transformation of the 
current state of affairs.15  
 
1.4 Definitional issues 
Here, I will introduce three important definitional issues to explain precisely the way in 
which I use the term ADL, which will be present throughout this work. First of all, 
following Bayefsky, I will treat the concepts of equality and non-discrimination as the 
‘positive and negative statements of the same principle’.16 Therefore, ‘[o]ne is treated 
equally when one is not discriminated against and one is discriminated against when one 
is not treated equally’.17 Thus, I will refer to ADL or, alternatively, to equality and anti-
discrimination law as synonyms, despite the many different conceptual debates that 
currently exist regarding whether ADL is grounded in equality or, rather, if it articulates 
a fundamental freedom in a liberal society.18 Moreover, I understand ADL as comprising 
what the surface structure of ADL around the world illustrates. Briefly, we can claim that 
this emergent field of law is constituted by the prohibitions of direct and indirect 
discrimination, and by the duties of reasonable accommodation.19 Within these legal 
structures, we can find several institutional configurations and articulations, such as the 
penalisation of hate crimes, the regulation of sexual harassment, and specific positive 
equality duties. Thirdly, we must advance some theoretical issues concerning the 
possibility of speaking of ADL as a distinctive field of law. For Tarunabh Khaitan, there 
are several necessary and sufficient conditions that can help us in distinguishing the 
norms of ADL from other legal norms: the personal grounds condition requires a 
                                               
15 For an example of a critical account from a radical left position, see A Somek, Engineering Equality: An 
Essay on European Anti-Discrimination Law (OUP 2011).  
16 A Bayefsky, A Bayefsky, ‘The principle of Equality or Non-discrimination in International Law’ (1990) 
11 Human Rights Quarterly 1, 5.   
17 ibid. 
18 Although I acknowledge the many different debates that exist on whether the value or the principle of 
equality constitutes the normative grounding of a theoretical account of ADL, I will not address these 
debates directly. In the next chapter, I will provide different reasons to support a constitutional conception 
of ADL, many of which address the relationship between equality and non-discrimination. Moreover, in 
chapter 5, I provide the reader with a brief overview of the debates around the philosophical foundations 
of ADL (see  5.2).  
19 S Moreau, ‘What is Discrimination?’ (2010) 38 Philosophy & Public Affairs 143. 
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connection between the act or omission prohibited or mandated by the anti-discrimination 
norm and certain traits or characteristics that persons have or observe, what we call 
grounds (eg, that a restaurant owner denies a person admission to its premises on the 
grounds of her skin colour);20 moreover, these protected grounds (eg sex) must be capable 
of classifying persons into more than one class of persons, loosely called groups (eg men 
and women), and the members of at least one group must be significantly more likely to 
suffer abiding and substantial disadvantage than the members of at least one other group 
defined by the same ground (women in relation to men). 21  Additionally, the duty-
imposing norm must be designed such that it is likely to distribute the substantive benefits 
or burdens in question to some, but not all, members of a protected group.22 That is to 
say, ‘unlike a universal welfare benefit or a socio-economic right, even positive norms in 
discrimination law (…) are not designed to benefit every member of the target group’.23 
This last condition, which Khaitan calls the eccentric-distribution condition, is what 
allows us to distinguish norms of ADL from others that seem to be closely related, such 
as those associated with social or human rights.24 In other words, anti-discrimination 
norms ‘do not, on their own, guarantee access to the substantive or tangible burden or 
benefit whose distribution is in question to any particular individual’.25 In some cases, 
ADL interacts with other norms, especially social rights provisions, to struggle for a 
universal distribution of some tangible benefit. Take, for example, a norm that makes 
education available to everyone except those with learning disabilities. Challenged by an 
anti-discrimination norm, the former educational provision is extended to those with 
learning disabilities, making this norm more universally applicable than before: it 
removes the exclusion of some groups from the benefit in question, but the universality 
at issue here is the one guaranteed by the educational provision.  
 
1.5 Considering Latin America as a whole26 
I must also face a challenge that is common in what is known as ‘area studies’, which 
consider the possibility of adopting different approaches and methodologies to the study 
                                               
20 T Khaitan, A Theory of Discrimination Law (OUP 2015) 27-30. 
21 ibid 30.  
22 ibid 38-41.  
23 ibid 39.  
24 ibid 39-41. 
25 ibid 39. 
26  Today, the term Latin America is used to describe countries of the Americas where Castellan and 
Portuguese languages prevail. In general, English, Dutch and French-speaking countries or territories are 
not included.  
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of Latin America as a whole. 27  Comparative legal scholars dealing with regional 
approaches have to face the same problem, that is, in grouping countries with different 
legal regimes, practices and cultures under a single common thread in order to be able to 
make comparisons with other regional units. Regardless of their different political, 
economic and cultural realities, Latin American jurisdictions have many things in 
common, starting with their language - with Brazil as an exception - and their status as 
former colonies of Spain and Portugal. 28  Immediately after independence, Latin 
American countries started a gradual consolidation of a Latin American juridical space, 
resorting to the same legal sources, constituted mainly by the rejection of Spanish 
(Colonial) law and the endorsement of French codification processes or other Western 
European legal traditions (such as Italy or Germany), and later looked to US legal 
practices to find innovative solutions to problems that were not easily found within the 
family of civil law traditions.29 Nowadays, Latin American jurisdictions influence each 
other, without any centralised or leading jurisdiction, and with several regional venues, 
such as the IAHRS, triggering common threads that allow several countries to converge 
on key legal institutions and practices.30 Although each jurisdiction has its own legal 
language, the common Latin American legal space allows for a regional legal language 
to emerge, through which ‘an Argentinian lawyer in a US-based law firm can coordinate 
the due diligence for projects all over Latin America’. 31  For several observers, for 
example, we can speak of a Latin American law of amparo,32 a common approach to 
codification processes, 33  and an emerging regional consensus on the recognition of 
structural remedies for harms that affect a large part of the population.34  
 
In recent years, some legal scholars have approached the study of Latin American 
constitutional law as a case Ius Constitutionale Commune, including both the practice of 
                                               
27 B Hoffmann, ‘Latin America and Beyond: The Case for Comparative Area Studies’ (2015) 100 European 
Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 111.  
28  Nevertheless, ‘Brazilian and Hispanic American lawyers do share a rather common map of legal 
influences, institutions, and ideologies.’ D López-Medina, ‘The Latin American and Caribbean legal 
traditions’, in U Mattei (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Comparative Law (CUP 2012) 351. 
29 ibid 349. 
30 G Aguilar, ‘Surgimiento de un Derecho Americano de los Derechos Humanos en América Latina’ (2011) 
24 Cuestiones Constitucionales 3. 
31 López-Medina (n 29) 356.  
32 J Esquirol, ‘The Failed Law of Latin America’ (2008) 56 The American Journal of Comparative Law 75, 
122-4.  
33 MC Mirow, Latin American Law: A History of Private Law and Institutions in Spanish America (U of 
Texas Press 2004) ch15.  
34 F Piovesan, ‘Ius Constitutionale Commune en derechos humanos e impacto del sistema interamericano’, 
in A von Bogdandy and others (eds), Ius Constitutionale Commune en América Latina: Rasgos, 
potencialidades y desafíos (UNAM 2014) 67. 
 29 
the IAHRS and domestic constitutional arrangements. 35  The constitutionalisation of 
human rights, including the right to equality and non-discrimination, is now considered a 
regional process of convergence produced by common legal and social practices rather 
than by political or institutional co-operation among regional actors.36 This allows me to 
include, within a single object of research, both the IAHRS and domestic arrangements, 
and their interrelations, in spite of their legal, political and cultural differences. Here, I 
am interested in processes of reform in an emergent field of law that I claim are rooted 
both in a regional debate around what constitutes the constitutional conception of ADL 
and the principles that are immanent in the relatively young practice of six jurisdictions 
and the regional human rights venue from which I draw the main examples for my work.  
 
Although I am not attempting to make a complete doctrinal reconstruction of ADL in 
Latin America, that is, to present the state of the art of this field of law in the region, I 
will consider six domestic jurisdictions (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Mexico 
and Peru), together with the IAHRS, as my dataset. The reasons that motivated this 
decision are threefold. First, although there are common challenges concerning 
discrimination around the region, the jurisdictions considered here observe particular 
problems, such as a strong presence of afro-descendant communities (Bolivia, Colombia, 
and Peru), or major indigenous populations (Bolivia, Chile, Peru, and Mexico), which 
cover a reasonable range of problems that are being addressed by anti-discrimination 
regimes. Secondly, the chosen dataset include jurisdictions that are in different stages of 
development regarding equality and anti-discrimination regimes. Indeed, this dataset 
ranges from the Chilean case, which does not include a prohibition of discrimination in 
its constitution and leaves every innovation to the development of statutory law, to the 
Mexican case, which has recently amended its constitution to include a general 
prohibition of discrimination on an open list of grounds, and has a comprehensive body 
of legislation and an administrative body in charge of tackling discrimination. Finally, 
the dataset includes the IAHRS because of its central role in developing a common or 
regional understanding of human rights, including, of course, the right to equality and 
non-discrimination.37 Although this dataset suggests I will attempt a comparative legal 
                                               
35 A von Bogdandy, ‘Ius Constitutionale Commune: una mirada a un constitucionalismo transformador’ 
(2015) 34 Revista de Derecho del Estado 3.  
36 M Gongora-Mera, Inter-American Judicial Constitutionalism: On the Constitutional Rank of Human 
Rights Treaties in Latin America through National and Inter-American Adjudication (Institute of Human 
Rights 2011).  
37 von Bogdandy and others (n 6). 
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work, it could be better described as a platform to seek for examples that illustrate the 
transformative approach to ADL I defend in this work.  
 
1.6 Avoiding the ‘Failed Law’ of Latin America  
Finally, closely related to the previous point, my research project is shaped by the need 
to present to a global audience the possibilities of developing a transformative approach 
to ADL in particular social and historical formations currently present in Latin America. 
Instead of presenting a detailed legal analysis or impact assessments of particular anti-
discrimination legislation, or the performance of the IAHRS in redressing discrimination 
across the region, I present the case for a transformative approach to ADL through a 
general descriptive account of recent anti-discrimination reforms; thus I use the term 
‘Latin American ADL’ to refer to a general account of what a common approach to this 
field of law should look like in the region. Nevertheless, writing a thesis on Latin 
American law for an audience in the Global North entails generalisations that generate 
risks and challenges.  
 
First, there is a burden of justification upon Latin American legal scholars in presenting 
a common account of regional/local legal practices that is of value for legal analysis. In 
recent years, several legal scholars have been writing in English about law in Latin 
America, usually for audiences that have a powerful impact on development projects, 
processes of diffusion of legal ideas, or comparative legal practices, or that have an 
indirect impact on international relations.38 In the US, Latin American law has become a 
field of study in itself, especially because of the increasing need for co-ordinating legal 
services, demanded by law firms and international agents.39 For example, the need to 
reduce the complexities of ‘doing business’ in Latin America has created a demand to 
present the legal space of the continent as a whole, disregarding the fact that there is no 
institutional integration as it exists in Europe.40 However, in these cases, there is a certain 
background assumption, driven by different interests, which makes Latin American Law 
a messy object of analysis. 
 
                                               
38 J Esquirol, ‘Legal Latin Americanism’ (2013) 16 Yale Human Rights & Development Journal 145.  
39  Harvard Law School, ‘Renewing Latin American Legal Studies’ (2010) 
<http://www.harvardiglp.org/uncategorized/november-13-renewing-latinamerican- 
legal-studies/> accessed 10 October 2017.  
40 J Sánchez, Los Informes Doing Business Del Banco Mundial: Reflexiones Mexicanas (UNAM 2016). 
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Initially, among ‘Law and Development’ scholars, it ‘stood to reason that if development 
and democracy were lacking, and law was assumed to have something to do with it, then 
there must be something seriously wrong with Latin American law’.41 The basic premise 
was that law provided no precise insight into how political power was implemented in 
the region, so it was better to turn to law-and-society approaches that could highlight the 
real social factors that had a determinant account on the individual and collective 
behaviour of Latin Americans regarding their legal orders. 42  Furthermore, the 
incorporation of Latin American legal systems within comparative legal studies favoured 
the ‘Europeanness approach’, which made Latin Americans believe that although they 
were part of a transnational body of law, in the end were they depicted ‘as a second-rate 
copy of European models’.43  In terms of this approach, if we are to study Western 
European legal systems, it is better to go for the direct sources rather than their imperfect 
versions.44  
 
These two areas of law, among others, reinforced the idea of a ‘Failed Law of Latin 
America’, which may be of interest to social sciences, interested in how law actually 
operates in different social contexts, but not to legal scholars. When writing for the Global 
North, legal scholars are tempted to seek validation from a transnational community and 
legal authorities that are distant from local and regional debates, and that embed particular 
interests that are not always transparent.45 Once the discourse of the ‘failed law’ has been 
raised and reproduced by different sources, the doors are open for discourses facilitating 
legal reform, which simultaneously tend to disregard current legal institutions, which are 
now doomed to fail. In the words of Esquirol,  
reformers in or concerned with Latin America have chosen to 
condemn entire segments or the legal system as a whole in order to 
effectuate change. That is, characterizations of failure are used to 
replace entire areas of Latin American institutionality with different 
models, systems, and traditions. Rather than recognize specific 
policies or politics that are advanced by existing legality or by their 
opposition to them, reformers have chosen to frame their projects in 
terms of the broad deficiencies of the system as a whole.46 
                                               
41 Esquirol (n 39) 149. 
42 M García Villegas, ‘A Comparison of Sociopolitical Legal Studies’ (2016) 12 The Annual Review of 
Law and Social Science 25. 
43 Esquirol (n 39) 150. 
44 A Garro, ‘Shaping the Content of a Basic Course on Latin American Legal Systems’ (1988) 19 University 
of Miami Inter-American Law Review 595. 
45 D Bonilla, ‘Introduction’, in Constitutionalism of the Global South (CUP 2013). 
46 Esquirol (n 23) 124. 
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In other words, the main negative effect of this discourse of the ‘Failed Law of Latin 
America’ is that it discredits existing state law and legal institutions as unworthy of 
consideration, and also keeps off the table ‘the interests they may express and the political 
forces they may represent’.47 Esquirol speaks of an ‘acquis legaux’ (legal capital) that is 
not considered in the permanent struggles of legal reform that are taking place in the 
region. Legal alternatives, which are usually brought from the Global North, with the 
sponsorship of international, European or US aid and development institutions, are not 
compared or balanced with their counterparts in Latin America. The problem we are 
facing now is that the urgent need for legal reforms and the institutionalisation of ADL 
in the region, as I will explain in the first part of this thesis, may push towards another 
legal transplant that could devalue the advances that Latin American ADL is already 
producing. In order to address that danger, the overall challenge is to present legal 
discourses in Latin America, which ‘refers to the vast array of academic and societal 
debate about law in specific national legal communities in Latin America’, and integrate 
them into a general account of Latin American ADL, without losing the specificity of 
some legal discourses that are articulated in local legal languages.48 In that way, we can 
undertake a comparative analysis of what may be of value, of what can be imitated, and 
of what foreign sources can be followed, transplanted or imported. Thus, the challenge is 
to write about Latin American ADL with a sufficient level of generality as to be of value 
for global audiences, but to significantly engage, when possible, with ‘the substance of 
mainstream local legal debate in particular Latin American countries’.49  
 
1.7 Preliminary contributions to the scholarship  
Although it will become clear in the concluding chapter, this work attempts to contribute 
to the scholarship in different ways. First, the thesis constitutes a significant contribution 
to the scarce literature on ADL in Latin America. In this region, there is no treatment of 
ADL either from a regional or domestic perspective. Every new reform or innovation in 
the area of ADL is considered as a gloss to the equality clauses that have been present 
since the early republican times, but there is no literature beyond that.50 Moreover, there 
is a lack of critical assessments of the recent boom of anti-discrimination legislation, 
which is considered as a necessary force for good. In sum, it constitutes the first overview 
                                               
47 ibid 116.  
48 ibid 145.  
49 ibid 148. 
50 It is revealing, for example, that there is no domestic comprehensive study on the impact of recent anti-
discrimination reforms, or on the role of recently created anti-discrimination agencies.  
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of the current status and future possibilities of anti-discrimination legal projects in Latin 
America. Secondly, and avoiding the image of the ‘failed law’ of Latin America, this 
work attempts to recover the possibility that this region can have a say in broader legal 
debates, such as those taking place in comparative equality law. Although this 
contribution would entail more sophisticated doctrinal analyses for each legal regime, my 
work relies on the idea that we should start valuing the anti-discrimination ‘acquis legaux’ 
(legal capital) in Latin America. Thirdly, this work purports to become a contribution to 
anti-discrimination legal scholarship, which underestimates the precise ways in which 
ADL constitutes a legally-driven field of social change. Even if many legal scholars 
working on the field of ADL are aware of its transformative potential, there is no critical 
account of the place ADL may occupy within progressive political projects. Moreover, 
the thesis makes a specific contribution to debates around Latin American 
constitutionalism and the particular roles that law plays in advancing social progress. 
Against approaches that present Latin American constitutionalism under an overarching 
project of transformative constitutionalism, a more careful and detailed study of Latin 
American legal scholarship shows us different places and sites of academic debate that 
have become important sources and catalysers for currents or schools of thought that have 
developed different versions of Latin American constitutionalism. In concrete terms, the 
thesis addresses the concrete articulations of ADL within different forms of 
constitutionalism in Latin America. Lastly, and considering the many different 
ramifications of Nancy Fraser’s multi-dimensional theory of social justice, my thesis 
contributes a novel application of Fraser’s approach to the struggles currently being 
waged through the means of ADL. 
 
1.8 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into two parts. The first deals with the constitutional groundings of 
ADL and the ways in which both the history of ADL in Latin America and the 
contemporary Latin American constitutional trends articulate a certain approach to the 
recent reforms of ADL. Here, I first explain four different types of arguments that can be 
used to support a constitutional conception of ADL that may rival alternative conceptions, 
such as a developmental or employment-based conception (chapter 2). Then, I give the 
reader a brief overview of the history of ADL in Latin America, which is closely 
connected with the early republican constitutional history, and current social and legal 
mobilisation processes that have produced a re-emergence of substantive equality and 
non-discrimination in Latin America (chapter 3). This part concludes with a general 
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account of the debate around three different contemporary currents of Latin American 
constitutionalism and argues for the development of a constitutional conception of ADL 
grounded in EDC. Indeed, for this emergent current, which is nowadays rooted mainly in 
a regional constitutional scholarship, the constitutional conception of ADL needs to stress 
the institutional articulation and co-ordination of the foundational commitments to 
equality and non-discrimination (chapter 4).  
 
The second part is focused on developing a critical social theory of ADL in Latin 
America. Without this second part, the constitutional conception developed before is 
doomed to fail, as it will be incapable of acknowledging its strengths and limits, and its 
emancipatory potential in a region that has declared itself committed to tackling 
discrimination. In order to do that, in the first chapter of this second part, I will introduce 
the reader to the need to resort to critical theory to understand the current place of ADL 
within progressive political projects. Drawing from current debates around the 
philosophical foundations of ADL, I address their lack of attention to the emancipatory 
potential of ADL, and introduce the work of Nancy Fraser, a critical social theorist who 
has developed a framework to understand both the strengths and limits of an allegedly 
emancipatory project such as ADL (chapter 5). Then, I present the method for developing 
the principles of a transformative approach to ADL that I claim are grounded in the recent 
reforms and in the practice of Latin American ADL, and explain three principles that 
require a brief explanation in the current context (chapter 6). Subsequently, I present the 
principle of the challenging stance, which prompts ADL to be permanently putting into 
question the background cultural conditions that shape the meaning and operation of legal 
orders (chapter 7). In the last two chapters (chapters 8 and 9), I present to the reader the 
principles of the socio-economic lens and the political axis. According to the former, 
ADL is intimately connected with socio-economic rights struggles and poverty issues, 
which acquire an inevitable pre-eminence in a continent like Latin America, the most 
unequal region in the world, with high poverty or vulnerability rates; for the political axis, 
in its turn, ADL has an inevitable political dimension, even if at times it seems concerned 
with daily or merely private issues.   
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Chapter 2 Towards a Constitutional Conception of Anti-Discrimination Law 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter maps out the different reasons for a constitutional conception of ADL. A 
constitutional conception of ADL attempts to describe, explain and justify the fact that 
constitutions provide robust support for the development of ADL. Within the classic 
concept-conception distinction, the idea of a constitutional conception of ADL stands as 
an alternative to others, like the employment-based conception, or the developmental 
conception. The employment-based conception has been advanced as a way to understand 
the origins of equality law in the UK, when protection from discrimination was granted 
in a narrow range of social contexts. 1  For its part, the developmental conception 
conceives of ADL as an ancillary device of economic policy, such as the developmental 
discourse of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (hereafter, 
‘ECLAC’) at the beginning of the 1990s, which supported anti-discrimination legal 
reforms to promote the social cohesion required to enhance market adaptability.2 Another 
interesting example of the developmental conception is the ‘market integration model’ of 
the social policies of the EU, which states that ADL’s ‘intervention in employment 
regulation is regarded as justified only where this is necessary to prevent unfair 
competition that could disrupt the smooth functioning of the internal market’.3  
 
A constitutional conception of ADL should also acknowledge the different constitutional 
conceptions that arise from the different understandings of the role or purpose of 
constitutions. Therefore, a constitutional conception of ADL is closely associated with 
the debate around what constitutions (should) do. Nowadays, this debate is dominated not 
only by normative constitutional analysis, but by an emergent sociology of constitutions, 
which ‘accounts for the motives underlying the constitutional construction of legitimacy, 
and it tries to cast light on the legitimating status of constitutions by examining societal 
functions and the objective social exigencies that are reflected in constitutional norms’.4 
Between normative and sociological analysis of constitutions, we can find different kinds 
of reasons that explain and justify why constitutions are so closely associated with ADL. 
                                               
1 N Bamforth, ‘Conceptions of Anti-Discrimination Law’ (2004) 24 OJLS 693, 693-701. 
2 F Leiva, ‘Towards a critique of Neo-Structuralism’ (2008) 50 Latin American Politics and Society 1.  
3 M Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union (OUP 2002) ch1. 
4 C Thornhill, A Sociology of Constitutions: Constitutions and State Legitimacy in Historical-Sociological 
Perspective (CUP 2011) 8. For my case of study, we could say, it entails an analysis of the role that 
constitutions play in the development of ADL, and the activity of individuals and groups that resort to ADL 
within a constitutional narrative. 
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This chapter will provide different reasons to support a constitutional conception of ADL, 
although the debate over what is the best constitutional conception will be left for the 
following chapters, where I will take into account the context of contemporary Latin 
American constitutional debates. The general question that this chapter will attempt to 
answer is, why do we need a constitutional conception of ADL to give an account of this 
emerging field of law? The different types of reasons provide independent support for the 
main claim, and together constitute a strong case in favour of a constitutional approach 
to the study of ADL. 
 
2.2 A Constitutional Conception of Anti-Discrimination Law 
What is the distinctive quality of having a constitutional right to equality? Should it mean 
something more than the guarantee of general laws, addressing the critique on the 
‘emptiness of equality’? 5  Or, as Moreau asks, ‘how can we make sense of what 
discrimination involves, in a way that might explain why we require constitutional 
protection from it by means of a distinctive right to equality?’6 The first part of this 
fundamental question will be addressed throughout many different parts of this work, but 
especially in a future chapter that deals with the philosophical foundations of ADL.7 The 
second part, which I am interested in here, can be addressed separately from the first, 
looking into constitutional theories and practices that consider that discrimination is an 
important constitutional evil to be redressed through the means of law. Furthermore, I 
will address the second part of Moreau’s question by looking into the relationships 
between constitutions and current developments in ADL.  
 
To do that, I will enquire into the traditional debate about the role or purpose of 
constitutions. Constitutions perform many functions, so the debate about their role is not 
definitive, but merely emphasises one aspect as their key identity. For Jeff King, there are 
four possible accounts of the purpose of ‘democratic constitutions’ that highlight different 
relevant dimensions: first, the classical image of constitutions as a social contract (either 
actual, tacit or hypothetical), which comprises the ‘agreement between citizens on the 
                                               
5 P Westen, ‘The Empty Idea of Equality’ (1982) 95 Harvard Law Review 537 (arguing that equality is an 
empty concept, which adds nothing to the proposition that laws are general and equally applicable to all the 
subjects covered by a certain norm).  
6 S Moreau, ‘Equality Rights and Stereotypes’, in D Dyzenhaus and M Thorburn (eds), Philosophical 
Foundations of Constitutional Law (OUP 2016) 284. 
7 see ch5 
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principles of government’;8 second, the idea that constitutions exist in order to limit the 
power of governments that otherwise would rule arbitrarily (‘Unlike the idea of a contract, 
the concept of limited government does not require any consent, nor does it pretend to 
present itself as something one would consent to.’);9 third, constitutions could also be 
seen as social conventions for the mutual advantage and stability of a certain polity, so 
‘they may provide the seed for understanding why an arrangement not formally agreed to 
is legitimate’;10 and finally, according to King, constitutions can be described as ‘mission 
statements’, as outlining the ‘the core, constitutive political commitments of the 
community, and are meant to guide the institutions of the state in dealings inter se, as 
well as in their dealings with citizens and foreign persons and organisations’.11 To these 
accounts, one could add the role of constitutions in the allocation of competences between 
different actors according to issues of legitimacy, expertise or convenience (what I call 
the ‘organisational’ function). In other words, constitutions could be described not as 
contracts/conventions that serve to limit and guide governments in their institutional 
framework, or in the relation to citizens or people more broadly, but mainly as devices 
that distribute competences and tasks to different actors. This division and allocation of 
roles is done according to different degrees of democratic legitimacy, distinctive moral 
or social commitments, or different expertise. When declaring that fundamental rights 
should limit and orient public institutions, constitutions assign different roles in the 
protection of fundamental rights.12 Granting a fundamental right generally implies giving 
a court the power to strike down legislation that contravenes this constitutional 
commitment, because it is thought that judges are usually isolated from the pressures of 
politics, which may have incentives to threaten a certain fundamental right. However, 
when protecting fundamental rights, constitutions sometimes go beyond that, and provide 
the groundings of an institutional system for the protection of these rights. For example, 
when granting the right to equality and non-discrimination, several constitutions establish 
                                               
8 J King, ‘Constitutions as Mission Statements’, in D Galligan and M Versteeg (eds), Social and Political 
Foundations of Constitutions (CUP 2015) 75. In Rawlsian terms, a constitution would contain most of the 
basic structure of justice, the content of which is determined by the principles of justice that rational and 
reasonable individuals would adopt under certain conditions in the original position. J Rawls, Political 
Liberalism (Columbia University Press 2005) 227-30.   
9 King (n 8) 77; M Loughlin, ‘Rights, Democracy and Law’, in T Campbell, K Ewing and A Tomkins (eds), 
Scepticism and Human Rights (OUP 2001) 43.  
10 King (n 8) 78. 
11 ibid 81. This idea has also been promoted by Republican thought, which ‘emphasizes the role which 
constitutions perform not only in controlling the exercise of public power-the negative function- but also- 
the positive function- of ensuring that that power is guided towards socially desirable ends’. Loughlin (n 9) 
43-4. The idea of ‘constitutions as mission statements’ is also connected with the issue of political identity.   
12 The organisational function goes a step further than the second dimension of constitutions presented by 
Jeff King. What is important is not only the limit to governmental powers, but the way in which a certain 
scheme for the exercise of public powers allows us to see constitutions as enablers of political action.  
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institutions that will be at the frontline of the struggle against discrimination. The 
constitutional inclusion of statutory duties to develop a comprehensive programme of 
anti-discrimination regulation, or the creation of administrative agencies in charge of 
implementing the constitutional commitment to the issue are but two examples of this 
‘organisational’ function. 
 
By analysing the different functions of constitutions, we could provide a picture of how 
power is distributed and exercised in a certain polity, and the reasons that justify a certain 
constitution. We could think that agreement/consent, limited government, stability, 
mutual advantage, constitutive commitments and organisational functions are essential to 
the idea of constitutions. In any case, however, these different accounts of the purpose or 
identity of modern democratic constitutions shape the way in which we understand how 
political power is lived in a certain polity.  
 
With this brief explanation in mind, I will provide four different types of reasons to 
support a constitutional conception of ADL: historical, political, institutional and 
theoretical. The different functions that a constitution performs emphasise different 
dimensions, and the types of reasons that support a constitutional conception of ADL are 
inscribed within the above-mentioned discussion. In explaining these types of reasons, I 
will articulate arguments from constitutional theory with debates around the 
philosophical foundations of ADL, in order to present the case for a constitutional 
conception of ADL, which will later be translated to the Latin American constitutional 
context.  
 
2.3 Historical reasons 
First, there are historical reasons to elaborate on a constitutional conception of ADL. 
General guarantees of equality, from which prohibitions of discrimination are usually 
derived, have been recognised by constitutions around the world for more than a 
century.13 According to the database of the Comparative Constitutions Project, 97.4% of 
                                               
13 There are usually three constitutional models in regard to approaching the relation between equality and 
discrimination: general provisions of equality, like the Equal Protection Clause of the US, which rely on 
courts for the task of establishing standards of scrutiny for different cases of unequal treatment; non-
discrimination provisions that do not refer to general equality provisions, and proscribe discriminatory 
conducts or practices, like the constitutions of Norway and Denmark, which are exceptional in this regard; 
and, lastly, the most popular model, as expressed in the Constitution of Germany (1949), which includes, 
besides a general equality clause, a general prohibition of discrimination, and in some cases a list of 
particular grounds of protection. In the latter case, the role of identifying what is legitimate differential 
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the world’s current constitutions include the right to equality, compared to 74% that 
recognise the right to life, allegedly the most basic right.14 If the origins of the right to 
equality meant nothing more than basic political equality for some, as expressed in the 
liberal revolutions of the end of the eighteenth century, or the expression of basic 
standards of rule of law, nowadays it is also connected with substantive equality, and has 
given way to an expansion of its meanings.15  Redistributive and anti-discrimination 
claims are but two extensions of this traditional right. During recent years, the boom in 
anti-discrimination legislation has been connected with constitutional law in the majority 
of jurisdictions that have decided that constitutional provisions are not enough for the 
effective protection of this right. Anti-discrimination legislation around the world is 
usually seen as developing and giving meaning to the pertinent constitutional equality 
clauses.16  
 
Historically, the connection between anti-discrimination struggles and constitutional 
equality clauses derives from the fact that groups struggling for political recognition or 
emancipation usually use existing constitutional equality clauses as a basis for their 
claims to be incorporated as full members of the political community.17 In other words, 
these groups refer to currently existing constitutional equality values or rights in order to 
reclaim their membership in a community of equals yet to be realised.18 Constitutional 
equality clauses, then, observe a tension between the enshrinement of well-accepted 
fundamental values (equality before the law) and aspirations that are seen as a point of 
departure for social change (substantive equality).19  
 
                                               
treatment has not been left entirely to constitutions, and the role of courts has been essential. Sometimes, 
this last model includes a constitutional grounding for positive action or statutory duties to tackle 
discrimination. B Bryde and M Ashley Stein, ‘General provisions dealing with equality’, in M Tushnet, T 
Fleiner and C Saunders (eds), Routledge Handbook of Constitutional Law (Routledge 2013). 
14  Comparative Constitutions Project, ‘Spread of Rights’ (2012) 
<http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/#> accessed 15 December 2016.  
15 Bryde and Stein (n 13) 288. 
16  see, for example, the legislative proceedings of the different amendments to the ADLMEX (2014) 
<http://sil.gobernacion.gob.mx/Librerias/pp_HProcesoLegislativo.php?SID=&Seguimiento=2874713&A
sunto=> accessed 18 July 2016; Legislative History of the ADLCHI. Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, 
‘Historia de la ley Anti-Discriminación n20.659’ (2013) <http://www.bcn.cl/historiadelaley/nc/historia-de-
la-ley/4516/> accessed 3 November 2016. 
17  H Irving, ‘More Than Rights’, in S Williams (ed), Constituting Equality: Gender Equality and 
Comparative Constitutive Law (CUP 2009) 86. 
18 N Lacey, ‘Normative Reconstruction in Socio-Legal Theory’ (1996) 5 Social & Legal Studies 131, 144. 
19 What Axl Honneth calls the ‘structural openness’ of the right to equality before the law. The Struggle for 
Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts (MIT Press 1995) 110. For a critical history of the 
Equal Protection Clause in the US, and its contrasting anti-backsliding and aspirational accounts, see M 
Dorf, ‘The Aspirational Constitution’ (2009) 77 George Washington Law Review 1631. 
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The influence of international human rights law in expanding the understating of 
traditional constitutional equality clauses has also been relevant. Indeed, constitutions 
drafted after the Second World War, when the evolution of international human rights 
law flourished, favoured the establishment of general equality clauses plus a general 
prohibition of discrimination. 20  In the language of international human rights law, 
moreover, we speak of a right to ‘equality and non-discrimination’, as if non-
discrimination would be a natural extension, or even the negative side of the traditional 
right to equality.21 The addition of non-discrimination to the principle of equality is in 
line with the fact that the consolidation of international human rights law came at a time 
when most domestic jurisdictions already granted, albeit in an imperfect way, a general 
right to equality before the law.22 In that sense, a constitutional conception of ADL gives 
‘adequate priority to the fact that anti-discrimination norms are articulated –and arguably 
given their principal focus- in constitutional (…) codes, at both national and international 
level’.23  
 
All in all, the historical connections between constitutional equality clauses and the 
development of ADL are undeniable. Even if the philosophical debates on the foundations 
of ADL question whether equality is the grounding value for anti-discrimination rights,24 
most constitutions around the world have either created equality clauses that include an 
explicit prohibition of discrimination on the basis of certain protected grounds,25  or 
amended the drafting of the right to equality before the law to include such a prohibition.26  
 
2.4 Political Reasons 
Regarding the political reasons, a constitutional conception of ADL relies not just on the 
idea that constitutions grant certain fundamental rights to limit the powers of government, 
                                               
20 Bryde and Stein (n 13) 93.  
21 A Bayefsky, ‘The principle of Equality or Non-discrimination in International Law’ (1990) 11 Human 
Rights Quarterly 1, 5. 
22 J Clifford, ‘Equality’, in S Farrior, Equality and Non-Discrimination under International Law (vol 2, 
Routledge 2015) 9-10.  
23 Bamforth (n 1) 693-4. 
24  E Holmes, ‘Anti-discrimination Rights Without Equality’ (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 175; T 
Khaitan, A Theory of Discrimination Law (OUP 2015); S Moreau, ‘In Defense of a Liberty-based Account 
of Discrimination’, in D Hellman and S Moreau (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law 
(OUP 2013).  
25 eg, Constitutions of Angola (2010), art 23; Fiji (2013), art 26; Somalia (2012), art 11. All of the English 
translations of the binding constitutional texts quoted in this work are taken from the website 
https://www.constituteproject.org/.  
26 eg, Constitution of Argentina (1853-1985, amended in 1994), art 75; Croatia (1991, amended in 2010), 
art 14; and Estonia (1992, amended in 2011), art 12.  
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but on the broader idea that they are a ‘mission statement’.27 In that sense, these reasons 
assume that constitutions are not only a limit to what politics can do, but a roadmap on 
what politics should do to retain its legitimacy. In doing that, a constitution provides 
standards of political legitimacy.28 Furthermore, these reasons are political in the sense 
that they constitute, articulate or frame the identity of a certain polity, what we have in 
common as members of the same polity, or the values and commitments that bring us 
together. 
 
As noted by Khaitan, ‘like democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, a system of law 
regulating discrimination has become key to how states define themselves’, a marker ‘of 
what a “civilized society” is’.29 It is precisely this idea that lies behind the political 
reasons to offer a constitutional conception of ADL. What does it mean then for a certain 
value or principle to gain the status of constitutional law? Not only the idea that it is 
supposed to have a higher hierarchy than the rest of the legal regime, but the recognition 
that the principle has become part of a certain country´s public governance.30 Equality 
and non-discrimination have become part of what governments should do, but especially 
of what they should protect and promote among their citizens if they are to retain their 
political legitimacy.  
 
In addition, the fact that general equality and non-discrimination clauses are included in 
constitutions has different political effects: it explicitly names a certain ‘constitutional 
evil’ to be redressed, gives priority to this problem in the political agenda of state 
institutions, provides legal legitimacy for political struggles around the meaning of these 
clauses, and gives the institutional instances that deal with discrimination a certain 
‘constitutional weight’.31 For example, even if judges are dealing with the adjudication 
of statutory ADL, they are aware that they are immersed in a constitutional issue. This is 
what explains the insistence of several groups and activists for an ‘equal rights 
                                               
27 King (n 8). 
28  D Grimm, ‘The role of fundamental rights after sixty-five years of constitutional jurisprudence in 
Germany’ (2015) 13 International Journal of Constitutional Law 9. 
29 Khaitan (n 24) 4-5. 
30 The CJEU has declared that a general principle of equality is a foundational core value, what defines the 
ethos of European citizenship, a fundamental norm of the EU. Case C-144/04 Mangold v. Helm (2005) 
ECR I-9981. 
31 For the idea of ‘constitutional evil’, see J Balkin, Constitutional Redemption (OUP 2011) 7; for the idea 
of ‘constitutional weight’, see Robert Post, interviewed in M Mercat-Bruns, Discrimination at Work: 
Comparing European, French, and American Law (UC Press 2016) 18; for the idea of constitutions as 
providers of legal legitimacy for political activism, see S Scheingold, The Politics of Rights: Lawyers, 
Public Policy, and Political Change (University of Michigan Press 2004).   
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amendment’ in the US constitution. As demonstrated by a recent study, state constitutions 
that include a general equality clause have a statistically significant higher likelihood of 
a decision favouring an anti-discrimination claim.32 However, as illustrated by feminist 
reports on comparative constitutional practice, ‘constitutional sex equality provisions are 
neither necessary nor sufficient to reduce gender gaps’.33  To do that, constitutional 
provisions need political activism around them to achieve their aims: ‘constitutions by 
themselves do not constrain government power and do not produce social or legal 
change’, and its provisions ‘must be taken up, claimed, and used by political and social 
actors in the service of such goals in the political context of their time’.34 
 
Furthermore, and in connection with the view of constitutions as ‘mission statements’, 
constitutional law not only offers a normative standard from which to judge the whole 
legal order, but may be seen as an expression of our factual sociological preconditions.35 
For Jürgen Habermas, law can be seen not only as a technical medium, ‘whose function 
is to create the optimal working conditions for the economic and administrative system’,36 
but mainly as belonging to the ‘societal component of the life-world’. 37  Here, 
constitutional law is of paramount importance, because its legitimacy does not derive 
directly from legality. Constitutional law not only serves as a technical medium of social 
coordination, but has a ‘regulative function in everyday human action, which [is] closely 
connected with moral expectation, and thus belongs to the “legitimate orders of the life-
world”’.38 In this regard, law, and especially constitutional law, can perform a social-
integrative function, and ‘transpose the private interests of citizens into the public terms 
of the citizenship’.39 The constitutional character of ADL, then, could also be seen as an 
expression of the constitutive commitments that stem from our life-world, while also 
performing a social-integrative function.40 Thus, a constitutional conception of ADL is 
                                               
32 L Baldez, L Epstein, and A Martin, ‘Does the U.S. Constitution Need an Equal Rights Amendment?’ 
(2006) 35 The Journal of Legal Studies 243.  
33 J Suk, ‘An Equal Rights Amendment for the XXIst century’ (2017) 28 Yale Journal of Law & Feminism 
381, 399.  
34 P Lambert, D Scribner, ‘The Constitutional Recognition of Gender Equality in Chile and Argentina’ 
(Western Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Vancouver, April 2017).  
35  C Thornhill, ‘Political Legitimacy: A Theoretical Approach Between Facts and Norms’ (2011) 18 
Constellations 135. 
36 C Thornhill, Political Theory in Modern Germany: An Introduction (Polity Press 2000) 166.  
37 J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Polity Press 1996) 80. 
38 Thornhill (n 36) 166 
39 ibid 171. 
40  A constitutional conception of ADL could be grounded in the ‘broader moral culture’ of a certain 
community, a set of distinctive political values (‘constitutional patriotism’), ‘which the constitution is 
deemed to reflect but not to create’. A Ferrara, ‘Of Boats and Principles: Reflections on Habermas’s 
“Constitutional Democracy”’ (2001) 29 Political Theory 782, 788. Moreover, if the purpose of every 
constitution is ‘to realize the system of rights anew in changing circumstances, that is to interpret the system 
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always in tension with itself, to the extent that the operation of anti-discrimination laws 
on the ground may challenge the boundaries and meanings of political citizenship, which 
are usually articulated in constitutional discourse.41 In that sense, the political reasons in 
support of a constitutional conception acknowledge the contested nature of constitutional 
law’s legitimacy.42  
 
Also, discrimination law ‘has considerable expressive currency in most societies’, and 
that may be another political reason why prohibitions of discrimination are included along 
with formal equality clauses.43 As Khaitan puts it,  
an asymmetric antidiscrimination duty that did not, at least formally, 
protect dominant groups that have expressive salience will be (often 
wrongly) seen as implying that their interests do not count. This is 
likely to catalyse retaliation (including expressive retaliation), often 
targeted at the protected group. Given the impossibility of non-
expression, the next best alternative is a default for expressive even-
handedness between salient groups, unless there are robust reasons 
for apparent partisanship which outweigh this preference.44 
That is, although the general aim of ADL may be targeting relative group disadvantage, 
the requirements of formal equality or symmetry are considered warranties of the 
consideration of all interests. That is a compelling reason to consider the prohibitions of 
discrimination in the same articles or sections where constitutions warrant formal equality 
and, in that sense, a political reason in support of a constitutional conception of ADL.    
 
Finally, the political reasons point to the symbolic importance of a constitutional 
grounding of ADL. For Robert Post, a constitutional principle of anti-discrimination is of 
utmost importance for the legitimacy of the development of a sub-constitutional anti-
discrimination regime, ‘for that symbol (…) brings us together in a way the statute 
doesn’t’.45  
 
                                               
of rights better, to institutionalize it more appropriately, and to draw out its contents more radically’, a 
constitutional conception of ADL entails the possibility of interpreting in a dynamic way the moral culture 
of a certain community. Habermas (n 37) 384.  
41  Although in different terms, this idea was developed in N Bamforth, ‘Sexuality and citizenship in 
contemporary constitutional argument’ (2012) 10 International Journal of Constitutional Law 477.  
42 Feminist scholarship has produced a history of the contested nature of constitutional law’s legitimacy, 
describing different ‘sites of constitutional struggle for women’s equality’. R Rubio-Marin and W Chang, 
‘Sites of constitutional struggles for women’s equality’, in Tushnet and others. (n 13). 
43 Khaitan (n 24) 177 
44 ibid 178. 
45 Post (interview) Mercat-Bruns (n 31) 18. 
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2.5 Institutional Reasons 
Every constitution says something on the question of how to protect its most important 
commitments, and this has effects on the powers of different state institutions. The 
institutional reasons that support a constitutional conception of ADL emphasise the 
explicit or implicit institutional choices of constitutional arrangements. Here, I use the 
term ‘institutions’ as decision-making processes: thus, institutional reasons try to answer 
the question of which process is best suited, according to its competence, within the 
struggle against discrimination (ideally, a question of ‘institutional choice’, that focuses 
on ‘the allocation of decision making’, but that also assesses ‘implications across the 
behavior of the institutional alternatives that are the building blocks of real reform’).46 
The added value of a constitutional conception of ADL is that it permeates the whole 
legal order with specific institutional implications.47 As Neil Komesar puts it: 
Constitutional law seems straightforwardly about institutional 
choice—in particular, the choice between judicial and political 
decision making and, therefore, it should be directly accessible via 
comparative institutional analysis. Constitutions are primarily about 
institutional design and institutional choice.48   
Without downplaying other functions of constitutions, like the ones presented in the first 
part of this chapter, I want to stress here the institutional reasons to support a 
constitutional conception of ADL. The incorporation of anti-discrimination protections 
in the UK is symptomatic, because even in the absence of a written constitution, the 
regional integration with Europe allows us to highlight the institutional reasons to support 
a constitutional conception of ADL:49 with the incorporation of EU Equality Law through 
                                               
46 N Komesar, ‘The Logic of the Law and the essence of Economics: Reflections on Forty Years in the 
wilderness’ (2013) Wisconsin Law Review 265, 325. Although he claims that this methodology is mainly 
descriptive, it has an obvious normative stance, as Johanna Croon states: ‘All institutions must make 
decisions, in which they reconcile multiple, often contradictory, interests and deal with complex themes. 
The least imperfect institution is the one that may ensure the most adequate representation of interests under 
such straining circumstances.’ In other words, ‘the focus on representation shows that the theory itself is 
motivated by egalitarian concerns’. ‘Comparative Institutional Analysis, the European Court of Justice and 
the General Principle of Non-Discrimination—or—Alternative Tales on Equality Reasoning’ (2013) 19 
European Law Journal 153, 164.  
47 For Komesar, ‘[i]f you want to understand the meaning of a legal term, ask what function it plays. In 
U.S. constitutional law, the term “fundamental rights” determines an important institutional choice. If 
legislation impinges on a fundamental right, then, under U.S. constitutional law, serious judicial review 
under equal protection or substantive due process follows and, therefore, decision making about the subject 
largely shifts from the political process to the courts.’ (n 46) 271. 
48 ibid 270. 
49 Some have argued that anti-discrimination constitutes a principle of common law in the UK, even if its 
status, exact content and scope still remain unclear. J Jowell, ‘Is Equality a Constitutional Principle?’ (1994) 
47 Current Legal Problems 1; C O’Cinneide, ‘Equality: A Constitutional Principle?’ (UKCLA Blog, 14 
September 2011) <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2011/09/14/colm-ocinneide-equality-a-constitutional-
principle/> accessed 13 September 2015.  
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the European Communities Act (1972), or the anti-discrimination rights protected in the 
European Convention of Human Rights through the Human Rights Act (1998), national 
authorities have to read statutes in the light of these incorporated norms. Thus, the 
constitutional dimension is obvious: if statutes cannot be read in the latter way, courts 
should disapply them in cases involving EU Equality law (direct effect); 50  where 
conventional rights are applicable, the Supreme Court of the UK could issue a declaration 
of incompatibility that may or may not be followed by the government.51 For Bamforth, 
this legal scenario has a constitutional nature to the extent that, 
it deals with the powers and spheres of action of vital state 
institutions: for in determining which rules of statutory interpretation 
to apply, we are concerned with the proper approach of the courts 
when dealing with and applying the products of the legislative 
process.52  
 
Furthermore, although we are dealing with statutory law, both the European Communities 
Act and the Human Rights Act are viewed as ‘central features of the UK’s current 
constitutional architecture’.53 
 
Nevertheless, the institutional reasons to support a constitutional conception of ADL go 
beyond the power of courts, because they address the powers of other public entities 
(especially if we endorse some form of comparative institutional analysis).54 For Nicholas 
Bamforth, we should avoid endorsing an ‘exclusively constitutional conception’, that is, 
one that explains every social context in which discrimination should be tackled as an 
interpretation of the anti-discrimination clause of a certain constitution, like some 
readings of the Equal Protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the US 
Constitution.55 Although a constitutional conception of ADL is concerned with all of the 
contexts in which discrimination may arise (not only employment), it should also be 
                                               
50 European Communities Act 1972 (UK), s 2(4). 
51 Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), ss 4, 10, schedule 2. 
52 Bamforth (n 1) 699. He advances this argument to find a place for employment anti-discrimination law 
‘within a broader constitutional framework’: ‘if it is right to characterize the rules dealing with 
interpretation, “disapplication” and declarations of incompatibility as imposing requirements of a 
constitutional nature, then each time a court deals with a case involving discrimination within the 
employment relationship, it must –in so far as either EC law or the European Convention is relevant to that 
case- deal with the subject-matter in the light of those constitutional requirements’. 698-9.  
53 ibid 699.  
54 For Komesar, the nature and scope of judicial powers to review legislation should be an institutional 
choice based on ‘the relative strengths and weaknesses of the reviewer (the adjudicative process) and of the 
reviewed (the political process)’. Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics and 
Public Policy (University of Chicago Press 1994) 254. 
55 Bamforth (n 1) 696.  
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concerned with the development of infra-constitutional regulation that may give meaning 
and effect to the pertinent constitutional clauses. According to the organisational function 
presented before, constitutions distribute different roles according to differing degrees of 
democratic legitimacy and expertise. When conferring courts the power to strike down 
legislation that may be deemed discriminatory, we tend to forget the previous roles that 
other public entities could play when placed on the frontline against discrimination. For 
example, legislatures and administrations are better placed to design structural 
frameworks to prevent and tackle discrimination, and a constitutional mandate to develop 
anti-discrimination programmes of regulation may place them at the frontline of this 
serious commitment. Moreover, they may have more democratic legitimacy than courts 
(that is, pay due respect to the principle of equal respect and concern when addressing 
cases where a range of diverse and complex interests are at stake), and in that way 
contribute to fostering the public culture required by ADL to pervade in social and private 
life. However, if we consider that anti-discrimination law is mainly crafted as a device 
for groups that generally suffer from social and political exclusion, the power of courts 
will always have a central place.56  The representation-reinforcing theory of judicial 
review may give us an idea of how to accommodate and organise these different powers, 
taking into account the existence of disadvantaged, marginalised or politically powerless 
groups.57  
 
A constitutional conception of ADL should acknowledge that ‘what is important is not 
just that there should be some form of conscious and explicit reflection on constitutional 
arrangements, but that this should be the work of the people whose society is to be 
governed by these arrangements’.58  That could provide a space for the approach of 
political constitutionalists, who argue that the debate about rights ‘forms part of the 
circumstances of politics’.59 Within this context, we can understand the interplay between 
a constitutional conception of ADL and its different expressions in statutory law or 
                                               
56 As put by Komesar, ‘Courts are most needed where alternative decision makers like political processes 
and markets work least well’. (n 46) 268. 
57 J Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard University Press 1981). However, he is criticised for not 
considering comparative institutional analysis: ‘[w]hile Ely detects the imperfections of the legislature in 
making procedural decisions, he is mistaken in inferring from these imperfections that courts should be 
assigned powers to make these decisions. Such a conclusion requires comparing the virtues and vices of 
courts and legislatures, while taking into account the complex interdependencies between these institutions. 
As Komesar establishes, such a comparison does not necessarily favour courts over legislatures.’ Why Law 
Maters? (OUP 2014) 201.  
58 J Waldron, ‘Constitutionalism: A Skeptical View’, in T Christiano and J Christman (eds), Contemporary 
Debates in Political Philosophy (Wiley-Blackwell 2009) 270. 
59 R Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism (CUP 2007) 25.  
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broader sub-constitutional regulation. For Robert Post, the fact that equality and non-
discrimination counts as a constitutional principle in the US has a direct influence on the 
fact that it requires state action and intervention in private relationships.60 This, in turn, 
either through administrative or court action, ‘spreads horizontally into the private 
sphere’, causing ‘the rest ofthe society to be much more aware of these issues and to 
want more directives’.61 So, the constitutional grounding of ADL leads to an institutional 
development (‘a causal matter’, for Post): ‘the fact that we looked at the state, whichis 
supposed to be supremely neutral, led people to think about the relationship between race 
and private action and led to legislation. These are complementary. It is not either-or.’62 
Thus, there must be an adequate division of work between a constitutional anti-
discrimination principle and a statutory anti-discrimination regime where they can be 
seen as complementary: constitutions provide the symbols, the values, while statutes are 
focused on the details, the impact on the ground.63 In the European context, the role of 
general constitutional equality clauses, such as the ones in Germany (article 3) and France 
(article 1), have been considered crucial to laying a constitutional foundation for equality 
and anti-discrimination public policies, and provide a ‘degree of institutional 
coordination’ of these.64 Within this framework, for example, article 3.2 of the German 
Constitution, which establishes that ‘[t]he state shall promote the actual implementation 
of equal rights for women and men’, has been interpreted as a ‘constitutional rights norm’ 
that entails both a goal of the government and a principle that can limit the exercise of 
other enforceable rights.65 However, this article is not to be considered an individual 
entitlement to the ‘actual implementation of equality through the constitutional 
complaints procedure’, but instead a ‘constitutional foundation against challenges’ to 
policies crafted to ‘increase women’s presence in the public and economic sphere, and 
measures to increase men’s presence in the family and private sphere’.66 Overall, the 
constitutional foundation for gender equality policies and its institutional coordination 
                                               
60 Post (interview) Mercat-Bruns (n 31) 18. Also, German constitutional jurisprudence grounded state 
duties to protect maternity and women’s labour disadvantage, even against private interests, on the general 
equality clause of the German constitution. A Peters, Women, Quotas, and Constitutions (Kluwer Law 
1999) ch4. 
61 Post (interview) Mercat-Bruns (n 31) 18. 
62 ibid. 
63  ibid (‘There is an inherent tendency to make constitutional law general, and there is more of an 
opportunity to make statutory law impact-oriented’). 
64 Suk (n 33) 438. 
65 A ‘constitutional rights norm’ (eg, social state of law), embodies an objective order of values. R Alexy, 
A Theory of Constitutional Rights (OUP 2010) ch 2.  
66 Suk (n 33) 415. 
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places the legislator in the centre, as the ‘primary enforcer’ of the ‘actual implementation’ 
of equality and anti-discrimination rights.67   
 
As stated by Eskridge Jr and Ferejohn, moreover, a constitutional conception that is aware 
of its institutional reasons may give leeway for the development of anti-discrimination 
super-statutes. In other words, a constitutional conception of ADL acknowledges the 
crucial role that statutory law plays in developing and even reshaping the constitutional 
understanding, penetrating the ‘public normative and institutional culture in a deep 
way’.68 Therefore, for these kinds of reasons, a constitutional conception recognises a 
constitution’s limitations in tackling discrimination and the importance of allocating 
competences to different institutional actors, according to their particular democratic 
legitimacy and technical expertise. Nowadays, there are many cases of constitutional 
equality clauses mandating the enactment of ordinary legislation that develops the 
constitutional principle of equality and non-discrimination, delineating the constitutional 
standard of protection and allocating competences between different actors.69  
 
2.6 Doctrinal Reasons 
With respect to the doctrinal reasons to develop a constitutional conception of ADL, we 
should ask what role this conception plays in the debate on whether ADL could be 
considered a discrete area of law.70 With the growing enactment or expansion of anti-
discrimination regulation, the nature and scope of the subject have attracted more 
scholarly attention than ever. The need for consistency, which has been expressed in the 
creation of comprehensive equality and anti-discrimination bodies of legislation, is now 
one of the main theoretical questions of ADL.71  
 
                                               
67  Suk supports an equal rights amendment in the US based on what she calls a ‘a constitutional 
infrastructure of social reproduction’, based on comparative constitutional practice. ibid 438. 
68 W Eskridge and J Ferejohn, ‘Super-Statutes’ (2001) 50 Duke Law Journal 1214, 1215. For them, the 
Civil Rights Act (1964) reshaped the constitutional understanding of the anti-discrimination principle 
(1237-1242). For Habermas, a dynamic interpretation of the constitution places the practice of 
constitutional creativity in ordinary political legislation, challenging ‘the separation between constitutional 
creativity as an extraordinary and rare deliberative practice and ordinary political legislation ongoing in 
everyday life of an historically developing community’. M Vargova, ‘Democratic Deficits of a Dualist 
Deliberative Constitutionalism: Bruce Ackerman and Jürgen Habermas’ (2005) 18 Ratio Iuris 365, 382; J 
Habermas, ‘Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?’ (2001) 29 
Political Theory 766; Habermas (n 37) 248.  
69 Constitution of South Africa (1996, amended in 2012) s 9.4; Constitution of Kenya (2010) art 27.6.  
70 Hellman and Moreau (n 24) 1. It is, in a way, the other face of an ‘exclusively constitutional conception’, 
which envisages ADL as a section of constitutional law. Bamforth (n 1) 697. 
71 Khaitan (n 24).  
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Constitutions usually provide arguments to elaborate on a certain account of the 
wrongness of discrimination, which affects the doctrinal development of ADL. Moreover, 
in some cases constitutions declare or express the broader aims of non-discrimination 
clauses. Some constitutions may emphasise the particular interests of victims that are 
affected by discrimination,72  while others may be more concerned with the motives 
behind discriminatory acts;73 other documents may address the broader collective effects 
of discrimination on the basis of certain grounds that are shared by many people,74 or 
even a combination of these.75  
 
In that sense, a constitutional conception of ADL provides a basis to articulate a 
principled approach to ADL, which could avoid several disciplinary problems: first, 
distinguishing between direct and indirect discrimination as different clauses, without any 
principled continuity; second, treating special accommodation requirements as distinct 
from discrimination law; and third, the judicial trend of relying on different tests of 
scrutiny, according to different protected grounds.76 In general, a principled approach 
provides anti-discrimination law with a ‘purpose clause’, avoiding fragmentation and 
inconsistency. 77  Ordinary legislation could express the differences in the moral 
condemnation of intentional versus non-intentional discrimination in awarding damages, 
or distinguish between the different defences that may be available to defendants, but the 
idea of having a constitutional conception of anti-discrimination law allows us to describe 
them as different forms of the same injustice: discrimination.78  
 
The idea of relying on constitutional law to develop a principled consistency of statutory 
discrimination law is not at odds with what has happened in other disciplines, like labour 
law. Indeed, the groundings of labour law have been gradually displaced from private to 
public law and, specifically, to constitutional law, in order to build a coherent normative 
                                               
72 Constitution of Maldives (2008) art 17.2. 
73 Constitution of Bangladesh (1972, reinst. 1986, rev. 2014) art 38.b.  
74 Constitution of Bolivia (2009) art 14.  
75 The Constitution of South Africa (1996, amended in 2012) s 1; 7.1; and 9.  
76 S Moreau, ‘Discrimination as Negligence’ (2010) 40 Canadian Journal of Philosophy 123, 124. For Julie 
Suk, an equal rights amendment in the US would go beyond tiers of scrutiny and provide leeway for a 
unified constitutional doctrine that can ‘clarify the relationship of gender equality policies with other 
constitutional values.’ Suk (n 33) 439.   
77 This was debated during the legislative proceedings of the Equality Act UK (2010). In the end, the 
Equality Act ‘did not confer any particular constitutional status on the right to non-discrimination’, and did 
not include a ‘purpose clause’, ‘which would “spell out” the principled basis of the legislation and the 
“vision of equality” to which it aimed to give effect’. C O’Cinneide and K Liu, ‘Defining the limits of 
discrimination law in the United Kingdom: Principle and pragmatism in tension’ (2015) 15 International 
Journal of Discrimination and the Law 80, 85. 
78 S Moreau, ‘What is Discrimination?’ (2010) 38 Philosophy & Public Affairs 143, 176.  
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unity for the different labour law clauses. According to Hugh Collins, what gives 
coherence to labour law ‘is a sense of vocation’, which  ‘springs from a conviction that 
urgent social problems need to be addressed, and blossoms into a vision of justice in the 
sphere of social life in which law plays its appropriate role’.79 For him, this sense ‘marks 
out a field of enquiry, establishes criteria of relevance of legal materials, and finally 
constructs a critical vantage-point from which to assess the substance and techniques of 
current law’.80 This sense of vocation is also present in discrimination law, and may be 
recognised as one of the reasons for enacting constitutional equality and non-
discrimination clauses in the most relevant parts of several constitutions. 81  The 
paradigmatic example is the Constitution of South Africa, which highlights the social 
problems that need to be addressed by a programme of ADL, and gives certain priority to 
the anti-discrimination agenda.82  
 
A constitutional conception does not contradict the idea that discrimination could also be 
seen as a personal wrong, ‘akin to a tort’.83 However, it adds something more, allowing 
us to see the connection between the wrongfulness of discrimination and the broader 
social or political goals that these laws may serve. For example, we could refer to the 
constitutional grounding of ADL to understand the expressive dimension of 
discrimination harms, and how these broader harmful effects against groups could be 
connected with the personal wrongs committed against a particular victim.84 In a sense, a 
constitutional conception allows us to understand the different but interconnected nature 
of the doctrinal questions that a certain area of law must answer. Drawing from H.L.A. 
Hart, Khaitan notes that there is ‘a purposive inquiry into the general justifying aim of 
discrimination law’, and a different ‘set of distributive sub-questions: what rights and 
duties does the law distribute, to whom, and when’.85 A constitutional conception of ADL 
                                               
79 H Collins, ‘Labour Law as Vocation’ (1989) 105 Quarterly Law Review 468, 473.  
80 ibid. 
81 For Bamforth, ‘[g]iven the contextual nature of anti-discrimination law, as well as its concern with issues 
of historical and contemporary social justice, it is easy to view both conceptions of the subject in terms of 
Collins’ “vocational organization”’. (n 1) 700.  
82 Constitution of South Africa, s 9. 
83 Moreau (n 78) 146. For her, the tort of discrimination law is a wrong committed to a set of deliberative 
freedoms to which we all have an equal independent entitlement.  
84 There is a widespread expressivist scholarship on the theory of the Equal Protection Clause in the US. P 
Brest, ‘The Supreme Court, 1975 Term - Foreword: In Defense of the Anti-Discrimination Principle’ 
(1976) 90 Harvard Law Review 1; K Karst, Belonging to America: Equal Citizenship and the Constitution 
(Yale University Press 1991). Based on Sophia Moreau’s recent pluralist account, a constitutional 
conception of ADL would allow us to ‘conjoin’ the individual (a wrong committed to an individual) and 
collective dimensions (injustices suffered by groups corresponding to the protected grounds) of 
discrimination (n 78) 178. 
85 Khaitan (n 24) 10.  
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could concede that these types of questions may be different but are obviously connected. 
Indeed, the justification for legally prohibiting discrimination can be distinguished from 
the reasons for using different legal devices in order to enforce that prohibition. However, 
if we want to develop an accurate doctrinal reconstruction of the current anti-
discrimination programmes of regulation, we need to make efforts to connect the answers 
to these two kinds of questions. In this way, for example, we could understand the way 
in which judicial reparations, crafted according to the broader aims of ADL, are 
connected with the forms that wrongful discrimination adopts in a certain case.86  
 
Constitutions also provide a normative judgment on which of our traits should not be 
considered as factors to be weighed in decisions in certain social contexts.87 Whether they 
are chosen or not, or relevant to us, or whether they reflect a historical pattern of 
disadvantage, the crucial thing is that they should not be considered as burdens or 
imposing social costs in our decisions. However, the question of which are these 
normatively extraneous traits is a complex doctrinal issue that has a constitutional 
dimension. 88  When discrimination law decides to enumerate protected grounds it 
‘comprises a combination of empirical, political, and expressive judgments’. 89 
Constitutions are generally thought to do precisely that, that is, recognise the nature of 
the struggles of historically excluded groups; signal the political reasons to include certain 
grounds that may be analogically considered to include others in the future (either by 
statute, judicial interpretation or through constitutional amendments); and provide an 
expressive component to discrimination based on certain grounds. Some constitutions 
open up the path to consider social origin, class or even poverty as grounds of protection, 
and that is usually a matter of constitutional law, as it depends on a relevant normative 
question in a certain society.90 Overall, a constitutional conception of ADL could provide 
reasons for a dynamic interpretation of the doctrinal question of how to deal with the 
openness of the list of protected grounds.91 
 
                                               
86 C Troncoso and N Morales, ‘Caso Duque con Colombia: Un caso de discriminación estructural’ (2017) 
13 Anuario de Derechos Humanos 135. 
87 A constitutional conception is also aware of the social contexts where an anti-discrimination programme 
of regulation should be applied, considering liberty rights. For example, it does not generally apply to our 
personal relationships, where we are allowed to ‘discriminate’ regarding who we love or who we are friends 
with.   
88 S Fredman, Discrimination Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 110. 
89 P Shin, ‘Is There a Unitary Concept of Discrimination?’, in Hellman and Moreau (n 24) 171. 
90 Moreau (n 78) 158. 
91 Fredman (n 88) 130. 
 54 
2.7 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has given an outline of the different types of reasons that justify the need for 
a constitutional conception of ADL. These reasons highlight the different functions or 
roles of modern democratic constitutions. In mapping these different reasons, I have 
provided the reader with different types of arguments that are used to elaborate on a 
constitutional conception of ADL that gives an account of the historical connection 
between equality clauses and the development of ADL, that is, to the fact that ADL 
derives from the interpretation or expansion of constitutional equality clauses; to the 
political causes and effects of both the expansion of equality clauses towards ‘equality 
and non-discrimination’ clauses and the political role these provisions play in legal 
orders; to the institutional impact of including these clauses in constitutional orders, 
highlighting the organisational function of constitutions; and, lastly, a constitutional 
conception of ADL that can engage with several doctrinal problems that are becoming 
increasingly acute for the emergence of ADL as a single field or discipline of law. The 
arguments presented in this chapter must now be translated to the discussion surrounding 
Latin American Constitutionalism, which places equality and anti-discrimination at the 
centre of its agenda. 
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Chapter 3 A History of Anti-Discrimination Law in Latin America 
3.1 Introduction 
After more than 35 years since the beginning of the ‘third wave’ of democracy in the 
region, Latin America is undergoing deep transformations.1 Nowadays, elections take 
place regularly, albeit not without problems, and changes in power can happen without 
the threat of a military coup or a violent conflict. However, many obstacles still impede 
the path to deepening democracy. Discrimination, poverty and inequality are probably 
among the most important problems, as they crowd out the agenda of different policies 
focused on promoting the rule of law, human rights, social cohesion, or economic 
development. Every country in the region has created new institutional arrangements and 
enacted laws that are supposed to tackle these obstacles. However, legal transformations 
are taking place in the region, where there are particular features that threaten these 
reforms: according to the GINI index, Latin America is the most unequal continent in the 
world, and almost one third of its population live in poverty;2 although its citizens support 
democracy, they are alarmingly unsatisfied with its performance;3 moreover, on average, 
the majority of the population thinks that discrimination has structural causes, and that 
race, ethnicity, poverty and a lack of education or connections determine their lives and 
destinies.4 These features provide the perfect scenario for a boom in the enactment of 
equality and anti-discrimination provisions. Although there may be different objectives 
for the enactment of these provisions, they are now part of the different jurisdictions in 
the region, and are thus used, applied and interpreted by legal actors and affected parties. 
This reality compels us to give the reader an overview of the legal situation that has 
developed across Latin America, which is characterised by an evolution from the formal 
constitutional equality clauses of the early republican era to the establishment of complex 
anti-discrimination statutes in recent years. Although this history could be a focus of 
research in itself, this chapter will give a brief historical overview of this passage.   
                                               
1  It started in 1978 with the transitional processes in Ecuador and Dominican Republic, and was 
consolidated in 1989-1990 with the re-establishment of democracy in Paraguay, Chile and Nicaragua. 
2 Moreover, income inequality is concentrated among the most vulnerable groups, which coincides with 
the different grounds of protection of ADL. CEPAL, La Hora de la Igualdad (2010) 
<http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/0/39710/100604_2010-114-ses.33-
3_la_hora_de_la_igualdad_doc_completo.pdf>, accessed 4 January 2015. 
3 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, La calidad de las democracias en América 
Latina (2014) <http://www.idea.int/es/publications/sod-in-latin-america/index.cfm> accessed 6 march 
2015. 
4 A Chong and H Ñopo, ‘The Mystery of Discrimination in Latin America’ (2008) 8 Economía 79.  
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The objective of this chapter is to describe the history of Latin American ADL, tracing 
back its origins and presenting its current articulations. From the materials we have at 
hand, we can start thinking about further reforms or future developments, through a 
normative reconstruction of a transformative ethos of ADL, considering the particular 
circumstances and challenges of Latin American countries. The nature and scope of the 
empirical claims included in this chapter constitute the first part of the ‘normative 
reconstruction’ of Latin American ADL, which entails a fair description of the legal 
doctrines and practices that will be put to work for a transformative approach in future 
chapters. However, the main problem with a historical overview is that ADL does not 
exist as a distinctive field of law in Latin America. Scholars tend to ascribe the 
development of anti-discrimination legal provisions to the general evolution of 
constitutional law, or to advances in regional human rights law. To date, there is no 
comprehensive handbook or textbook on this subject from either a national or a regional 
perspective.5 In stark contrast with the development of this field of law in the so-called 
Global North, there are almost no examples of comprehensive accounts of its main 
conceptual groundings, doctrinal underpinnings, or institutional implications.6 Moreover, 
courts and legal operators do not understand its provisions as part of a larger doctrinal 
body with more or less clear boundaries. The idea of ADL does not make sense outside 
the reading of the general constitutional equality clauses that have been present in Latin 
American constitutions since the first half of the nineteenth century. 7   Although 
traditionally understood as mere formal equality clauses, things have started to change. 
Some countries have expanded the wording or understanding of their constitutional 
equality clauses, including general prohibitions of direct/indirect discrimination, a list of 
different protected grounds, or intersectionality clauses. Moreover, some countries have 
recently enacted specific anti-discrimination provisions and comprehensive bodies of 
legislation after lengthy legislative debates. Throughout the region, legal reforms are 
taking place without critical doctrinal scrutiny. The following brief historical overview is 
a first step to bridging this problem.  
 
                                               
5  However, there are studies that focus on a specific ground of protection. T Hernández, Racial 
Subordination in Latin America: The role of the State, Customary Law, and the New Civil Rights Response 
(CUP 2013).  
6 E Ellis and P Watson, EU Anti-Discrimination Law (OUP 2014); S Fredman, Discrimination Law (2nd 
edn, OUP 2011); N Reiss, S Rice, and D Allen, Australian Anti-Discrimination Law (Federation Press 
2014). 
7 see the essays included in C De la Torre, El Derecho a la No Discriminación en México (Porrúa 2006).   
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3.2 The origins of anti-discrimination law in Latin America: constitutional equality 
clauses 
3.2.1 Constitutional Equality in the nineteenth century 
The roots of ADL can be traced back to the early enactment of constitutional equality 
clauses. Although these clauses were meant to grant the universal authority of law during 
the founding era of the Latin American republics, anti-discrimination legal norms have 
been gradually integrated into the former during the recent decades. A brief overview of 
the origins and development of these constitutional clauses during the nineteenth century 
will allow us to understand this connection.  
 
Influenced by the French Revolution and US’ independence process, the newly 
independent countries of Latin America embraced the republican principles of popular 
sovereignty, equality and freedom. 8  Moreover, the need to fight the wars for 
independence compelled local Creole elites to promise citizenship rights to previously 
excluded castes like indigenous and African slaves.9 At least on paper, the new republics 
granted equality before the law to all their citizens. From the Constitution of Haiti (1805), 
the first Latin American constitution to be enacted, there was widespread recognition of 
a right to equality before the law in almost every constitutional text.10 The recognition of 
this right and, more generally, the idea of citizenship itself, were particular features of 
Latin American republicanism: ‘[a]t a time when most of the Western world, with the 
conspicuous exception of the United States, endorsed monarchy, Spanish America opted 
for the republic.’11 
 
Political citizenship, materialised through the right to vote, was extended early on to all 
free, non-dependent and adult males, including, in some cases, members of the indigenous 
population.12 This ideal, imported in the early years of independence, attempted to replace 
the notion of ‘the pueblos, the comunidades, the subject, the vecino (neighbour or 
                                               
8 M Mirow, Latin American Law: a History of Private Law and Institutions in Spanish America (University 
of Texas Press 2004) 103.  
9 P Blanchard, Under the Flags of Freedom: slave soldiers and the wars of independence in Spanish South 
America (University of Pittsburgh Press 2008). 
10 Other examples are as follows: Constitution of Venezuela (1830) art 188; Constitution of Argentina 
(1819) art 110; Constitution of Ecuador (1830) art 11; Constitution of Uruguay (1830), art 132; Constitution 
of Bolivia (1826) art 149; Constitution of Brazil (1824) art XIII; Constitution of Chile (1833) art 12; 
Constitution of Colombia (1830) art 12; Constitution of Paraguay (1844) title X, art 2.   
11 H Sábato, ‘On Political Citizenship in Nineteenth-Century Latin America’ (2001) 106 The American 
Historical Review 1290, 1291.  
12 ibid 1297.  
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resident)’ with the idea of equal citizens of a single nation.13 From the beginning, it was 
considered too abstract for the contexts of the region, but ‘gained increasing favour 
among the ascending revolutionary elites and found its way into the first constitutions.’14 
This initial extension of franchise was restricted by the elites some decades later, whom 
‘increasingly attributed the difficulties in founding a stable political order to the extended 
suffrage’.15 
 
From the start, the general right to equality before the law had no effective implications 
for the concession of political citizenship. The republican language, used to mark the 
rejection of the colonial past, did not ‘translate into equal rights for all the population, 
most of whom remained as excluded from citizenship as before’. 16  The liberal-
conservative alliance, which emerged in the mid-nineteenth century as a reaction to the 
political instability of the recently created polities and dominated the constitutional scene 
for almost two centuries, had a very particular understanding of equality. Liberals and 
conservatives allied against radicals (or the so-called republican tradition in the 
nineteenth century) in rejecting the ‘social question’ and argued for a restrictive 
conception of democracy. 17  They advocated a narrow understanding of the right to 
equality, which implied, at most, the concession of political equality (franchise) to the 
few, subject to property, income and literacy qualifications.18 During the founding period 
of Latin American constitutionalism, ‘liberals and conservatives defended (…) 
the independence thesis, that is to say, the thesis according to which it was necessary to 
have economic independence in order to have political independence.’ 19  An early 
example was the Constitution of Colombia in 1830: in the section on ‘Political Rights’, 
it granted the right to equality before the law to all Colombians, ‘whatever their wealth 
or destinies’; subsequently, however, it described the property and education 
                                               
13 ibid 1292.  
14 ibid.  
15 ibid.  
16 J Couso, ‘The Changing Role of Law and Courts in Latin America: From an Obstacle to Social Change 
to a Tool of Social Equity’, in R Gargarella, P Domingo, and T Roux (eds), Courts and Social 
Transformation in New Democracies: An Institutional Voice for the Poor (Ashgate 2006) 62. Nevertheless, 
there were some minor improvements regarding the admission of mulatos to universities, and to the legal 
status of Indians in some specific areas, such as land distribution. 
17 J Morris, ‘La Cuestión Social’, in H Godoy (ed), Estructura Social de Chile (Editorial Universitaria 
1971). 
18 see, for example, the thoughts of some Latin American intellectuals in the nineteenth century regarding 
franchise (Samper, Mora, Bello and Alberdi) R Gargarella, Latin American Constitutionalism 1810-2010: 
The Engine Room of the Constitution (OUP 2013) chs 2-3.   
19 ibid 47. 
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requirements that preconditioned citizenship and thus the right to vote.20 Therefore, the 
independence thesis restricted the right to equality before the law to those who were able 
to vote, and in turn the right to vote was severely restricted. The right to equality was not 
considered a general clause on social equality, or as recognising the equal status of 
citizens in the social sphere, or as giving rise to general or special prohibitions on non-
discrimination. There was no mention of sex, race or ethnicity, or any reference to 
discrimination as a social evil that should be tackled. No wording of the right to equality 
before the law during the nineteenth century included grounds of protection other than 
citizenship, which was narrowly constrained according to the liberal-conservative 
mindset described earlier, granting ‘limited political liberties and ample civic (economic) 
liberties.’21 By the end of the nineteenth century, almost every constitutional text had 
introduced ‘property, income, or literacy qualifications to the franchise’.22 
 
3.2.2 Codification (Private Law) and Status 
As happened with new constitutions, codification was considered crucial for nation-
building processes, and brought the possibility of repealing the entire colonial order.23 
Early republics saw a new private law as essential to restructure society and break with 
the colonial past.24 The ‘revolutionary’ ideals of individual liberty and equality before the 
law acted through the codification processes, which required that legislation should be 
directed ‘in unified fashion for the “citizen” rather than for the “noble”, the “bourgeois”, 
and the “peasant”’.25 In a sense, the apparent rights revolution brought by constitutional 
equality clauses was tamed through codification processes that were focused mainly on 
‘rules related to property and inheritance, [that] controlled the structure of society and, in 
turn, channelled significant political power to the authority creating those rules’. 26 
Furthermore, civil codes were supposed to be the concrete embodiment of the newly 
                                               
20 D Bushnell, ‘The Independence of Spanish South America’, in L Bethell (ed) The Cambridge History of 
Latin America III (CUP 1994) 109.  
21 Gargarella (n 18) 199. Although this trend was also applicable to the developed world of that time, it is 
important to state this against the background of the Latin American emphasis on republican values.  
22 Sábato (n 11) 1297. 
23 I Jaksic, Andrés Bello: Scholarship and Nation-Building in Nineteenth-Century Latin America (CUP 
2006) 176. 
24 Unlike a mere compilation of older bodies of laws, codification was focused on ‘planning a better society 
by means of new systematic and creative law’. M Murillo, ‘The evolution of codification in the civil law 
legal systems: towards decodification and recodification’ (2001) 11 Journal of Transnational Law and 
Policy 1, 4.  
25 Mirow (n 8) 98.  
26 Indeed, ‘several early attempts at codification began not with the provisions dealing with the legal status 
of persons, as the French Civil Code of 1804 would indicate as the logical starting place, but with the 
provisions dealing with the inheritance and succession of property’ ibid.  
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created constitutional values, so the whole project of the ‘liberal state trusted the legal 
framework of the civil society to civil codes’.27 The majority of the constitutional texts 
that were created after independence included a state duty to legislate through codes in 
the civil and criminal spheres.28 Thus, the relation between codes and constitutions leaned 
towards private law, which attempted to regulate the behaviour of private spheres that 
were considered important for bourgeois liberal society.29  For Merryman, these ‘old 
individual rights’ (rights of personality, private property, and freedom of contract), which 
were the principal target of the Revolution, ‘received their “constitutional protection” in 
the civil codes.’30 In other words, these codes ‘were thought of as serving something like 
a constitutional function’.31  
 
Although the codification of new private rules was directed to the citizen in a unified way, 
access to civil rights was formally constrained by different regulations regarding 
property, marriage status and legal capacity. The articulation of these regulations allowed 
only certain citizens to be full members of the social and political community. For 
example, the private law definition of legal capacity impeded a broader expansion of civil 
citizenship to indigenous, afro-descendants, women, and the poor.32 Debt peonage, tenant 
farming, the legal status of married woman or a simple lack of resources made it very 
difficult for these individuals to represent themselves in private or commercial relations 
or even before state institutions. Also, one could point to the notion of the private sphere 
in the early Family Law provisions, which rested on the presence of a patriarch: ‘when 
hereditary distinctions were abolished, domestic patriarchy and dependency came to the 
fore in regulating access to the privileges of citizenship’.33 Indeed, ‘on a practical level, 
patriarchal authority became a precondition of republican citizenship’. 34  The early 
Constitution of Cundinamarca (Colombia) of 1811 declared that, ‘no one can be a good 
citizen who is not a good father, good son, good brother, good friend, and good 
                                               
27  A López y López, ‘Constitución, Código y Leyes Especiales, Reflexiones sobre la llamada 
Descodificación’, in II Centenario del Código Civil (Editorial Centro de Estudios Ramón Areces 1990) 
1165.  
28 A Guzmán Brito, ‘La Codificación como programa constitucional en Francia, España e Iberoamérica 
durante el siglo XIX’ (2012) 39 Revista Chilena de Derecho 3. 
29 Murillo (n 24) 4.  
30  J Merryman and others, The Civil Law Tradition: Europe, Latin America and East Asia (Michie 
Company 1999) 1170.  
31 J Merryman and R Pérez-Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of 
Europe and Latin America (Stanford University Press 2007) 93. 
32 Mirow (n 8) 103.  
33 S Caulfield, S Chambers, and L Putnam, Honor, Status, and Law in Modern Latin America (Duke 
University Press 2005) 7.  
34  N Milanich, ‘Women, Gender, and Family in Latin America, 1820-2000’, in T Holloway (ed), A 
Companion to Latin American History (Blackwell Publishing 2011) 462. 
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husband’.35 Moreover, many countries allowed their younger male populations to obtain 
citizenship if they got married. 36  Therefore, property was not the only important 
precondition for civil and political citizenship, family status and legal capacity were also 
significant factors. Within this scenario, equality before the law meant the guarantee of 
equal treatment of two or more members of the male elite.37 
Beyond formal exclusion in regard to access to civil and political citizenship, the 
historical continuity of the colonial concepts of honour and social status during the post-
independence period is also crucial to understanding the coexistence of a theoretical 
commitment to liberal equality and widespread practices of discrimination.38 Like in 
colonial times, honour and reputation affected one’s capacity to get access to civil and 
political rights, as the constitutional and legislative commitments to equality ‘did not 
erase social hierarchies based on perceived biological differences, nor did they end social 
or legal practices of discrimination’:39 Indeed,  
those who were not able to display the markings of honor -for men, 
economic independence and patriarchal authority -found it 
exceedingly difficult to defend their rights before the police or courts. 
The state also played a newly enhanced role in distributing honor as 
it sought to check private authority in various forms. Officials stopped 
short, however, of stripping honorable men of their authority over 
their wives, children, servants, or other dependents.40 
Either from formal legislative sources, or through the concepts of honour and status in 
the private and social spheres, the republican values that lay behind the constitutional 
commitments to equality were eroded, and meant almost nothing to disadvantaged 
groups.    
 
3.2.3 The irrelevance of legal equality 
The interplay between constitutional equality clauses, codification, specific legislation, 
and the concepts of social status and honour, created an integrated framework through 
which to apply the second strand of the Aristotelian formula: unlikes should be treated 
                                               
35  Constitution of Cundinamarca (Colombia) 1811, art 4 < 
http://www.ensayistas.org/identidad/contenido/politica/const/co/cundinamarca.htm>, accessed 5 May 
2015.  
36 Milanich (n 34) 462.  
37 Improvements were seen in commercial/private relations between peninsulars and Creoles, and with the 
abolition of nobility titles and other legally sanctioned social privileges. Mirow (n 8) 145-6.  
38 R Barragán, ‘The “spirit” of Bolivian law: citizenship, patriarchy, and infamy’, in S Caulfield and others 
(n 33) 78.  
39 Caulfield and others (n 33) 2. 
40 ibid. 
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differently, according to their unlikeness. Rather than equalise the status of members of 
the political community, equality clauses allowed a broad range of hierarchies, 
segregation and discrimination. A good way to understand the lack of emancipatory 
power of the legal equality clauses is through the different historical articulations of law 
and race in a region that supposedly escaped from racism already during the independence 
era.41 The first decades of independent history saw an almost complete legal banning of 
slavery, and few instances of citizenship concessions to ethno-racial communities.42 
Likewise, and in contrast to the status of Blacks in the US, there was no legally sanctioned 
segregation, and anti-miscegenation laws were not usual. However, as Góngora-Mera 
puts it, ‘this constitutional and legal idealism masked the deals that the political elites 
made to keep their privileges and manage social hierarchies’, which ‘ultimately resulted 
in structural discrimination’.43 Even progressive political projects during the twentieth 
century that endorsed ideals of racial and ethnic inclusion, or concepts like mestizaje 
(mixture) or democracia racial (racial democracy), managed to maintain racial 
stratification with whites and mestizos at the top, and indigenous and afrodescendants at 
the bottom.44 The ideas of racial equality and ethnic specificity have been advanced only 
during the recent decades, after lengthy debates and polemics about the allegedly ethno-
racial character of regional democracies.45  For more than one and a half centuries, 
equality clauses did almost nothing to improve the status and wellbeing of disadvantaged 
ethno-racial groups.  
 
The example of the relationship between law and race could well be extended to other 
vulnerable or marginalised groups that gained attention with the gradual expansion of 
political rights around the middle of the twentieth century.46 Women were granted the 
vote between the 1930s and 1950s, and indigenous movements and rural peasants were 
                                               
41 In a way, the early history of legal/political equality in Latin America is not even enough to attract the 
moderate enthusiasm for revolutionary charts of Marx, for whom legal emancipation was ‘a stage’ of 
emancipation: ‘[b]eing regarded by the state as if we were free and equal is an improvement over being 
treated as if we were naturally subjected and unequal vis-a-vis stratifying social powers.’ W Brown, States 
of Injury (Princeton University Press 1995) 114.  
42 Sábato (n 11) 1310.   
43 M Góngora-Mera, ‘Transnational Articulation of Law and Race in Latin America: A Legal Genealogy 
of Inequality’ (2012) Desigualdes.net 18 
<http://www.desigualdades.net/Resources/Working_Paper/18_WP_Gongora-Mera_online.pdf>, accessed 
20 December 2014 (emphasis added).  
44  CEPAL, Afrodescendientes en América Latina y el Caribe: del reconocimiento estadístico a la 
realización de derechos (2014).  
45 E Telles and S Bailey, ‘Understanding Latin American Beliefs about Racial Inequality’ (2013) 118 
American Journal of Sociology 1559, 1565.  
46 E Posada Carbó, ‘Democracia, Liberalismo y Procesos Electorales en América Latina desde 1930’, in M 
Palacios, and G Weinberg (eds), Historia General de América Latina: América Latina desde 1930 (Trotta-
Unesco 2008) 395. 
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gradually included in ‘mass democracy’ through traditional political parties or the ascent 
of populism.47 However, even after being incorporated into their political communities 
through citizenship rights (specifically, franchise), there was no sense of equal status with 
those who were part of the civil and political elites. That is, there was no substantial 
change in the social sphere that could be translated into real political equality. For 
O´Donnell, this may be explained by the formal expansion of political rights without the 
proper recognition and protection of civil and social rights. 48  In other words, the 
expansion of the right to political participation (voting, running for election and political 
party affiliation) was not joined by the promotion of diverse and educated public opinion 
through social and civil rights.49  New constituencies exercised their citizenship only 
during elections, while in between, only the members of a privileged minority were 
allowed full citizenship, giving form to ‘delegative democracies’. 50  From this 
explanation, many scholars have challenged TH Marshall’s ideas on citizenship to 
elucidate the problem of the gradual expansion of citizenship rights when applied to the 
Latin American context. How would an expansion of political rights work within an 
environment of restricted ‘social rights granted to particular groups in society (eg, the 
working class) in the absence of universal political and civil rights’?51 A critical account 
of the history of citizenship in Latin America shows the irrelevance of traditional equality 
clauses.  
 
Furthermore, the legal veil of formal equality coexisted with two structural features of 
Latin American Law that expressed old legacies of colonial rule. First, formal equality 
clauses coexisted with widespread non-compliance with the scarce protective legislation 
that was sometimes enacted due to ideological, economic or religious concerns.52 This is 
considered a longstanding feature, through which social status determines the ‘unequal 
                                               
47  For Carlos De la Torre, populism entailed a re-emergence of equality in the public discourse. ‘El 
Populismo en Latinoamérica: entre la Democratización y el Autoritarismo’ (2013) 247 Nueva Sociedad 
120, 122.  
48 G O’Donnell, ‘Why the rule of law matters’ (2004) 15 Journal of Democracy 32, 42. For example, as 
late as the 1970s, although political rights were universally granted to men and women, the legal status of 
being married prevented the exercise of some basic civil rights for women in most Latin American 
countries. A Lavrín, ‘Women in twentieth-century Latin American society’, in Bethell (n 20) 529.   
49 An interesting exception to this trend was the Peronist era in Argentina, ‘because so much emphasis was 
placed on the extension of social rights’. L Whitehead, ‘State Organization in Latin America since 1930’, 
in Bethell (n 20) 87.  
50 G O’Donnell, ‘Estado, democratización y ciudadanía’ (1993) 128 Nueva Sociedad 62.  
51 P Oxhorn, ‘Social Inequality, Civil Society and the Limits of Citizenship in Latin America’, in S Eckstein 
and T Vickham-Crowley (eds), What Justice? Whose Justice? Fighting for Fairness in Latin America 
(University of California Press 2003) 47; L Nosetto, ‘Variaciones en torno al concepto de ciudadanía’ 
(2009) 6 Factótum 77. 
52 The delayed implementation of anti-slavery measures is an illustration of this feature. Mirow (n 11) 146.  
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application of the law according to the addressees of the norms’. 53  Secondly, 
constitutional equality clauses coexisted with a whole range of legislative and 
administrative measures that continued to structure the traditional social stratification. In 
general, the post-independence institutional arrangements allowed the mutual 
reinforcement of a diversity of policy measures that upheld different legal treatments for 
those in differing social circumstances. A range of policies maintained the cultural, social 
and racial structuring of society, like criminal law, prison reform and police ordinances 
to prosecute disadvantaged and marginalised groups, 54  health and hygiene laws 
surreptitiously designed to maintain the notion of white supremacy, 55  family laws 
structured around patriarchy-dependency and status,56 and selective immigration policies 
to favour the incorporation of ‘good races’ from Europe and the United States.57  
 
In exceptional cases, the development of constitutional equality provisions incorporated 
sex or race among the legal grounds of protection, or made reference to disadvantage in 
the understanding of this general clause. A notable example is the Constitution of 
Argentina of 1819, which established that ‘[m]en are so equal before the law, that this 
should be one and the same for all, be this criminal, prescriptive or protective, and it 
should favour equally the powerful and the miserable’’ 58  This wording was quite 
progressive for the time, especially if one takes note of another provision that makes 
reference to indigenous peoples, although with a paternalistic and assimilationist 
perspective.59 Another interesting exception is the famous Mexican Constitution of 1917, 
which protected the first social rights in the modern era, including an explicit reference 
to sex in a clause regarding equal pay for men and women (art 123).60 These were unique 
exceptions, as virtually none of the constitutional texts of the region recognised a general 
prohibition of discrimination or included references to particular vulnerable groups until 
the middle of the twentieth century.  
                                               
53 Góngora-Mera (n 43).  
54 R Salvatore, and C Aguirre (eds), The Birth of the Penitentiary in Latin America (University of Texas 
Press 1996). 
55 A Zullawski, ‘Hygiene and “The Indian Problem”’ (2000) 35 Latin American Research Review 107.  
56 I Jaramillo, ‘The Social Approach to Family Law: Canonical Family Law Treatises of Latin America’ 
(2008) 58 American Journal of Comparative Law 843, 865. 
57 D Cook-Martín and D Fitzgerald, ‘Liberalism and the Limits of Inclusion: Race and Immigration Law in 
the Americas (1850-2000)’ (2010) 41 Journal of Interdisciplinary History 7.  
58 Constitution of Argentina (1819) art 110. 
59 ibid art 128: ‘Being the Indians equal in dignity and rights to the rest of the citizens, they will have the 
same privileges and will be subject to the same laws.’ The Constitution of Paraguay (1844) used the same 
wording. 
60 E de la Torre and J García, Desarrollo histórico del constitucionalismo hispanoamericano (IIJ-UNAM 
1976) 225.  
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The emergence of the ‘social question’ at the beginning of the twentieth century triggered 
the enactment of the first social policies, acknowledging that some groups could be more 
vulnerable than the rest of the population.61 Most of the time, Latin American social 
policies were focused only on ‘social insurance’ for the workers in the formal sector 
(usually, the male breadwinners).62 In contrast, social assistance was merely a residual 
bunch of measures designed to provide some help to those other groups that were not in 
the formal sector, or under the family protection of an urban worker. Although the first 
social assistance policies made explicit references to vulnerable groups like women, the 
disabled, or indigenous people, there was no reference to the evils of unfair discrimination 
or the idea of disadvantage. Moreover, they were intended to benefit all those who needed 
help, so they could not be recognised as part of the minimum doctrinal body of ADL 
presented in the introductory chapter.63 With the expansion of the electorate to women 
and other previously excluded groups from the 1930s, political parties tried to gain 
support from these new constituencies, and the ascent of populism in countries like 
Argentina or Brazil further reinforced this pattern of inclusion.64 For Phillip Oxhorn, even 
when populism or other progressive forces expanded the boundaries of citizenship, 
especially regarding social and political rights,  
the dominant model of citizenship during the 20th century was 
citizenship as cooptation. Rights were anything but universal. Social 
rights of citizenship were segmented, partial and unequal. Entitlement 
to them was predicated on political loyalty and/or a de facto 
acceptance of the limits of social change through social mobilization. 
In this way, the social construction of citizenship was severely 
constrained in a hierarchical fashion that reinforced rather than 
mitigated social inequality.65  
 
Summarising this section, the most important fact is that for more than 150 years, 
formal/constitutional equality clauses were not seen and applied as emancipatory 
provisions that grounded strong prohibitions of discrimination against vulnerable or 
marginalised groups, provided foundations for the development of social equality 
                                               
61 C Abel, ‘La Política Social en América Latina desde 1930 hasta el presente’, in Palacios and Weinberg 
(n 46) 213. 
62 A Barrientos and C Santibañez, ‘New Forms of Social Assistance and the Evolution of Social Protection 
in Latin America’ (2009) 41 Journal of Latin American Studies 1. 
63 see 1.4. 
64 Posada Carbó (n 46) 395.  
65 P Oxhorn, ‘When everything seems to change, why do we still call it citizenship?’, in M M Sznajder and 
others (eds), Shifting Frontiers of Citizenship: The Latin American Experience (Brill 2012) 485. 
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provisions, or resulted in corrective devices to challenge a long history of social and 
political exclusion. 
 
3.3 The re-emergence of equality in Latin America 
During the second half of the twentieth century, new political constituencies started to 
place a strain on the social order. Longstanding practices of discrimination and social 
exclusion became visible in the political arena. However, the institutional reaction to 
address these practices took some decades to materialise.  
 
Initially, and prompted by the image of ‘racial innocence’, 66  many Latin American 
countries started to react to discrimination (and, specifically, to racism) through the use 
of criminal sanctions.67  Even before any explicit reference in favour of ethno-racial 
groups in constitutional provisions, countries like Brazil enacted criminal sanctions 
against racial discrimination already in the 1950s (the first in Latin America). The Alfonso 
Arinos Act criminalised racial discrimination in the workplace, commerce, public 
premises, the public sector and education.68 The aim of this strategy was to show the 
seriousness of the official anti-racism commitment and to isolate these aberrant acts from 
other cultural practices, which were allegedly grounded in republican values: ‘racists are 
criminals rather than representatives of long-standing racist cultural norms’.69 The claim 
of republican virtuousness in Latin America was generally raised as a way to distance 
itself from slavery, racism or other xenophobic acts generally present in the US.70 In the 
words of the presidents and heads of state of South America at the beginning of this 
millennium:  
The Presidents view with concern the resurgence of racism and of 
discriminatory manifestation and expressions in other parts of the 
                                               
66 A Dulitzky, ‘A Region in Denial: Racial Discrimination and Racism in Latin America’, in A Harris (ed), 
Race and Equality Law (Ashgate 2013) 93.  
67 Although only a few countries have comprehensive anti-discrimination laws, most of the countries in the 
region have included hate crimes in their criminal legislation either as crimes in themselves or as 
aggravations. Hernández (n 5) 199. 
68 Law 1.390 (1951).  
69 Hernández (n 5) 104. For her, ‘even though the criminalization of racial discrimination suggests a strong 
normative commitment to the eradication of discrimination, it may, as a practical matter, have had the ironic 
effect of making the legal system less capable of dealing with the problems of inequality and discrimination’ 
(ibid 105).  
70 P Wade, ‘Race in Latin America’, in D Poole (ed), A Companion to Latin American Anthropology 
(Blackwell 2008) 182.  
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world and state their common commitment to preserve South 
America from the propagation of said phenomenon.71  
 
In this scenario, criminal sanctions highlighted Latin America’s alleged commitment to 
racial equality. Nevertheless, historically, the effectiveness of tackling discrimination 
through the use of criminal law has been undermined by the selective and unequal 
application of law, and constraints to victims’ access to justice. The example of the 
Alfonso Irinos Act of 1951 is illustrative: only 9 defendants were convicted during its 46 
years of operation. 72  The same could be said of subsequent Brazilian statutes 
criminalising discrimination, which were affected by the same problems.73  
 
After this initial criminal reaction, the region had to wait until the last decades of the 
twentieth century to see real advances in social and legal equality.74 One of the most 
important effects of the ‘third wave’ of democratisation in the region was the emergence 
of a diversity of social issues that came to occupy the public agenda. The fragmentation 
of social movements that were previously united in the struggle against dictatorships or 
authoritarian regimes allowed the diversification of social demands, and the emergence 
of indigenous, feminist and environmental struggles, among others. 75  With this, the 
demands for a broader understanding of the general right to equality fostered 
constitutional amendments and new laws to protect specific vulnerable groups.76 In that 
sense, the re-emergence of equality in the transitional era occurred mainly through the re-
appropriation of the meaning of the constitutional right to equality before the law by 
social activists and movements.77 We could say that it was a movement towards filling 
the so-called ‘empty’ clause of formal equality, or the awakening of a longstanding 
‘dormant clause’.78  
 
                                               
71 Quoted in Dulitzky (n 66) 93.  
72 Hernández (n 5) 118-9.  
73 J Rodrigo and M Rodríguez, ‘Law and Public Sphere: Spaces for Interaction and Flow Direction’, in S 
Kron, S Costa, and M Braig (eds), Democracia y reconfiguraciones contemporáneas del Derecho en 
América Latina (Vervuert Verlag 2012) 171.  
74 Mirow (n 8) 200. 
75 S Álvarez and A Escobar (eds), The Making of Social Movements in Latin America (Westview 1992).  
76 S Kron, S Costa, and M Braig, ‘Democracia y reconfiguraciones contemporáneas del derecho en América 
Latina: una introducción’, in Kron and others (n 73) 9. Clearly, this was a case of a black and indigenous 
mobilisation, which pushed for concrete legal and constitutional reforms. Wade (n 70) 187. 
77 For Elizabeth Jelin, these movements generated a dialectic between the new cultural rights of identity 
and the previously dominant conceptions of equal citizenship. ‘Ciudadanía(s)’ (2003) UDISHAL, Serie 
Mayor, Documento de Trabajo 3.  
78 P Westen, ‘The Empty Idea of Equality’ (1982) 95 Harvard Law Review 537. For the re-appropriation 
of dormant clauses, see Gargarella (n 18) ch7.  
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We should also take into account the influence of international human rights law and an 
emergent regional human rights regime.79 The IAHRS, as we will see in the next section, 
has been crucial in expanding the scope and meaning of the right to equality and non-
discrimination. These two factors –the emergence of newer demands and the influence of 
international and regional human rights law- acted as catalysts for reform, and prompted 
a diversity of anti-discrimination measures that were not co-ordinated. Indeed, the legal 
empowerment of social movements created avenues for social change that revisited the 
dormant clauses of different constitutions. For example, in the 1990s, the claims to 
enforce the right to HIV treatment from public health systems were in part articulated 
through the use of the right to equality before the law within litigation battles. In these 
legal procedures, a frequent invocation of international human rights law was considered 
essential to the re-appropriation of a right that was formerly considered a veil to hide 
social exclusion and marginalisation. 80  Moreover, the re-emergence of equality 
discourses through the re-interpretation of traditional rights, like the right to equality 
before the law, gradually developed and reinforced a sense of identity or belonging within 
certain groups, creating a special relation between equality, cultural differences, and 
personal/collective identities, as illustrated by the LGBT movement(s) in Latin America. 
Mobilisation against discrimination led to the re-appropriation of constitutional rights in 
a vernacular way, and was thus also performative for the development of 
personal/collective identities.81 
 
With the return of democracy in the 1990s, inequality and discrimination were brought to 
the forefront of the public agenda. In this transitional era, the newly elected governments, 
with almost no human rights institutional structure, had to react to equality and non-
discrimination claims made by domestic social movements or international organs 
through the monitoring procedures of international human rights treaties. For many years, 
it seemed that it was enough for governments to claim that the constitutional equality 
clauses were binding law and that international obligations were being properly 
incorporated into national law.82 General constitutional equality clauses were the explicit 
                                               
79 The impact of international human rights law at the domestic level in Latin America was clearly seen in 
the changes to the national institutional arrangements regarding discrimination after the UN World 
Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, held in Durban 
(2001). M Htun, ‘From “Racial Democracy” to Affirmative Action: Changing State Policy on Race in 
Brazil’ (2004) 39 Latin American Research Review 60. 
80 J Contesse and D Lovera, ‘Acceso a tratamiento médico para personas viviendo con VIH/Sida: Éxitos 
sin Victoria’ (2008) 8 Sur 149. 
81 IM Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (OUP 2011) 160-1. 
82 Hernández (n 5) 102-3.  
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or implicit grounding of general prohibitions of non-discrimination, and the law on paper 
was deemed to be enough evidence of a government’s compliance before the international 
community.83 The claim of social movements for a broader understanding of the right to 
equality did not generate an immediate institutional response.  
 
The current scenario is somewhat different: at least at the level of discourse, the race for 
substantive or material equality has now arrived in Latin America. Whether in courts, 
administrations or parliaments, or in the broader public opinion, equality discourse has 
entered daily debates.84  Political campaigns, awareness raising strategies, legislative 
agendas and broader media language have deployed substantive equality as an 
overarching concept: Matrimonio Igualitario (Equal Marriage), Muevete por la Igualdad 
(Move for Equality), or Fundacion Iguales (Equality Foundation) are common examples 
of the different uses of equality, grounded in an overarching notion of equal status.85 
Equality has been deployed in its different dimensions both by groups reaffirming cultural 
specificity and by those struggling for material benefits within a broader understanding 
of social citizenship. In other words, there has been a strong connection between equality 
discourses and struggles for both the right to equality and non-discrimination, and within 
struggles for social rights grounded in egalitarian values. The language of Latin American 
activism easily accommodated a place for both dimensions of equality, contradicting the 
assumed incompatibility between them, that is, the contradictions between class and other 
grounds of protection from discrimination like race, sex or ethnicity.86  
 
At both the domestic and regional levels, judicial forums have been keen to receive 
arguments to develop the previously dominant formal equality clauses and expand their 
scope. In a way, courts are gradually starting to abandon the jargon of equality as a mere 
negative liberty (or as a warranty of neutral treatment), and embrace an anti-subordination 
                                               
83 D Lovera, ‘El Informe de Chile ante el Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales: el Papel 
del Derecho’ (2005) Anuario de Derechos Humanos 167. 
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85 These names refer, respectively, to the umbrella slogan of the Argentinian social movement for same-
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Research’, in A Escobar and S Alvarez (eds), The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: 
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approach,87 a social reading of the equality mandate,88 a reading of equality as a principle 
of non-domination,89 or a conception of substantive equality.90 In the words of Clérico, 
Ronconi, and Aldao:   
Supreme Courts, Constitutional Courts and tribunals from many 
countries in Latin America have been applying the equality mandate 
since they were born as institutions. However, probably only in the 
last decade of the twentieth century they started to apply the equality 
clause both as a material legal principle and in its non-discrimination 
version.91 
 
This process has been accompanied by different changes at the normative level: new 
regional treaties, new and amended constitutions, and special statutory and administrative 
regulations against discrimination. However, this copious legal development has not 
achieved the emancipatory promise made by the rapid advancement of democracy and 
human rights discourse during the last two decades.92 The emergent ADL in the region, 
promoted in part by the role of the IAHRS and domestic courts, has not given rise to 
effective forms of legal protection for people who suffer from the evils of inequality and 
discrimination. In a way, the race for equality has not yet resulted in the institutional 
development of effective protections against discrimination. Comparatively, Latin 
American countries have been very generous in ratifying special human rights treaties 
and including new rights in their domestic catalogues.93 However, ‘such legal provisions 
do not translate into effective human rights protection on the ground’.94 
 
                                               
87 R Saba, ‘Igualdad de Trato entre Particulares’ (2011) 89 Lecciones y Ensayos 217. 
88 V Abramovich, ‘From Massive Violations to Structural Patterns: New Approaches and Classic Tensions 
in the Inter-American Human Rights System’ (2011) 6 Sur 7.  
89 L Clérico and others, ‘Towards a Reconstruction of Equality Case-Law Trends in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: On Non-Discrimination, Anti-Subordination, Redistribution and Recognition’ (2013) 9 Revista 
Direito GV 115. 
90 IACHR, The Road to substantive democracy: Women’s political participation in the Americas (OAS 
2011) ch 5. 
91 Clérico and others (n 89) 121.  
92  Although there are no empirical works that measure the effectiveness of anti-discrimination legal 
provisions, indicators show that poverty and social exclusion are disproportionately high among groups 
protected by ADL. Because of that, some authors speak of the ‘Latin American Paradox’, characterised by 
the permanent convergence between democracy, human rights and social inequality. HJ Burchardt, ‘The 
Latin American Paradox: Convergence of Political Participation and Social Exclusion’ (2010) 3 
Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 40.  
93 J Melton and others, ‘To codify or not to codify? Lessons from consolidating the United Kingdom’s 
constitutional statutes’ (2015, The Constitution Unit UCL) 27-8. 
94 J Cavallaro and S Erin Brewer, ‘Revaluating Regional Human Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First 
Century: the case of the Inter-American Court’ (2008) 102 The American Journal of International Law 
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3.3.1 The national re-emergence of equality and anti-discrimination  
In what follows, I will describe the recent domestic re-emergence of equality and anti-
discrimination discourse through a new understanding of constitutional equality clauses 
or the reform or enactment of new constitutional, statutory or administrative provisions.  
 
3.3.1.1 Latin American Constitutions  
Recent constitutional changes in the region have major differences between them and are 
applicable to different contexts, but we can draw some common features related to the 
topic of this project.95 Following Rodrigo Uprimny, one could say that one of the most 
important common features is that ‘the constitutional reforms give special protection to 
groups that have been traditional targets of discrimination, including indigenous and 
African-descended communities’. 96  Another common feature, strongly related to the 
former, is that ‘many constitutions express a strong commitment to equality, not only 
prohibiting discrimination on grounds of race, gender, and other factors, but also ordering 
special affirmative action policies to make equality real and effective’.97 In some cases, 
these developments have resulted from amendments to the formal constitutional equality 
clauses, or the incorporation of new provisions that should be read in conjunction with 
the former. One can notice the explicit inclusion of a general prohibition from 
discrimination in the core parts of constitutions (Constitution of Mexico, art 1; Bolivia; 
art 9.1; Peru, article 2.2), and the generous wording of some constitutional equality 
clauses that include not only the negative dimension of the right to be free from 
discrimination, but the positive side, by offering constitutional grounding to special 
measures and affirmative action policies (Constitution of Colombia, art 13).98 Others 
have included a different provision, explicitly establishing that positive action or special 
measures in favour of protected groups are not incompatible with equality clauses, and 
should be interpreted as measures promoting real equality (Constitution of Argentina, art 
75.23). Moreover, some constitutional texts offer explicit grounding for special policies 
that favour specific groups, like gender quotas in political representation (Constitution of 
                                               
95 A chronology and summary of major constitutional changes can be found in R Uprimny, ‘The Recent 
Transformation of Constitutional Law in Latin America: Trends and Challenges’ (2011) 89 Texas Law 
Review 1587, 1587-1589. Several countries in the region adopted new constitutions, among others, Brazil 
(1988), Colombia (1991), Paraguay (1992), Ecuador (1998 and 2008), Peru (1993), Venezuela (1999), and 
Bolivia (2009). Others made major reforms, like Argentina (1994), Mexico (1992 and 2011), Costa Rica 
(1989), and Chile (2005). 
96 ibid 1589-90. 
97 ibid 1592.  
98 see appendix (table 1). 
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Argentina, art 37; Constitution of Colombia, art 40), the private and public participation 
of people with a disability or special needs (Constitution of Bolivia, art 71.II), and specific 
policies that may foster equal opportunities for indigenous people (Constitution of 
Mexico, art 2.B). Overall, we could claim, with the exception of Chile (Constitution of 
Chile, art 19.2), that Latin American constitutions are not neutral with regard to the 
phenomenon of discrimination.99 
 
The development of lengthy and detailed constitutions in the recent decades has favoured 
the advent of anti-discrimination constitutional provisions in Latin America.100 Also, the 
legacy of codification processes has influenced the way in which constitutional texts are 
becoming a major source for adjudication in contemporary legal landscapes. 101 
Considered as superior codes, constitutional texts have started to incorporate more 
detailed provisions that are able to regulate not only the relationship between the state 
and individuals, but also private relationships.102 Furthermore, the idea that rights are 
granted by the state, rather than being old liberties that existed before the creation of the 
state and are only then recognised by judge-made law, has triggered detailed regulation 
of the scope of constitutional rights. 103  This legal mindset has created the false 
expectation that the scope of rights is fixed by the constitutional wording, suffocating 
broader efforts to develop more substantive readings through sub-constitutional 
regulation. The progressive language of several constitutional texts in Latin America has 
provided incentives for legal mobilisation processes that can both advance the interests 
of disadvantaged groups and challenge legal arrangements that could be considered 
discriminatory when compared to constitutional standards.104 However, the danger is that 
                                               
99 ‘Neutral’ constitutions are those that merely grant a right to equality before the law, excluding the equal 
‘protection of the law’, or any other provision that commits the state in the struggle against discrimination. 
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(2009) 41 Comparative Politics 337. 
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14.2), and a principle for international relations (art 255.3).  
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liberalizador del derecho administrativo’, in M Tapia and M Martinic (eds), Sesquicentenario del Código 
Civil de Andrés Bello (Lexis Nexis 2005). 
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international human rights treaties for the adjudication of private conflicts. A Huneeus, ‘Introduction to 
Symposium on the constitutionalization of International Law in Latin America’ (2015) AJIL Unbound 90.  
103  R Barker, ‘Latin American Constitutionalism: an overview’ (2012) 20 Williamette Journal of 
International Law and Dispute Resolution 1, 5. 
104 P Lambert and D Scribner, ‘The Constitutional Recognition of Gender Equality in Chile and Argentina’ 
(Western Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Vancouver, April 2017). 
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social movements may prefer to fix their demands through constitutional discourses 
rather than mingling with the details of technical regulation.  
 
3.3.1.2 Statutory (and administrative) provisions 
Although the establishment of anti-discrimination provisions at the legislative and 
administrative levels has been increasing, it is still fragmented and scarce.105 The need to 
explore the development of sub-constitutional regulation starts from the growing 
scepticism about the promises of constitutional changes.106 In a sense, it is a challenge 
against the reform fetishism present in the region, especially regarding the transformative 
potential of constitutional reform: ‘the naïve belief that constitutional reform on its own 
can rise to far-reaching political transformation.’107  
 
Recent years have witnessed a growing enactment of specific anti-discrimination 
provisions. Beginning with the enactment of the Argentinian Anti-Discrimination Law 
(1988) and the Mexican Federal Law to Prevent Discrimination (1992), many countries 
in the region started to establish sectorial laws to address the needs and demands of 
different groups affected by discrimination. In this sense, anti-discrimination provisions 
are now part of a piecemeal evolution, without clear theoretical groundings other than the 
general modern understanding of constitutional equality clauses. Either because of 
international influence, social pressure or technical concerns, different statutes and 
administrative decrees granting special measures to prevent discrimination and protect 
vulnerable groups are part of a plethora of rules that go from disability laws and racial 
equality statutes, to special laws against gender identity discrimination.  
 
Nevertheless, this wave of fragmented anti-discrimination provisions has not developed 
the appropriate infrastructure to protect these rights. As stated by Brinks and Botero, 
democracies in our region ‘have witnessed a proliferation of formal rights for traditionally 
marginalized populations –the indigenous, the women, the poor- but without 
                                               
105 see appendix (tables 1-2). 
106 There is growing scepticism about the development of forms of ‘constitutional populism’, characterised 
by the merely symbolic effect of constitutional commitments and their use for electoral interests. JP 
Sarmiento, ‘El populismo constitucional en Colombia, hacia la instrumentalización simbólica de la 
Constitución por medio de proyectos de actos legislativos fallidos’ (2013) 15 Estudios Socio-Jurídicos 75.  
107 D Nolte and A Schilling-Vacaflor, ‘Introduction: “The Times they are a changing”: Constitutional 
Transformation in Latin America since the 1990s’, in Detlef Nolte and Almut Schilling-Vacaflor (eds), 
New Constitutionalism in Latin America: Promises and Practices (Ashgate 2012) 25.  
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corresponding growth of the infrastructure required to generate compliance’’108  The 
efforts to build the ‘corresponding infrastructure’ at the legislative or administrative level, 
through the establishment of special anti-discrimination legislation or the creation of 
equality bodies, or an adequate degree of institutional coordination, have been weak. 
Maybe this is because the case for legal reform ‘often focus[es] on the substantive rule to 
the exclusion of all else.’ 109  In a sense, the effectiveness of substantive anti-
discrimination provisions, which are generously present in every country in the region, 
‘rests on the development of a dense structure of lateral support composed of ancillary 
rules, and third party facilitators and controllers, often but not only within the state.’110  
 
There is no comprehensive legislation other than that in Mexico, which has recently been 
amended to give more powers to the anti-discrimination agency in charge of its 
implementation.111  Recent years have seen a boom in anti-discrimination legislation 
around the region. Bolivia, Chile and Colombia have enacted so-called general anti-
discrimination laws with different scopes. While Bolivia has enacted comprehensive 
legislation giving soft powers to an administrative agency, Chile and Colombia have 
restricted the scope of their legislation to the creation of a judicial remedy to tackle 
discrimination or to the creation or aggravation of hate crimes. In the cases of Argentina, 
Bolivia, and Chile, the legal definition of discrimination is tied to the enjoyment of other 
fundamental, constitutional or international human rights, and has attracted criticism for 
not including an autonomous right to equality and non-discrimination.112 However, in all 
of the selected countries, the legislative or administrative expansion of the protected 
grounds of discrimination, or the expansion of the scope of protection, is expected to 
impact on the constitutional definition of discrimination. 113  In this regard, we can 
understand these recent regulations as part of what scholars call small-c constitutions, 
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109 ibid.  
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112 I Díaz García, ‘Ley chilena contra la discriminación: una evaluación desde los derechos internacional y 
constitucional’ (2013) 40 Revista Chilena de Derecho 635.  
113 see, for example, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (Argentina), Maximiliano Alvarez y otros s/n 
c. Cencosud S.A. (2010) (considering the ADLARG as a ‘constitutional projection’ of the protection from 
discrimination to individual employment relationships); Corte Suprema (Chile), rol 11521-2014 (habeas 
corpus) (including nationality, considered as a protected ground in the ADLCHI, to the constitutional right 
to equality before the law).  
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which expand the scope and meaning of constitutional rights, or as statutory changes that 
modify the public understanding of discrimination as a constitutional evil.114 
 
Moreover, several countries have created administrative agencies, equality bodies or 
commissions with the explicit task of tackling discrimination, like Peru (National 
Committee against discrimination, CONACOD) and Bolivia (Committee against all 
forms of racism and discrimination), following the examples of the Instituto Nacional 
contra la Discriminación, la Xenofobia y el Racismo (INADI) created by the Argentinian 
Government in 1995, and the National Committee to Prevent Discrimination in Mexico 
(CONAPRED). 115  Although each of these countries has autonomous ombudsmen 
(defensorias del pueblo or NHRIs) with both consultative and quasi-judicial powers, they 
have realised the need to create special anti-discrimination entities.116 In these cases, there 
is an important administrative implementation of anti-discrimination regulations that 
develops in detail the constitutional and legislative clauses. However, the incentives for 
reaching friendly settlements and the lack of accessible information constitute an 
important obstacle to the development of administrative jurisprudence on 
discrimination.117 
 
                                               
114 D Law, ‘Constitutions’, in P Cane, and H Kritzer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal 
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November 2016. 
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provides a fragmented access to some of its resolutions of individual complaints, but there is no systematic 
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3.3.2 The Inter-American Human Rights System and the emergence of substantive 
equality 
Despite the lack of resources and political support from the regional and national 
constitutive institutions, the IAHRS has developed strong and effective protection of 
some basic human rights. 118  Since its creation in the 1960s and its subsequent 
development, most of its activity and resources have been focused on the most egregious 
human rights violations, like torture, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. 
Those problems have strongly influenced the institutional path adopted by the system. 
During the height of the dictatorships in the region, the IACHR was very relevant in 
reporting violations and applying international pressure to authoritarian regimes. 
However, with the ‘third wave’ of democracies in the region in the 1990s, the 
Commission started to refer contentious cases to the IACtHR (or the ‘Court’), the 
adjudicative body that was created by the ACHR, which entered into force in 1978. From 
then on, the Court became very important in the development of common human rights 
standards in the region, especially regarding the way in which democracies were to deal 
with past (recent) human rights violations.119 Transitional justice became the main scope 
of action for both the Commission and the Court, in contrast with its European 
counterpart. Nevertheless, ‘[a]s the countries of Latin America have moved through the 
phase of transition to (…) the phase of democratic consolidation the concerns regarding 
the nature of the region’s democracies change.’120 Social movements, who deploy their 
scarce resources to put different claims on the public agenda, have triggered a major shift 
in the issues with which both organs of the system have to deal, and discrimination is 
certainly one of these newer issues.  
 
As the ACHR does not provide a definition of discrimination, the IACtHR has followed 
other organs and treaties.121 In its first article, the ACHR protects the right to equality and 
non-discrimination regarding conventional rights, through the so-called subordinate 
                                               
118 For a critical overview, see R Goldman, ‘History and Action: the Inter-American Human Rights System 
and the Role of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’ (2009) 31 Human Rights Quarterly 
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clause of article 1.1, including an open list of protected grounds.122 Moreover, in article 
24, and under the heading ‘right to equal protection’, the ACHR protects the right to 
equality before the law, and, as a ‘consequence’, the right to the ‘equal protection of the 
law’.123 According to Antkowiak and Gonza, ‘the right to equal protection of the law 
focuses upon the content of the law, and directs legislators to avoid all discrimination 
when drafting and enacting statutes’.124 In other words, article 24 establishes that the right 
to equality and non-discrimination is protected before the enactment and enforcement of 
national legislation. 125  In general, the IAHRS has concluded that both clauses are 
expressions of the general principle of equality and non-discrimination, so the 
jurisprudence of article 1.1 is pertinent to determining the meaning and scope of article 
24.126  
 
From these two textual sources (articles 1.1. and 24), the IAHRS has developed one of 
the most important innovations. The explicit agenda of the Commission has embraced the 
role of tackling structural inequalities that lie beyond formal institutional arrangements.127 
The Court, for its part, has started to ‘confront cases of structural human rights violations 
the causes of which do not lie in the exercise of arbitrary state power but are rather the 
consequences of state weakness and failure to act’.128 In the words of Abramovich: 
In recent years, the [IAHRS] has increasingly confronted an agenda 
tied to the problems stemming from inequality and social exclusion. 
After enduring complicated periods of transition, Latin American 
democracies find themselves threatened by the sustained increase in 
social inequality and the exclusion of vast portions of the population 
from the political system and the benefits of development, which 
                                               
122 Art 1.1: ‘The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized 
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Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica (Advisory Opinion 1984) para 83.  
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imposes structural limitations on the exercise of social, political, 
cultural and civil rights.129 
 
Moreover, the ratification of regional human rights treaties directed at the protection of 
specific vulnerable groups is a sign of this trend.130 Two recently approved treaties, the 
Inter-American Convention against all forms of Discrimination and Intolerance (the Anti-
Discrimination Convention), and the Inter-American Convention against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination and Related Forms of Intolerance (the Anti-Racism Convention), 
represent the latest advances on the issue by international human rights experts. Although 
they still need to get more signings to enter into force, preparatory works are very 
important to understand the IAHRS’s scholarship on ADL. 131  For example, beyond 
providing a definition of discrimination, the Anti-Discrimination Convention makes 
explicit references to the concepts of intersectionality, indirect, structural or institutional 
discrimination, and general groundings for strong positive measures or affirmative 
actions. Moreover, it allows collective complaints mechanisms that can overcome the 
problem of identifying all of the claimants, as sometimes happens with the formal 
mechanisms of the ACHR.132 
 
The equality jurisprudence of the Court has had both ‘clarifying and confusing results’, 
but has made a great effort to provide a coherent framework for understanding the 
implications of the right to equality and non-discrimination in the Americas.133 Although 
the Court follows both the ECtHR and the US Supreme Court approaches to assess 
whether discrimination has occurred, it has recently developed, albeit imperfectly, its own 
ways to adjudicate cases in contexts of structural discrimination. Sometimes, the Court 
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adjudicates on the basis of ‘suspect clauses’, shifting the burden of proof from the 
petitioner to the state whenever a state measure uses a prohibited ground; however, it also 
uses the approach of the ECtHR, by applying a traditional proportionality analysis to 
discrimination cases.134 For some scholars, this jurisprudence is not very sophisticated, 
in part because the states’ defence strategies are not easily admissible in cases of blatant 
discrimination, so the tests cannot advance to future stages.135 If the defendant states 
cannot provide a prima facie justification for a discrimination complaint, the 
methodologies used to assess whether discrimination has taken place do not receive much 
feedback. In Atala, one of the few cases in which the Court set the stage for a conflict to 
be addressed through the use of tiers of scrutiny or proportionality analysis, the Court had 
the opportunity to clarify the issue, but the equality jurisprudence still remained 
somewhat puzzling.136 Overall, the Court has been reluctant to find a violation of article 
24 when it can establish that other rights have been violated in a discriminatory way, 
entailing a violation of article 1.1. Indeed, when a claim is based on a situation of 
structural discrimination, the Court has required that evidence produced, for example by 
UN or IACHR reports, which has an influence on the issue under discussion, must be 
directly concerned with the claims raised by the petitioner. 137 In a way, the situation of 
structural discrimination serves only as secondary evidence or as a background context 
when other rights are found to have been violated, or as a way to confirm an individual 
violation of other rights in cases of structural discrimination. The danger of the Court 
finding situations of structural discrimination only in the most egregious cases (eg, the 
massive numbers of killings of women in northern Mexico; and the situation of persons 
internally displaced by the guerrilla conflict in Colombia) is that it may thwart more 
sophisticated accounts of disparate impacts or indirect discrimination in the near future, 
when more complex issues will be brought to the system. In general, we can claim that 
an expansion of the concept of discrimination towards more sophisticated accounts of 
indirect discrimination or disparate impacts is not a plausible way forward for the 
development of the equality jurisprudence of the IAHRS in the near future. The fact that 
petitions reach the Court stage only through a decision of the Commission, and only after 
domestic remedies have been exhausted, narrows down the kind of discrimination claims 
that can be of interest for the development of the equality jurisprudence. If the wrongness 
of discrimination is not easily visible, or if there is a prima facie defensible stance to 
                                               
134 ibid 49.  
135 ibid 51. 
136 IACtHR, Atala Riffo and others v Chile (2012) para 125.  
137 IACtHR, Vélez Loor v. Panama (2010) para 251. 
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justify the challenged measure, for example, the IAHRS may prove reluctant to make a 
doctrinal contribution in the face of the many other issues that the region must address.  
 
Notwithstanding the abovementioned problems, and sometimes only as obiter dicta, the 
jurisprudence of the IACtHR has developed a social and substantive reading of the right 
to equality.138 In this way, for example, the IACtHR has said that the right to equality 
imposes a duty to accommodate cultural differences, especially in the context of 
indigenous peoples or ethnic minorities’ cases.139 Moreover, the general principle-right 
to equality and non-discrimination has been regarded as having the status of jus cogens, 
considered as one of the main exportations of the IAHRS to international human rights 
law.140 In a famous advisory opinion on the status of undocumented migrant workers, the 
Court stated that, 
the principle of equality before the law, equal protection before the 
law and non-discrimination belongs to jus cogens, because the whole 
legal structure of national and international public order rests on it and 
it is a fundamental principle that permeates all laws.141 
 
Thus, among the newer issues expected by Abramovich, probably the most important has 
been the development of a conception of substantive and effective equality derived from 
the textual basis of the ACHR, reaching up to the status of jus cogens, according to recent 
jurisprudence.142 As the Court said in 2005, regarding a group of victims of a right-wing 
paramilitary movement in Colombia that were in a situation of structural vulnerability,  
With regard to this situation of inequality, it is pertinent to recall that 
there is an unbreakable tie between the erga omnes obligations to 
respect and guarantee human rights and the principle of equality and 
non-discrimination, which has the nature of jus cogens and is crucial 
to safeguard human rights both under international law and under 
domestic venue, and which impregnates all actions by State power, in 
all its expressions. To comply with said obligations, States must 
abstain from carrying out actions that in any way, directly or 
indirectly, create situations of de jure or de facto discrimination, and 
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141 IACtHR, The Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants (Advisory Opinion 2003) 
para 101. 
142 IACtHR, YATAMA v. Nicaragua (2005) paras 184-5; Servellón-García et al. v. Honduras (2006) paras 
95, 112; ‘Mapiripán Massacre’ v. Colombia (2005) para 178; Apitz Barbera and others v. Venezuela (2008) 
para 209; and Atala (n 136) para 79.  
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they must also take positive steps to revert or change existing 
discriminatory situations in their societies, to the detriment of a given 
group of persons. This entails the special duty of protection that the 
State must provide in connection with actions and practices of third 
parties who, under its tolerance or acquiescence, create, maintain or 
foster discriminatory situations.143 
This paragraph summarises the Court’s general understanding of the principle-right to 
equality and non-discrimination: a right that includes both a negative warranty of neutral 
treatment and a positive duty of the state and third parties to create the conditions for the 
realisation of the principle of equality. Furthermore, through its remedial regime, the 
Court has approached these issues from a pragmatic stance, considering the institutional 
capacities of the countries and the coalitions and networks needed to overcome structural 
patterns of discrimination and disadvantage.144 Considering the problems of the equality 
jurisprudence mentioned before, this general stance must be approached with some 
nuances. However, the institutional role of the IACtHR is different from its European 
counterpart, as it has to deal with problems charged with policentricity that prevent it 
from being a mere fourth instance of appeal. In the words of a former judge of the 
IACtHR,  
Unlike other international tribunals and supervisory mechanisms, the 
IACourt has known how to assume (…) its institutional role as a 
human rights tribunal in the region where it operates: an agency for 
generating renewed Inter-American human rights law, which 
establishes, by means of addressing large themes in especially 
transcendent cases, the criteria which will guide the national courts in 
a broad process of their reception of Inter-American Law (…) 
Nowadays, the IACourt is an organ which emits general – but 
mandatory – guidelines for the formation of an American ius 
commune in its subject matter; in contrast, it is not – and never was – 
a jurisdictional organ of third or fourth instance; nor is it a tribunal 
designed to intervene repeatedly in innumerable cases of the same 
nature in order to affirm, through hundreds or thousands of 
resolutions, a consistent thesis.145  
Within this peculiar ‘institutional role’, we can assess the equality jurisprudence in a more 
integral way, by acknowledging the possible contributions of Inter-American Human 
Rights Law to the development of a Latin American ADL. Indeed, it has already provided 
reasons for developing a common understanding on the general tenets of the principle of 
                                               
143 ‘Mapiripán Massacre’ (n 142) para 178. 
144 A Huneeus, ‘Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court’s Struggle to Enforce 
Human Rights’ (2011) 44 Cornell International Law Journal 493. 
145 S García Ramírez, ‘The relationship between Inter-American Jurisdiction and States (National Systems): 
some pertinent questions’ (2015) 5 Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law 115, 124-5.  
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equality and non-discrimination among national courts and legal operators, and for the 
activity of social movements.146 In the second part of this thesis, the case law and the 
broader developments on equality and non-discrimination within the IAHRS will be 
crucial for understanding the main features of the transformative approach to ADL that I 
attempt to elaborate here.  
 
3.4 Conclusions 
Although a legal history of equality clauses in the region would require a separate 
research project, a historical insight is necessary to understand the recent boom in anti-
discrimination provisions within a trajectory that started in the independence era. This 
chapter has focused on giving a brief overview of the history of ADL in Latin America, 
influenced by the development of broader constitutional equality clauses, sub-
constitutional regulation, Inter-American human rights law, and the role of social 
mobilisation. The re-emergence of equality discourse has triggered the need to think 
about the groundings and boundaries of the current anti-discrimination programmes of 
regulation. In sum, this chapter has presented the raw legal materials and the ways in 
which they have emerged to constitute an anti-discrimination legal capital that should 
form the starting point for a normative reconstruction of Latin American ADL.  
 
Overall, we can say that the roots of an emergent ADL are somehow consolidated at both 
the level of substantive constitutional law and within the IAHRS; however, as mentioned 
before, that is not the case with statutory and administrative regulations, which should 
provide the lateral support or the corresponding infrastructure to protect anti-
discrimination rights. The need for further legal reforms in ADL compels us to think 
critically about the boundaries of this distinctive field of law and the need to bridge the 
divide between normative commitments and the proper institutional arrangements. The 
region may look to Europe or elsewhere to seek models of reform, especially in order to 
develop effective institutional arrangements for the protection of already recognised anti-
discrimination rights. However, it should not forget what it already has and the context 
in which it operates.  
 
                                               
146 see, for example, the influence of the case law of the IACtHR on the legislative proceedings of the 
ADLCHI. BCN, ‘Historia de la ley Anti-Discriminación n20.659’ (2013). 
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Chapter 4 Contemporary Latin American Constitutionalism: Egalitarian-Dialogic 
Constitutionalism as a constitutional conception of Anti-Discrimination law 
4.1 Introduction  
One of the most salient patterns in the recent constitutional transformations in Latin 
America is the commitment to overcome the social and political exclusion accumulated 
by a history of discrimination. Moreover, a great majority of Latin Americans consider 
themselves victims of discrimination, either directly or indirectly. Discrimination, then, 
is a constitutional problem. If discrimination is directly or indirectly attributed to the 
constitution, we may gradually lose fidelity to our recently launched constitutional 
projects. To understand the place of anti-discrimination commitments in Latin American 
constitutions, we need to give an overview of current constitutional debates, focused on 
the way in which domestic constitutional projects are addressing the main challenges in 
the region. This chapter starts by providing an overview of Latin American 
constitutionalism, focusing on the defining features of contemporary constitutional 
projects. It ends by establishing one of these projects as the main basis for developing a 
constitutional conception for ADL in Latin America. Although the chapter is based on a 
description of the current constitutional scholarship, it adopts a normative stance towards 
one of the schools or trends of Latin American constitutionalism that I claim 
accommodates better the challenges posed by discrimination. In other words, although 
this chapter relies on empirical claims regarding the features of different schools of 
constitutional thought, there is a normative shift from where I develop my preferred 
constitutional conception of ADL.  
 
I will focus on the ‘fifth period’ of Latin American constitutionalism, which goes from 
the end of the twentieth century to the present day, a period with historical records of 
stability and democratic transitions,1 and been characterised by intense constitutional 
experimentation, where ‘countries have increasingly sought their own solutions to their 
own challenges’, generating a diversity of constitutional arrangements.2 Moreover, this 
experimentation has led to internal or external tensions, expressed in different ways: a 
simultaneous expansion of forms of political participation and the centralisation or 
                                               
1 R Gargarella, Latin American Constitutionalism 1810-2010: The Engine Room of the Constitution (OUP 
2014) ix. 
2 M Mirow, Latin American Constitutions: The Constitution of Cádiz and its Legacy in Spanish America 
(CUP 2016) 240. 
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concentration of power in the hands of the Executive;3 greater democratic or institutional 
stability combined with electoral volatility, fragile party systems, and low public trust in 
representative institutions;4 and tensions between generous agendas of social rights, with 
a special emphasis on vulnerable minorities, and strong protection of property or 
investment rights, favourable to neoliberal developments.5  
 
These constitutional experiments do not preclude us from outlining common strands of 
constitutional ideas and setting the debate around three main schools of Latin American 
constitutionalism: Latin American Neo-constitutionalism (hereafter, ‘LANC’); New 
Latin American Constitutionalism (hereafter, ‘NLAC’); and Egalitarian-Dialogic 
Constitutionalism (hereafter, ‘EDC’). These schools of thought, I claim, have in common 
a transformative ethos that emerges as an organising principle for their main features, 
although in different forms. The different forms of doing constitutional scholarship entail 
developing concepts and constructs that can have an impact on reality, abandoning an 
idea of legal scholarship as implying scientific neutrality.6 In the description of each 
current, I will highlight their normative commitments, and the different ways in which 
they understand the role of law in producing social change. In particular, their differences 
will be of utmost importance when arguing for a Latin American constitutional 
conception of ADL, because the right to equality entails particular ‘challenges for 
comparative constitutional analysis as each jurisdiction’s response to equality is in 
significant ways dependent on the constitutional text in question (and the legislative 
framework) as well as each jurisdiction’s social and political history’.7 If, as argued 
before, Latin American ADL is grounded in constitutional equality clauses, then it is 
crucial to delve into contemporary constitutional debates. Furthermore, and although 
there are processes of institutional convergence in the region, the common legal discourse 
around Latin American ADL does not address the impact of different forms of 
constitutional scholarship on the protection of rights on the ground.8 In this way, this 
                                               
3 Gargarella (n 1) 155-65.  
4 K Roberts, ‘Parties, Party Systems, and Political Representation’, in P Kingstone and D Yashar (eds), 
Routledge Handbook of Latin American Politics (Routledge 2012) 48. 
5 M P Saffón, ‘Can Constitutional Courts be Counterhegemonic Powers vis-à-vis Neoliberalism? The Case 
of the Colombian Constitutional Court’ (2007) 5 Seattle Journal for Social Justice 533.   
6 A von Bogdandy, ‘The past and promise of doctrinal constructivism’ (2009) 7 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 364, 367. 
7 K O’Regan and N Friedman, ‘Equality’, in T Ginsburg and R Dixon (eds) Comparative Constitutional 
Law (Edward Elgar 2013) 473.  
8 A Huneeus, ‘Constitutional Lawyers and the Inter-American Court’s Varied Authority’ (2016) 79 Law 
and Contemporary Problems 179. 
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chapter also attempts to make a contribution to our ‘intellectual maps of 
constitutionalism’, which ‘tend to marginalize the experience of the developing world’.9  
 
4.2 The Latin American constitutional debate 
For Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Latin America is the region where the debate on the future of 
constitutionalism is debated with more intensity and urgency’.10 The importance of Latin 
America for constitutional academia may seem at odds with this region’s poor record on 
respect for basic standards of rule of law. Maybe, ‘the law of the Global South, or rather 
its inefficiency and lack of originality, can be of interest to sociologists, anthropologists 
and law professors interested in issues of social justice and the reforms needed to achieve 
it’.11  However, as stated in one of the volumes of The Cambridge History of Latin 
America, ‘[a]lthough constitutions have often been violated, most countries in the region 
are highly legalistic and take seriously constitutional precepts, even when they do not 
adhere to them’.12 Nowadays, even though the gap between constitutional commitments 
and political realities seems to be narrowing, the scope of constitutional challenges is 
expanding.13  
 
Constitutional projects of the ‘third wave’ have endorsed different forms of ‘aspirational 
constitutionalism’, that is, ‘the idea that the destiny of our societies depends in large part 
on having good constitutions’.14 In contrast with the traditional debate of the nineteenth 
century, focused on the legacies of the past (colonial era), nation-building processes, and 
material or economic interests, the contemporary debate is based on a productive and 
instrumental relationship between law and social change, on how law could become the 
cornerstone of social progress. It highlights the constitutive and instrumental dimensions 
of law: rather than the mere institutionalisation of expectations and interactions in the 
                                               
9 M Schor, ‘An Essay on the Emergence of Constitutional Courts: The cases of Mexico and Colombia’ 
(2009) 16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 173, 174. 
10 A von Bogdandy, ‘Ius Constitutionale Commune en América Latina: una mirada a un constitucionalismo 
transformador’ (2015) 34 Revista Derecho del Estado 1, 6.  
11  D Bonilla, ‘Introduction: toward a constitutionalism of the Global South’, in D Bonilla (ed), 
Constitutionalism of the Global South: The Activist Tribunals of India, South Africa, and Colombia (CUP 
2014) 6.  
12  J Hartlyn and A Valenzuela, ‘Democracy in Latin America since 1930s’, in L Bethell (ed), The 
Cambridge History of Latin America VI (CUP 1994) 158. My project asks what it means for Latin American 
constitutions to take seriously their anti-discrimination commitments rather than strict compliance with 
legal frameworks. In that sense, my project constitutes an exception to the idea ‘that constitutional 
scholarship only flourishes when the law in question binds the authorities’. von Bogdandy (n 6) 370. 
13 D Law and M Versteeg, ‘Sham Constitutions’ (2013) 101 California Law Review 863, 911.  
14 M García Villegas, ‘Law as Hope’ (Eurozine, 24 February 2004) <http://www.eurozine.com/law-as-
hope/> accessed 2 May 2015. 
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social sphere, law also ‘shapes our very imagination about social possibilities’ and 
‘provides strategic resources for the conduct of social struggle’.15 However, ‘how law 
matters depends on the complex, often changing dynamics of context in which struggles 
occur’.16 The following sections constitute an attempt to go beyond assessments of the 
efficiency of law as an instrument of social change, in an effort to provide an account of 
the place that constitutional law occupies in progressive political projects in Latin 
America.17  
 
During transitional stages, countries look to constitutional law as an instrument to 
navigate future challenges rather than as a mirror of past or current social, cultural or 
economic arrangements.18 One may plausibly claim that the main constitutional dispute 
is now concentrated on how to solve the challenges and persistent problems that still 
pervade the region, with a view to a more promising future. Moreover, even if the material 
basis of constitutions has been somehow displaced from constitutional discourse, the 
emphasis of the modern debate is on how to break the cycle of material inequality 
‘bequeathed’ by a history of segregation and political exclusion; the material basis has, 
rather, shifted to aspirations, isolating the constitutional debate from political economy.19 
All in all, constitutional law is considered as the darling of progressive thinking in the 
region and it has been coupled with several adjectives: ‘inclusive’, ‘transformative’, 
‘egalitarian’, ‘new’, and ‘aspirational’. 20  It has become the favourite idiom of 
emancipatory projects, and almost every progressive social reform has endorsed different 
versions of constitutional thinking. Nevertheless, despite the differences, some scholars 
argue that there is a common identity that allows us to speak of a ‘Ius Constitutionale 
Commune’, focused ‘on overcoming social exclusion through the triad of human rights, 
democracy and the Rule of Law’.21 The three most popular ‘schools’ of the contemporary 
                                               
15 M McCann (ed), Law and Social Movements (Ashgate 2006) xii. 
16 M McCann, ‘Law and Social Movements’, in A Sarat (ed), The Blackwell Companion to Law and Society 
(Blackwell 2008) 519.  
17 For Helena Alviar, the belief in the instrumental uses of law persists despite its frequent frustrations, 
signalling the importance of expanding the analysis of law and societal change, addressing also what law 
leaves untouched, unsaid or out of reach. ‘The redistribution of property in Latin America: Should we lose 
our faith in law?’ (2010) 5 Revista Internacional de Pensamiento Político 91.  
18 R Teitel, ‘Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation’ (1997) 106 Yale Law 
Journal 2009, 2014. 
19 García Villegas (n 14). 
20 ibid; von Bogdandy (n 10); M Alegre and R Gargarella (eds) El Derecho a la Igualdad: Aportes para un 
constitucionalismo igualitario (Abeledo Perrot 2007). Within the emergence of ‘adjectival 
constitutionalism’, that is, ‘the study of constitutionalisms with some modifier’, the Latin American 
constitutional debate is fundamental. M Tushnet, ‘Varieties of Constitutionalism’ (2016) 14 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 1.  
21 von Bogdandy (n 10) 6.  
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constitutional scene are concerned with the evils that the political regimes of the region 
are trying to address.22 They navigate around the central idea that constitutions should be 
directly and explicitly concerned with the main social and economic challenges of Latin 
America. If these challenges are not addressed, then responsibility could be attributed 
directly or indirectly to the constitutional content or structure itself.  
 
In the following sections I will provide a description of the contemporary constitutional 
trends in Latin America, explaining their origins, aims and institutional implications. This 
description will not attempt to look for the ‘best practice’ or the ‘most effective’ solution 
to a legal problem across the different jurisdictions, or to causally explain the current 
constitutional arrangements.23 By contrast, and assuming that ‘there are other forms of 
deep knowledge beyond description and classification, and alongside causal 
explanations’, I will attempt to implement an ‘hermeneutic procedure of comparative law 
that is not oriented towards isolatable relations of cause and effect, but rather towards an 
understanding that arises from a synthesis of a multiplicity of elements in their manifold 
relationships’.24 With this method in mind, I will provide reasons to conclude that EDC 
could overcome the failures and frustrations associated with LANC and NLAC in regard 
to bringing social change and democratic consolidation, becoming a synthesis of a 
multiplicity of elements in their manifold relationships.  
 
The three constitutional currents have some common features that should be highlighted 
before outlining their differences. Apart from their common origin, during the ‘third 
wave’ of democracies, they share a diagnosis: dissatisfaction with the performance of 
democratic regimes in achieving socio-economic equality, social inclusion and 
democratic consolidation.25 Another relevant point is their transformative ethos, as each 
current reserves a special place for constitutional law in the project of social 
transformation, a promise to perform better than alternative projects in bringing change. 
Furthermore, we should recall the basic idea that constitutionalism has always emerged 
from a certain trauma, an obsession with tackling certain problems that seem to require 
                                               
22 I speak of schools or currents to express the idea that the contemporary debate takes place around a 
scholarly debate. 
23 For an overview of different types of constitutional comparison, see R Hirschl, Comparative Matters 
(OUP 2014) ch6.  
24  A von Bogdandy, ‘Comparative constitutional law as social science? A Hegelian reaction to Ran 
Hirschl’s Comparative Matters’ (2016) MPIL Research Paper Series  
25 R Uprimny, ‘Recent Transformations in Constitutional Law in Latin America’ (2011) 89 Texas Law 
Review 1587; L Whitehead, Latin America: A New Interpretation (Palgrave 2006) ch6.  
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an urgent resolution.26 In the case of Latin America, each current promises to end social 
exclusion and marginalisation, and bring about better performances in socio-economic 
terms. In this regard, the description of each school’s defining features does not prevent 
us from highlighting their common normative stances. Finally, although each has 
different stances on the neo-liberal impacts on the region, they have all critically assessed 
the impacts of the economic system on fundamental rights.  
 
4.3 Latin American Neo-Constitutionalism 
Neo-constitutionalism has its origins in the post-war period, when human rights became 
the language of justice and social progress, and courts its best allies. It has been dominant 
in parts of Europe and Latin America,27 and is now considered both a constitutional model 
and a theory of legal analysis and interpretation.28 Originally, it was considered as a 
reaction against the failure of positivism in protecting rights, but later it adapted itself to 
‘inclusive positivism’, once it realised that most of the values, principles and fundamental 
rights were incorporated formally in the constitutional rule of recognition.29 However, the 
methodological commitments of neo-constitutionalism are closer to a clear rejection of 
positivist approaches to the study of law.30 From its different sources, we can draw its 
normative and institutional prescriptions, which are somehow straightforward: 
constitutional texts should be rigid (difficult to amend), have the force of law, and be 
interpreted and applied by independent judges that should remain isolated from external 
or internal pressures. Judges have to approach the constitutional text with specific rules 
of interpretation tuned to the moral content of the object under interpretation, and 
(generally) have the last word on what that constitution means.31 Within a strict division 
between law and politics, the neo-constitutional literature emphasises the incorporation 
of (international) human rights standards into the constitutional catalogue of rights, which 
should then be used as the standards of political legitimacy for every infra-constitutional 
provision. Then, the technique of balancing allows legal reasoning to apply constitutional 
                                               
26 Gargarella (n 1) ch4. 
27 The term makes sense only within Italo-Ibero-Latin American academic circles. J Fabra, ‘Una nota sobre 
el neoconstitucionalismo’, in J Fabra and L García Jaramillo (eds), Filosofía del Derecho Constitucional: 
Cuestiones Fundamentales (UNAM, 2015) 522. 
28  P Commanducci, ‘Modelos e Interpretación de la Constitución’, in M Carbonell (ed), Teoría del 
Neoconstitucionalismo (Trotta 2007) 52-3.  
29 J Etcheberry, ‘El ocaso del positivismo jurídico incluyente’ (2015) 67 Persona y Derecho 411, 413-4.  
30 P Commanduci, ‘Formas de Neoconstitucionalismo: un análisis metateórico’, in M Carbonell, Neo-
constitucionalismo(s) (Trotta 2009) 87.  
31 L Prieto Sanchis, ‘Notas sobre la Interpretacion Constitucional’ (1991) 9 Revista del Centro de Estudios 
Constitucionales 175, 176. 
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rights and principles to every legal conflict, as they are considered ‘optimization 
requirements’ that, through the weigh formula, have an answer for every set of 
circumstances.32 That explains the progressive constitutionalisation of all areas of law, 
and the direct or indirect application of the constitution in all public or private 
relationships. Despite maintaining the basic liberal arrangements for the organisation and 
separation of powers, it imbued both law-making and application processes with 
standards and principles of substantive constitutional law, opening the channels for moral 
interpretation.33 
 
The importation of neo-constitutionalism to Latin America has shaped new 
understandings of its main premises, so we should ask here about the distinctiveness of 
LANC. In Latin America, neo-constitutionalism has been associated with long and 
detailed constitutions, which could be explained by the legacy of processes of 
codification, and currently there is an inflationary trend of incorporating more 
fundamental rights and detailed regulations in constitutions’ catalogues.34 It has also been 
associated with new adjudicative practices, which were supported by a ‘growth industry’ 
of judicial reforms that has gradually changed constitutional practices.35 For LANC, the 
combination of more constitutional rights and stronger courts would increase the chances 
for social progress, specifically in the hands of ‘new more consequentialist, socially 
conscious and self-consciously progressive judges’.36 
 
In less than 20 years, the transnational scholarly debate turned very fast from discussions 
around sovereignty and non-intervention to a more cosmopolitan, integrated, and rights-
oriented legal realm.37 Indeed, there was a rediscovery of the open texture of legal texts, 
in which an active role of legal subjects was determinant in the production of legitimate 
aims. Moreover, such new legal readings shifted the focus from the previously dominant 
                                               
32 Constitutions irradiate their normative force to every part of the legal system, so there is no need to wait 
for the legal production of the legislature or the administration, and there is no space for ‘political question 
doctrines’. If constitutional rights are ‘optimization requirements’ that have a precise answer to a legal 
conflict (a rule, applicable to the case), then only judges have the final word. R Alexy, A Theory of 
Constitutional Rights (OUP 2002) 47.  
33 A Alterio, ‘Corrientes del Constitucionalismo Contemporáneo a Debate’ (2014) 8 Problema, Anuario de 
Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho 227, 234.  
34 J Melton and others, ‘To codify or not to codify? Lessons from consolidating the United Kingdom’s 
constitutional statutes’ (2015, The Constitution Unit UCL) 27-8. 
35 L Hammergren, Envisioning Reform: Improving Judicial Performance in Latin America (Penn State 
University Press 2007).  
36 D Brinks, ‘“A Tale of Two Cities”: The Judiciary and the Rule of Law in Latin America’, in Kingstone 
and Yashar (n 4) 66. 
37 A Huneeus. ‘Constitutional Lawyers and the Authority of the Inter-American Court’ (2016) 79 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 179.   
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statutory (textual) interpretation that was bequeathed by codification. This ‘turn to legal 
interpretation’ entailed the endorsement of ‘new interpretive theories’ that ‘are 
marshalled against the conventional practices of national courts and traditional 
commentators, which are in turn dismissed as pure legal formalism’. 38  The new 
conception of legal interpretation was seen ‘as a key to open the closed gates of legal 
formalism’, which were partially responsible for the conservatism of legal practice.39  
 
The predominance of this new conception of legal interpretation came along with 
extended access to justice mechanisms, where individuals sought in courts what was not 
available through the ordinary means of policy reform.40 In a continent with frequent 
representativeness crises, and manifold administrative shortcomings or weaknesses, 
courts applying open-textured constitutions with broad catalogues of human rights were 
seen as the main avenue for social progress.41 Throughout the continent, constitutional 
principles were to be applied under the pro-personae criteria in order to offer the best 
available protection for fundamental rights. These principles took the job of fitting a 
whole codified legislation –in many countries, a legacy from the nineteenth century- that 
was seen as detached from the social reality and as an unjust structure. Furthermore, if 
principles are ethical-political products of moral argumentation rather than legal rules 
with deontic structures, then nothing prevented judges from creating new constitutional 
principles not included in texts, if it was a requirement of justice or dignity in certain 
circumstances. 42  This new practice of adjudication promoted the exercise of strong 
powers of judicial review, including both the constitution and international human rights 
treaties as standards of review. During recent years, this practice has reached its peak with 
the doctrines of the ‘bloc of constitutionality’ (the idea of extended constitutions, which 
incorporate international human rights as standards of review)43 and ‘conventionality 
                                               
38 J Esquirol, ‘The Turn to Legal Interpretation’ (2011) 26 American University International Law Review 
1031, 1033. 
39 D López Medina, ‘¿Por qué hablar de una teoría impura del derecho para América Latina?, en D Bonilla 
(ed), Teorías del Derecho y Transplantes Jurídicos (Siglo del Hombre 2009) 46. 
40 This has been the case even when public trust in courts is still very low, and may be better explained by 
changes in constitutional opportunity and support structures. C Smulovitz, ‘Judicialization in Argentina: 
Legal Culture or Opportunities and Support Structures?’, in J Couso, A Huneeus and R Sieder (eds) 
Cultures of Legality: Judicialization and Political Activism in Latin America (CUP 2010).  
41 D Brinks and W Forbath, ‘The Role of Courts and Constitutions in the New Politics of Welfare in Latin 
America’, R Peerenboom and T Ginsburg (eds), Law and Development of Middle-Income Countries (CUP 
2014).  
42 L Streck, Verdade o Consenso (Saraiva 2014) 470-96.  
43 R Uprimny, Bloque de Constitucionalidad, Derechos Humanos, y Proceso Penal (Consejo Superior de 
la Judicatura 2006) 29-33.  
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control’ (the idea that judges, as state officials, are bound to apply the ACHR and its 
jurisprudence in the exercise of their adjudicatory powers).44 
 
The idea that there is a big gap between the ‘laws on the books and laws on the ground’ 
raises challenges that must be overcome by any legally driven project of social change. 
However, by placing the moral language of constitutions at the heart of social progress, 
LANC endorsed the image of ‘failed law’ in Latin America, suggesting that technical 
regulations and institutional coordination are somehow too far-fetched.45 The legitimacy 
crisis of legislatures and bureaucracies has resulted in judges becoming the main social 
actors in the project of changing reality through a flexible managerial approach, which 
allows judges to consult the best available technical expertise to find ad-hoc solutions.46 
The idea of a top-down, elite-based project that could highlight the failure of legislative 
politics and administrative activity in delivering public goods has turned into a common 
picture in many constitutional jurisdictions in the region. Therefore, the change that neo-
constitutional trends brought to Latin America was not only about entrusting judges with 
powers to enforce fundamental rights, but also about assuming a distrust of legislatures 
and its institutionalisation in different legal devices.47  
 
In Latin America, the idea of courts rather than executive or legislative powers addressing 
pressing social issues has become a common currency of constitutional law. The 
Colombian Constitutional Court has been seen as the model agent for social change.48 
For their part, the Supreme Court of Brazil, the Supreme Court of the Nation in Mexico, 
the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica, and the Argentinian 
Supreme Court are sometimes seen as the main followers of this new practice of 
progressive neo-constitutional adjudication.49 Moreover, because of the legitimacy crisis 
of legislatures, and the critiques of the hyper-presidentialist regimes that dominate across 
                                               
44 For a critical account of conventionality control, see J Contesse, ‘Inter-American constitutionalism: the 
interaction between human rights and progressive constitutional law in Latin America’, in C Rodríguez 
Garavito (ed), Law and Society in Latin America (Routledge 2014).  
45 J Esquirol, ‘The failed law of Latin America’ (2008) 56 The American Journal of Comparative Law 75.  
46 For Fernando Atria, neo-constitutional scholarship has ended up undermining the normativity of law and 
its ability to guide human behaviour, triggering a retreat to a pre-modern law, where the moral adjudication 
of judges have the power to decide what law means after the facts are considered. La Forma del Derecho 
(Marcial Pons 2016) 56. 
47 Alterio (n 33) 262-3. 
48 K Merhof, ‘Building a bridge between reality and the constitution: The establishment and development 
of the Colombian Constitutional Court’ (2015) 13 International Journal of Constitutional Law 714, 721. 
49 Although neo-constitutional adjudication has not always been progressive. Brinks, ‘“A Tale of Two 
Cities”: The Judiciary and the Rule of Law in Latin America’, in Kingston and Yashar (n 4) 68; J Gonzalez-
Bertomeu and R Gargarella (eds), The Latin American Casebook: Courts, constitutions, and rights 
(Routledge 2016).  
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the region, judges are seen as the last hope for those that are excluded from access to 
political or social channels to make their demands.50 Overall, despite their impact on the 
ground, these courts see themselves as contributors to the consolidation of democracy 
over time, fosterers of a constitutional culture, and developers of stronger civil societies.51  
 
As discussed above, LANC is a radical interpretation of the basic neo-constitutional idea 
that constitutions should emphasise their substantive (moral) over their procedural 
(political) dimension. In this scenario, a constitutional jurisdiction becomes the main 
actor in delineating the powers allocated to the legislative, the executive, and to ordinary 
judges, with an overarching view of protecting fundamental rights; to sum up, we could 
say, far from the state arrangements, closer to the citizen.52 The perspective of rights as 
‘trumps’ or as ‘the sphere of the undecidable’ was advanced in the region to the detriment 
of the majoritarian understanding of democracy.53 The institutional architecture of courts 
and the principle of procedural fairness, then, are considered a better warranty for the 
egalitarian protection of fundamental rights. 
 
4.4 ‘New’ Latin American Constitutionalism 
This term describes recent processes of constitution-making in Bolivia (2009), Ecuador 
(2008), and Venezuela (1999), and the interest it has aroused in their study in the Ibero-
American academic world. Although some authors include the Constitution of Colombia 
(1991) and other constitutional processes, there are structural differences with the latter 
processes.54 Thus, we should start by asking, what does ‘new’ mean when applied to Latin 
American Constitutionalism? According to its more prominent scholars, the newness lies 
in the radical democratic origins of constitutions, and the idea that for the first time Latin 
                                               
50 R Gargarella, P Domingo and T Roux, Courts and Social Transformation in New Democracies: An 
institutional voice for the poor? (Ashgate 2006). 
51 Brinks (n 49) 69. 
52  R Arango, ‘Fundamentos del Ius Constitutionale Commune en América Latina: Derechos 
Fundamentales, Democracia y Justicia Constitucional’, in A Bogdandy and M Morales (eds) Ius 
Constitutionale Commune en América Latina. Rasgos, Potencialidades y Desafíos (UNAM 2015) 27; 
Alterio (n 33) 241-6. 
53 Alterio above (n 33) 240. In a continent plagued by imperfect democracies, it is suggested, LANC does 
not even require a democratic theory of its own. P Salazar, ‘Garantismo y Neo-constitucionalismo frente a 
frente: algunas claves para su distinción’ (2011) 34 Doxa 289, 294. 
54 I agree with Pedro Salazar, for whom the ‘family resemblance’ should be thick enough to make the 
common patterns relevant. ‘El nuevo constitucionalismo latinoamericano (una perspectiva crítica)’, in L 
Gonzalez D and Valades (coords), El constitucionalismo contemporáneo. Homenaje a Jorge Carpizo 
(UNAM 2013) 349.  
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America can elaborate a constitutional project of its own.55 Moreover, some claim it is 
the first transformative project, because the liberal constitutional projects have always 
been designed and operated to protect the status quo (thus, the adjective postliberal).56 Its 
novelty also relies on the fact that it is the only current that explicitly stands against 
capitalism, articulating in constitutional terms the explicit endorsement of a certain 
political economy.57 Finally, its origins may lie outside of academia and closer to the 
processes of social mobilisation against the impacts of the Washington Consensus.58  
 
The most striking feature of NLAC is the priority of the ‘popular’, relocating the people 
at the forefront of constitutional law.59 NLAC, then, is the constitutional consolidation of 
new forms of populism; for its critics, a doctrine where a single source of power (the 
populist leader) appeals directly to the masses, through referenda or other participatory 
means, in order to maintain its legitimacy. 60  Although it shares with LANC the 
pervasiveness of constitutional law even at the margins of legal regimes, the priority is 
placed on the democratic rather than the legal dimension of constitutions.61 It claims a 
specific extra-constitutional origin in constituent assemblies that have a ground-breaking 
character in the history of Latin American constitutionalism.62 That leads NLAC to define 
the constitution as the expression of the will of the constituent power rather than a 
framework to limit and correct politics. Nevertheless, the ‘people’ do not only appear at 
certain special moments, challenging dualism and representative democracy.63 Moreover, 
NLAC reclaims a role for the people in constitutional interpretation. However, it is quite 
                                               
55 R Viciano and R Martínez, ‘La Constitución democrática, entre el neoconstitucionalismo y el nuevo 
constitucionalismo’ (2013) 48 El Otro Derecho 63. The symbolic dimension is also crucial for breaking 
with the old order, as illustrated by the new official names of countries (eg Plurinational State of Bolivia). 
56 J Wolff, ‘Towards Post-Liberal Democracy in Latin America? A Conceptual Framework Applied to 
Bolivia’ (2008) 45 Journal of Latin American Studies 31, 33.  
57 G Pisarello, ‘El nuevo constitucionalismo latinoamericano y la constitución venezolana de 1999: balance 
de una década’ (2009) <http://www.sinpermiso.info/textos/el-nuevo-constitucionalismo-latinoamericano-
y-la-constitucin-venezolana-de-1999-balance-de-una-dcada> accessed 27 July 2015. 
58  R Martínez and R Viciano, ‘Fundamentos Teoricos y Practicos del Nuevo Constitucionalismo 
Latinoamericano’, in R Viciano (ed), Estudios sobre el nuevo constitucionalismo latinoamericano (Tirant 
Lo Blanch 2012) 332. 
59  A Medici, ‘Nuevo constitucionalismo latinoamericano y giro decolonial: Seis proposiciones para 
comprenderlo desde un pensamiento situado y crítico’ (2013) 48 El Otro Derecho 15, 21.  
60 S Edwards, Populismo o Mercados (Norma 2009). 
61  R Viciano and R Martínez, ‘¿Se puede hablar del nuevo constitucionalismo latinoamericano como 
corriente doctrinal sistematizada?’ (2011) <http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/wccl/ponencias/13/245.pdf> 
accessed 20 May 2016. 
62 Martínez and Viciano (n 58) 310.  
63 NLAC avoids being associated with the kind of ideas proposed by Bruce Ackerman, which have been 
popular in Latin America to justify systems of constitutional control. B Ackerman and C Rosenkrantz, ‘Tres 
Modelos de Democracia Constitucional’ (1991) 29 Cuadernos y Debates 15. 
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different from several strands of popular constitutionalism, as it is known in the US 
constitutional debate.64  
 
Regarding constitutional arrangements, it distances itself from the classical separation of 
powers, not only because it gives predominance to the executive power in dealing with 
the most important daily issues of politics, but because it creates a fourth power (‘citizens’ 
power’, ‘social control and transparency power’, or a ‘participation and social control 
function’), which is in charge of supervising the way in which constituted authorities 
carry out the constituent power’s will.65  Mechanisms of direct democracy, then, are 
crafted in order to prevent the constituted authorities from deviating from the constituent 
power’s will.66 The constituent power has a permanent presence, and always retains the 
power to make the constitution anew. In this way, the rules of constitutional change are 
crafted in order to prevent67 or, even more so, exclude the participation of constituted 
powers.68 Along with LANC, it supports a ‘rigid’ constitution, with super-majoritarian 
rules of change and strong powers of judicial review. This architecture suggests that the 
intention of these constitutions is to freeze the constituent power over time, and keep alive 
the revolutionary spirit that originally animated it, as a threat against the potential abuses 
of constituted authorities.69 In that sense, at least regarding the power to interpret the 
constitutional text, it is committed to a kind of ‘originalism’.70 For some scholars, NLAC 
should recognise the openly political character of post-liberal methods of constitutional 
interpretation and leave behind the artificial boundaries between law and politics.71 In 
that regard, NLAC has taken seriously the counter-majoritarian objection to judicial 
review, and promoted the direct election of the members of constitutional courts, the 
                                               
64 For the connections between popular constitutionalism and constitutional practices in Latin America, see 
R Niembro and M Alterio (eds), Constitucionalismo Popular en América Latina (Porrúa 2013).  
65 Constitution of Venezuela, Title V, chV; Constitution of Ecuador, chV, title IV; Constitution of Bolivia, 
arts 241-242. 
66 Martínez and Viciano (n 58) 323. 
67 Constitution of Ecuador, art 441. 
68 Constitution of Bolivia, art 411; Constitution of Venezuela, arts 342-346. 
69 Martínez and Viciano (n 58) 332. The role of concentrated constitutional review in updating the political 
will of the constituent power has been a constant since the early case law of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice 
of Venezuela. See judgements of the chamber N3.167 (2002); N-160343 (2016). 
70 No scholar has used the term ‘originalism’ to defend the constitutional methods of interpretation used by 
the mixed systems of constitutional controls of NLAC. In some cases, originalism has implied using the 
proceedings of the constituent assembly to defend a certain point. In Bolivia, it is the main rule of 
constitutional interpretation, according to the Law of the Plurinational Constitutional Court (art 6). In 
Venezuela, following the constitutional endorsement of the Bolivarian doctrine (Constitution of Venezuela, 
art 1), the Supreme Tribunal of Justice refers to the writings of Bolivar to shed light on constitutional 
clauses, adding uncertainty to the outcome of the interpretive process. Judgment of the chamber N-160343 
(2016) s I.2. 
71 A Oquendo, ‘The politicization of human rights’ (2016) 50 NYU Journal of International Law and 
Politics 1.  
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possibility of rejecting nominations for these courts, and the opening up of the indictment 
of justices to the general public.72  
 
The constitutions of NLAC are filled with principles, and rules are required mainly when 
they are needed to articulate the will of the constituent power. 73  Moreover, these 
constitutions are comparatively more extended than the average: between 350 and 444 
articles.74 The extension may be explained as a product of the will of the constituent 
power, composed by the many, who needed to express their different aims, and in that 
sense restrain the powers of constituted authorities (specially, the legislative) while 
favouring greater powers of constitutional review. 75  NLAC’s constitutions include 
lengthy and detailed catalogues of rights, compared to other constitutions in the region, 
in some cases articulating the institutional protection that will be afforded to each right, 
considering its individual or collective dimension.76  
 
Although the constitutional structure of NLAC sounded radical to progressive legal 
scholars, the operation of democratic mechanisms of control has not been used in order 
to democratise the ‘engine room’ of constitutions.77 Indeed, processes of concentration 
and centralisation of power have eroded the declared commitment to public 
participation.78 Moreover, the hyper-presidentialist arrangements of NLAC have blurred 
‘the legal and political dividing line between the presidency as an institution and the 
persona of its holder’. 79  Furthermore, the incorporation of fundamental rights and 
mechanisms of direct democracy have not implied a radical redistribution of economic 
                                               
72 A Noguera, ‘El neoconstitucionalismo andino: ¿una superación de la contradicción entre democracia y 
justicia constitucional?’ (2011) 90 Revista Vasca de Administración Pública 167, 191-4.  
73  eg, the highly specific rules for a referendum included in ch XI, on constitutional reforms, in the 
Constitution of Venezuela.  
74 Along with the Constitution of Colombia (380 articles), these are the most extended constitutions in the 
region.  
75 Martínez and Viciano (n 58) 323.  
76 An overview of the rights protection system in NLAC in C Storini, ‘Derechos y Garantías en el Nuevo 
Constitucionalismo Latinoamericano’ (XV Encuentro de Latinoamericanistas Españoles, Madrid, Nov 
2012). 
77 Gargarella (n 1) 156, 172-177, 192-195. 
78 R Huber and C Schimpf, ‘Friend or Foe? Testing the Influence of Populism on Democratic Quality in 
Latin America’ (2016) 64 Political Studies 872.  
79  F Panizza, Contemporary Latin America: Development and Democracy Beyond the Washington 
Consensus (Zed Books 2009) 223.   
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power,80 or the improvement of environmental standards.81 Indeed, other centre-of-left 
political projects in the region have achieved better and more sustainable socio-economic 
outcomes under liberal constitutional frameworks.82 However, the assessment of social 
policies and their effectiveness in tackling socio-economic problems is still an object of 
debate. It is still not clear whether constitutional forms of neo-populism are necessary to 
achieve more egalitarian outcomes. In practical terms, the concentration of power in the 
hands of the executive power, infringements of judicial independence, and the restriction 
of civil liberties have been at the forefront of the agenda of NLAC, attracting criticism 
even from the radical left.83  
 
4.5. Egalitarian-Dialogic Constitutionalism 
As a current that is increasingly taking root in Latin American constitutionalism, its main 
sources can be found in the work of a progressive scholarship that is sceptical about both 
the premises of LANC and the operation of NLAC on the ground. The term draws from 
the writings of Roberto Gargarella, a combination of his active support for egalitarian 
constitutionalism and his works on the dialogical model of constitutional justice.84 Since 
the beginning of his career, he has advocated strengthening deliberative democracy, and 
gradually developed a theory of judicial review suited to the challenges of Latin American 
democracies. 85  During the last decade, he has attempted to reconstruct the Latin 
American constitutional tradition in order to understand what we could learn from 200 
years of constitutional history.86  
 
Like Gargarella, several scholars are somewhat frustrated by the performance of self-
declared progressive constitutional democracies in bringing about social change. 87 
                                               
80 The ‘boom of commodities’ has explained, in greater part, the increasing power of social policies in 
tackling poverty and inequality. N Birdsall, N Lustig and D McLeod, ‘Declining Inequality in Latin 
America’, Kingstone and Yashar (n 4) 163-171.   
81  R Lallander, ‘Entre el ecocentrismo y el pragmatismo ambiental: consideraciones inductivas sobre 
desarrollo, extractivismo y los derechos de la naturaleza en Bolivia y Ecuador’ (2015) 6 Revista Chilena 
de Derecho y Ciencia Política 109. 
82 McLeod and N Lustig (n 80). 
83 eg, International Commission of Jurists, Strengthening the Rule of Law in Venezuela (2014). 
84  Gargarella (n 1) ch 10; ‘We the People’ Outside of the Constitution: The Dialogic Model of 
Constitutionalism and the System of Checks and Balances’ (2014) 67 Current Legal Problems 1.  
85  R Gargarella, ‘Democracia Deliberativa y Judicializacion de los Derechos Sociales’, in Alegre and 
Gargarella (n 20).  
86 Gargarella (n 1). 
87  see, for example, critical accounts of the impact of the ‘social constitutionalism’ advocated by the 
Colombian constitution. H Alviar, ‘Distribution of resources led by courts: A few words of caution’, in H 
Alviar, K Klare and L Williams (eds), Social and Economic Rights in Theory and Practice (Routledge 
2015).  
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Originally, these scholars thought that judicial review and activist courts could trigger 
democratic deliberation and promote social justice, considering the difficult conditions in 
which electoral democracies have been working since the beginning of the 1990s.88 They 
supported novel forms of legal mobilisation, and developed their ideas on judicial review 
based on the practice of social movements, human rights clinics, or non-governmental 
organizations.89  In that sense, they first elaborated on sophisticated versions of neo-
constitutionalism and the potential contribution of courts to democratic consolidation.90 
However, they gradually realised how the perils of judicial elitism and conservatism may 
downplay the ultimate aims of progressive legal thinking in Latin America.91 As domestic 
and regional courts have been judicially assertive, going beyond (and against) the 
‘neoliberal’ original framework under which they were fostered in the beginning, they 
have ‘become a politically prized booty and now enjoy less degrees of freedom than their 
younger selves’.92 Furthermore, judicial activism has also become a tool for conservative 
interests, who have used courts to prevent changes achieved through majoritarian 
politics.93 Reacting to that, and to novel mobilisation strategies beyond courts, scholars 
from EDC started to reclaim the priority of the people in creating, crafting and 
interpreting constitutional arrangements. That is why they looked for support in popular 
constitutionalism, and began to welcome the democratic innovations of NLAC.94 After 
some years of witnessing the operation of these novel legal institutions on the ground, 
they realised, once again, how progressive social projects may be curtailed by the 
concentration of power, corruption and the restraint of individual liberties.95 Nowadays, 
and considering the repeated frustrations of progressive political projects, they still 
endorse the importation of some form of transformative constitutionalism into Latin 
                                               
88  For example, see D Lovera, ‘¿A quién pertenece la Constitución en Chile? Cortes, Democracia y 
Participación’ (2010) 11 Revista Jurídica de la Universidad de Palermo 119.  
89 C Rodríguez-Garavito and D Rodríguez-Franco, Radical Deprivation on Trial (CUP 2015); N Espejo 
and A Carillo, ‘Re-imagining The Human Rights Law Clinic’ (2011) 26 Maryland Journal of International 
Law 80. 
90 For the role of Latin American courts in consolidating democracy, see D Landau, ‘Political Institutions 
and Judicial Role in Comparative Constitutional Law’ (2010) 51 Harvard Journal of International Law 319.  
91 For critical approaches to ‘judicial elitism’, see Alterio and Niembro (n 64).   
92 S Botero, ‘Agents of neoliberalism? High courts and rights in Latin America’, in T Falleti and others 
(eds), Latin America Since the Left Turn (University of Pennsylvania Press, Forthcoming). 
93 MA Peñas, and JM Morán, ‘Conservative litigation against sexual and reproductive health policies in 
Argentina’ (2014) 22 Reproductive Health Matters 82. 
94  J González-Jacomé, ‘From abusive constitutionalism to a multilayered understanding of 
constitutionalism: Lessons from Latin America’ (2017) 15 International Journal of Constitutional Law 447, 
457.  
95 J Couso, ‘Radical Democracy and the “New Latin American Constitutionalism’ (SELA conference, July 
2014). 
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America, although within a critical reassessment of the liberal framework bequeathed by 
200 years of constitutional history.96  
 
Within the current debate, EDC stands for an update of the double commitment of 
foundational Latin American constitutionalism to the principles of collective self-
determination and individual autonomy. However, it remains sceptical about the current 
achievements: 
On the one hand, Latin American constitutions maintain a 
concentrated organization of power, pay little attention to the 
deliberative bodies, and seem to still be too hostile to popular political 
participation. On the other hand, these Constitutions have extended 
their statements of rights, over the years, in an unprecedented way, 
although without providing those rights with a proper institutional 
support.97 
The abovementioned ideals could hardly generate an abstract objection, but EDC is 
concerned with the question of what constitutional arrangements are best equipped to 
realise these goals in practice. Gargarella, at the end of his Latin American 
Constitutionalism, gives us some clues to understand the implications of his conception 
of constitutional law, but he lacks ‘a more concrete agenda to put forward’.98 EDC’s 
scholars are aware of the gap that exists between the double normative commitment and 
the constitutional practice of Latin America. However, they are also conscious of the need 
to reinforce, in an innovative way, the normative commitments that constitutes the 
‘trinitarian formula of the constitutionalist faith: a commitment to human rights, 
democracy, and the rule of law’.99 In that regard, the main challenge for the research 
programme of EDC is the translation of this double commitment in institutions able to 
address the current problems of Latin American societies. In what follows I will attempt 
to answer two questions that I think constitute the research agenda of EDC: What are the 
main features of EDC? And, more importantly, how can the institutional implications of 
EDC be materialised? 
 
                                               
96  R Uprimny, ‘The Recent Transformation of Constitutional Law in Latin America: Trends and 
Challenges’ (2011) 89 Texas Law Review 1587, 1599-1604.  
97 Gargarella (n 1) 206. 
98 see the critique of D Wei and P Privatto in their book review of Latin American Constitutionalism (2014) 
12 International Journal of Constitutional Law 256, 260. 
99 M Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An Integrated Conception of Public Law’ 
(2013) 20 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 605, 609. 
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The central feature of EDC is defined by an attempt to provide a ‘third way’ that can 
overcome the deficiencies of both LANC and NLAC. Although it shares with them a 
positive view of the relationship between law and social change, it puts forward a theory 
of law and legal reasoning that is inscribed in a broader theory of democracy attuned to 
Latin American problems.100 Political equality is the main driver of social transformation 
for EDC, avoiding the defence of a constitutional arrangement just because it brings moral 
and social progress. EDC acknowledges the difficulty in promoting ‘an egalitarian reform 
in an inegalitarian society, whose members lack the moral disposition necessary for 
making the reform their own’, and endorses constitutional reforms that go beyond mere 
institutional engineering, towards symbolic and ethical commitments with social goals.101 
The transformative ethos of EDC is explicit in the sense that discrimination, poverty and 
socio-economic inequalities are the main constitutional evils to be addressed (structural 
problems that commit all state action), and political equality is the best remedy against 
those evils.102  
 
Nevertheless, the most important innovation of EDC is a particular placing of law at the 
centre of social progress. It is characterised by a republican conception of law as a 
medium of social integration, as it is based in lifeworld discourses, but also as an effective 
mechanism of social coordination in complex and functionally differentiated societies, 
where the grounds of social integration do not rely on mere authority or divine sources.103 
In other words, law cannot just be posited, but, as a social system, needs to contribute its 
own conditions of legitimacy. This Habermasian idea, as applied to Latin America, 
becomes crucial to understand the relationship between constitutional law, legitimacy and 
the rule of law.104 EDC is then concerned with the political and institutional conditions 
under which law is created, and with the institutional conditions under which law is 
applied: a concern with deliberative politics, a theory of legislation that in Latin America 
must address the particular problems of presidential forms of government; and a theory 
of adjudication and judicial review, where the distinction between law and morals, and 
                                               
100 Compared to EDC’s literature on judicial review, theories of administration and legislation do not attract 
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101 Gargarella (n 1) 205. 
102 E Nino, ‘La discriminación menos comentada’, in R Gargarella (ed), La Constitución en 2020: 48 
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law and politics, is maintained to the service of democracy.105 If laws are created under 
democratic conditions that pay due respect to the principle of political equality, with a 
fluid communication between political public spheres and institutional sites of legal 
production, then there is an increased commitment to the positive character of law that 
shapes the way in which legal conflicts will be adjudicated. 106  This Habermasian 
influence was strongly visible in the late writings of Carlos Santiago Nino, who turned to 
political theory in order to argue that legal norms produced by inclusive democratic 
procedures have a presumption of validity, procedures capable of generating impartial 
decisions on issues that affect everyone.107 If those conditions are not met, adjudicatory 
processes must assume a dynamic role in the protection of deliberative politics.108 The 
relationship between a theory of deliberative democracy and methodological positivism 
is understood in a dynamic way, where the division of legal labour (the creation and 
application of law) does not imply complete isolation between law and morals, on the one 
hand, and law and politics, on the other. In that way, it acknowledges that law has internal 
resources, both in the stages of creation and application, although with different degrees 
and articulations, to put forward justice concerns; and also the radical indeterminacy of 
law, which generates the need to refer to legal procedures of adjudication to give a final 
word on a particular issue.  
 
Lastly, EDC’s research programme needs to highlight its commitment to institutional 
reform. Indeed, the main argument of Gargarella’s historical account points to the way in 
which the incorporation of progressive and substantive clauses in Latin American 
constitutions has not altered the liberal-conservative arrangement regarding the 
distribution of powers, which has remained highly centralised on the executive.109 The 
idea of entering into the ‘engine room’ is aware of the dangers of ambitious projects of 
social engineering that may suffer from hyperrationality, that is, the belief that reason has 
                                               
105 D López Medina, ‘La “Cultura de la Legalidad” como discurso académico y práctica política: un reporte 
desde América Latina’, in I Wences and others (eds), Cultura de la Legalidad en Iberoamérica: Desafíos 
y Experiencias (FLACSO 2014) 72-5. 
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parliamentarism. M Alegre, ‘Democracia sin Presidentes’, in Alegre and Gargarella (n 18). 
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sufficient ability to foresee all the consequences of legal reforms, without any concern 
for the processes required to achieve the aims of those reforms.110 While recognising the 
limits of legally-driven projects of social change, EDC stresses the institutional choices 
that are inscribed in constitutional decisions, which ascribe to different institutions the 
role of pursuing certain goals in particular social contexts.111 In a way, it revives the 
interest for the doctrine of a separation of powers, updating it as a concern for the ability 
of law in co-ordinating institutional efforts towards democratically chosen collective 
goals.  
 
EDC assumes that different state entities have a certain institutional role in addressing 
constitutional problems or duties that should be accountable before affected 
constituencies. The overarching ideal is to promote the virtues of deliberation and protect 
the value of collecting information from different sources, correcting initial preferences, 
addressing expert opinion, and incorporating previously excluded voices in the public 
debate.112  Then, the dialogical dimension of EDC is articulated as a methodological 
commitment to a kind of comparative institutional analysis that has a strong normative 
stance: the protection of political equality.113  Indeed, even if abstract considerations 
favour institutional choices for deliberation and dialogue in democratically elected 
bodies, EDC is concerned with addressing alternative institutional capacities that may 
assume a dynamic role in the long-term project of consolidating democracy and political 
equality. Moreover, EDC is concerned with extra-institutional spaces that may also play 
their part in fostering these ideals, like the emergent literature on social protest and 
popular constitutionalism in Latin America.114 
 
Overall, EDC is concerned with the role of law in developing the foundations of what 
O’Donnell called a ‘democratic rule of law’.115 In this way, EDC articulates a particular 
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relationship between law and social change, and between law and democratic 
consolidation. As a full and working democracy is yet to be consolidated in the region, 
the role of law becomes central to foster the quality of democracy. Accordingly, law and 
legal institutions may contribute ‘to the endogenous formation of preferences conducive 
to social change’ and to the generation of the political practices that are required for the 
entrenchment of the rule of law and constitutionalism in the region.116 EDC is looking for 
a middle path between an instrumental conception of constitutional law (the idea that law 
can directly transform social reality) and an extreme realist or sociological account (the 
idea that what really matters for democracy is not law, but societal attitudes). Therefore, 
the relationship between law and democracy is mutually reinforcing, and the historical 
problem of ineffective constitutions will not be solved only by a naked devolution of 
power from elites to rules.117 It is not only more regulation, but laws that could promote 
their own legitimacy and effectiveness. EDC, then, supports a constitutional conception 
of ADL that could itself be the driver of transformation, democratisation, and therefore 
legitimation.  
 
4.5 EDC as the best constitutional conception of ADL in Latin America 
In this last section, I argue that EDC provides different reasons to develop a particular 
constitutional conception of ADL in Latin America that both highlights its substantive 
commitments and its concern with an effective scheme of co-operation and dialogue for 
its enforcement. Although both LANC and NLAC consider anti-discrimination 
commitments crucial, I claim that they remain insufficiently focused on the institutional 
problems for the effective enforcement of ADL. On the one hand, and in the face of 
political crises and institutional blockades, LANC suggests that judges are the best 
‘institutional voices’ for those that suffer from discrimination in the region. In this line of 
analysis, and in the light of situations of structural discrimination, LANC has recently 
advanced different judicial mechanisms for the protection of the right to equality and non-
discrimination, such as the conventionality control or a structural approach to 
reparations. 118  However, this default reliance on judges, as a counter-majoritarian 
guarantee for politically powerless groups that suffer from discrimination, is done without 
any comparative institutional analysis, that is, any attempt to create the institutional 
                                               
116 Gargarella (n 1) 202.  
117  M Schor, ‘Constitutionalism Through the Looking Glass of Latin America’ (2005) 41 Texas 
International Law Journal 1, 7.  
118 T Antkowiak, ‘Remedial Approaches to Human Rights Violations: The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights and Beyond’ (2008) 46 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 351.  
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conditions for potentially more effective enforcement under alternative institutional 
arrangements. On the other, NLAC assumes that the principle of majoritarian rule and the 
permanent presence of the people (in the form of the subject of the constituent power) are 
the best guarantees for rights protection, advancing a certain ‘politicization of human 
rights’.119 In this case, it is suggested, the right to equality and non-discrimination is better 
served by the action of political organs. In other words, if LANC pushes towards some 
form of ‘depoliticization’ of anti-discrimination struggles, NLAC pushes for their 
‘politicization’. Although EDC is a current of Latin American constitutionalism that is 
yet to be developed, it provides a way out of this confrontation, where the emphasis is 
placed on the substantive commitments rather than on the particular legal ways of 
realising those commitments, or where alternative institutional processes for the 
enforcement of ADL are sidelined.  
 
EDC is explicit in its commitment to equality and non-discrimination, naming (structural) 
discrimination as one of the main constitutional evils to be addressed. It acknowledges 
the important symbolic and expressive character of this commitment, and its political role 
in defining the membership of the political community. Nevertheless, what distinguishes 
EDC is that, within the traditional constitutional structure, it supports the connection of 
the dogmatic with the organic parts of constitutions (that is, the catalogues of rights with 
the section on the distribution of powers), through the establishment of the foundations 
of institutional systems for the protection of rights.120 Although constitutions do not need 
to regulate each and every aspect of the institutional system for the protection from 
discrimination, they can provide a framework for its development.  
 
Recalling the institutional reasons that support a constitutional conception of ADL, EDC 
highlights the way in which constitutions matter for the development of an effective 
institutional scheme for the enforcement of the generous anti-discrimination 
commitments included in contemporary Latin American constitutionalism. As explained 
by Komesar, constitutions always entail explicit or implicit institutional choices, 
allocating tasks to different decision-making processes, usually either courts or political 
organs.121 EDC follows this approach and attempts to take it further: it aims to craft 
constitutional schemes that can foster the development of effective and comprehensive 
                                               
119 Oquendo (n 71) 31-42.    
120 Gargarella (n 1) 201.  
121 N Komesar, ‘The logic of the law and the essence of economics: reflections on forty years in the 
wilderness’ (2013) Wisconsin Law Review 265, 270. 
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enforcement mechanisms. Constitutions can enable state organs in regard to the 
development of an infrastructure for the protection of the right to equality and non-
discrimination, provide a degree of institutional coordination between different entities 
(multi-actor schemes), mainstream anti-discrimination commitments across all state 
activities, avoid fragmentation in the reading of non-discrimination commitments 
according to the different schemes for the protection of discriminated groups, and give a 
purposive and principled reading to the different articulations of non-discrimination 
commitments at the sub-constitutional level. Although statutory or administrative law can 
perform all of these functions, the role of constitutional law should not be underestimated. 
As I explained in chapter 2, the different kinds of reasons that support a constitutional 
conception of ADL are defined by the different tasks or functions that constitutions play, 
emphasising the need to approach the study of constitutional law from multifarious 
perspectives. EDC pays particular attention to the institutional and doctrinal reasons to 
develop such a conception.  
 
Doctrinally, the constitutional pledge to equality and non-discrimination, which is usually 
also the object of detailed legislative regulation, provides greater leeway for those in 
charge of the implementation of ADL at the sub-constitutional level. According to 
Fombad, the presence of constitutional support matters for the effective protection of the 
right to be free from discrimination.122 The incorporation of a general anti-discrimination 
clause at the constitutional level already provides incentives for a unified approach to the 
sub-constitutional reading of ADL.123 Moreover, the constitutional foundations of an 
institutional scheme for the protection of the right to equality and non-discrimination, 
such as the creation of an administrative entity in charge of the protection and promotion 
of such a right, have the potential to avoid the fragmentation of anti-discrimination 
protections, which may gain contingent victories at the legislative or administrative level, 
or the problem we know as the ‘hierarchy of grounds’.124  
 
                                               
122 C Fombad, ‘The Constitutional Protection against Discrimination in Botswana’ (2004) 53 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 139.  
123 P Lambert and D Scribner, ‘The Constitutional Recognition of Gender Equality in Chile and Argentina’ 
(Western Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Vancouver, April 2017). 
124 A Coddou and T Vial, ‘Estándares y criterios para la creación de un órgano anti-discriminación en Chile’ 
(2013) Anuario de Derecho Público 216.  
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Institutionally, constitutions can provide the foundations for ‘webs of accountability’,125 
a multi-task scheme that mainstreams anti-discrimination commitments,126 a multi-stage 
process for the protection of equality and non-discrimination,127 or the ‘infrastructure’ for 
a sophisticated equality regime.128 Constitutions can grant autonomy and a reserve a 
special role for NHRIs in the struggles against discrimination. Furthemore, they can 
allocate different anti-discrimination tasks, such as complaint-handling powers for 
autonomous agencies, and consultative powers to non-autonomous ones; enable 
associational rights that can articulate themselves in power channels against 
discrimination, or third parties that can bridge the enforcement dilemma (eg, collective 
associations, unions); expand the rules of standing for certain constitutional writs or 
actions against discrimination; or, at least, clarify the role of courts in cases of structural 
discrimination.   
 
Enabling third party-controllers (eg, governmental agencies, or even NGOs that may 
serve in the public interest) is an example of how constitutions may strengthen an 
institutional system for the protection of anti-discrimination rights. Indeed, as proposed 
by Brinks and Botero, third-parties not only have some control in the realisation of the 
relationship between the first and second parties (the duty and the right-bearers), but 
‘might also (…) be facilitators, who provide support for first and second party actors in 
their interactions with controllers (for example, lawyers, NGOs, victim support groups, 
even neighbors)’. 129  This is even more important ‘when the second parties are 
disadvantaged relative to the first parties’, so ‘third party facilitators might be as or more 
important than controllers’.130 
 
                                               
125  M Taylor and V Buranelli, ‘Ending up in Pizza: Accountability as a problem of Institutional 
Arrangement in Brazil’ (2007) 49 Latin American Politics and Society 59.  
126 J Shaw, ‘Mainstreaming Equality and Diversity in European Union Law and Policy’ (2005) 58 Current 
Legal Problems 255.  
127 Lambert and Scribner (n 123).  
128 J Suk, ‘An Equal Rights Amendment for the Twenty-First Century: Bringing Global Constitutionalism 
Home’ (2017) 28 Yale Journal of Law & Feminism 381.  
129 Brinks and Botero, ‘Inequality and the Rule of Law: Ineffective Rights in Latin American Democracies’, 
in D Brinks and others (eds), Reflections on Uneven Democracies: The Legacy of Guillermo O'Donnell 
(Johns Hopkins University Press 2014) 220. 
130 ibid 221. In a recent comparative study, scholars showed how organisational rights do matter for the 
protection of rights on the ground. These rights ‘aid the establishment of organizations (…) that have the 
incentives to safeguard the right as well as the means to act strategically to protect it from government 
repression (…), a built-in mechanism that addresses the collective-action problem inherent in individual 
rights protection’. A Chilton and M Versteeg, ‘Do Constitutional Rights Make a Difference?’ (2016) 60 
American Journal of Political Science 575. 
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An interesting example, in this regard, is provided by the still underdeveloped equality 
regime that emerged after the enactment of the Equality Act in the UK (2010), which has 
clear constitutional dimensions.131 In this regime, the harmonisation of previously created 
public sector equality duties, and the unification of powers in the hands of the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission, constitutes an interesting approach to understand the 
relationships between EDC and ADL. The self-determination of concrete and measurable 
equality and non-discrimination objectives by public/private bodies, which are at the 
same time subject to regulatory monitoring by the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission, and to a potential judicial review process, constitutes an important 
implementation of reflexive/responsive approaches to the enforcement of ADL. 132 
Indeed, by relying on equality objectives declared by organisations themselves, 
objectives that include a certain pattern of distribution (eg, to have a certain distribution 
of gender positions at the end of a certain period), these practices invite third-party 
controllers to collaborate on the enforcement of measurable commitments, and provide a 
background role for courts in this web of accountability.133  
 
In Latin America, there are several examples of constitutional mandates for the enactment 
of special anti-discrimination statutes, 134  the creation of national anti-discrimination 
programmes or plans, or even the creation of NHRIs with the role of protecting human 
rights in general, and equality and non-discrimination in particular.135 Once created, this 
constitutionally mandated governmental activity is subject to judicial review that may be 
triggered by NHRIs, other public entities, or even the wider public. Acknowledging the 
underdeveloped institutional capacities in Latin America, EDC assumes that courts will 
always be crucial actors of last resort for particular cases of discrimination, especially 
considering that discriminated groups are usually politically powerless, and have 
restrained access to the institutional schemes for the enforcement of ADL. In some ways, 
these emerging trends suggest that ADL in Latin America may be moving towards some 
form of reflexive/responsive approach towards the realisation of anti-discrimination 
                                               
131 J Sigafoos, ‘Using Equality as a Sword’ (2016) 16 International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 
66. 
132 MA Stephenson, ‘Mainstreaming equality in an age of austerity: What impact has the Public Sector 
Equality Duty had on work to promote gender equality by English local authorities?’ (DPhil Thesis, 
Warwick University, 2016) 44-8.  
133 In this way, the enforcement of ADL can address Alexander Somek’s critique; he argued that the 
normative deficiency of ADL, that is, the absence of a measurable pattern of distribution in the anti-
discrimination norm, ends up fallling prey to moralism. Engineering Equality: An essay on European Anti-
Discrimination Law (OUP 2011) 142-5.  
134 Constitution of Argentina, art 75.23. 
135 Constitution of Mexico, art 102; Constitution of Bolivia, art 222.   
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commitments. 136  The frequent emergence of dialogical practices in Latin America 
constitutes a novel object of research that is increasingly gaining attention, although 
mostly focused on the role of higher courts in triggering forms of institutional dialogue 
or participation of affected individuals or communities. In what follows, I will show some 
examples at regional and domestic levels.137  
 
Regarding the IAHRS, the practices of ad-hoc supervisory mechanisms of compliance 
crafted by the IACtHR are an interesting example of enabling third party controllers that 
can bridge the distance with the standards according to which judgments are assessed in 
domestic contexts with varying institutional capacities.138 Moreover, and for the same 
reasons, EDC has critically addressed the doctrine of ‘conventionality control’, according 
to which domestic judges should refrain from the application of any law that may 
contravene the object and aim of the ACHR. The critique has been grounded on the idea 
that democracies are allowed to seek and decide on the best institutional arrangements to 
give effective protection to their international obligations. Conventionality control, it is 
said, should not preclude the institutional possibilities that countries may explore for 
complying with international obligations, that is, democratic deliberation on the domestic 
distribution of powers.139  Under EDC, the relationship between national and supra-
national legal regimes is characterised by regional/transnational dialogues that must 
respect both democracy and human rights, that is, dialogues that could synergically 
reinforce the institutional capacities that domestic democracies have, and that develop 
clear criteria for triggering sound supra-national judicial interventions.140 These examples 
suggest that EDC is continually seeking the best potential institutional arrangement that 
can support sustainable compliance with the substantive equality commitments that 
derive from the IAHRS.   
                                               
136 If reflexive regulation acknowledges the different logics and dynamics of communication between 
subsystems of a system of regulation (eg, the discourse of courts, or the logic of unipersonal agencies), 
responsive regulation attempts to be transparent regarding the substantive aims and open to instances of 
participation and deliberation that may improve regulatory outcomes. While reflexive regulation places law 
as one system of communication among others, responsive approaches have created more space for the 
particular role that legal processes may play in the achievement of the declared aim and its capacities to 
enhance co-operation and dialogue towards that enterprise. Stephenson (n 132) 48. 
137 R Gargarella, ‘El Nuevo constitucionalismo dialógico frente al sistema de frenos y contrapesos’, in R 
Gargarella (ed), Por una Justicia Dialógica: el Poder Judicial como promotor de la deliberación 
democrática (Siglo XXI 2014).  
138 A Huneeus, ‘Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court’s Struggle to Enforce 
Human Rights’ (2011) 44 Cornell International Law Journal 493, 529-30. 
139 J Contesse, ‘¿Última Palabra? Control de Convencionalidad y Posibilidades de diálogo con la Corte 
Interamericana de derechos humanos’, in Derechos humanos: posibilidades teóricas y desafíos prácticos 
(Libraria 2014). 
140 J Contesse, ‘Resisting Inter-American Human Rights Law’ (2018) 44 Yale Journal of International Law 
forthcoming). 
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On a domestic level, let us explore the example of Mexican ADL as an early attempt of 
EDC. In 2001, a constitutional amendment incorporated a general prohibition of 
discrimination with an open list of protected grounds,141 which fostered the creation, in 
2003, of CONAPRED (an administrative agency with investigative, educative, 
consultative, and complaint-handling powers, created by a law that declared that 
discrimination entailed a social interest and a public order issue).142 Subsequently, in 
2011, a new constitutional amendment established that international human rights treaties 
have constitutional hierarchy, and included other modifications regarding constitutional 
remedies.143 In this scenario, the Mexican NHRI (the National Commission of Human 
Rights), created in 1992, had to accommodate this new scheme for the protection of 
equality and non-discrimination. While the Commission constitutes an NHRI that 
complies with international human rights standards (Paris Principles), CONAPRED is a 
decentralised body of the federal government (it depends on the Secretaria de la 
Gobernacion). Although both entities participate in the creation of the four-year Human 
Rights Plan, CONAPRED has a special duty to create an anti-discrimination 
programme.144 In these plans or programmes, all public entities are invited to participate 
in the construction of their own human rights or anti-discrimination objectives, which 
should be translatable to measurable indicators that are subject to monitoring by either 
the Commission or CONAPRED.145 Currently, both the Commission and CONAPRED 
have powers to receive discrimination complaints: if the former has the power to issue 
non-binding individual or general recommendations, the latter has the power to impose 
administrative sanctions and issue reparation orders for complaints against ‘actions, 
                                               
141 Constitution of Mexico, art 1.5.  
142 Consejo Nacional de Derechos Humanos, La discriminación y el derecho a la no discriminación (CNDH 
2016) 20. ADLMEX, art 1.  
143 Constitution of Mexico, art 1.2.  
144 CONAPRED, Programa Nacional para la Igualdad y No Discriminación 2014-2018 (Diario Oficial 30 
April 2014).  
145  The Mechanism for Follow-Up and Evaluation of the Human Rights Programme in Mexico City 
(Federal District) includes special anti-discrimination duties. Although this mechanism is an instrument of 
soft law, supervised by the Human Rights Commission of Mexico City, among other organs, the relevance 
of creating real, plausible and measurable objectives that can prevent discrimination can be said to be the 
foundations of public sector equality duties (PSED) in the region. Evidence Lessons from Latin America, 
‘Making Human Rights Real: Two Latin American experiences in the rights-based approach to 
policymaking’ (2012, Ella Network) 2-3. The rights-based approaches in Mexico and Argentina are the 
most sophisticated mechanisms for transforming human rights standards into concrete indicators. In both 
cases, what we see is an explicit reliance of these programmes in the constitutional duties of mainstreaming 
equality and anti-discrimination (Constitution of Argentina, art 75.23; Constitution of Mexico, art 1.3). 
However, we still need to see what the role of the courts could be in the enforcement of these programmes, 
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dialogues organised by public authorities.  
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omissions, or social practices’ considered discriminatory;146 while the former deals with 
complaints against public authorities, the latter can also deal with complaints against 
private actors.147 The anti-discrimination powers of these entities are supposedly well co-
ordinated, and if one individual or group has triggered a complaint against a public 
authority before the Commission, CONAPRED is prevented from beginning a new 
case. 148  Furthermore, if the Council believes that its institutional capacities are 
overloaded or if it anticipates a political conflict, it can raise a case or an issue before the 
Commission, which has greater autonomy, financial support and legal powers to address 
a particular problem, despite the lack of sanctioning powers.149  For example, at the 
request of CONAPRED,150 the Commission has the power to address a case and make 
general recommendations or trigger an action of unconstitutionality before the Supreme 
Court of Justice of the Nation, which entails a process of abstract constitutional review 
of certain legislation at either the national or state level.151 In several cases, the combined 
activity of both organs, triggered by individual or collective anti-discrimination 
complaints, or even by their own initiative, has ended up in a policy reform that protects 
the rights of discriminated groups, such as people with disabilities, LGBT minorities, or 
people living with HIV. For example, in one landmark case, and after a TV chronicle that 
showed the structural discrimination suffered by people with disabilities in the airport of 
Mexico City, the Human Rights Commission of the Federal District, created by the 
constitutional mandate included in article 102.B, and CONAPRED, decided that the latter 
would initiate a complaints (queja) procedure to determine public responsibilities. In an 
expedient procedure, CONAPRED opened public hearings, consulted expert opinions, 
and required several documents to issue its judgment.152 A few months later, the Secretary 
of Transport and the National Directorate for Civil Aviation issued an administrative 
regulation to warrant the accessibility for people with disabilities to aviation facilities. In 
most of these cases, authorities have complied with the judgments of CONAPRED or the 
                                               
146 In the case of CONAPRED, the binding administrative sanctions include different reparation measures 
(among others, restitution, compensation, public sanction, public pardon, and a general warranty of non-
repetition). If these measures are not complied with, CONAPRED can start judicial proceedings. 
ADLMEX, arts 83, 83bis.  
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2014.  
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150 Internal Regulation of the National Commission of Human Rights, art 11.  
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recommendations issued by the Commission(s), but the judicial stage is always open: 
CONAPRED can resort to a judge in the case of lack of compliance with its resolutions, 
or the Commission can ‘file accusations and complaints with the appropriate authorities’, 
including litigation in some specific cases. 153  Up to this point, however, the 
administrative equality regime, combining both autonomous and non-autonomous state 
entities, has preferred a collaborative and non-litigious approach to address situations of 
structural discrimination. 
  
In Chile, the lack of a constitutional anti-discrimination clause, and a statutory duty 
included in the recently enacted ADL that is highly abstract and not subject to supervision 
by any administrative entity, have ended up reducing the protection from discrimination 
to the availability of judicial remedies. The statutory duty, included in article 1.2 of the 
Chilean ADL, which forces every state entity to enact measures against discrimination, 
has been considered too abstract, and is by-passed by several organs, especially 
considering the lack of supervisory mechanisms. 154  This statutory duty includes no 
deadlines, no specific way of complying with it, and no measurable objectives that public 
entities should address.155  
 
In Argentina, for its part, the combination of a constitutional mandate for positive equality 
duties, which favoured the creation of INADI,156 the autonomy of the defensoría del 
pueblo,157 and the commitment to the protection and promotion of fundamental rights,158 
provide support for a multi-actor scheme for the protection of the right to equality and 
non-discrimination.159 There are several examples where complaints raised before the 
INADI have subsequently been transferred to provincial or local defensorías, and, as a 
last resort, the issue may be assigned to the federal Defender of the People, who can 
activate formal judicial remedies.160 In other cases, reports elaborated by INADI have 
been considered crucial for the adjudication of anti-discrimination claims raised by the 
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Defender of the People or by other collective associations through the constitutional 
remedy of amparo.161 Moreover, the intense policy experiments with anti-discrimination 
plans at both the national and local levels, entailing different public and private actors, 
constitute a pioneering example for the enforcement of ADL in Latin America.162 In a 
way, the emergence of reflexive-responsive schemes for the creation and enforcement of 
human rights programmes or plans opens up the path for the development of native forms 
of public sector equality duties in Latin America.163 
 
EDC considers that constitutions are fundamental for the development of responsive 
approaches to the enforcement of constitutional commitments. Indeed, constitutions are 
considered not only the repository of shared values that cannot be ignored, but also the 
enablers of schemes of communication and co-operation between different actors that 
should be engaged in the enforcement of its clauses. In this way, constitutions may favour 
responsive approaches for the legislative and administrative enforcement of ADL, by 
establishing mainstreaming duties for including the concerns of the right to equality and 
non-discrimination in every state activity, while leaving the details of concrete 
regulations to institutional implementation and public-private interaction. However, 
constitutions are at the same time fundamental due to their role in avoiding the dangers 
of reflexive/regulatory approaches that question the normative force of law. Indeed, by 
guaranteeing a special role for courts in the protection of human and fundamental rights, 
EDC acknowledges that power asymmetries are crucial for the enforcement of 
constitutional commitments. Although there is space for regulated bodies to develop their 
own solutions, or craft their own anti-discrimination objectives, a ‘clearly defined 
pyramid of enforcement’ must be put in place ‘if those solutions do not meet the 
objectives that regulation is designed to achieve’; indeed, ‘there is no space for 
deliberation about whether to take any action at all.’ 164 In other words, by providing a 
space for legislatures, administration, and the judiciary in the enforcement of ADL, 
                                               
161 see, for example, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (Argentina), Sisnero, Mirtha Graciela y otros 
cl Taldelva SRL y otros s/amparo (2014). Here, INADI presented an amicus curiae describing the general 
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enforcement of ADL in Latin America. ACNUDH, Hacia un plan nacional contra la discriminación en 
Argentina (INADI 2005).    
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453. 
164 Stephenson (n 132) 48. 
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constitutions have the opportunity to create institutional architectures or infrastructures 
that can help in the realisation of its commitments. 
  
4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter explained the features of three schools of constitutional thought currently 
present in Latin America, which have emerged from the desires embedded in allegedly 
aspirational constitutions. LANC and NLAC have been presented as different modes of 
articulating the relationship between law and social change, but have also been criticised 
for their insufficient democratic premises or for the real impact of their constitutional 
innovations.  
 
In this scenario, EDC presents itself as a ‘third way’, which is increasingly taking root in 
Latin American constitutionalism, to overcome the deficiencies exhibited by LANC and 
NLAC. As I said before, it is a kind of ‘synthesis of a multiplicity of elements in their 
manifold relationships’.165 In this regard, EDC is based on a combination of empirical 
claims regarding the frustrations or the real impact of the other schools of constitutional 
thought, and a set of normative commitments that need to be reinforced and articulated 
in innovative ways. Surely, the realisation of these commitments is a working project, 
because we can not say that Latin American legal regimes are defined by their robust 
channels of dialogue, deliberation, institutional coordination, or democratic participation. 
Indeed, we may think the opposite. However, as a constitutional scholarship that is 
expanding, EDC needs to keep developing concepts and ideas with a view to impact and 
transform reality. The following features of EDC can be highlighted: first, it considers 
that the constitution is mainly a configuration of power, although with a radical 
commitment to the realisation of democracy and the protection of human rights; along 
with NLAC, it relies on external legitimacy, assuming that constituent assemblies are a 
regulative ideal of utmost importance; regarding the organic distribution of powers and 
functions, it is committed to institutional choices oriented towards the protection of 
political equality, and to different forms of public dialogue (either in the structure of 
judicial review, the implementation of a deliberative bureaucracy, or a renewed theory of 
legislation); its endorsement of the priority of the political process, and the constitutional 
institutionalisation of the conditions of legitimacy of the former; its defence of forms of 
dialogue and interaction with international orders that could protect both the values of 
                                               
165 see 4.2. 
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democracy and human rights (‘weak conventionality control’); and, finally, its 
commitment to a republican conception of law that accommodates a revitalised version 
of positivism as a legal theory. As a current that is increasingly taking root in 
constitutional scholarship, it has yet to attract more attention, especially regarding a 
democratic theory of administration, and a renewal of the debate around executive-
legislative relations within a normative commitment to political egalitarianism. 
Nevertheless, it is the latest answer to the challenges of a region that, even more than 
before, is plagued by a dynamic constitutional scholarship.  
 
As I explained in the last section, and considering the first two chapters, where I mapped 
the different kind of arguments that support a constitutional conception of ADL, and 
described the history of Latin American ADL, EDC stands as the ideal project to embed 
a transformative approach to ADL in the region. Specifically, it supports constitutions 
that can create the conditions for effective enforcement of the already generous anti-
discrimination commitments of recent constitutional transformations. EDC attempts to 
carve out constitutional ‘engine rooms’ in order to fulfil the promises of anti-
discrimination provisions and develop forms of comparative institutional analysis to seek 
the best guarantees of political equality. The first part of this thesis, then, concludes by 
advancing a particular constitutional conception of ADL that acknowledges the synergic 
relation between law and social change, on the one hand, and law and democratic 
consolidation, on the other. The need to improve regional records on the respect for the 
rule of law must be addressed through more democracy and human rights, by 
strengthening EDC’s double commitment to collective self-determination and individual 
autonomy. As it currently stands, EDC constitutes an interesting though underdeveloped 
school of constitutional thought, with many challenges ahead. With all its normative and 
institutional commitments, EDC seems to be the most interesting answer to the challenges 
posed by widespread practices of discriminations. It is an innovative attempt to enforce 
the already generous commitments to anti-discrimination of recent constitutional 
transformations. However, to understand the place of ADL within this project, we need 
to critically address the problems discrimination poses for legal regulation and 
institutional arrangements, and the many different dimensions that discrimination entails. 
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SECOND PART: A CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY OF ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION LAW IN LATIN AMERICA1 
 
The two dimensions of EDC highlighted in the last chapter should prompt further studies 
on ADL in Latin America. In particular, its explicit commitment to tackling 
discrimination and its concern with adequate infrastructures for the effective enforcement 
of ADL provide support for studies on the role that constitutions play in developing 
particular anti-discrimination regimes. In general, aspirational constitutions of the recent 
era, which are committed to equality and non-discrimination, need to be understood as 
serious attempts to end the traumas or evils that shape their clauses, despite the imperfect 
institutional arrangements that attempt to make those commitments effective. A recent 
history of dictatorships and political turmoil, and a longstanding colonial legacy of 
economic inequality and racial and social hierarchies are definitely crucial to 
understanding recent constitutional (trans)formations. However, it is also important to 
address the institutional capacities that different constitutional arrangements contemplate 
in regard to tackling discrimination. In this context, rather than a purely normative 
analysis of the principles or values embedded in these transformations around ADL, the 
research programme of EDC entails ‘a sociologically informed approach’ towards the 
study of ADL, addressing the sociopolitical realities around legal institutions.2  
 
However, even before EDC’s becoming of age as a (legal) research programme, one 
needs to critically understand the phenomenon under study, in this case, discrimination 
in Latin America, and the role of law in addressing it.3 In other words, a constitutional 
conception of ADL grounded in EDC needs to move the project forward by developing 
an analysis of the problems it needs to address. The idea of a normative reconstruction I 
advanced in the introduction suggests that the legal standards of justice we apply when 
we deploy the provisions of ADL are not the outcome of independent procedures that are 
detached from the analysis of society. In other words, the task of normatively 
                                               
1 I use the terms critical theory or critical social theory as synonyms. 
2 M Garcia Villegas, ‘A Comparison of Sociopolitical Legal Studies’ (2016) 12 The Annual Review of Law 
and Social Science 25. A sociopolitical vision of law understands that ‘law cannot be understood outside 
of its social and political dimensions’. In contrast to legal formalism, it supports the idea of relative legal 
autonomy (from society) and relative legal neutrality (from political power). (27-8).  
3 In this way, it warns against the unintended effects of theoretical discussions around the question of 
whether ‘critical legal studies’ were a consolidated legal theory or tradition in the US. These discussions 
ended up occluding or impeding critical socio-legal research in regard to what was happening with 
(neo)conservative backlashes to civil rights that started to dominate the political debate in the 1970s-1980s.  
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reconstructing Latin American ADL entails not only the application of binding legal 
provisions to an independent social reality, but an analysis of the social structures and 
behaviors that explain discrimination, and the ability of law in tackling that problem. 
However, the idea of normative reconstruction does not ‘leave the business of social 
analysis to the empirical studies of social sciences’, but attempts to combine empirical 
and normative claims in the analysis of social phenomena such as discrimination. 4 
Indeed, the task of ‘processing and sorting out the empirical material’ is carried out 
according to their internal efficacy and normative achievements, to their ‘significance for 
the social embodiment and realization of socially legitimated values.’5 In general, we may 
say, a normative reconstruction entails abandoning the traditional division of labor 
between normative theory and social sciences. In this work, I have already explained the 
way in which I understand the normative starting points, the recent constitutional 
transformations that have derived in a set of provisions that form the bulk of Latin 
American ADL, which constitutes positive law, with all their expressive, constitutive and 
instrumental dimensions. As one may guess, these provisions are also open-textured, 
inviting discriminated individuals and groups to give meaning and substance to ADL, to 
infuse the law with their struggles, and reshaping their contents and structure in that same 
process.  
 
The need to understand the target of ADL, the evil to be redressed, emerges from the 
dangers of using the wrong remedy: addressing discrimination with inadequate means; 
creating new dangers or harms, or reproducing old ones, such as forgoing or occluding 
traditional issues of redistribution; or creating negative competition between groups for 
scarce shares of recognition, issues that explain the current salience of ADL in the 
Western World.6 By forging a better understanding of discrimination, we will be able to 
craft adequate legal remedies.7 Furthermore, by studying the role that law and legal orders 
play in addressing discrimination, we can bridge the gap between the normative 
expectations of a constitutional narrative of equality and anti-discrimination and the 
concrete objectives that a consolidated equality regime can plausibly achieve. For 
                                               
4 A Honneth, Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life (Polity 2014) 6. 
5 ibid. 
6 see, for example, the political debate prompted by Obama’s presidential directive that allowed students to 
use bathrooms corresponding with their gender identity. For Wolfgang Streeck, this was a paradigmatic 
example of how the growth of identity politics was partially to blame for Trump’s victory, who rearticulated 
white identities and class concerns in his groundbreaking campaign. ‘Trump and Trumpists’ (2017) 3(1) 
Inference < http://inference-review.com/article/trump-and-the-trumpists> accessed 28 August 2017. 
7 B Smith and D Allen, ‘Whose fault is it? Asking the right question to address discrimination’ (2012) 37 
Alternative law journal 31. 
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example, it is precisely the frustration with the impact of anti-discrimination reforms on 
black communities in the US that lies at the origins of critical race theory.8 In this regard, 
socio-legal studies are fundamental to unmasking the radical inefficacy of progressive 
legal reforms, or to highlight the selective application of law in Latin America. Socio-
legal studies, then, are fundamental for critical approaches to law. Nevertheless, in the 
case of Latin America, we have relatively young regimes of law crafted to tackle 
discrimination that have still to display their normative potential and their internal (eg, 
operating according to their premises) or external (eg, effecting social and cultural 
changes more broadly) efficacy. A critical social theory of ADL in Latin America could 
anticipate the potential strengths and limits of this area of law, without the need to wait 
for concrete socio-legal studies denouncing its inefficacy, or relying by default on the 
image of the ‘failed law in Latin America’, which serves as a project of constant legal 
reforms imported from abroad.9    
 
Rather than providing a complete sociological explanation of discrimination in Latin 
America, a comprehensive sociological method for studying ADL, or a sociological 
analysis of the impact of recent reforms, 10 in the second part of this thesis I will develop 
a critical social theory of ADL that builds upon legal practices that are currently taking 
place in the region (a critical legal approach to the study of ADL in this part of the world). 
EDC, as a committed constitutional project of reform, needs to be complemented by a 
critical legal theory capable of giving a general account of the strengths and limits, the 
remedies and harms, the possibilities and dangers, or the benefits and costs of 
consolidating equality regimes or programmes of ADL in Latin America.11  In other 
words, as a sociologically informed approach to the study of constitutionalism in Latin 
America, EDC needs to be complemented by critical legal theory,  
that portion of normative legal theory which is specifically concerned 
to dig beneath the surface of legal doctrines and practices: to go 
beyond a project of explanation and rationalization and to interrogate 
                                               
8 C Douzinas and A Gearey, Critical Jurisprudence: The Political Philosophy of Justice (Hart 2005) 259. 
9 J Esquirol, ‘The Failed Law of Latin America’ (2008) 56 The American Journal of Comparative Law 75. 
10 R Banakar, ‘Studying Cases Empirically: A Sociological Method for Studying Discrimination Cases in 
Sweden’, in R Banakar and M Travers (eds), Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart 2005). 
11 Although it will become clear later in this work, critical legal approaches not only develop conceptual or 
discursive critiques of law, but also provide pragmatic assessments that derive from its practical vocation 
towards the legal activity of social movements. D Kennedy, ‘The International Human Rights Movement: 
Part of the Problem?’ (2002) 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal 101.  
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the deeper political, historical and philosophical logics which 
underpin the power of law.12 
This definition of what critical legal theories entail suggests that we need to go beyond 
the traditional boundaries of constitutional scholarship. It is in this terrain where I situate 
the second part of this thesis. In this scenario, two questions become fundamental: why 
is it worthwhile developing critical legal theories of ADL without the need for 
comprehensive socio-legal studies that can have a say on the effectiveness or the impact 
of recent legal reforms? Why is it worthwhile developing critical legal approaches to 
ADL on its own terms, disregarding the need for a complete doctrinal reconstruction of 
this area of law?13  
 
In Latin America, it seems that any expansion towards sociologically informed 
approaches to law entail abandoning the internal perspective, and leave socio-legal 
studies as mere sociological explanations of how law operates on the ground, irrespective 
of its normative commitments, or as mere (political) admonitions of law, where legal 
venues are considered simply as battlefields through which to continue political struggles 
through slightly different means.14 Indeed, socio-legal studies seem to adopt an entirely 
external position to law, without reflecting on the ethical and political questions raised by 
the nature and significance of legal practices in several parts of Latin America.15 The case 
for advancing a critical social theory of ADL in Latin America stems from the need to 
complement socio-legal studies with a fundamental task, that is, the ethical or political 
orientations of research, or the impossibility of a value-free inquiry into the operation of 
recent ADLs on the ground.16 In this way, a critical legal theory of ADL in Latin America 
entails a sociologically informed approach that eschews external perspectives to the study 
of law as just one object of research among others. Furthermore, critical legal theories 
add something that traditional legal analyses are unable to provide. The latter work with 
raw legal materials and seek ‘the elements that may plausibly be represented as social or 
moral ideals’ (ideals that ‘are believed to be in some sense already present in the law’),17 
                                               
12 N Lacey, ‘Normative Reconstruction in Socio-Legal Theory’ (1996) 5 Social & Legal Studies 131. 
13 Although a ‘complete doctrinal reconstruction’ of ADL is not necessary to develop a critical social 
theory, ‘some’ doctrinal work is crucial to understand the stage of development of anti-discrimination legal 
regimes in Latin America, as I explained in chapter 3. 
14 Garcia Villegas (n 3) 34-5. 
15  D Bonilla, ‘Introduction: toward a constitutionalism of the Global South’, in D Bonilla (ed), 
Constitutionalism of the Global South: The Activist Tribunals of India, South Africa, and Colombia (CUP 
2014) 6-7. 
16 Lacey (n 13) 133. 
17 R Mangabeira Unger, ‘Legal Analysis as Institutional Imagination’ (1996) 59 The Modern Law Review 
1, 9. 
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or develop constructive interpretations that ‘impose purpose on an object or practice in 
order to make of it the best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to 
belong’;18 after that, however, traditional legal analysts understand that their role must be 
carried out with caution and modest institutional ambition, respecting institutional 
competences, and providing ‘merely a difference in the interpretation or an elaboration 
of existing legal materials – a new gloss on the 14th amendment or something of the 
sort.’19 In contrast, critical legal theories of ADL can work with legal materials and start 
their political or ethical reflections without the need to rationally reconstruct this 
relatively young field of law, either to find implicit moral or social ideals, or to impose a 
purpose on them and construct the law’s integrity. In this regard, the raw materials of 
Latin American ADL, as presented in the first part of this thesis, can accommodate a 
critical social theory of ADL that can provide a better understanding of the strengths and 
limits of this area of law.  
 
A common theme around critical analyses of law is the idea of exclusion or oppression, 
which unifies different strands of critical legal feminism, critical race theory, and critical 
disability theory that endorse a critique of law’s power and its harmful effects but without 
abandoning the commitment of the internal perspective to law.20 As Balkin puts it, what 
unifies critical legal theories is their ambiguity regarding the law’s legitimating role: even 
if law legitimates political institutions by providing checks and balances or by embedding 
moral principles that serve as grounds of critique, it also legitimates domination or 
oppression, masquerading harms that can be widespread, such as institutionalising 
structural disadvantage.21 Moreover, critical legal theories challenge the law’s absolute 
autonomy, suggesting the need to consider socio-political realities or the context of the 
creation and application of the law, and the special impact of the law on disadvantaged 
groups.22 These approaches have decided not to renounce the law’s distinctive capacities 
and leave them to their oppressors or to the free flow of societal interests; instead, they 
have committed themselves to the law and legal reasoning, adopting an internal 
perspective while keeping their critical stance. In that regard, critical legal theories have 
                                               
18 J Waldron, ‘Dirty Little Secret’ (1998) 98 Columbia Law Review 510, 516. 
19 Mangabeira (n 18) 9.  
20  K Crenshaw, ‘Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Anti-
Discrimination Law’ (1988) 101 Harvard Law Review 1331; P Williams, ‘Alchemical Notes: 
Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights’ (1987) 22 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law 
Review 401; H Samuels, ‘Feminist Legal Theory’, in R Banakar and M Travers (eds), Law and Social 
Theory (2nd edn, Hart 2013).  
21 J Balkin, ‘Critical Legal Theory Today’, in F Mootz (ed), On Philosophy in American Law (CUP 2008). 
22 K Bartlett, ‘Feminist Legal Methods’ (1990) 103 Harvard Law Review 829. 
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been particularly attentive to ADL, being rigorous to scrutinise its broken promises and 
unmask its real legitimising motives, while also being ready to exploit the contradictions 
of dominant legal paradigms, enhance the power of disadvantaged groups and individuals 
through legal means, or elaborate alternative meanings of legal concepts. Overall, critical 
legal approaches to ADL invite us to imagine how a different regime of ADL would look 
after posing ethical or political questions that arise from looking at the practice with a 
power/value/interest-laden perspective. It is in that spirit that a critical theory of ADL 
becomes a fundamental task, which is worthwhile in itself, for anyone interested in the 
role of law in advancing human emancipation.  
 
In the first chapter of this second part (chapter 5), I provide reasons to develop a critical 
social theory of ADL, and outline a definition of ADL as an anti-misrecognition device, 
though thoroughly interimbricated with economic and political spheres. In the following 
chapters (6, 7, 8, and 9), I work around the interplay between my social theory of ADL 
and the legal practices in Latin America, in an attempt to show instances of anticipatory 
illumination that ground the principles of a transformative approach to ADL that serve as 
a roadmap of its unfinished project.  
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Chapter 5 Towards a critical social theory of anti-discrimination law 
5.1 Introduction 
As political philosophy is turning towards a relational conception of equality, with 
concepts of oppression, domination or subordination coming to the fore, theories of ADL 
have become more attractive for both philosophy and legal theory.1 Against a purely 
distributive paradigm, relational equality has highlighted the need to give a more accurate 
philosophical account of legal fields like ADL, which aim to redress the evils of social 
relations rather than generate a fairer distribution of shares of self-respect. However, even 
if ‘relational equality sounds very much like a description of anti-discrimination law’, the 
aims of the current anti-discrimination regimes are very much about access to 
employment, services, goods and resources that are valuable to people, especially those 
who are most vulnerable. 2  In other words, ADL ‘also aims to rectify distributive 
injustices’,3 or constitutes ‘an indispensable component of a basic structure that justly 
distributes the benefits and burdens of social cooperation’.4 
 
In the midst of distributive and relational theories of equality, ADL may seem to provide 
a solution to many of the problems that contemporary societies are facing. Different 
governments have created equality laws on the assumption that they are part of 
progressive political projects tackling key social and economic evils: discrimination 
undermines the social basis for economic systems, unjustly restricts access to valuable 
social goods, constrains valuable options for individual freedom, generates harms for 
individual and social identities, and endangers social cohesion. For conservatives 
however, ADL goes too far in attempting to intervene in social relations and promote 
cultural and social changes according to an egalitarian ideal;5 for some liberals, ADL 
should be narrowly crafted (or, worse still, dispensed with altogether) in order to avoid 
                                               
1 D Hellman and S Moreau, Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law (OUP 2013); C Fourie and 
others (eds), Social Equality: On What It Means to Be Equals (OUP 2015). Although there are many debates 
around whether the value or principle of equality constitutes the normative underpinning of ADL, the 
concepts of equality and non-discrimination seem to be inevitably connected in both legal and non-legal 
discourses. One is discriminated against when one is not treated equally, as the popular jargon claims. 
Moreover, as I explained in the introduction and in chapter 2, the connection between equality and ADL 
derives from different types of reasons that sustain a constitutional conception of ADL.  
2 S Moreau, ‘Equality and Discrimination’, in Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Law (CUP 
forthcoming).  
3 ibid. 
4 S Choudhry, 'Distribution vs. Recognition: the case of anti-discrimination laws' (2000) 9 George Mason 
Law Review 145, 149.  
5 E Pricker, ‘Anti-Discrimination as a program of private law’ (2003) 4 German LJ 771; J Cornides, ‘Three 
case studies on “Anti-Discrimination” law’ (2012) 23 EJIL 517.  
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curtailing other important freedoms, like freedom of association or freedom of contract;6 
for the sceptical left, ADL may be deemed as the ‘darling’ of neo-liberal projects, 
endorsing a politics of identity that forgoes issues of redistribution. 7  This puzzling 
scenario invites us to think better about the nature and purpose of ADL, not only because 
it touches upon deeper moral issues, and has an unavoidably expressive character, but 
because it promises to achieve a society free of oppression, subordination and domination 
with a fairer distribution of rights and duties. To be part of progressive political projects, 
ADL needs to be critical of its role in contemporary societies, where it is faced with 
processes of modernisation that push towards social/political disintegration and 
systemic/market integration.8 Neither a panacea nor a purely human face for neoliberal 
arrangements, ADL could be a truly revolutionary project that aims to transform the 
current state of affairs. Philosophical debates around ADL have attempted to give an 
account of its promises. By placing the wrongness of discrimination in certain aspects of 
our current practices, different theories of ADL have tried to give an account of this 
emergent field of law by explaining when and why discrimination is wrong, and the need 
for legal regulation. However, as I will argue, we need more than philosophical theories 
attached to our legal practices to understand what is at stake here.  
 
In this chapter, I start by arguing that debates around the philosophical foundations of 
ADL seem to be ill-equipped to provide an account of the emancipatory potential of this 
emergent field of law. Although these debates wander between the look for univocal and 
pluralist theories that can provide a normative foundation for ADL, and which have an 
impact on how the law works and affects people’s lives, these theories bypass the fact 
that ADL contains radical promises that need to be reassessed in the current state of post-
socialist conditions. The debates around the philosophical foundations of ADL are 
important for doctrinal issues that continually arise in the case law, which include the 
distinction between direct and indirect discrimination, the availability of defences against 
discrimination claims, and the connection between particular distributive questions (the 
distribution of rights and duties to different actors) and the general justifying aim of ADL, 
among others. Nevertheless, they do not have the tools to understand how the evolution 
of the praxis of ADL in certain contexts is the outcome of social, political and legal 
mobilisation within bounded institutional ‘battlefields’. As I explained in the first part of 
                                               
6 R Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws (Harvard University 
Press 1995).  
7 A Somek, Engineering Equality: An Essay on European Anti-Discrimination Law (OUP 2011).  
8 W Streeck, ‘The Crisis of Democratic Capitalism’ (2011) 71 New Left Review 5, 25 
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the thesis, the normative reconstruction should start with the radical anti-discrimination 
commitments that are part of binding (positive) law, with all is expressive, constitutive, 
and instrumental dimensions. However, the need to move this project forward will not be 
enhanced by reinforcing a normative theory that is detached from the practices it attempts 
to address. It is here that critical social theories enter the picture, clarifying the strengths 
and limits of anti-discrimination projects, that is, the place of ADL within a theory of 
social/political emancipation.9 Overall, I start from the basic assumption that even if ADL 
is not a solution to every social problem, it is more revolutionary than what some of its 
critics sustain.  
 
What are the limits of the transformative potential of ADL? If ADL is not a solution to 
every problem, how should we understand the role of ADL in different spheres, such as 
the economy, culture and politics? What kind of economic or political harms can ADL 
properly address? In sum, what is the truly revolutionary aspect of ADL that triggers 
reactions from different constituencies? In an attempt to answer these questions, I will 
supplement the debates around the philosophical foundations of ADL with insights from 
critical social theories, more specifically, the theory of social justice developed by Nancy 
Fraser. Within her theory, we can read ADL as an anti-misrecognition device and display 
its transformative potential (ADL as a paradigmatic case of ‘non-reformist reform’).10  
 
5.2 Philosophical Foundations of ADL  
In this section, I argue that the debates around the philosophical foundations of ADL have 
not addressed the emancipatory potential of this emergent field of law, that is, its strengths 
and limits as a legally-driven project of cultural and social change. In particular, I will 
explain the path from mental-state theories to current pluralist theories of ADL and the 
spaces it opens up for a critical social theory of ADL.  
 
It has been a while since theories of ADL abandoned the idea that what is required to 
eliminate discrimination is a demand for consistent treatment, that is, to ensure the 
                                               
9 In Marxists terms, political emancipation was achieved with the principle of equality before the law and 
the abolition of feudal entitlements; social/human emancipation, for its part, is the full realisation of the 
promise of equality, and is understood as societies being free of subordination, domination or oppression. 
K Marx, ‘On the Jewish Question’, in R Tucker (ed), The Marx-Engels Reader (2nd edn, Norton & 
Company 1978). I claim that ADL has a say in both dimensions of emancipation.    
10 N Fraser, ‘Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation’, 
in Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?: A political-philosophical exchange (Verso 2003) 
79. 
	 124 
impartial application of the law to all regulated subjects. If consistent treatment were all 
that ADL demands, then the formal equality clauses that have been present in our legal 
systems for more than two centuries would be sufficient. The incorporation of 
prohibitions of discrimination according to different protected grounds, usually after 
social/political mobilisation, demanded theoretical debates about the value that stands in 
the background of a comparative exercise.11 Thus, the expansion of ADL required a 
theoretical exercise beyond formal equality. For anti-discrimination scholarship, this 
movement towards the philosophical foundations of ADL required us to focus on the 
wrongness of discrimination and the reasons that ultimately justify having a whole set of 
legal regulations to tackle it. Furthermore, the emergence of the doctrine of implicit bias, 
the incorporation of indirect discrimination clauses, and the need for ADL to structurally 
address the stigma, stereotype or prejudice against certain social groups, have expanded 
our understanding of discrimination and made it much more difficult to theorise it.12 With 
the current shift towards relational equality, theories of ADL are required to deal with 
both distributive and relational dimensions, complicating the answer to the question, 
‘which of the many morally troubling features of discriminatory acts and policies render 
them wrongful or unfair’?13  
 
Having abandoned mental state theories of ADL, several theories have proposed 
alternative accounts of the wrongness of discrimination. Recognition-based theories of 
ADL, usually based upon a broader conception of relational equality, argue that the 
wrongness of discrimination lies in the lack or failure of recognition of the victim. 14 For 
their part, prioritarian theories argue that there are several reasons to justify ADL as a 
way to redress disadvantage and alleviate the well-being of those who are worst off.15 
Indeed, these theories focus on the effects of discrimination on its victims, who are 
usually denied important means to support their well-being, and start from a ‘general 
moral theory according to which the right action is the action that maximizes moral 
value’.16 Liberty or freedom-based theories argue that discrimination is a violation of an 
                                               
11 D Reaume, ‘Dignity, Equality, and Comparison’, in Hellman and Moreau (n 1) 9.  
12 Moreau (n 2). 
13 ibid.  
14 E Anderson and R Pildes, ‘Expressive Theories: A General Restatement’ (2000) 148 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1503; D Hellman, When is Discrimination Wrong? (Harvard University Press 
2008); A McColgan, Discrimination, Equality and the Law (Hart 2014); P Shin, ‘The Substantive Principle 
of Equal Treatment’ (2009) 15 Ratio Iuris 149. 
15 In general, prioritarian theories move away from grounding ADL in the value or principle of equality.  
16 Moreau (n 2); K Lippert-Rasmussen, Born free and equal: A philosophical inquiry into the nature of 
discrimination (OUP 2014); R Arneson, ‘Discrimination, Disparate Impact, and Theories of Justice’, in 
Hellman and Moreau (n 1). For these theories, ADL is an instrument of distributive justice. 
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individual liberty, independent of what others possess. 17  For Sophia Moreau, 
discrimination entails a violation of our interest in ‘freedoms to have our decisions about 
how to live insulated from the effects of normatively extraneous features of us, such as 
our skin color or gender’.18 In this way, discrimination works like a tort: a personal wrong 
committed against an individual by another, ‘wrongs which consist in unfairly 
disadvantaging someone because of a trait whose costs she really should not have had to 
bear’.19  
 
Recently, opposed to the idea of attempting to capture the wrongness of discrimination in 
a single value, several scholars have supported pluralist theories of ADL. They argue that 
the wrongness of discrimination, when considering the practice of our anti-discrimination 
laws, is not reduced to a single value, and thus it is a theory of discrimination law ‘which 
gives some role to the absence of social subordination, some role to the protection of 
freedoms, and some role to the effects of discrimination on people’s well-being’.20 
Khaitan’s theory of ADL combines a prioritarian-sufficientarian view of its purpose (the 
elimination of systemic disadvantage that endangers the possibility of human autonomy), 
with a freedom-based view that also considers discrimination as a personal wrong that 
imposes ‘costs on membership of groups whose membership is morally irrelevant’.21 
Sophia Moreau, abandoning her original claim to give an account of ADL uniquely based 
on the violation of an individual right to deliberative freedoms, now endorses a pluralist 
account that promises to capture the different strands of discrimination: ‘we do care very 
much about giving people deliberative freedoms in certain contexts; but we also care just 
as deeply about eliminating subordination and eliminating relative disadvantages between 
social groups’.22 
 
Maybe pluralist theories have achieved the best we can hope for from theory: ‘apparently 
incompatible theoretical explanations (…) all have captured some essential truth about 
discrimination law (although none can explain everything on its own)’.23 However, we 
                                               
17 J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (OUP 1986) ch9. For Benjamin Eidelson, discrimination entails a 
violation of a right to be treated as individuals. Discrimination and Disrespect (OUP 2015); Choudhry (n 
4) 154.  
18 S Moreau, ‘What is Discrimination?’ (2010) 38 Philosophy and Public Affairs 143, 147. 
19 Moreau (n 2).  
20 ibid.  
21 T Khaitan, A Theory of Discrimination Law (OUP 2015) 168.  
22 Moreau (n 2). In ‘What is Discrimination?’, she acknowledged the possible deficiencies of a purely 
liberty-based account of ADL (n 18) 178.  
23 Khaitan (n 21) 10. 
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are not entirely clear about how we can institutionally articulate these theoretical accounts 
to capture the different strands of current anti-discrimination laws. One possibility is to 
distinguish several facets or dimensions of current anti-discrimination laws within 
pluralist theories, and provide a compartimentalised explanation of the operation of 
sophisticated institutional programmes of regulation. For example, we may explain direct 
and indirect discrimination as addressing the same personal wrong, because we 
understand that we are unjustly imposing costs on group membership for the victims; 
however, at the same time, we can distinguish between the different defences that may be 
available for defendants in both cases, as direct discrimination usually involves an explicit 
lack of recognition or egregious expressive harms, while indirect discrimination may be 
understood as the legislative imposition of duties on those who control valuable goods 
that determine our socio-economic position. Also, we may distinguish between the 
judgment of the wrong of discrimination, which answers the legal question of who should 
be held responsible for a discrimination claim, and the desirability of using ADL to 
eliminate systemic disadvantage against certain social groups, which is expressed in the 
remedial parts of judgments that frequently attempt to extend the impact beyond the 
directly affected parties.  
 
The above-mentioned theories have been looking - each in its own way - for ‘a coherent 
normative foundation upon which discrimination law can securely rest’.24 They have 
been criticised because there are several aspects of the surface structure of anti-
discrimination laws that are not explained by the preferred normative foundation, even 
when we consider those aspects as morally desirable.25 For example, how can we explain 
the fact that we consider indirect discrimination as something to be redressed even when 
the discriminatory act shows no demeaning expressive message to the victim? And, how 
can we explain the fact that ADL also protects individuals who are not among 
disadvantaged groups if the discriminatory act cannot be considered a serious threat 
against their individual freedoms? In a way, the whole theoretical enterprise is about 
dealing with aspects of our current anti-discrimination laws that we consider important. 
Therefore, looking for the right balance between what the practice shows us and what we 
think ADL should be doing is a plausible theoretical enterprise. An acknowledgment that 
the relationship between law (as it is) and morality is mutually constitutive has been one 
of the main contributions of the current state of the philosophical debate around ADL: it 
                                               
24 ibid 6. 
25 P Shin, ‘Is there a unitary concept of discrimination?’, in Hellman and Moreau (n 1).  
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is not only that our practice should match our previous moral agreements, but that our 
practice can inform, both practically and theoretically, our moral reasoning. 26  It is 
precisely by exploiting this relationship that pluralist theories have been developing the 
most interesting accounts of ADL. 
 
On the whole, debates around the philosophical foundations of ADL have not addressed 
the question of whether ADL could be considered an emancipatory project of social 
change. Initially, this question may fall towards the purposive inquiry, which ‘engages 
with overall systemic concerns: why do we have a system of discrimination law at all? 
What, indeed, is the point of this area of law?’27 To answer these questions, it is useful to 
resort to the practice of ADL, which in several jurisdictions has proved quite challenging 
for the status quo and has been dubbed a ‘dangerous’ instrument in the hands of 
subordinated social groups. Different lawmakers attempt to craft anti-discrimination 
institutions and devices than can keep expectations low: for example, broader economic 
or social issues are usually left out of legal regulation, creating a clear distinction between 
socio-economic issues and ADL,28 or excluding class, socio-economic status, or poverty 
as protected grounds;29 statutory duties to modify institutional arrangements according to 
the commitments of equality and non-discrimination are considered too demanding for 
the status quo, and there is a strong preference for strictly judicial models of ADL;30 in 
general, positive actions are considered compatible with ADL, but policy-makers are 
mindful of not making these measures the main remedy against discrimination; regardless 
of their constitutional grounding, anti-discrimination regulations sometimes aspire to be 
merely technical, leaving ADL with no grounding principles or purpose-based 
reasoning;31 in some cases, lawmakers are conscious of the possible chain of events that 
may follow the enactment of an ADL, including clauses that prevent anti-discrimination 
claims from becoming the first step in a slippery slope towards broader legal reforms.32 
                                               
26 Khaitan (n 21) 5-6; C O’Cinneide, ‘Justifying Discrimination Law’ (2016) 36 OJLS 909, 914.  
27 Khaitan (n 21) 10. 
28 eg Equality Act UK (2010) s 149. 
29 eg EU Equality Directives: Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle 
of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, art 2; Council Directive 
2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment 
and occupation, art 1. 
30 eg ADLARG.  
31 C O’Cinneide and K Liu, ‘Defining the limits of discrimination law in the United Kingdom: Principle 
and pragmatism in tension’ (2015) 15 International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 80, 85. 
32 ADLCHI, art 18 (‘Interpretation of this Law. The provisions of this law will not be interpreted as 
amending or derogating other currently binding legal rules’). According to the history of the legislative 
proceedings, this provision was incorporated with the support of right-wing parties, which were fearful that 
the newly created judicial remedy would be used to challenge institutions such as marriage. BCN, ‘Historia 
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As was highlighted at the beginning of the chapter, although ADL is not a solution to 
every social problem, either in relation to social or material inequality, it could prove 
quite emancipatory in the hands of those who have been disadvantaged or considered 
second-class citizens. 
 
By looking into the practice with a pluralist lens, we may acknowledge that the theoretical 
question around ADL requires elements that go beyond a relationship between law and 
morality. For example, we may need to theorise capitalism in order to look for the ways 
in which some groups are subordinated, or why, even with perfect starting conditions in 
terms of access to a good, some groups end up worse off than before. Maybe a whole 
picture of the practice would tell us that social movements see ADL as a truly 
encompassing project that addresses several problems faced by disadvantaged groups and 
reserve a place for it within a broader movement towards social emancipation. And maybe 
that is what people expect or what governments promise when particular anti-
discrimination laws are enacted.  
 
Indeed, even if these theories seem to have reached a stage at which only pluralist 
approaches can provide comprehensive accounts of the many aspects that anti-
discrimination laws seem to cover, they seem insufficiently equipped to understand the 
place of ADL in broader progressive political projects. In other words, they seem to be 
blind to the potential emancipatory power of ADL, which has been crafted not only to 
redress the violation of individual freedoms, challenge the demeaning messages that acts 
or social practices send to discriminated groups, and alleviate the well-being of those who 
are worst off, but also to tackle social subordination, that is, where social groups are 
unfairly subordinated to others. Even if tackling social subordination has been both a 
moral insight into understanding the wrong of discrimination and a reading of positive 
law (eg, the principle of anti-subordination in US law), the implications of incorporating 
this broader social aim seem to puzzle philosophical theories of ADL. Sophia Moreau has 
recently provided a pluralist theory of ADL that reserves a special place for subordination 
in the determination of why and when discrimination is unjust. This move should trigger 
new understandings of how some social groups end up with a lower social status, or ‘to 
explore the many ways in which acts, policies, and physical structures in the world 
                                               
de la ley Anti-Discriminación n20.659’ (2013) <http://www.bcn.cl/historiadelaley/nc/historia-de-la-
ley/4516/> accessed 3 November 2016. 
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perpetuate these differences in status’.33 This move requires us to go beyond purely 
philosophical enquiries, in order to explore the ways in which social structures and 
individual or collective behaviours and attitudes have a causal relationship with situations 
of social subordination (combining prejudices or stereotypes, and sustaining ‘policies, 
practices and physical structures that tacitly accommodate the dominant group’s needs at 
the expense of less privileged groups’), or mark a group as inferior on the basis of a 
prohibited ground of discrimination.34 Surely, this demands a broader perspective in the 
study of discrimination: if social subordination is a social phenomenon that is hardly 
understood without engaging with social theories, theories of ADL need to expand their 
scope not only to understand when and why discrimination is unjust, but also to reveal 
possible paths of emancipation.  
 
It is precisely here that my project meets and delves into the interstices of critical (social) 
theory, using ideology critique as the preferred tool of inquiry. As McNay puts it, this 
method entails two dimensions, disclosure and reflexivity. The first (disclosing critique) 
‘tries to penetrate forms of ideological domination, the ways in which symbolic forms 
(words, images, ideas) are used to naturalise and legitimate exploitative and unequal 
social relations and, above all, to manufacture political quiescence’.35 In a way, this first 
moment attempts to answer the old Marxist question of how subordinates consent to their 
subordination, that is, on how discrimination becomes normalised or embedded in social 
structures. According to the second moment (reflexivity), which ‘is inwardly directed 
towards the scrutiny of ideology critique’s own presuppositions’, we need to ensure that 
the path to emancipation ‘does not become yet another ideological mode of thinking, that 
is, that it reproduces prejudicial beliefs that themselves reinforce or mystify unjust social 
hierarchies’.36 Here, I engage with the work of Nancy Fraser, because I think she provides 
us with an illuminating account of the potential emancipatory possibilities of an emerging 
field of law like ADL, highlighting both its benefits and strengths, as well as its limits 
and dangers. Her theory allows us to apply these two moments of ideology critique to the 
social phenomena we associate with discrimination, and provides us with the tools to 
elaborate practical roadmaps. In this way, by using a term she has explicitly endorsed as 
a ‘political compass’ for current times, I propose to understand ADL in Latin America as 
                                               
33 S Moreau, ‘Discrimination and Subordination’ (draft, quoted with permission from the author).  
34 ibid. 
35 L McNay, ‘Contemporary Critical Theory’, in M Freeden and M Stears (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Political Ideologies (OUP 2013) 140.  
36 ibid. 
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an anti-misrecognition device that acknowledging its limits, can act as a case of ‘non-
reformist reform’. In this way, the second part of this thesis, which this chapter opens, is 
not an inquiry into the correct theory of discrimination law or a moral account of the 
wrongness of discrimination, but an attempt to engage with critical social theory in order 
to provide an account of the emancipatory potential of ADL. The following section asks 
the question, what can critical social theories contribute to the analysis of current forms 
of discrimination and the potential transformative role of ADL in addressing/redressing 
it? 
 
5.3 The critical social theory of Nancy Fraser 
5.3.1 Introduction: non-reformist reforms 
In general, critical social theories distinguish themselves from traditional theories in 
regard to their practical aim towards human emancipation, that is, challenging domination 
or oppression and improving human freedom in all its forms. In order to do that, every 
critical theory is ‘necessarily interdisciplinary in nature’,37 and ‘must explain what is 
wrong with current social reality, identify the actors to change it, and provide both clear 
norms for criticism and achievable practical goals for social transformation’.38 
 
Nancy Fraser is a critical theory scholar who has developed a ‘comprehensive critical 
theory of justice’ in the midst of current post-socialist conditions. 39 Her theory’s ultimate 
aim is to provide a comprehensive framework through which to understand and clarify 
the different struggles of our times. In several works, she uses the famous statement of 
Karl Marx on what should be the object of philosophy, which counts as a general 
definition of critical theory: ‘the self-clarification of the struggles and wishes of the 
age.’40 In contrast with the Rawlsian approach, which bypasses an analysis of the concrete 
injustices that afflict contemporary societies, she starts from an empirically grounded 
                                               
37  ibid (‘when intellectual enquiry (…) is contained within a single discipline unified by received 
assumptions about how to proceed, there is no imperative for (…) critical self-reflection and it runs the 
risks of becoming reified.’) 
38  J Bonham, ‘Critical Theory’ (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 8 March 2005) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/critical-theory/> accessed 12 February 2015.   
39 Rainer Forst, ‘First things First’, in N Fraser and K Olson (eds), Adding Insult to Injury (Verso 2008) 
310. These conditions represent the current state of social justice struggles that decouple redistributive 
politics from politics of recognition and that lack any overarching socialist project of transformation. 
Moreover, these conditions observe ‘a decentering of claims for equality in the face of aggressive 
marketization and sharply rising material inequality.’ Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the Post-
Socialist Condition (Routledge 1997) 3. 
40 N Fraser, ‘What’s Critical About Critical Theory?’, in Fortunes of Feminism (Verso 2013) 19. 
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social theory to develop her normative standard of participatory parity. She explicitly 
starts her analyses from what she calls ‘folk paradigms of social justice’, which ‘constitute 
a moral grammar that social actors can (and do) draw on in any sphere to evaluate social 
arrangements’.41 In contrast to Axl Honneth, who claims that critical theory should avoid 
deriving its concepts from the activity and struggles of social movements, Fraser supports 
the general idea that social theory should start from concrete political experiences, as 
everything happens in discursively mediated contexts.42 Indeed, her theory draws mostly 
from the struggles of feminist movements, and assesses the extent to which our critical 
theories ‘serve the self-clarification of the struggles and wishes of contemporary 
woman’. 43  In this context, ‘the folk paradigms of justice that constitute a society’s 
hegemonic grammars of contestation and deliberation’ are the starting point for Nancy 
Fraser’s theory, although ‘they do not enjoy any absolute privilege.’44 In her famous 
debate with Axl Honneth, who endorses a subject-centred philosophy, in which moral 
psychology grounds, and constrains, social theory and moral philosophy, the method of 
the critical theorist becomes clearer, because it should assess ‘folk paradigms of justice’ 
with two independent questions: ‘first, from, the perspective of social theory, whether a 
society’s hegemonic grammars of contestation are adequate to its social structure, and, 
second, from the perspective of moral philosophy, whether the norms to which they 
appeal are morally valid’.45  
 
Within the first perspective, Fraser advocates a social theory capable of analysing the 
mutual imbrication of economy, culture and politics in contemporary societies, and 
avoids approaches such as substantive trialism (where there is a dissociation between 
each dimension), or economism/culturalism/politicism (where the different dimensions 
are reduced to one). Instead, she adopts a ‘perspectival trialism’, where redistribution, 
recognition and representation are the three analytical perspectives applied to social 
phenomena, 'which cut across institutional divisions'.46 It is important to highlight that 
                                               
41 These paradigms 'are transpersonal normative discourses that are widely diffused throughout democratic 
societies, permeating not only political public spheres, but also workplaces, households, and civil society 
associations’. N Fraser, ‘Distorted beyond all recognition: A Rejoinder to Axl Honneth’, in Fraser and 
Honneth (n 10) 207-8. Today, the principal 'folk' paradigms of justice are recognition, redistribution and 
representation.  
42 ibid 204-205.  
43 Fraser (n 40) 19-20. 
44 Fraser (n 41) 207, 208.  
45 ibid 208.  
46 ibid 217. The incorporation of ‘politics’ as a third domain, or the analysis of misrepresentation as a 
separate form of injustice, stemmed from the analysis of how the grammar of contestation and deliberation 
has been altered with globalisation (what she calls a ‘Post-Westphalian frame’): above and beyond first 
order questions of substance, like those addressed by redistribution and recognition, 'arguments about 
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these are analytical distinctions within a theory that has been elaborated with a single 
purpose: to provide an evaluative framework to the struggles of our time.47 In other 
words, these are not distinctions that pretend to mirror social dynamics or describe states 
of facts; instead, it is an approach for the social theorist who is working to offer guidance 
on the struggles of social movements.48 However, in several parts of her work, Fraser 
acknowledges the need to theorise capitalism, which develops institutional 
differentiations between the different spheres: 
the economic dimension becomes relatively decoupled from the 
cultural dimension, as marketized arenas, in which strategic action 
predominates, are differentiated from non-marketized arenas, in 
which value-regulated interaction predominates. The result is a partial 
uncoupling of economic distribution from structures of prestige.49 
This has triggered the critique that if Fraser’s distinction between redistribution, 
recognition and representation has an institutional basis, then it is not merely analytical; 
this is something I will come back to in future chapters.50  
 
In the realm of moral philosophy, she offers a ‘clear articulation of a normative 
framework’ to distinguish between worthwhile desires and aims for the struggles of our 
age. 51  Specifically, grounded within a liberal/universalist ‘norm of the equal moral 
worth’, she proposes the standard of ‘participatory parity’, where ‘justice requires social 
arrangements that permit all members of society to interact with one another as peers.’52  
                                               
justice today also concern second-order, meta-level questions. What is the proper frame within which to 
consider first-order questions of justice? Who are the relevant subjects entitled to a just distribution or 
reciprocal recognition in the given case? Thus, it is not only the substance of justice, but also the frame, 
which is in dispute'. N Fraser, ‘Reframing Justice in a Globalized World’ (2005) 36 New Left Review 69, 
72.  
47 Several authors have wrongly interpreted Nancy Fraser's approach without considering that recognition 
and redistribution are different ‘analytical’ perspectives. For example, Choudhry criticised Fraser for 
adopting a group-based status recognition that 'sets to one side the notions of recognition that underlie 
egalitarian politics of redistribution, even if only as a simplifying device’ (n 4) 159. He does not take into 
account how she conceives of the relations of intertwinement between the two, how in real life we usually 
experience both harms and, finally, how we can start thinking about a strategy to redress those harms.  
48 Fraser (n 41) 198. 
49 N Fraser, ‘Rethinking Recognition’ (2000) 3 New Left Review 107, 118.  
50 In the words of Axl Honneth: ‘Contrary to her assurances that she is restricting herself to a "perspectival 
dualism," at times Fraser succumbs to the temptation of talking about "social integration" and "system 
integration" in an essentialist sense.’ ‘The Point of Recognition: A Rejoinder to the Rejoinder’, in Fraser 
and Honneth (n 10) 253. 
51 C Zurn, ‘Arguing over Participatory Parity’, in Fraser and Olson (n 39) 148. 
52 Fraser, ‘Why Overcoming Prejudice is Not Enough’, in Fraser and Olson (n 39) 84, 87. Apparently, her 
normative standard endorses a thick (substantive) conception of justice, suggesting a deontological 
conception of liberalism. Although different from procedural liberalism, which centres on the institutional 
arrangements that grant democratic procedures, Fraser’s approach acknowledges that participatory parity 
results from the accumulation of substantive standards that have been incorporated to the realisation of 
equality. Fraser (n 41) 230. 
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Within post-socialist conditions, and in the current context of complex societies facing 
modernisation processes that pull towards systemic integration, which in its turn 
endangers communicative practices of social integration, the question that emerges is 
how a theory of social justice like that of Nancy Fraser can foster human emancipation.53 
A first remark is that Fraser attempts to develop a critical theory that defends the 
‘continued importance and the continued validity of “grand theorizing”’, which provides 
us with ‘a big picture that allows us to situate ourselves historically and to orient ourselves 
politically’.54 Although we may be dealing with gender subordination in ordinary family 
relations, we should never lose sight of the big picture, of what is at stake structurally and 
politically in those relations. Nevertheless, one of the most important premises that 
unifies different critical theories is starting ‘with agents' own pretheoretical knowledge 
and self-understandings’ and employing different approaches according to the differing 
circumstances. 55  Moreover, contemporary critical theories need to show some 
‘perspicacity’: 'if, at the end of the day (…) critical social theory doesn´t tell us something 
insightful and practically useful about the actual struggles and wishes of our age, then it 
has missed the target’.56   
 
Without abandoning the need for grand-theorising, Nancy Fraser borrowed from André 
Gorz the term ‘non-reformist reform’, in order to assess whether a policy or action could 
be framed as emancipatory in the current post-socialist conditions.57 In the words of 
Fraser, as stated already, these are reforms (or, better, struggles) that ‘set in motion a 
trajectory of change in which more radical reforms become practicable over time.’58 
 
In this way, Nancy Fraser is on the look out for a ‘via media between an affirmative 
strategy that is politically feasible but substantively flawed, and a transformative one that 
is programmatically sound but politically impracticable’.59 Moreover, in connection with 
                                               
53 Fraser (n 40).  
54 H Dahl and others, ‘Recognition, Redistribution and Representation in Capitalist Global Society: An 
Interview with Nancy Fraser’ (2004) 46 Acta Sociologica 374, 381.  
55 Bonham (n 38).  
56 Zurn (n 51) 143. 
57 For Gorz, ‘[a] reformist reform is one which subordinates its objectives to the criteria of rationality and 
practicability of a given system and policy. Reformism rejects those objectives and demands—however 
deep the need for them—which are incompatible with the preservation of the system. On the other hand, a 
not necessarily reformist reform is one which is conceived not in terms of what is possible within the 
framework of a given system and administration, but in view of what should be made possible in terms of 
human needs and demands.’ André Gorz, Strategy for Labour (Beacon Press 1967) 7; Fraser (n 10) fn91. 
58 Fraser (n 10) 79-80. 
59 ibid 79. 
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Fraser’s understanding of Foucauldian genealogies of power, we could understand that 
emancipation, in her theory, ‘refers specifically to transforming a state of domination into 
a mobile, reversible, and unstable field of power relations within which freedom may be 
practiced’.60 In other words, emancipation does not mean freedom from power relations 
(with Foucault, we would say, there is no way out of power relations, we are subjectively 
constituted by them), the traditional utopian image of freedom for the Enlightenment 
tradition; however, as Fraser states, ‘what Foucault needs, and needs desperately, are 
normative criteria for distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable forms of power’.61 
The standard of participatory parity, in connection with her political critique of the force 
of law, which will be explained later, will allow us to frame ADL as a non-reformist 
reform,  
that opens up lines of fragility and fracture within the present that are 
also spaces of anticipatory illumination, spaces that enable us to 
transform states of domination into mobile and reversible fields of 
power relations, and to practice freedom within those fields.62 
 
In a way, non-reformist reforms are ‘policies with a double face’: they call upon people’s 
identities and articulate their claims within existing frameworks/grammars of recognition, 
redistribution and representation, while they also ‘set in motion a trajectory of change in 
which more radical reforms become practicable over time’.63 Thus, for example, feminist 
movements are challenging hard-wired norms that rank ‘masculine’ qualities above 
‘feminine’ ones, but they must also gain concrete advances in order to broaden their 
support. In other words, contrary to former social movements that have sacrificed 
immediate achievements for an ultimate aim, Nancy Fraser calls for reforms that could 
reinforce current power struggles. The strategy, then, lies in 
conceiving and pursuing reforms that deliver real, present-day results 
while also opening paths for more radical struggles for deeper, more 
structural change in the future. Feminists can embrace this approach 
in an agnostic spirit. We don’t need to decide now whether the end 
                                               
60 A Allen, ‘Emancipation Without Utopia: Subjection, Modernity, and the Normative Claims of Feminist 
Critical Theory’ (2015) 30 Hypathia 513, 517. 
61 N Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions’ (1981) 3 Praxis 
272, 286. 
62 Allen (n 60) 524.  
63 Fraser (n 10) 79. 
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result must be a postcapitalist society (…) So I say, let’s pursue 
nonreformist reforms and see where they lead.64 
 
5.3.2 Does she have a particular theory of law? 
Now we need to focus on one of the most pressing questions regarding Nancy Fraser’s 
theory of justice, a question that has been raised frequently in exchanges with Jacques 
Derrida, Axl Honneth, Leonard Feldman, Christopher Zurn, William Scheuerman and 
Thomas McCarthy, among others. In general, these critics have claimed that Fraser has 
neglected the analysis of law as a separate sphere (the neglect critique). Even though she 
locates her normative principle of participatory parity within the liberal values of equality, 
freedom/autonomy and dignity, for her critics ‘she does not elaborate it in legal-and 
political-theoretical terms; thus, she largely bypasses the complicated contestation of the 
meanings of equality, autonomy, and the like within the liberal tradition’.65 
 
Moreover, as put by one of her critics, ‘Fraser tends to treat law as purely instrumental, 
as a guarantor of redistribution and recognition claims, rather than as a mode of social 
ordering and a dimension of social justice in its own rights’ (the instrumentalist 
critique).66 For Axl Honneth, within Fraser’s approach to law,  
state-sanctioned rights are to have only the purely instrumental 
function of equipping already achieved entitlements to cultural 
recognition or economic redistribution with certain enforcement 
powers after the fact. This instrumentalism (…) forgets that rights 
govern relations among actors in fundamental ways, and their 
significance to social interaction is thus not only functional. Rather, 
the subjective rights we grant one another by virtue of the legitimation 
of the constitutional state reflect which claims we together hold to 
require state guarantees in order to protect the autonomy of every 
individual. This interactive character of rights also allows us to 
explain why they should be understood as independent, originary 
sources of social recognition in modern societies.67 
In several works, Honneth has stressed that legal recognition or legal freedom is 
indispensable for personal integrity and thus a positive achievement of modernity, 
                                               
64 G Gutting and N Fraser, ‘A Feminism Where “Lean In” Means Leaning On Others’ (New York Times, 
15 October 2015) <https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/10/15/a-feminism-where-leaning-in-
means-leaning-on-others/?mcubz=1> accessed 15 November 2016. 
65 T McCarthy, ‘Book review: Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-
Philosophical Exchange’ (2005) 115 Ethics 397, 400. 
66 ibid; Honneth (n 50) 251-2.  
67  ibid. 
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because law is needed to enable structures of recognition outside the legal sphere of 
rights.68 This is what Fraser supposedly ignores or bypasses, the centrality of law and 
rights for political and social struggles in modernity. Although Fraser expresses ‘fidelity 
to critical theory as an interdisciplinary endeavor, law’s status within that project 
ultimately remains unclear’, opening the door to critiques of endorsing a neo-marxist 
approach to law that is merely functional or instrumental.69 Despite her self-declared neo-
Kantian commitment, she does not address law, the rule of law or rights, and does not 
engage with the legal scholarship inspired by Frankfurt’s Critical school, especially that 
since the publication of Habermas’ Between Facts and Norms.70  
 
Although her general comments on law are very brief, we can say that her empirical 
reference points always deal with social struggles around legal institutions (eg, marriage) 
or waged within legal discourses (eg, domestic violence). In this regard, law becomes a 
crucial object of analysis, as social movements use legal discourse as one of the main 
avenues to advance their ‘folk paradigms of justice’, either to challenge legally sponsored 
subordinations or to ‘redress nonjuridified status subordination’.71 The question, then, 
could be reformulated from the point of view of the relationship between law and social 
change, or between law and the demands of social movements.  
 
Even if her main works do not directly address the central place that law occupies in 
social and political struggles, her exchanges with several scholars allow us to reconstruct 
her legal thoughts in a more fruitful way. Her thoughts on law are rooted in her comments 
to Jacques Derrida’s legal ideas, a brief work that has not been quoted by most of her 
critics, and that could help us in defending her critical theory approach to law. 72 In 
contrast to Derrida, who endorsed a metaphysical idea about the force of law as 
constitutively and inescapably violent, she supported a political understanding of the 
force of law that locates ‘law’s force in contingent social relations and 
                                               
68 A Honneth, Struggles for Recognition (MIT Press 1995); Freedom´s Right: The Social Foundations of 
Democratic Life (Polity Press 2014) ch4 
69 W Scheuerman, ‘Recent Frankfurt Critical Theory: Down on Law?’ (2017) 24 Constellations 113, 114, 
123.  
70 J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Polity Press 1996).  
71 N Fraser (n 41) 221.  
72 J Derrida, ‘Force of Law’ in D Cornell and others (eds) Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice 
(Routledge, 1992). For Fraser’s response, see her ‘The Force of Law: Metaphysical or Political?’ (1991-
1992) 13 Cardozo Law Review 1325. Not even William Scheuerman, who has probably made the most 
informed critique of Nancy Fraser from a Frankfurt-inspired theory of law, made a reference to this work. 
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institutionalizations of power’.73 Moreover, her political approach to the force of law 
specifies the object of critical theory in ‘forms of masked, structural violence’, because 
we tend to overlook ‘a range of deadly systemic social processes’ that generate massive 
harms, and ‘which cannot be easily attributed to identifiable individual agents’.74 For 
example, she pays special attention to the expressive harms or symbolic injustices rooted 
in legal institutions that operate to exclude certain groups, who then become unable to 
participate as peers in certain social interactions.75 
 
Specifically, in her critique of Derrida’s The Force of Law, she supports a critique of law 
that can highlight the structural limitations of current legal systems in addressing ‘claims 
for harms one has suffered by virtue of belonging to a social group’.76 Thus, she has 
always been aware of the limits of an individualistic justice that ‘presents obstacles to 
anyone who seeks judicial standing to claim that a systemic injustice has occurred’.77 
Furthermore, a political approach to the force of law, she argues, should not preclude a 
critical analysis of the cultural backgrounds of legal systems, which determine the 
functions and outcomes of legal decision-making processes that ‘work to the 
disadvantage of subordinated social groups’.78 Summarising her ‘political critique of the 
force of law’, we could say that its object consists in rendering visible ‘forms of masked, 
structural violence that permeate, and infect’ specific legal judgments, an 
‘institutionalized regime of justice reasoning situated in a specific, structured, 
sociocultural context’.79   
 
At the end, she leaves open the door for considering law as a vehicle of social 
emancipation, because her theory of social justice has the normative tools to distinguish 
and identify forms of legal violence that are not necessary.80 We should remember that 
Fraser’s ‘perspectival trialism’ conceives of law as pertaining to the three above-
mentioned domains of justice (redistribution, recognition, representation), ‘where it is 
                                               
73 Fraser (n 72) 1328.  
74 ibid. 
75 Fraser (n 49) 115.  
76 Fraser (n 72) 1329. 
77 ibid.  
78 Fraser illustrates this with the ‘congeries of androcentric assumptions that has led many judges and juries 
to reject self-defense as a legal defense in cases where women are accused of attacking or killing men who 
have battered them over a period of years. It has been argued that any legitimate act of ‘self-defense’ must 
occur in the heat of an assault and cannot involve use of a deadly weapon against an assailant who has used 
‘only’ his fists.’ ibid 1330.  
79 ibid.  
80 ibid. 
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liable to serve at once as a vehicle of, and a remedy for, subordination’.81 Again, in 
contrast with Honneth, who reserves a special place for legal recognition in one 
institutionalised social sphere (rights), Fraser highlights the pivotal role that law plays in 
many social spheres, giving form to what Scheuerman called the compartmentalization 
thesis against Honneth.82  
 
For Honneth, family and marriage fall under the sphere of love, esteem or solidarity in 
our social relations (eg, work), while legal recognition deals with the respect we need in 
public spheres, as citizens with equal rights. In the words of Scheuerman, for Fraser, ‘[t]he 
law decisively shapes intimate relationships in ways that Honneth’s attempt to parcel it 
off into a separate sphere of recognition obscures’.83 However, in other parts of his work, 
Honneth gets closer to Fraser, and stipulates a broader role for law in modern conditions, 
where it can serve as a ‘legitimate and even necessary means to make sure that recognition 
in the sphere of intimacy takes a normatively acceptable form. Law does not disable but 
instead enables “structures of recognition” even outside the (legal) sphere of rights.’84 
This is an issue that has been present since the early works of Fraser, especially in her 
critique of the Habermasian view on juridification, which romanticises the family as a 
sphere of communicative interaction that should be kept apart from the density of legal 
regulation, according to his distinction between system and lifeworld.85 In contrast with 
Scheuerman, who suggests that Fraser is an enemy of legalism, we can read Fraser’s 
critical approach to juridification as part of her political approach to the force of law: we 
should not be afraid to use the weapons of law, or fight within legal arenas, especially 
against certain epistemologies that start from substantive boundaries that put the family, 
educational institutions or other romanticised spheres outside the scope of legal 
regulation. By treating law perspectivally, Fraser assumes that we can call for its force 
whenever we face a parity-impending challenge.  
 
Although she has not spent too much energy on developing a thoughtful approach to legal 
issues, her political critique of the force of law acknowledges that law is not just an 
instrument but constitutes an important insight into the analysis of ‘folk paradigms of 
justice’; for example, it has allowed feminist movements to display their struggles in legal 
                                               
81 Fraser (n 41) 220.  
82 Scheuerman (n 69) 116. 
83 ibid. 
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arenas, recognising their own despised identities in legal discourses (eg, human rights) 
and transforming the meaning of legal terms that were previously understood according 
to dominant positions. In this way, Fraser can respond to the instrumentalisation critique, 
and advance the possibility of addressing law and legal discourse as sources of social 
justice in itself. Legal discourses (that is, an officially recognised idiom, which includes 
concrete vocabularies, paradigms of argumentation, narrative conventions and modes of 
subjectification) are readily available means of interpretation and communication (MIC) 
that constitute ‘the historically and culturally specific ensemble of discursive resources 
available to members of a given social collectivity in pressing claims against one 
another’.86 Even if ‘a society’s authorized [MICs] are often better suited to expressing the 
perspectives of its advantaged strata than those of the oppressed and subordinated’, social 
struggles deploying legal strategies or making their claim in legal avenues have made 
linguistic innovations to articulate injustices that previously lacked names.87 I think that 
this idea of law as being both constitutive and instrumental is closer to what Nancy Fraser 
recognises as the proper picture of law in her theory. In some way, this places Fraser 
closer to the emerging literature on law and social movements, which has abandoned a 
purely instrumental notion of law for a more complex picture.88  
 
5.3.3 ADL as an anti-misrecognition device 
From the work of Nancy Fraser, there are good reasons to understand ADL as an anti-
misrecognition device and inscribe it within her critical social theory. Although she has 
not made any detailed analysis of ADL, her theory allows us to place this field of law 
within broader reforms or policies for emancipatory social change. At first glance, 
Fraser’s theory of social justice could favour a reading of ADL as a device against every 
form of injustice. Indeed, ADL has been used in every social sphere, from tackling 
everyday discrimination in the media (culture), to highlighting the absence of women 
from political positions of power (politics), and addressing poverty in countries that do 
                                               
86 Fraser, ‘Struggle Over Needs’ (n 40) 57. One may add that the constitutive function of law is connected 
to its expressive dimension. To the extent that the law is a social construct, it attempts to give meaning to 
social structures and behaviors with the purpose of impacting reality and the way we deal with it. In this 
process, however, the law also highlights its expressive dimension. Anderson and Pildes (n 14).   
87 N Fraser ‘Prioritizing Justice as Participatory Parity’, in Fraser and Olson (n 39) 334; see also the analysis 
of ‘the politics of needs surrounding wife-battering’, where feminist activists ‘renamed the practice with a 
term drawn from criminal law and created a new kind of public discourse’, highlighting the political 
character of the issue under discussion. Fraser (n 40) 72; ‘Toward a Discourse Ethic of Solidarity’ (1986) 
5 Praxis International 425.  
88 M McCann, ‘Law and Social Movements’, in M McCann and A Sarat (eds), The Blackwell Companion 
to Law and Society (Blackwell 2004). 
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not have a welfare state (economy). In general, then, ADL cuts across the three domains 
of justice. However, according to Fraser’s theory, I will argue that ADL could be 
considered an anti-misrecognition device for the following reasons: first, we need an 
account of ADL that acknowledges its limits, because it is not a solution to every form of 
injustice; second, we require an articulation with the remedies against forms of injustice 
that are mainly rooted in the economy or in the political sphere; and third, instead of 
drawing upon an ontological distinction between what pertains to the state and what 
pertains to culture, we need to combat the formal/cultural institutionalisation of value 
patterns that impedes participation as peers in social life.  
 
Fraser’s analysis of contemporary recognition struggles starts from the need to develop a 
comprehensive theory of justice that can articulate different struggles addressing different 
harms. In her early works, she started from the fact of our current postsocialist conditions 
in order to analyse two different paradigms of social justice, redistribution and 
recognition, and integrate them into a single framework (a ‘bivalent conception of 
justice’).89 Her initial worries were rooted in the dilemmas between recognition and 
redistribution struggles, specifically in the problem of ‘displacement’:  
The demise of communism, the surge of free-market ideology, the 
rise of ‘identity politics’ in both its fundamentalist and progressive 
forms – all these developments have conspired to decenter, if not to 
extinguish, claims for egalitarian redistribution.90  
To address this problem, she provided an account of two different conceptions of 
injustice, maldistribution and misrecognition, which could be addressed in every societal 
domain (‘perspectival dualism’). 91  She stated that applying these two analytical 
perspectives to contemporary struggles required a socio-theoretical framework where 
‘neither of these injustices is an indirect effect of the other’, but where both could be 
understood as ‘primary and co-original’.92 She later recognised the need to incorporate 
politics as a separate domain, where a distinct form of injustice (misrepresentation) takes 
place (‘perspectival trialism’).93 In this sphere, the struggles are about participation itself, 
that is, about who has a voice, and about membership in a participatory community.  
                                               
89 N Fraser, ‘Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics’ (1996) The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 
Stanford University.  
90 ibid 4. 
91 Fraser (n 10) 63.  
92 Fraser (n 90).  
93 T Burns and S Thompson, Global Justice and the Politics of Recognition (Springer 2013) 172. Leonard 
Feldman speaks of a ‘trivalent theory of justice’. ‘Redistribution, Recognition and the State: The Irreducibly 
Political Dimension of Injustice’ (2002) 30 Political Theory 402, 420. 
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Fraser’s status model of recognition is influenced by a Weberian approach to Marx.94 
Indeed, within this folk paradigm of justice, victims ‘are more like Weberian status 
groups than Marxian classes’.95 In other words, they are ‘[d]efined not by the relations of 
production, but rather by the relations of recognition, [and] they are distinguished by the 
lesser respect, esteem, and prestige they enjoy relative to other groups in society’.96 When 
evaluated from the standard of participatory parity, misrecognition is a specific form of 
injustice where ‘institutionalized patterns of cultural value constitute some actors as 
inferior, excluded, wholly other, or simply invisible, hence as less than full partners in 
social interaction’.97  
 
In contrast with ‘identity models of recognition’, such as those of Axl Honneth and 
Charles Taylor, which ‘start from psychological premises about the intersubjective 
conditions for the development of a sense of personal identity’, the status model of 
recognition endorses a sociological approach that ‘treats recognition from the external 
perspective of a sociological observer rather than the internal perspective of individuals 
engaged in intersubjective relations of recognition and identity-formation’. 98  Hence, 
misrecognition should not be understood mainly as a cognitive/psychological issue, but 
as ‘an institutionalized social relation’.99 Although Fraser does not ignore the possibility 
that misrecognition may have profound effects on individual identities, she considers that 
from the perspective of a critical theory of justice, we should not start the analysis of our 
current struggles from subjective, unmediated, pre-political experiences of injustice.100 In 
                                               
94 In contrast, her approach to the politics of redistribution is influenced by the Marxist paradigm of the 
exploited working class. Overall, her theory could be labelled a Neo-Marxist approach, an example of ‘the 
articulation of Weberian concepts in the recent development of Marxist theory (…) a Neo-Marxist theory 
of class.’ V Burris, ‘The Neo-Marxist Synthesis of Marx and Weber on Class’, in N Willey (ed), The Marx-
Weber Debate (Sage Publications 1971) 68. Neo-Marxists grant ‘considerable autonomy to nonclass form 
of oppression. Disagreements remain as to the most appropriate way of conceptualising these forms of 
oppression, their degree of autonomy, and the precise manner in which they are articulated with capitalist 
class relations’. (ibid) As I will address later, the precise manner in which non-class forms of oppression 
are articulated with class in contemporary capitalism is one of the most important contributions of Nancy 
Fraser’s critical social theory.  
95 Fraser (n 10) 14. She quotes the influential work of Max Weber, called ‘Class, Status and Party’. 
96 ibid. 
97 ibid 29.  
98 Zurn (n 51) 147-8.  
99 N Fraser, ‘Capitalism, Heterosexism and Misrecognition’ (1997) 52/53 Social Text 279, 280. 
100 C Zurn, ‘Balkanization or Homogenization: Is There a Dilemma between Recognition and Distribution 
Struggles’ (2004) 18 Public Affairs Quarterly 159, 167 (arguing that identity models of recognition have 
something to say about crafting remedies of differentiation or dedifferentiation). Also, for Lois McNay, 
‘Fraser’s critique of the subjectivism inherent in the identity model of recognition is so emphatic that it 
leads to an objectivist style of analysis that forecloses any understanding of the subjective dimensions of 
oppression and agency’’ She develops on Bordeau’s idea of habitus, which could allow Fraser to 
‘understand subjectivity as an effect of power relations’, but without relinquishing ‘the central importance 
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other words, ‘the status model does not so much exclude other meanings of recognition 
as set constraints on how they may be legitimately achieved’.101 Her account, then, is 
broader than identity models, which start their analysis of misrecognition from a 
phenomenological account of subjective experiences of injustice:  
critical theory must prioritize the critique of institutionalized injustice 
in order to open a space for legitimate forms of self-realization. 
Treating justice as the first virtue, it must seek to equalize the 
conditions under which various interpretations of human flourishing 
are formulated, debated and pursued.102  
 
Furthermore, the need to look at status rather than identities does not imply endorsing a 
fixed ontological lens that assumes that groups are an unavoidable fact of modernity. 
Although Fraser’s model 
does not deny the multiplicity of kinds of social affinity groups, 
collectivities, associations, coalitions, and so on found in complex 
societies, it focuses only on those groups that owe their existence as 
a group to being placed in a subordinate social position because of 
entrenched patterns of cultural value. According to the status model, 
then, misrecognition arises not merely from cultural and symbolic 
slights, but only from those that are anchored in social institutions and 
that systematically deny the members of denigrated groups equal 
opportunities for participation in social life.103  
 
In her early works, Fraser acknowledged the tensions between ascertaining the existence 
of group-based misrecognition and the reifying potential of group identities, which in turn 
excludes dissenters and breeds separatism.104 Her liberal commitment to the principle of 
equal moral worth and the standard of participatory parity made her radically aware of 
the potentially oppressive role of group identities for individual autonomy.105 Moreover, 
her critical stance towards social struggles and social movements does not commit her to 
                                               
of a hermeneutic orientation in understanding aspects of oppression and agency’. ‘The Trouble with 
Recognition: Subjectivity, suffering and agency’ (2008) 26 Sociological Theory 271, 283-284. In ch 9, I 
develop the principle of the political axis of ADL, and ask whether incorporating a focus on agency within 
Fraser’s work helps us in understanding how some individuals or groups are willing to challenge their 
oppression while others remain passive and consent to their subjection.  
101 Fraser (n 87) 333. 
102 ibid 334. 
103 Zurn (n 51) 148. 
104 Fraser (n 39); in contrast, Iris Marion Young, who also acknowledged the importance of group-based 
oppression, was initially uncritical towards the possible reifying effects of group identities, and understood 
'group differentiation' as 'both an inevitable and a desirable aspect of modern social processes'. Justice and 
the Politics of Difference (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 47.   
105 Choudhry wrongly includes Fraser in his account of the ‘paradigm of recognition’, which he claims does 
not address the potential oppressive effects of group identities. (n 4) 163.  
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a full partisan endorsement of those causes: ‘once we couch misrecognition in terms of 
status subordination, it becomes clear that misrecognition can occur not only across 
groups, but within groups as well’.106 In this way, we can understand her critical stance 
on how the achievements of second-wave socialist feminists have been co-opted by 
mainstream neoliberal thought, reproducing the social conditions for gender 
subordination.107  
 
To overcome misrecognition, she initially advocated a deconstructive recognition politics 
(as she advocated socialism for redistribution struggles), aimed at the deconstruction of 
binary oppositions that reproduce practices of cultural misrecognition.108  The initial 
versions of her account were against an ‘affirmative politics of recognition, as interfering 
with transformative economic justice and generating perverse feedback loops of 
resentment when combined with liberal welfare state programs targeting disadvantaged 
groups’.109 However, in the Tanner Lectures (1996), she elaborated a more diversified 
account of recognition remedies, arguing that ‘judgments about the appropriateness of a 
deconstructive approach to cultural injustice or a multiculturalist approach cannot be 
made theoretically, and a priori’.110 Later, in Recognition Without Ethics (2001), Fraser 
acknowledged that recognition struggles should choose their strategies and remedies 
carefully, according to the particular kind of cultural injustice that they purport to tackle, 
while also assuming a connection with the other two dimensions of justice.111 Some 
injustices may require misrecognised groups  
to be unburdened of excessive ascribed or constructive 
distinctiveness. In other cases, they may need to have hitherto 
underacknowledged distinctiveness taken into account. In still other 
cases, they may need to shift the focus onto dominant or advantaged 
groups, outing the latter’s distinctiveness, which has been falsely 
parading as universality. Alternatively, they may need to deconstruct 
the very terms in which attributed differences are currently 
elaborated. Finally, they may need all of the above, or several of the 
                                               
106 Zurn (n 51) 153. 
107 N Fraser, ‘Feminism, Capitalism and the Cunning of History’ (2009) 56 New Left Review 97. 
108  Fraser (n 39) ch1. For some critics, this early account looked like ‘an assimilationist project that 
ultimately expects all barriers and divisions to dissolve. The weight attached to transformation inevitably 
suggests a process of convergence between what are currently distinct values or identities, a cultural 
“melting pot” out of which new-but then no longer “cultural”- identities will be forged.’ A Phillips, ‘From 
Inequality to Difference’, Fraser and Olson (n 39) 124. 
109 L Feldman, ‘Status Injustice: The Role of the State’, in Fraser and Olson (n 39) 223. The same critique 
could be made of liberal versions of multiculturalism that celebrate diversity without challenging the 
dominant horizons of value.  
110 ibid. 
111 N Fraser, ‘Recognition Without Ethics’ (2001) 18 Theory, Culture & Society 21, 31. 
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above, in combination with one another and in combination with 
redistribution.112 
 
In other words, a range of different recognition remedies, whether affirmative or 
transformative, may be available, across the different domains of justice. The target of 
these different remedies is not the culture, the economy or ‘the political’ as separate 
entities (substantive trialism), but rather different harms whose origins lie primarily in 
these different spheres. Any attempt to tackle a phenomenon like discrimination, without 
being aware of the interimbrications, may end up reproducing the conditions that generate 
a certain harm in any sphere of interaction. 113  In some exceptional cases, Fraser 
acknowledges the possibility of cross-redressing, that is, redistribution remedies that 
tackle misrecognition, or recognition remedies that tackle maldistribution.114 In a way, 
Fraser´s initial dilemma between redistribution and recognition struggles has gradually 
shifted from a tragic to a practical dilemma: ‘[t]here are real and persistent practical 
differentiation tensions between the numerous remedies and strategies that might be 
adopted to achieve social justice’.115  
 
Although ‘standard forms of formal legal equality’ are necessary but not sufficient for 
participatory parity to be possible, the strategy of groups pushing for differentiation today 
may be the consolidation of formal equality tomorrow.116 A more detailed analysis of the 
history of legal equality clauses would teach us that recognition remedies are not always 
pushing for the consolidation of difference, opening up the possibility for an approach to 
ADL that accommodates a range of different recognition remedies in its struggle against 
misrecognition, considering the interimbrication of the different spheres.117 
 
                                               
112 Fraser (n 89) 35.  
113 This could address Zurn’s critique (n 51); Fraser (n 89) 46-7.  
114 Fraser (n 10) 83.  
115 C Zurn, ‘‘Balkanization or Homogenization: Is There a Dilemma between Recognition and Distribution 
Struggles’ (2004) 18 Public Affairs Quarterly 159, 179. 
116 Fraser (n 89) 30.  
117 Questions regarding LGBTI struggles could help us in building this approach: what should its advocates 
pursue through the usage of ADL? Egalitarian Marriage (considering sexual orientation as a barrier to the 
right to marriage) or decoupling benefits from heterosexual marriage and allocating them to individuals? 
Should they concentrate their struggles on achieving formal equality or in attempting to overcome cultural 
forms of misrecognition that are better confronted by intervening in the social and private spheres of action? 
Should their main target be the cultural domain, attempting to challenge dominant horizons of value, or the 
legal sphere and institutions, which grant the social basis for an egalitarian distribution of self-respect? 
Fraser, ‘Rethinking Recognition: Overcoming Displacement and Reification in Cultural Politics’ (n 39) 
136. For her, the answers of social movements to these questions would need to pass the test of ‘non-
reformist reforms’. 
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Rescuing the contribution of ‘identity models of recognition’, like the one articulated by 
Axl Honneth, where recognition implies securing the conditions of social interactions for 
individuals to develop self-confidence (love), self-respect (law), and self-esteem 
(achievement), may lead us towards this flexibility.118 In the words of Zurn: ‘different 
types of recognition struggles-contra Fraser- may or may not be fundamentally aimed at 
dominant cultural patterns of value, and furthermore, may or may not involve strategies 
for remedy that tend towards group differentiation’.119 However, nothing in the ‘status 
model of recognition’ prevents us from incorporating this flexible approach to recognition 
remedies, especially if we include representation remedies. Indeed, we could say that she 
endorses the idea that  
a theory of social justice must attend to the multiple causal axes of 
injustice and the different forms of political struggles appropriate to 
them. It must be sensitive to their distinct sets of focal issues, types of 
injustice, normative claims, candidate remedies, strategic choices, 
practical tensions between desirability and feasibility, and so on.120 
 
This practical approach towards recognition remedies should be coupled with her 
analytical distinctions/socio-theoretical articulations of non-class forms of oppression 
with class and citizenship in contemporary capitalism. Fraser’s analytical distinction 
between misrecognition, maldistribution and misrepresentation is appropriate to 
understand the limits of an emancipatory tool like ADL. Indeed, when we are able to 
understand in which sphere certain harm is mainly rooted, we are able to tailor particular 
remedies, allowing us a more efficient use of our limited capacities for social struggles. 
Within Fraser’s account, ADL attempts to tackle a social phenomenon that has its origins 
in the institutionalisation of cultural value patterns, which may have effects in different 
spheres or dimensions, as illustrated by the economic or political effects of 
discrimination. As an anti-misrecognition device that tackles harms that are mainly rooted 
in culture, this does not mean that it does not operate in the economy or in the political 
sphere.  
 
The idea that harms are rooted primarily in the cultural sphere, at the same time, does not 
mean that ADL tackles merely symbolic harms. Contrary to the idea of coupling symbolic 
                                               
118 Zurn (n 115) 180.  
119 ibid 171. For Zurn, Nancy Fraser’s status model of recognition does not fit with basic struggles for 
political and legal equality that are not primarily directed at institutionalised patterns of representation, 
interpretation and communication (ibid 173). 
120 ibid 180. 
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harms with culture and material harms with the economy, Fraser explains that ‘injustices 
of misrecognition are just as material as injustices of maldistribution.’121 Thus, ‘norms, 
significations, and constructions of personhood that impede women, racialized peoples, 
and/or gays and lesbians from parity of participation in social life are materially 
instantiated’.122 Her theoretical framework, then, ‘eschews orthodox distinctions’ and 
endorses a socio-theoretical distinction between the different spheres in order to propose 
a theory of social emancipation that can deal with the gaps, with those instances where 
misrecognition is not the superstructure of an economic base, or address those economic 
complexities that move fluidly across different cultural spheres in order to achieve its 
self-declared aims of enhancing competitiveness or maximising profits.123  
 
Futhermore, labelling ADL an anti-misrecognition device does not preclude the mutual 
influence of the different spheres, the mutual imbrication between the economy, culture 
and politics. On the contrary, these ‘three dimensions stand in relations of mutual 
entwinement and reciprocal influence’, as Fraser state in Reframing Justice in a 
Globalizing World.124 Although the different articulations of the political dimension of 
justice have never been fully explained by Fraser, a footnote of the latter essay is the 
clearest articulation of this mutual ‘interimbrication’:  
the capacity to influence public debate and authoritative decision-
making depends not only on formal decision rules but also on power 
relations rooted in the economic structure and the status order (…). 
Thus, maldistribution and misrecognition conspire to subvert the 
principle of equal political voice for every citizen, even in polities that 
claim to be democratic. But of course the converse is also true. Those 
who suffer from misrepresentation are vulnerable to injustices of 
status and class. Lacking political voice, they are unable to articulate 
and defend their interests with respect to distribution and recognition, 
which in turn exacerbates their misrepresentation. In such cases, the 
result is a vicious circle in which the three orders of injustice reinforce 
one another, denying some people the chance to participate on a par 
with others in social life. As these three dimensions are intertwined, 
efforts to overcome injustice cannot, except in rare cases, address 
themselves to just one of them. Rather, struggles against 
maldistribution and misrecognition cannot succeed unless they are 
joined with struggles against misrepresentation—and vice versa. 
                                               
121 Fraser (n 99) 286. 
122 ibid. 
123 Fraser (n 107); W Brown, Undoing the Demos (Verso 2015). 
124 Fraser (n 46) 79. 
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Where one puts the emphasis, of course, is both a tactical and a 
strategic decision.125 
 
The interimbrication of the different spheres does not mean that ADL can address every 
possible injustice, whatever the origin; rather, it starts from the idea that the political and 
economical systems tend to work according to their own logics, which can be better 
understood through other socio-theoretical devices. Within a broader theory of social 
emancipation, we should conjoin these different struggles against maldistribution, 
misrecognition and misrepresentation. However, at a more concrete level, we should 
tailor particular remedies addressed at different kind of harms after ‘a tactical and a 
strategic decision’.126 It is within this pragmatic approach to remedies that I frame ADL 
as an anti-misrecognition device.  
 
The following table illustrates the potential roles ADL can play within the 
interimbrication of the different spheres, suggesting it is neither an all-encompassing 
remedy nor strictly circumscribed within one of the spheres. In that regard, the table 
shows examples of harms mainly rooted in one of the three spheres, but with effects or 
influences in the others, and their possible remedies:127 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
125 ibid fn11.  
126  For some critics, this practical or even strategic turn in Fraser’s work is counterproductive if not 
complemented by a ‘relational phenomenology of social suffering’. Indeed, for McNay, Fraser’s theory 
‘overlooks types of suffering that fall below the perceptual threshold of the recognition and redistribution’, 
such as the constraining effects of class upon action, which ‘operate not so much in terms of objective 
access to resources but as a set of class-specific dimension’. Moreover, ‘a construal of agency from the 
perspective of a relational phenomenology that connects identities to deeper social structures is one way 
exploring the interpenetrations of cultural and economic forces’, the interimbrication that is so central in 
Fraser’s method. McNay (n 100) 293, 288, 287; C Zurn, ‘Identity or Status? Struggles over “recognition” 
in Fraser, Honneth, and Taylor’ (2003) 10 Constellations 519, 534. 
127 In each box, I describe the particular kinds of harms and, after the semicolon, suggest potential remedies 
tailored specifically to them.  
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Harms/Remedies Culture Economy Politics 
Culture Status inequality (Recognition); 
ADL; redressing everyday 
discrimination in the media.  
Gendered nature of 
Poverty, childcare and 
unpaid work, gender pay 
gap (sexual division of 
labour); ADL, formal 
equality, intersectionality   
Underrepresentation of 
women in politics; ADL, 
Quotas 
Economy  Stigmatisation of poverty; 
include poverty as a protected 
ground (ADL?) 
Economic inequality 
(Redistribution); Unions, 
collective bargaining, 
taxation, financial 
regulation. 
Buying votes; campaign 
financing laws.  
Politics Centralisation of politics and 
underestimation/stereotyping of 
the capacity of rural areas to 
develop themselves; political 
means 
Exclusion of Global South 
from international 
arrangements and 
underdevelopment; new 
UN venues (eg, global 
parliament) 
Political inequality 
(Representation); new 
electoral systems, 
federal/parliamentary 
arrangements 
Table 1 
 
Thus, for example, the first row shows different harms mainly rooted in the cultural 
sphere, but with effects in all of the other spheres. ADL attempts to redress everyday 
discrimination in the media, where harms can be deemed to be merely cultural, that is, 
they impede parity of participation but without a clear impact in the other spheres.128 For 
example, the stigmatisation of disadvantaged groups at comedy festivals could be 
addressed by using ADL in conjunction with media regulations in order to tackle the 
reproduction of the social conditions of disadvantage, even if its effects or impacts on the 
economic well-being or citizenship status of the victims are not clearly proved. The table 
also shows us that the gendered nature of poverty, the economic costs of childcare 
activities and unpaid work, and, more clearly, the gender pay gap, are mainstream cultural 
harms with profound economic effects. The remedies, here, may range from applying 
formal equality clauses to bridge gender pay gaps to an active use of intersectionality 
approaches to tackle the gendered nature of poverty. The remedies, in general, should 
bring forth or highlight the sexual division of labour, either by using comparators or by 
challenging the male-dominated horizons of value and its expressions in the job 
market.129 Lastly, ADL has been used to challenge the lack of disadvantaged groups in 
positions of decision-making power by revealing the obstacles that a male-dominated 
arrangement of representative democracy creates for women: from the toughness and 
bargaining skills that are unjustifiably attributed to men, to the timetable of party meetings 
                                               
128 K Pérez Portilla, Redressing Everyday Discrimination (Routledge 2016).  
129 S Fredman, ‘Women and Poverty: Human Rights Approach’ (2016) 24 African Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 494. 
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that make it difficult for women with ‘double shifts’ to attend. 130  However, even 
regarding harms that are rooted mainly in other spheres, ADL can be used as an ancillary 
device. The most obvious case has been to address the cultural effects of a structural 
economic harm, like the stigmatisation of people living in poverty.131    
 
In general, regarding harms mainly rooted in the other two spheres, Fraser’s theory of 
social emancipation would recommend tailoring remedies apart from ADL. This has to 
do with her account of the interimbrication of the different spheres. On the one hand, she 
has continually stressed the idea that late capitalism has developed into a ‘social 
formation that differentiates specialized economic arenas and institutions, including some 
that are designated as cultural’.132 What this means is that there is a ‘relative uncoupling’ 
of economic and cultural issues in the current state of late capitalist societies: ‘far from 
claiming that cultural harms are superstructural reflections of economic harms’, or that 
economic harms or injustices are always rooted in cultural hierarchies, like the sexual 
division of labour, she historicises the current capitalist formations in order to understand 
the gaps that could help us in tailoring the adequate remedies.133 I will address this 
interimbrication more deeply in chapter 8.  
 
On the other hand, although she has not deeply developed her account of 
misrepresentation, she acknowledges that the political sphere can create certain harms 
that could be better addressed by devices targeted at the boundaries of constitutional 
membership, like rights of citizenship, or by devices crafted to respect the idea that every 
member should have an equal political voice. As she explains in Reframing Justice, 
‘[m]isrepresentation occurs when political boundaries and/or decision rules function to 
deny some people, wrongly, the possibility of participating on a par with others in social 
interaction—including, but not only, in political arenas’.134  At a first level, there is 
ordinary-political misrepresentation, and here we enter into the terrain of political science 
and its debate on the relative merits of alternative political/electoral systems, or on the 
drawing of different constituencies (eg, gerrymandering) and their compliance with the 
principle of political equality and balance with other principles like stability or 
                                               
130  T Thomas, ‘Remedying Systemic Sex Discrimination by Gender Quotas: Just Because’ (2017) 
Forthcoming, Harvard Journal of Law & Gender.  
131 A Coddou, ‘Addressing Poverty through a Transformative Approach to Anti-Discrimination Law in 
Latin America’, in L Boratti and others (eds), Law and Policy in Latin America (Palgrave 2017).  
132 N Fraser, ‘A Rejoinder to Iris Marion Young’ (1997) 223 New Left Review 126, 127-8.  
133 ibid; Fraser (n 10) 56.  
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governability. At most, ADL could be used to highlight issues of political 
misrepresentation that disproportionately affect certain protected groups. In general, 
however, the constitutional guarantee of political equality, in its different articulations, 
should suffice to tackle these problems. At a different level, she introduces the idea of 
misframing, ‘which concerns the boundary-setting aspect of the political. Here the 
injustice arises when the community’s boundaries are drawn in such a way as to wrongly 
exclude some people from the chance to participate at all in its authorised contests over 
justice.’135 In contrast with ordinary-political misrepresentation, which can be addressed 
by traditional political means, misframing involves very serious injustices that have been 
highlighted by globalisation. Frequently, we suffer directly due to the impact of decisions 
in which we do not even have the opportunity to have a say, decisions that usually lie 
outside the boundaries of the national state in which we live. Here, the remedies should 
be crafted in order to foster the Habermasian discourse principle beyond the traditional 
Westphalian model.  
 
5.4 Conclusions 
This chapter started by providing an overview of the most important debate around the 
philosophical foundations of ADL and argued that pluralist theories have explained the 
wrongness of discrimination through several different aspects of the practice of ADL. 
These theories point towards a purposive inquiry into the practice of ADL as committed 
to transformative aims, such as the need to reduce and, hopefully, eliminate social 
subordination. In that regard, the philosophical foundations of ADL need to be 
complemented by a critical theory that is capable of placing ADL within a broader theory 
of social emancipation. As I argued here, ADL is an anti-misrecognition device that 
operates within an interimbrication of different spheres, through strategic and practical 
decisions of social agents. As I will illustrate in the following chapters, individuals and 
groups use ADL, highlighting its expressive commitments, and their sense of entitlement 
due to the recognition of identities in legal discourse, but also as a means for achieving 
recognition or access to valuable goods.  
 
The theoretical toolkit provided by Nancy Fraser allows us to locate ADL within a theory 
of social emancipation, to understand both its strengths and limits. In societies facing 
pressures for precarious systemic market-integration processes, ADL constitutes an 
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interesting case of non-reformist reform. Indeed, ADL can be a first step, with the 
materials we have at hand, towards elaborating progressive political projects that could 
reinforce the current struggles for human emancipation and alter the terrain upon which 
later struggles will be mounted. Hence, it is not only its expressive currency, but also the 
way in which ADL has been used, that constitutes the basis of the theoretical framework 
for a transformative approach to ADL. ADL appears to be a dangerous weapon in the 
hands of social movements that can exploit the legal and political opportunity structures, 
at least when viewed from the perspective of those who want to defend the dominant 
horizons of value of what is considered as the ‘norm’.  
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Chapter 6 The principles of a transformative approach to ADL 
6.1 Introduction 
Considering my definition of ADL as an anti-misrecognition device, although deeply 
interimbricated with the different spheres of social interaction, and with both constitutive 
and instrumental dimensions regarding the relationship between law and social change, 
what do we find in the practice of Latin American ADL? If my aim is to elaborate on a 
transformative approach to ADL, that is, to place it as a case of ‘non-reformist reform’, 
does the practice of Latin American ADL show certain illuminating patterns or trends? 
An answer to these questions motivates the following chapters, in which I develop the 
principles that I claim constitute the transformative approach to ADL in Latin America. 
 
Anti-discrimination scholarship has provided different accounts of the transformative 
potential of ADL, namely, in regard to expanding its scope of action to private actors,1  
or incorporating clauses of indirect discrimination, intersectionality or reasonable 
accommodation, 2  or the endorsement of a structural turn. 3  The debates around the 
philosophical foundations of ADL have attempted to incorporate these transformative 
aims. However, as I explained in the previous chapter, these debates seem ill-equipped to 
understand the place of ADL within progressive political projects. In contrast, when 
viewed from a particular critical social theory, such as the one developed by Nancy 
Fraser, Latin American ADL offers a promising avenue through which to perform this 
task.  
 
Indeed, in terms of comparative exercises, Latin American ADL is not characterised by 
the development of sophisticated doctrinal accounts, such as the ones advanced in the 
common law jurisdictions, or in the EU equality regime. For example, there is hardly a 
judgment in the region that clarifies the meaning of indirect discrimination, or the 
procedural implications of intersectionality clauses. 4  There are no handbooks or 
textbooks that rationally reconstruct the nascent equality regimes, either from a regional 
or a domestic perspective. Moreover, as I explained in the first part of this thesis, the 
                                               
1 E Muir, ‘The Transformative Function of EU Equality Regime’ (2013) 5&6 European Review of Private 
Law 1231, 1234. 
2 S Fredman, Intersectional discrimination in EU gender equality and non-discrimination law (European 
network of legal experts in gender equality and non-discrimination 2016). 
3 S Bagenstos, ‘The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law’ (2006) 94 California Law 
Review 1.  
4 E Caamaño, ‘La discriminación laboral indirecta’ (2001) 12 Revista de Derecho 67, 81.  
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institutional arrangements crafted by Latin American jurisdictions seem to be at an early 
stage of development, and even if egalitarian-dialogic constitutionalism seems to be 
pushing in the right direction, there is a long way to go in terms of the effective 
enforcement of recent legal reforms. However, as I will show in this second part - and 
viewed through the lens of Fraser’s theory - Latin American ADL can make an important 
contribution to the critical social theory of ADL, that is, to the emancipatory role it can 
play in ‘disclosing critique’ (unmasking domination, oppression and unfair disadvantage) 
and to the awareness of its limits and dangers (‘reflexivity’), the two ‘moments’ of 
ideology critique of ‘contemporary critical theory’.5 In other words, the second part of 
this thesis is focused on providing a critical theory for ADL in Latin America that can be 
used as an approach to existing anti-discrimination regimes.  
 
A few words on the rationale of this and the following chapters need to be said. In the 
first section of this chapter, I will explain the character, sources and functions of the 
principles; then, I will present three principles (state intervention, group dimension, and 
legal empowerment/mobilisation). In the following chapters (7, 8, and 9), I will present 
the principles of the challenging stance, the socio-economic lens, and the political axis of 
ADL separately, for two reasons: first, due to their prominence within the transformative 
approach to ADL and the importance they claim in understanding ADL as anti-
misrecognition device; secondly, and more important, these principles coincide with the 
folk paradigms of justice and the three analytical spheres or perspectives Fraser uses to 
address the social struggles of our era. For these reasons, the presentation of these 
principles requires a longer extension. 
 
6.1.1 Character, sources, and functions 
ADL occupies a peculiar place in debates around the meaning of law and how it is 
experienced in contemporary societies. For Mangabeira Unger,   
[b]ecause so much conflict over the content of law takes the form of 
a struggle over the distinction in the treatment of people, equal-
protection doctrine occupies a special place in the system of legal 
ideas. It is not merely another topic within the law; it is also, by 
                                               
5 L McNay, ‘Contemporary Critical Theory’, in M Freeden and M Stears (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Political Ideologies (OUP 2013) 140.
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synecdoche, the problem of law itself, just as property is not simply 
another right but the exemplary instance of rights.6 
This peculiar place, I suggest, can be approached from the standpoint of those who suffer 
discrimination and from the role that ADL plays in envisioning emancipatory 
alternatives. 7  In contrast to mainstream forms of legal and normative analysis 
(‘rationalising legal analysis’), where the raw materials of law are presented as the 
embodiment of more abstract moral or social ideals, ADL seems to be wary of coherence 
or an integral plan that is implicit in law.8 In particular, ADL seems prone to notice how 
certain aspects of the current practice or ‘corners of the law’ can show the ‘bad face’ of 
the practice, where ‘any given body of law or legal doctrine is bound up to be messy, rich 
in compromises, exceptions and contradictions’.9 Even if ADL, like ‘any given body of 
law’, is subject to these same problems, I argue that it provides us with ‘spaces of 
anticipatory illumination’ in regard to what a progressive anti-discrimination regime 
might look like in Latin America.10 In a way, the inner logic of ADL is that of critical 
theory itself.  
 
For responsive models of law, a legal order provides ‘its own built-in criticisms, and 
through those its own sources of elaboration and change’.11 Within this framework, ADL 
can be seen as a mechanism that not only affirms the authority of law, but ‘exposes [its] 
authority to challenge and open policies to change’.12 For Axl Honneth, the right to 
equality is affected by what he calls ‘structural openness’: an indeterminacy as to what 
counts as a legal person in order to have access to ‘equal rights’, opening up instituted 
forms of recognition to challenge, and thus, to the inclusion of previously excluded or 
discriminated groups. 13 For Mangabeira Unger, anti-discrimination rights may constitute 
basic ‘destabilization rights’, which ‘protect the citizen’s interest in breaking open the 
large scale organizations or the extended areas of social practice’ that usually ‘remain 
                                               
6 R Mangabeira Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become? (Verso 1996) 84. 
7 Of course, this peculiar place may also be explained by the role that equality plays in constructing our 
fidelity to law, to the added moral value of governing our common affairs through law. For this idea, see J 
Waldron, ‘Why Law – Efficacy, Freedom, or Fidelity?’ (1994) 13 Law & Philosophy 259.  
8 R Mangabeira Unger, ‘Legal Analysis as Institutional Imagination’ (1996) 59 The Modern Law Review 
1.  
9 J Waldron, ‘Dirty Little Secret’ (1998) 98 Columbia Law Review 510, 514.  
10 A Allen, ‘Emancipation Without Utopia: Subjection, Modernity, and the Normative Claims of Feminist 
Critical Theory’ (2015) 30 Hypathia 513, 524.  
11 P Nonet, Administrative Justice: Advocacy and change in government agency (Ruswell Sage Foundation 
1969) 251. 
12 ibid. 
13 A Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts (MIT Press 1995) 
110.  
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closed to the destabilizing effects of ordinary conflicts and thereby sustain insulated 
hierarchies of power and advantage’. 14  In different ways, ADL seems inherently 
dangerous for the authority of law, and as such provides an interesting case of immanent 
critique, an avenue for critical legal theory to explore law’s internal contradictions and 
unmask forms of domination, oppression or subordination. Immanent critique can be 
presented as nothing but a method to bridge the gap between the ideals that the law 
purports to embody and what actually occurs – between ‘wish and fulfilment’. 15 
Nevertheless, a more precise account of immanent critique within critical legal 
scholarship should distinguish it from mere internal critique. For Emilios Christodoulidis, 
drawing from a Marxist perspective,  
[i]mmanent critique is tied to the logic of contradiction where 
contradiction, as ‘practical’ rather than logical, informs a crisis that is 
experienced by social agents in the materiality of their life. Social 
reality is experienced by actors in terms of normative expectations 
that are constitutive (rather than ‘epiphenomena’) of that reality. 
Normative expectations are part of institutional frameworks that 
inform actors’ perception of social reality. Immanent critique aims to 
generate within these institutional frameworks contradictions that are 
inevitable  (they can neither be displaced nor ignored), compelling 
(they necessitate action) and transformative in that (unlike internal 
critique) the overcoming of the contradiction does not restore, but 
transcends, the ‘disturbed’ framework within which it arose.16 
 
In this account, immanent critique, when applied by legal scholars, does more than merely 
honour the rule of law as an ‘unqualifiable human good’, or the ‘internal morality of 
law’.17 Actually, the distinction between internal and immanent critique can be associated 
with the distinction between reformism and non-reformism, and in this way is related to 
the portrait of ADL I defend here. Rather than merely affirming the authority of law, or 
stabilising expectations, a progressive account of ADL needs to be attentive to those 
instances in which law destabilises or challenges its own authority, or exploits its 
‘structural openness’.18 Sometimes, the victories of ADL represent the shames of law, 
where the contradictions highlighted by the former become inevitable, compelling and 
                                               
14  R Mangabeira Unger, False Necessity: Anti-necessitarian social theory in the service of radical 
democracy (Verso 2004) 530. 
15 G Pearson and M Salter, ‘Getting Public Law Back into a Critical Condition: The Rule of Law as a 
Source for Immanent Critique’ (1999) 8 Social & Legal Studies 483, 488.  
16 E Christodoulidis, ‘Strategies of Rupture’ (2006) 20 Law and Critique 3, 6 
17 EP Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (Pantheon 1975) 266; L Fuller, The 
Morality of Law (revised edn, 1969 Yale University Press).  
18 Christodoulidis (n 16) 17.  
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transformative.19 ADL, described as an anti-misrecognition device that is thoroughly 
interimbricated with other spheres, which addresses cultural harms that are materially 
instantiated in institutional value patterns (as material as economic harms), and has both 
instrumental and constitutive dimensions, provides a privileged illustration of immanent 
critique. The principles presented here describe the conditions under which ADL can be 
considered a paradigmatic case of immanent legal critique, an inevitable, compelling and 
transformative form of critique or, alternatively, a case of ‘non-reformist reform’.  
 
The sources for these principles depend on an enlarged account of law and legal systems 
that we may call a ‘relational theory of law’, which understands the object of the critique 
by exploring the ‘interaction between legal relations and other forms of social relations 
rather than treating law as an autonomous field of inquiry linked only by external relations 
to the rest of society’.20 Specifically, the sources for these principles are located in the 
current practice of Latin American ADL, and not only in the case law of the IAHRS and 
domestic courts, in recent anti-discrimination legal reforms, or more broadly within 
transnational constitutional debates; in particular, these principles are to be found within 
the practice of social movements that deploy legal devices in their mobilisation strategies. 
Indeed, they are precisely the ones who exploit those ‘built-in criticisms’ of law, or the 
‘structural openness’ of forms of legal recognition.  
 
The principles presented here have only partial explanatory power, that is, they do not 
provide a comprehensive theoretical account of Latin American ADL. This is due not 
only to the methodological challenge of considering the different anti-discrimination 
regimes in the region under a single object of study, but primarily to the critical approach 
presented before: indeed, even if they derive from the practice of ADL, they attempt to 
provide spaces of anticipatory illumination in terms of what a transformative approach to 
ADL might look like.21 In other words, even if they can be claimed to be immanent legal 
                                               
19 See the speech given by the Spanish PM during the enactment of the Same-Sex Marriage Act, which 
highlighted how the case for this form of legal recognition, based on the principle of equality and non-
discrimination, became ‘inevitable’ (after years of institutional and social humiliation), ‘compelling’ 
(necessary to restore dignity, through the means of law) and ‘transformative’ (not only sexual minorities, 
but all the Spanish society would be transformed according to principles of decency and equal dignity). < 
http://cadenaser.com/ser/2005/07/01/espana/1120175411_850215.html> accessed 20 September 2017. 
20 Pearson and Salter (n 15) 488. For example, ‘the social institution of marriage involves a numbers of 
different forms of social relations (legal, economic, gender, sexual relations, etc.); such a conceptualization 
makes it possible to explore questions about the role which law plays in the development and change of 
this and other social institutions and practices.’ (ibid 489); A Hunt, ‘The Critique of Law: What’s “Critical” 
About Critical Theory?’ (1987) 14 Journal of Law and Society 5, 16.  
21 The methodology that attempts to elaborate these principles could be associated with what Boaventura 
De Sousa Santos calls a ‘sociology of emergences’, which searches for the signs, latencies or possibilities 
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principles, which are already explicit or implicit in law, they have no explanatory power 
if we understand this task as a (complete) ‘rational reconstruction’ of ADL. Thus, these 
are principles that even without any grounding in positive law, can be read out of it, or 
derived especially from the practice of those deploying legal strategies to advance anti-
discrimination rights in Latin America (immanent principles). 22  Furthermore, these 
principles are not primarily premises of political morality that can fit with the history and 
current accounts of Latin American ADL, as a Dworkinean analyst might attempt. To put 
it differently, I am not attempting to impose ‘a purpose on an object or practice to make 
of it the best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong’.23 My 
aim here is not to give a complete ‘theoretical account of the legal model regulating 
discrimination’ based on a certain Latin American dataset, but to advance the possibility 
of a transformative approach to ADL according to certain legal and social practices 
currently taking place in the region.24 The principles, thus, are built on certain examples, 
which expand the knowledge we have of the powers of ADL, representing what is absent 
from our current ‘perceptions’ of the role of law for producing social change.25 
 
These criteria provide a somewhat partial account of what we have, the current state of 
the art of parts of Latin American ADL, and a roadmap that can highlight the strengths 
and limits of an anti-discrimination programme, and thus its place within broader 
‘progressive political projects’. In general, these principles could be better characterised 
as normative standards that are immanent in legal practices and that illustrate the 
character of ADL as a case of ‘non-reformist reform’. These principles have two concrete 
functions. First, they are separate normative standards through which to evaluate different 
aspects of ADL, specially crafted to evaluate current reforms that are being discussed in 
Latin America and provide a roadmap for the much needed consolidation of these regimes 
of law. Although considered as separate normative standards, the principles together 
constitute a normative framework to which we can resort for discussing the ability of 
                                               
that are frequently discredited because they do not exist or because they are not easily translatable to 
measures or indicators. Toward a New Legal Common Sense (Butterworths 2004) ch9.   
22 For the concept of immanent values, see P Cane, ‘Theory and Values in Public Law’, in P Craig and R 
Rawlings (eds), Law and Administration in Europe: Essays in Honour of Carol Harlow (OUP 2003).  
23 R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986) 52. 
24 T Khaitan, A Theory of Discrimination Law (OUP 2015) 4.  
25 For the role of examples in expanding our knowledge and improving our judgments in legal reasoning, 
see O Angeli, ‘Global constitutionalism and constitutional imagination’ (2017) 6 Global Constitutionalism 
359, 361-6. 
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ADL to address structural issues or widespread practices of discrimination.26 Moreover, 
these principles could be considered as ‘the backdrop against which to consider the 
application of doctrinal issues that require resolution’. 27  In that sense, although 
immanent, they are available to orientate or serve as a source of arguments for strategic 
litigation or judicial resolution, and thus have a practical impact even in the absence of 
concrete reforms in positive law. In a way, these principles are legal principles that 
constitute the backdrop against which many of the most progressive landmark cases are 
built.  
 
In explaining each principle, I will consider the elements that constitute ADL as an anti-
misrecognition device and further developments in Nancy Fraser’s critical theory. With 
the help of her critical framework, the legal practice of the jurisdictions considered in the 
database will appear in a new light, providing us examples to imagine how a 
transformative approach to ADL would look like, that is, to represent what is absent from 
a doctrinal reconstruction of the law ‘as it is’.  
 
6.2 The principle of state intervention 
The idea that ADL entails some positive state action seems undisputed. However, the idea 
that the state, as a collective human association with peculiar legal features, should take 
a stance on divisive moral issues such as the ones involved in many discrimination cases, 
lacks unanimous support. This principle starts from the base that the State must intervene 
in societal spheres to tackle discrimination. In contrast to the classical liberal idea of the 
State as the main antagonist of society, one that should remain neutral in the face of moral 
disagreements, this principle forces the State to take a stance concerning discrimination. 
Thus, an initial question is how this principle can be reconciled with the liberal idea of 
state neutrality, that is, with the idea that the State should not promote or enforce any 
particular version of the good.  
 
Despite Nancy Fraser’s commitment to (some form of) liberalism and practical vocation 
towards the struggles of progressive social movements, reflections on theories of the state 
are scarcely present in her work. She has been criticised for not considering ‘the particular 
                                               
26 I have used this normative framework to analyse a recent judgment of the IACtHR in A Coddou, ‘Atala: 
a landmark in transformative approaches to anti-discrimination law in Latin America’, in K Fernandez and 
others (eds), Chile and the Inter-American Human Rights System (School of Advanced Studies 2017).   
27 P Craig, ‘Theory and Values in Public Law: A Response’, in Craig and Rawlings (n 22) 28.  
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role of the state and “the political” in struggles over distribution and recognition’, or its 
role as ‘a crucial source of oppression and hardship in itself’.28 Moreover, she seems to 
bypass the particular role the state can play in achieving emancipation. In her ‘Tanner 
Lectures’, when addressing the problems of liberal feminism and state neutrality, she 
stated the following:  
[i]n order to achieve just distribution and reciprocal recognition, it is 
necessary to devise policies that challenge conservative views of 
family and gender relations. (…) The view that justice requires social 
arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to interact 
with one another as peers is itself not neutral between feminist and 
fundamental views of gender relations.29 
However, there is no much more in her writings. According to Fredman, Fraser’s 
principle of participatory parity, ‘a moral principle which does not intrude on individual 
ethics’, could give us a basis to distinguish those areas in which the ‘state is entitled to 
take positive action to further specific values or prevent the pursuance of what it regards 
as morally bad goals’.30  
 
A recurrent theme in feminist political theory, the idea of state intervention, has recently 
been highlighted by theories of constitutional democracy, which understand the idea of 
state neutrality in a different way.31 Derived either from the liberal principle of plurality, 
or from the need to protect public morality, state intervention is justified to promote or 
secure the conditions required for equal valuable autonomy or reasonable deliberation.32 
Instead of avoiding mingling with social or moral conflicts, the modern constitutional 
state is required to intervene and enhance rational discussions among citizens that see 
themselves as equally entitled to participate in finding the solutions to potentially divisive 
moral issues.33  
 
                                               
28 L Feldman, ‘Redistribution, Recognition and the State: The Irreducibly Political Dimension of Injustice’ 
(2002) 30 Political Theory 402, 410-11.  
29 N Fraser, ‘Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics’ (1996) The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 
Stanford University, fn62. 
30 S Fredman, Human Rights Transformed (OUP 2008) 21. For a critique of Fraser’s distinction between 
morality and ethics, se C Zurn, ‘Arguing over participatory parity: On Nancy Fraser’s conception of social 
justice’, in N Fraser and K Olson (eds), Adding Insult to Injury: Nancy Fraser debates her Critics (Verso 
2008) 153-4.   
31 J Kantola, ‘Feminism’, in C Hay and others (eds), The State: Theories and Issues (Palgrave 2006) 119-
20. 
32 J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (OUP 1986) 426. 
33 J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Polity Press 1996) 176. 
 161 
While classical liberalism placed civil society against the state, and thus created an 
artificial division between the private and public spheres, ‘critical liberal theories’ have 
internalised the republican idea that these spheres are inherently connected.34 Within the 
latter frameworks, ADL can be understood, not as dealing with private harms that can 
merely be redressed through individual initiatives, but as engaging the state as the 
guarantor of public interest. Moreover, seen from the perspective of structural 
accommodations -where society bears the costs imposed by the way of life of dominant 
groups, as expressed, for example, in conventions, dress codes, working times, work-life 
balances, or architectural design- the need for intervention in the name of public interest 
seems justified from the liberal principle of equal concern and respect. As Sandra 
Fredman puts it, ‘[t]he status quo, without legal intervention, requires the out-group to 
bear the full cost’, so ‘disabled people bear the cost of disability’: ‘[w]hatever cost is not 
borne by employers or the state is left on the shoulders of those who are least able to bear 
it’.35 Accordingly, equal concern and respect for members of out-groups or, alternatively, 
the liberal idea of a basic structure that allocates the benefits and burdens of a collective 
scheme of co-operation provides strong groundings for the state to intervene through 
ADL.  
 
6.2.1 State theories 
If one moves beyond the liberal debates, and looks towards different state theories, we 
arrive at a much more nuanced approach of the idea of state intervention. Here, I will first 
present the traditional Kelsenian definition of the state and argue that relational theories 
are better equipped to understand the legal complexities that are involved in the principle 
of state intervention. Kelsen’s definition of the state as ‘a relatively centralized legal 
order’, although purely theoretical, has many impacts on legal practice.36 It provides 
accurate answers to questions about the three elements of traditional state theories 
(population, territory and power).37 To ascertain whether someone has compromised state 
responsibility, a pure legal theory of the state has obvious advantages, as illustrated by 
the rules of attribution for the international responsibility of States.38 For example, to 
                                               
34  N Fraser, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing 
Democracy’, in C Calhoun (ed), Habermas and the Public Sphere (MIT Press 1992) 118-21. 
35 S Fredman, ‘Substantive Equality Revisited’ (2016) 14 International Journal of Constitutional Law 712, 
734. 
36 H Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (2nd edition, University of California Press 1967) 286. 
37 Kelsen used law and state as synonyms. ibid 285. 
38 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.  
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determine state responsibility and award damages in foreign investment disputes, 
arbitrators have relied on the idea that the legal personality of the state implies conceiving 
of it as a ‘monolithic entity’.39 Along Kelsenian lines, the state is then characterised by 
the approach of corporate law, as a hierarchical entity that in the upper part of the scale 
has allegedly one person/entity liable. 40  This approach has been criticised for not 
acknowledging the administrative complexities of states, which must deal with 
contradictory interests and diverse goals.41  
 
If we want to understand how the state, even as a legal order, intervenes in socially or 
morally divisive issues, we should broaden our perspective towards relational theories of 
the state. Nicos Poulantzas argued in the late 1960s for the expansion of traditional 
Marxist state theory, and conceived of the (capitalist) state as a social relation: neither an 
entity in its own right, nor an instrument nor a rational subject, but a relationship of forces, 
or the material condensation of those relations.42 For relational theories, the problems of 
state theory are located in the articulation between state and society. As Jessop puts it, 
while the State  
is just one institutional ensemble among others within a social 
formation (…) it is peculiarly charged with overall responsibility for 
maintaining the cohesion of the social formation of which it is merely 
a part. Its paradoxical position as both part and whole of society 
means that it is continually called upon by diverse social forces to 
resolve society’s problems and is equally continually doomed to 
generate ‘state failure’ since so many of society’s problems lie well 
beyond its control and may even be aggravated by attempted 
intervention.43 
Relational theories of the state, by relying on this paradox, are better equipped to 
understand the complexities of the principle of state intervention.  
 
The idea that the state is something more than the accumulation or aggregation of private 
interests and something less than a monolithic legal entity has been pervasive in Latin 
American political and legal practice. The articulation of different practices within and 
                                               
39 ICSID, MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile (2004) para 166. 
40 Kelsen (n 36) 290-99.  
41 X Fuentes, ‘El impacto de las normas internacionales sobre protección de la inversión extranjera en el 
derecho nacional’, in CEPAL & GTZ, Acuerdos internacionales de inversión, sustentabilidad de 
inversiones de infraestructura y medidas regulatorias y contractuales (2010) 39. 
42 N Poulantzas, ‘The Capitalist State: A Reply to Milliband and Laclau’, in J Martin (ed) Poulantzas 
Reader (Verso 2008). 
43 B Jessop, State Power: A Relational-Strategic Approach (Polity Press 2008) 7.  
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around the state makes the approach of the state as a monolithic legal entity untenable. 
The study of the state in contemporary Latin America could be approached as ‘a 
differentiated structure which allows the various interests of civil society political 
expression’, where ‘these interests, and the individuals whose economic relationships 
produce these interests, are not simply submerged in the state’.44 This relational definition 
may explain the ambiguous relationship of Latin American citizens with their states: 
although a majority of them consider that the state should intervene in the economy and 
resolve social conflicts, they distrust its institutional capacities to solve problems like 
crime, corruption or inequality.45 Furthermore, although the majority of Latin Americans 
feel that powerful elites capture state institutions, they still consider that the State is the 
main agent that can improve their living conditions.46 
 
Relational theories of the State in Latin America have important legal implications that 
have been highlighted by recent approaches that consider the state a fragmented legal 
entity, with several interstices that allow some interests to prevail among/against others.47 
For Molyneux, for example, the history of the state in Latin America shows that states 
‘are far from constituting the all-powerful monoliths they are sometimes assumed to be’, 
and could be better characterised as arenas of social struggles with contingent and 
unpredictable outcomes, and limited transformative power, which makes the image of the 
state as standing above society a mere illusion.48 Analysing recent feminist struggles in 
the region, and challenging the illusory image of states as ‘neutral arbiters’, Molyneux 
posits that the state is the main reproducer of gender status inequalities: 
[w]hether through intention, through the effects of policies, or 
through indifference and inaction that maintains the power relations 
enshrined by the status quo, states are implicated in the ordering of 
gender relations over the societies over which they preside.49  
In recent years, there has been a growing body of literature on the gendered nature of 
social policies, which have reproduced gender inequalities through diverse social 
                                               
44 A Callinicos, Social Theory: An Introduction (Wiley 2015) 47. 
45 Latinobarometro, Informe 2013 (Latinobarometro 2013) 67-70.  
46 Latinobarometro, Informe 2016 (Latinobarometro 2016) 36.  
47 For Alvaro Garcia Linera, current vice-president of Bolivia, relational theories of the state, such as the 
one developed by Poulantzas, are important to understand the ‘reality’ of the (neoliberal) state in Latin 
America, its compartimentalisations and, thus, its possibilities for emancipation. ‘El Estado y la Vía 
Democrática al Socialismo’ (2015) 259 Nueva Sociedad 143, 152. 
48 M Molyneux, ‘Twentieth Century State Formation in Latin America’, in E Dore and M Molyneux (eds), 
Hidden histories of gender and the state in Latin America (Duke University Press 2000) 38. 
49 ibid 39. 
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programmes that, for example, place ‘mothers at the service of the state’.50 However, 
even in this scenario, ‘the power states have to affect social relations is neither absolute 
nor monolithic, nor is the exercise of power a zero-sum game’.51 
 
Furthermore, Latin America’s legal ‘brown areas’ or ‘lawless spaces’ openly challenge 
the ideal theory of the state as a centralised legal order.52 In a way, they challenge the 
element of effectiveness, considered fundamental to Kelsen’s definition of law.53 In turn, 
theories of legal pluralism dealing with indigenous peoples’ claims in Latin America 
‘have long challenged the state’s version of itself as a unitary, hegemonic legal order’.54 
Also, the upsurge of a ‘new developmental state’ in Latin America has changed the legal 
conception of the state in terms of its social roles, especially when considering the 
variance in state capacities and the different networks with which it interacts.55 In contrast 
with the image of the state favoured by dominant legal theories, which relied on a state 
issuing legal commands, the ‘new developmental state’ accommodates ambiguous legal 
roles: 
to be flexible and at the same time provide stability for investors; to 
be open to citizen involvement in the regulatory process of those 
affected by the rules and at the same time protect the institutions from 
being captured by interest groups; and finally, to be able to 
incorporate new forms of participation and transparency that go 
beyond the classical model of law (…) and at the same time provide 
avenues for responsive regulation that is accountable to the public.56 
 
Finally, neoliberal legalities in the region have favoured fragmented approaches to the 
state, or the emergence of different legal personalities.57 A ‘fragmented’ neoliberal state, 
                                               
50 M Molyneux, Change and Continuity in Social Protection in Latin America: Mothers at the Service of 
the State? (UNRISD 2007); V Schild, ‘Securing Citizens and Entrenching Inequalities: The Gendered, 
Neoliberalized Latin American State’ (2015) Research Network on Interdependent Inequalities in Latin 
America, Working Paper Series 83. 
51 Molyneux (n 48) 38.  
52 G O’Donnell, ‘On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View 
with Glances at Some Postcommunist Countries’ (1993) 21 World Development 1355; J Lemaitre, 
‘Constitutionalism or barbarism: how to rethink law in “lawless” spaces’, in C Rodriguez-Garavito (ed), 
Law and Society in Latin America: A New Map (Routledge 2015). 
53 For Wolfgang Friedman, ‘[h]ow this minimum of effectiveness is to be measured Kelsen does not say, 
nor could he do so without going deep into questions of political and sociological reality’ Legal Theory 
(5th edn, Columbia University Press 1967) 278. 
54 R Sieder, ‘Subaltern Cosmopolitan Legalities and the Challenges of Engaged Ethnography’ (2013) 75 
Universitas Humanistica 222, 233. 
55 D Trubek and others (eds), Law and the New Developmental State (CUP 2013).  
56 H Alviar, ‘Social Policy and the New Development State’, in ibid 347. 
57 Sieder speaks of ‘fragmented neoliberal sovereignties’ in Latin America. (n 54) 233. In contrast, liberal 
legality conceives of law ‘as a system of generalized rules that are interpreted through reason and applied 
equally to all following rational procedural formalities in manner void of political concerns and outcomes’. 
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with different state legalities (hard/soft law), nobilities (valued/undervalued), and 
intensities (intervene/retreat), challenges the image of a monolithical entity.58 Moreover, 
the neoliberal state, instead of defending state neutrality, justifies permanent intervention 
in both economic and non-economic areas. 59 If we define neoliberalism as an ‘order of 
normative reason’ that extends to ‘every dimension of social life’, producing particular 
subjectivities and social relations, we can understand the neoliberal state in contrast to 
the classical liberal distinction between state and civil society.60 In Latin America, the 
neo-liberal State has endorsed the idea of intervention in both economic and non-
economic areas since its early emergence in the Chilean dictatorship and its subsequent 
developments in the era of ‘structural adjustments’.61 The question, however, is how the 
state intervenes in these areas.  
 
6.2.2 State Intervention and Latin American ADL 
Legal mobilisation processes and legal practices in the region show a more nuanced 
approach to the character of the state as a legal order and highlight three main ways to 
address the principle of state intervention concerning ADL. First, we need to address the 
emergence of international and constitutional duties of the state to protect victims of 
discrimination, which derive from general obligations to respect, protect and promote 
human or fundamental rights.62 In several regional human rights treaties and domestic 
constitutions in Latin America, there is an explicit acknowledgment of the need for the 
state to tackle discrimination and craft its institutional arrangements to that end.63 In a 
recent case, related to discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, the IACtHR 
acknowledged, 
                                               
H Brabazon, ‘Understanding Neoliberal legality’, in H Brabazon (ed), Neoliberal Legality: Understanding 
the role of law in the neoliberal project (Routledge 2017) 2.  
58 That is, for example, the way in which neoliberal legality exploits the public/private distinction, which 
‘appears to be deployed when convenient’: intervening with intensity in some areas, and retreating softly 
in others. Brabazon (n 57) 11. 
59 For William Davies, ‘[a]n increase in state power has always been the inner logic of neoliberalism, 
because, in order to inject markets into every corner of social life, a government needs to be highly 
invasive.’ ‘The Neoliberal State: Power against “politics”’, in D Cahill and others (eds), Sage Handbook 
on Neoliberalism (Sage 2017). 
60 W Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution (Verso 2015) 30.  
61 A Thomas, How Left a Turn? Legacies of the Neoliberal State in Latin America (Doctoral Dissertation, 
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville 2013) 107-111.   
62 A Coddou, ‘Deberes generales de respetar, proteger y promover derechos fundamentales’, in P Contreras 
and C Salgado (eds), Derechos Fundamentales. Temas de Teoría General (Lom 2017).  
63 ACHR, arts 1.1 and 2; Inter-American Convention Against All Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance 
(A-69) (see the preamble and chapter IV, including a detailed list of measures and policies the state should 
put in place to combat discrimination in all its forms, even in social spheres); Constitution of Bolivia, art 
9.1; Constitution of Colombia, art 13.2.  
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that social, cultural, and institutional changes are taking place in the 
framework of contemporary societies, which are aimed at being more 
inclusive of their citizens’ different lifestyles. This is evident in the 
social acceptance of interracial couples, single mothers or fathers and 
divorced couples, which at one time were not accepted by society. In 
this regard, the law and the State must help to promote social 
progress; otherwise there is a grave risk of legitimizing and 
consolidating different forms of discrimination that violate human 
rights.64  
Frequently quoted by subsequent judgments, this line of reasoning has been criticised as 
promoting an unjustified expansion of judicial activism, creating obstacles to the gradual 
advances made recently by processes of democratisation.65 Nevertheless, comparatively 
speaking, social consensus does not play a crucial role in the adjudication of human rights 
affairs in Latin America. The right to equality and non-discrimination is considered as 
including the need for positive state action, intervening in favour of victims of 
discrimination, disregarding the idea of a regional or national consensus. This idea has 
been followed by several national courts, which have generally declared that they are 
competent to decide on potentially divisive moral issues and avoid adopting ‘political 
question doctrines’ that would prevent them from adjudicating a discrimination case.66  
 
The second way in which the legal practice of the region illustrates the principle of state 
intervention derives from the rising tensions between different state branches or agencies 
regarding compliance with the right to equality. There are different motivations, interests, 
and institutional capacities that reside in the State in regard to compliance with judgments 
of the IACtHR, especially those mandating the end of structural discrimination.67 Within 
the ad-hoc procedures for monitoring compliance with the IACtHR, some agencies of the 
state have been deeply engaged in the enforcement of a certain judgment despite the 
obstacles created by, or the reluctance of others.68 In the face of a poor compliance record 
with the IACtHR’s rulings, the building of coalitions or alliances with one or more of the 
                                               
64  IACtHR, Atala Riffo and daughters v. Chile (2012) para 120 (the emphasis is mine).  
65 G Neumann, ‘Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ 
(2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 101.  
66 Administrative Tribunal of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (Argentina), Freyre, Alejandro y otro 
c/GCBA s/amparo (2009) (the state has a duty to protect the right to equality and non-discrimination 
regarding access to (same-sex) marriage even against dominant public opinion); Suprema Corte de Justicia 
de la Nación (México), 45-2015 (tesis de jurisprudencia 10a.) (the power of Mexican states to define civil 
status according to their conceptions of the good cannot violate the fundamental right to equality and non-
discrimination).  
67 A Huneeus, ‘Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court's Struggle to Enforce 
Human Rights’ (2011) 44 Cornell Journal of International Law 493.   
68  Cladem-Red Mesa, Proposals for analysis and monitoring of the “Cotton Field” case sentence 
(CLADEM 2016) 66-82.  
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state branches constitutes an important tool for rights protection in Latin America.69 Thus, 
the way in which the state intervenes in issues associated with discrimination reveals a 
broader conception of its legal capacities and personalities than the ones derived from a 
strictly legal conception. At a domestic level, these tensions are illustrated by the action 
of NHRIs or anti-discrimination entities that use their (constitutional, legislative or 
merely administrative) autonomy in order to challenge social practices of discrimination 
even against the will of important state powers.70 For example, in the case of Mexico, the 
National Human Rights Commission and CONAPRED formed a coalition to litigate 
before the Supreme Court, in order to defend the constitutionality of the same-sex 
marriage act in Mexico City, challenging the position adopted up to that point by 
Mexico’s Attorney General.71 
  
Lastly, a third way to represent the principle of state intervention, connected with the 
previous one, is illuminated by the usage of state institutions for anti-discrimination 
mobilisation. Although litigation has always been the preferred strategy for anti-
discrimination struggles, scarce resources have triggered the expansion of the repertoire 
of legal mobilisation. Within processes of state modernisation and democratic 
consolidation, anti-discrimination struggles have been forging coalitions with more 
diverse legislatures and developed novel forms of ‘institutional activism’.72 Indeed, with 
an increase in electoral quotas for vulnerable groups and the expansion of political 
participation, anti-discrimination struggles have found allies in Congress in order to push 
for favourable legislative agendas. Moreover, the coming to power of several (centre-of-
)left governments in the region has allowed former social activists to reach positions of 
power and the emergence of agencies dealing with discrimination.73 This has prompted 
novel forms of mobilisation, where social movements find allies in the chains of 
bureaucracies, thereby exploiting contradictions against other agencies of the state that 
                                               
69 T Pegram and N Herrera, ‘From Compliance to Implementation: National Human Rights Institutions and 
the Interamerican Human Rights System’, in P Engstrom (ed), Assessing the Impact of the Inter-American 
Human Rights System (Pennsylvania Studies in Human Rights 2017). 
70 For the role of Latin American NHRIs and defensorias in horizontal forms of accountability, see T 
Peagram, ‘National Human Rights Institutions in Latin America’, in R Goodman and T Pegram (eds), 
Human Rights, State Compliance, and Social Change: Assessing National Human Rights Institutions (CUP 
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71 J Díez, The Politics of Gay Marriage in Latin America: Argentina, Chile, and Mexico (CUP 2015) 192. 
72 R Neaera and L Tatagiba, ‘Institutional Activism: Mobilizing for Women’s Health from Inside Brazilian 
Bureaucracy’, in F Rossi and M von Bulow (eds), Social Movement Dynamics: New Perspectives on Theory 
and Research from Latin America (Routledge 2016).  
73 E Dagnino, A Olvera, and A Panfichi, La Disputa por la Construcción Democrática en América Latina 
(CIESAS 2006) 74. 
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are less keen to handle anti-discrimination claims, and favouring the slow and gradual 
features of institutional change. 
 
6.3 The Group Dimension 
In her ‘political critique of the force of law’, Fraser criticises the ‘deep grammar’ of 
mainstream legal reasoning, arguing that ‘in our legal system it is exceedingly difficult, 
or indeed often impossible, to press claims for harms one has suffered by virtue of 
belonging to a social group.’74 That is, ‘even before legal judging officially begins, there 
has already been an operation of prejudgment’, which favours addressing individual 
harms that are ‘the result of a breach of contract or other definite assignable obligation’.75 
Despite Fraser’s comments, the idea of groups has always played an important role in 
ADL. In contrast with liberal theories of ADL, which neglect the group dimension, 
several theories claim that groups are decisive for the evaluation of the wrongness of 
discrimination.76 In her latest work, Sophia Moreau has incorporated the idea of groups 
as fundamental for the theoretical account of discrimination as subordination.77  For 
Khaitan, the need to reduce relative group disadvantage constitutes the main ultimate 
objective of ADL.78 Theories that consider indirect discrimination as the paradigmatic 
case of discrimination reserve a special place for the group dimension.79 Moreover, in the 
legal practice of comparative ADL, groups have always played an important role, whether 
in the determination of which grounds merits protection, in allowing collective standing, 
or for ordering collective reparations in situations of structural discrimination. Both 
theories of ADL and practical accounts, however, seem uncritical of the emancipatory 
potential or, alternatively, the dangers of the presence of ‘social’ groups in equality 
regimes. In this scenario, what contribution can critical theory make to the group 
dimension of ADL? What is the place of groups within a transformative approach to 
ADL? This section argues that the group dimension is crucial for understanding the 
transformative role of ADL.  
 
                                               
74 N Fraser, ‘The Force of Law: Metaphysical or Political’ (1991-1992) 13 Cardozo Law Review 1325, 
1329.  
75 ibid. 
76 A famous liberal theory of ADL in L Alexander, ‘What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, 
Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies’ (1998) 18 OJLS 167. 
77 S Moreau, ‘Discrimination and Subordination’, in The Many Faces of Equality (Forthcoming). 
78 Khaitan (n 24) 121.  
79 N Bamforth and others, Discrimination Law: Theory and Context (Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 292.  
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6.3.1 The group dimension in theories of ADL 
Within Khaitan’s pluralist account, the concept of discrimination implies being the victim 
of a certain harm because of one’s membership of a group that suffers relative and 
persistent disadvantage within a particular society.80 For some liberty-based accounts of 
discrimination, the grounds of protection determine the injustice of discrimination by 
assessing unjustified restrictions on individual deliberative freedoms due to certain 
normatively extraneous traits that classify persons into ‘social groups’.81 For Khaitan, the 
group element is one of the necessary and sufficient conditions that distinguish norms of 
discrimination law from other legal norms: what we call protected grounds (eg, sex) must 
be capable of classifying persons into more than one classes of persons, loosely called 
groups (eg, men and women), and members of at least one group must be significantly 
more likely to suffer abiding and substantial disadvantage than the members of at least 
one other group defined by the same ground. 82  Moreover, the duty-imposing anti-
discrimination norm must be designed such that it is likely to distribute the substantive 
benefits or burdens in question to some, but not all, members of a protected group 
(‘eccentric-distribution condition’).83  In that way, as I explained in the introductory 
chapter, ‘unlike a universal welfare benefit or a socio-economic right, even positive 
norms in discrimination law (…) are not designed to benefit every member of the target 
group’.84  
 
For prioritarian theories of ADL, if a person’s membership of a relatively disadvantaged 
group has an impact on their access to fundamental or primary goods, ADL plays a crucial 
systemic role: it sees the corresponding society through the lens of certain traits that 
classify persons into groups, according to patterns of disadvantage.85 However, even if, 
according to Khaitan, this systemic purpose must be considered when designing the 
precise rules and duties of anti-discrimination regimes, in the end, ‘the law on 
discrimination is ultimately about the protection of persons’.86 In a way, this signals the 
                                               
80 Khaitan (n 24) 168. 
81 S Moreau, ‘What is Discrimination?’ (2010) 38 Philosophy & Public Affairs 143. 
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83 ibid 38-41.  
84 ibid 39.  
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place that the idea of groups has in theoretical accounts of ADL, articulated in the 
following questions: if someone is a member of a protected or a cognate group; if she 
suffered unjustly because of her group membership; or if certain traits of the victim place 
her at a persistent and relative disadvantage in terms of access to primary goods. 
 
6.3.2 The Group Dimension and Comparative ADL 
The group dimension has a fundamental place in comparative ADL, and the discussion 
around the principles of anti-discrimination and anti-subordination in US ADL offers an 
interesting way of approaching this issue. 87  The latter was offered as a grounding 
principle to account for the progressive jurisprudence of the Equal Protection Clause, that 
is, the constitutional entrenchment of the duty to protect groups that have historically 
suffered mistreatment, or that lack political power, and considered unconstitutional any 
government action or inaction that subordinates African-Americans or similar social 
groups, regardless of the intentions or motives.88 Despite its soundness and the scholarly 
attention its attracted, the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court has persistently 
embraced the anti-discrimination principle over the anti-subordination principle, 
‘defining the Clause as targeted primarily at discrimination against individuals on a small 
number of forbidden grounds’, as a mandate of formal equality over substantive 
equality.89 Thus, the US constitution considers certain grounds as suspect categories 
subject to different types of scrutiny, even if it concerns ameliorative policies like 
affirmative action. 90  Nevertheless, the anti-subordination or group-disadvantaging 
principle has left its mark on the jurisprudence of the court, which has claimed some role 
for the status of groups in constitutional review processes: ‘racially neutral laws that have 
a disparate impact would be valid absent an illicit subjective purpose, but so too would 
most forms of affirmative action’. 91  For Patrick Shin, moreover, ‘the fact that 
antidiscrimination law dictates irrelevance for only a select set of enumerated group 
classifications [Civil Rights Act, title VII] strongly suggests that group-based concerns 
                                               
87  The anti-discrimination principle has also been called the anti-classification or colour/race/gender-
blindness principle; the anti-subordination principle has also been called the anti-caste or group-
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Origins and Fate of Antisubordination Theory, 3.  
90 Supreme Court of the US, Fisher v. University of Texas 579 US 14-981 (2015).    
91 Dorf (n 89) 5.  
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are relevant to the purposes of the law itself.’92 Overall, the principle that explains the 
dominant view in the US – that ADL protects ‘persons, not groups’- rests mainly on a 
non-comparative view of freedom and autonomy, where individuals are protected against 
adverse or preferential treatment based on inferences about their membership of a 
protected group; and stands against certain forms of treatment that are ‘justified solely on 
the expected consequences for welfare or group equality’.93  
 
In EU Equality law, the prohibition of indirect discrimination entails the assessment of 
disproportionate impacts of neutral rules, criteria or practices on certain groups, 
recognising the role that social groups play in the legal procedures of ADL. 94 
Furthermore, the concept of vulnerability has been useful when arguing that some groups 
are in desperate need of state action, and has derived in some interest jurisprudential 
innovations in the case law of the ECtHR.95 In exceptional cases, this court has accepted 
the existence of collective subjects for the purpose of standing.96 Ultimately, despite the 
emergence of several enforcement mechanisms that have made serious attempts to  
incorporate the idea of groups, 97  systemic concerns about reducing disadvantages 
between social groups seem to be an arena for regimes other than ADL.98  
 
6.3.3 The Group Dimension and critical theory 
For a critical theory of ADL, there are several problems with the group dimension that 
should trigger caution, something that Nancy Fraser addressed largely in her critical 
account of malrecognition and in her theory of the public sphere. From the work of 
Alexander Somek, one of the most passionate critics of the project of ADL, we can derive 
several criticisms of the group dimension that are important for the critical legal scholar.99 
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The first is whether the recognition of certain traits or categories of persons who usually 
suffer the effects of social spheres (or markets), allowing people to act out of their whims, 
ends up creating and reifying collective entities, leading to balkanisation and intra-group 
resentment.100The second is whether the extension of the grounds of protection creates 
incentives ‘to be admitted to the victim’s club’, leading to a reduction ad absurdum, 
especially if we consider that ‘whether or not a category becomes protected is a matter of 
political conflict and not of logic’.101 Thirdly, he claims that members of disadvantaged 
groups contend for primary goods and ‘do not act together or support each other’, even if 
‘the protection of the right to equal treatment of one group member incidentally creates a 
public good for others’.102  Hence, he proceeds, ‘the realization of any of the group 
member’s goals does in no manner depend on the cooperation with others’.103 Moreover, 
even across disadvantaged groups, he claims that the recognition of commonalities seems 
very difficult, because ‘they do not perceive to have in common the quality that they 
really share and which in fact accounts for the fact that they endure discrimination in the 
first place, namely, a lack of political and economic power’.104 In other words, for Somek, 
the idea of groups derived from ADL is concomitant with ‘sets’ of individuals that ‘reflect 
the commodified categories of consumption’:  
Groupism and the ‘diversity’ of so-called ‘cultures’ are the epitome 
of a society drained of solidarity. The celebration of ‘difference’ is 
the effect of a society where solidarity is unknown to the powerless. 
It is the consequence of individualism.105  
I think that these critiques are somewhat far-fetched. The problem with Somek’s account, 
which is arguably made from a sceptical left position, is that his arguments are based on 
the jurisprudence of EU ADL, which is focused very much on employment discrimination 
law, and does not take into account how anti-discrimination norms may act as catalysts 
for social mobilisation in manifold domains. 106  Indeed, his sceptical view on the 
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transformative capacities of ADL is shaped by images of individual interests resorting to 
litigation in the ‘absence of vision for political action’.107  
 
6.3.4 The Group Dimension and Nancy Fraser 
In Fraser’s work, theories of discourse help us to understand the formation of people’s 
social identities and, more importantly, how social groups can acquire collective agency 
to challenge the cultural hegemony of dominant groups in society. 108  For her, ‘the 
formation of social groups proceeds through struggles over social discourse’.109 Through 
these struggles, which use different means of interpretation and communication, feminist 
social movements have been able to challenge their exclusion from public spheres, the 
topics to be discussed, or reaproppiated official discourses.110  
 
Within this framework, law and legal discourse play a crucial role in defining the contours 
of social groups, especially of those that are formed under conditions of inequality, and 
provide disadvantaged minorities ‘with forums where they could object to exclusion and 
discrimination’.111 This process, as Fraser acknowledges, is not unidirectional: just as law 
influences the struggles, strategies and norms of social groups and movements, it is 
influenced, and in part shaped, by the activities of these collective subjects.112 Consistent 
with Fraser’s Gramscian influence, law is a way of world meaning-making, constitutive 
of social ontology, but also an avenue for official means of interpretation and 
communication, which are to be reshaped by different practices.113 In this way, law’s role 
in defining the contours of discriminated social groups and providing avenues for 
grievances should consider the emancipatory potential and dangers of the legal 
articulation of the group dimension.  
 
Through their recognition in law, several groups have realised their collective worth, and 
acknowledged their capability to challenge an order that, under the guise of neutrally 
addressing individual responsibilities, ends up disadvantaging social groups, something I 
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will address further with the principle of the challenging stance.114 Moreover, the legal 
recognition of certain grounds of protection has influenced the development of ‘subaltern 
counterpublics’, which are discursive arenas that allow ‘members of subordinated social 
groups [to] invent and circulate counter discourses to formulate oppositional 
interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs’.115 The ability of groups to speak 
in their own voice, without fear of being minimised, with their own conventions of 
discourse, constitutes an important insight into the current struggles of minority groups. 
Within Fraser’s framework, struggles for recognition are 
not so much [about] the recognition of the group as of equal worth, 
but the recognition of the group specificity in order to challenge a 
gender order that has established masculinity as its norm, challenge a 
racial hierarchy that has marked out Roma or blacks as deviants or 
criminals, achieve a more just distribution between privileged and 
disadvantaged groups.116 
 
The group dimension, as I argue here, does not involve a mere claim to cultural 
recognition: assessed through the filter of participatory parity, the assertion of a kind of 
collective agency entails the ability to speak within its specificity rather than a way to 
essentialise identities.117  Rather than depoliticise, as many critics of identity politics 
argue, the group dimension of anti-discrimination rights has the ability to reinscribe, 
through discursive means, the political nature of social disadvantage ascribed to group 
status or group membership.118 In this way, the group dimension challenges the idea that 
ADL, ultimately, protects persons and not groups. In other words, ADL protects not only 
the right of individuals to be free from (group) stereotyping or prejudices, but also their 
social identities as constitutive of their personal identities, and the group’s collective 
agency to participate in the public sphere.119 In Fraser´s work, furthermore, there is also 
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an important insight into the possibility of using legal remedies to make grievances as 
collective groups, something I will address later in this chapter. 
 
Although some recent pluralist accounts have called for theories of discrimination law to 
be complemented by theories of social subordination, which require a theoretical account 
of the reality of social groups or their place within broader social contexts, they do not 
provide an account of how this complementation may bring about real change for those 
who are in most need of protection from discrimination.120 The latter triggers a rethinking 
of the group dimension. A possibility is to look at the legal discourse and practice of 
jurisdictions to open up new lines of thought, highlighting what the legal practice can 
teach in terms of our philosophical accounts of discrimination. It is here that Latin 
American legal practice enters into the critical approach, one that not only highlights the 
importance of groups for legally addressing the wrongness of discrimination, but that 
allows the grievance of collective claims and the recognition of collective agency, and 
thus acknowledges the capacity of law to reduce significant disadvantages between social 
groups.  
 
6.3.5 The group dimension in Latin America 
Although there is plenty of evidence that relative group disadvantage in Latin America is 
widespread, discrimination law in the region is notorious for its lack of use of statistical 
comparison between different groups in order to prove discrimination. Also, the regular 
duties to disclose information on the part of defendants are not usually seen in schemes 
designed to tackle workplace discrimination in the region. The correlation between social 
indicators and disaggregated data on group membership could be an interesting way to 
operationalise the group dimension in Latin America.121 An overarching search in the 
jurisprudential database of six different jurisdictions shows that statistical studies or 
comparative evidence regarding groups’ relative disadvantage are rarely an issue in 
discrimination cases.122 Most cases end up evaluating whether the discriminator provided 
enough good reasons for the challenged behaviour, whether there was a discriminatory 
                                               
not against the entire group, but against the subset of the group that fails to assimilate to mainstream norms.’ 
Covering: The Hidden Assault On Our Civil Rights (Random House 2006) 21-2.  
120 Moreau (n 77). 
121 Inter-American Convention against all forms of discrimination and intolerance (State’s duty to provide 
disaggregated data, art 15.v)  
122 The Colombian Constitutional Court constitutes an exception. In several tutela judgements, this court 
has emphasised, with statistical support, the relative group disadvantage suffered by groups that are 
discriminated against. See, for example, T-025 (2004) and T-60 (2008).  
 176 
intention or motive, whether the victim allegedly suffered harms to her dignity, or 
whether the case involves a vulnerable social group. Although clauses of indirect 
discrimination and intersectionality have been incorporated into legal schemes, there has 
been almost no doctrinal development on this issue; furthermore, in many instances, there 
is no need to present evidence of a ‘group’ comparator to adjudicate a discrimination 
case. 123  It seems as though Latin American jurisdictions operate on the assumed 
widespread existence of social groups’ relative disadvantage without the need for any 
special justification. This particular feature may be explained by the deficient arguments 
of the plaintiffs, a lack of expertise in discrimination legal issues, or simply scarce 
institutional resources. Whatever the cause, there is a general tendency in Latin American 
courts to adjudicate cases without the need for a comparator, or the need to prove relative 
group disadvantage.124 
 
When viewed through the lens of critical theory, the practice of Latin American ADL 
exhibits three main features of an emerging group dimension that challenges the merely 
‘technical’ position that groups seem to occupy in comparative ADL.  
 
First, recent constitutional transformations in Latin America have included the legal 
recognition of ethnic and indigenous groups and expanded the grounds of protection from 
discrimination, acknowledging the claims raised by ‘new’ social movements in the 
region. 125  This recognition has happened simultaneously with processes of state 
retrenchment, privatisation, and neoliberalisation, allowing scholars to speak of a 
‘neoliberal multiculturalism’, where governance arrangements are crafted to distinguish 
citizens and groups that are welcome from those that are threatening to the market-shaped 
society.126 However, for others, the legal recognition of rights for minority cultures, or of 
the existence of collective identities, has prompted mobilisations that have ended up 
challenging the neo-liberal governance that may have shaped those reforms at the 
                                               
123 F Muñoz, ‘Estándares conceptuales y cargas procesales en el litigio antidiscriminación. Análisis crítico 
de la jurisprudencia sobre Ley Zamudio entre 2012 y 2015’ (2015) 28 Revista de Derecho 145; in Mexico, 
there have been jurisprudential thesis regarding indirect discrimination. Suprema Corte de Justicia de la 
Nación (México), 2007798-2014 (tesis jurisprudencial). However, this has not triggered a doctrinal analysis 
or a broader development of the concept of indirect discrimination.    
124 The recent emergence of anti-discrimination regimes in Latin America fits closer with the reasoning 
behind (sexual) harassment protections, ‘which are explicable only in deontological terms’. Somek (n 99) 
108.  
125  R Uprimny, ‘The Recent Transformation of Constitutional Law in Latin America: Trends and 
Challenges’ (2011) 89 Texas Law Review 1587, 1589.  
126 C Hale, ‘Neoliberal multiculturalism: the remaking of cultural rights and racial dominance in Central 
America’ (2005) 28 PoLAR 10. 
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beginning.127 Likewise, the expansion of the protected grounds of discrimination has 
entailed a repoliticisation of disadvantaged groups’ social markers. Notwithstanding the 
individualistic emphasis of general anti-discrimination clauses, the incorporation of 
several markers that define the boundaries of groups’ salience has been an acute doctrinal 
problem in several jurisdictions.128 At both the domestic and regional levels, these clauses 
have allowed a collective reading of civil and political rights, and an integrated approach 
to the adjudication of cases involving social and economic rights, which has unavoidably 
entailed a group dimension. 129  Furthermore, the recently approved Inter-American 
Convention against all forms of Discrimination and Intolerance includes an explicit 
reference to collective rights that is at odds with liberal constitutionalism:  
Every human being has the right to the equal recognition, enjoyment, 
exercise, and protection, at both the individual and collective levels, 
of all human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in their 
domestic law and in the international instruments applicable to the 
States Parties.130 
 
The recognition that social groups can be victims of discrimination implies the need to 
protect their ability to speak in their own voice and to make their grievances in the specific 
discursive contexts in which they arise, that is, to allow them spaces of ‘withdrawal and 
realignment’.131  
 
A second important feature of Latin American ADL is the ease with which adjudicators 
endorse a structural approach to remedies against discrimination. Following a trend 
adopted by the IACtHR and some of the most influential courts in the region, several 
cases illustrate the need to address structural problems with limited institutional 
                                               
127 O Kaltemeier and others, ‘Multiculturalism and Beyond: The New Dynamics of Identity Politics in the 
Americas’ (2012) 7 Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies 103, 107.  
128 see for, example, the dilemmas faced by afro-descendant movements: whether they present themselves 
as an ethnic group or demand, as individuals, equal treatment with other citizens. A Dultizky, ‘Cuando los 
Afrodescendientes se transformaron en “Pueblos Tribales”: el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos 
Humanos y las comunidades rurales negras’ (2010) 41 El Otro Derecho 13. 
129  O Parra Vera, Justiciabilidad de los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales ante el sistema 
interamericano (Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos-Mexico 2011) 47-57; see also V Abramovich, 
‘From Massive Violations to Structural Patterns: New Approaches and Classic Tensions in the Inter-
American Human Rights System’ (2009) 6 Sur 7, 17.  
130 Art 3 (emphasis is mine).  
131  See the judgment of the Administrative Tribunal of Cundinamarca (Colombia) regarding the 
justification of woman-only passenger cars in Bogotá: this measure not only protects woman from daily 
sexual violence, but allows them a ‘safe space’ to share their grievances and enhance their dignity. El 
Espectador, ‘Espaldarazo Jurídico a vagones para mujeres en Transmilenio’, October 7th, 2014 < 
http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/espaldarazo-juridico-vagones-mujeres-transmilenio-
articulo-520904> accessed 20 September 2017. 
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resources.132 The IACtHR has considered that the ‘guarantee of non-repetition’ forms 
part of the principle of integral reparation, generating duties for structural reforms that 
tackle the conditions that prompted human rights violations.133 In most of these cases, the 
issue of structural discrimination and its interimbrication with poverty or other situations 
of social exclusion have been at the forefront of innovative reparation schemes, based 
mainly on non-monetary compensation. Through a broad reading of article 63 of the 
ACHR, the IACtHR has developed an extensive system of reparations, and has set up 
supervisory committees that include the victims, different branches of the state, court 
staff, and even ‘fourth’ parties that can contribute to the solution.134 Within these ad-hoc 
procedures for compliance, the group dimension has contributed to a structural approach 
to discrimination, highlighting potential victims beyond the directly affected parties, and 
with special concern for the most vulnerable within affected communities.  
 
6.4 Legal Mobilisation/Empowerment   
Discriminated groups and individuals have reasons to distrust courts or administrative 
agencies, and to be sceptical about engaging in legal discourse or resorting to legal 
commitments in order to advance their claims. In general, they have not meaningfully 
participated in creating the legal norms under which they live, or taken part in the system 
that applies those norms to them. Moreover, legal orders usually protect those with the 
ability to navigate in their corners, constrain potentially more radical alternatives, and 
operate within the social backgrounds provided by dominant groups. The ideological 
underpinnings of legal systems are not friendly to those attempting to seek a radical 
restructuring of the social or institutional arrangements, and the undemocratic nature of 
judicial systems makes them difficult venues in which to challenge the status quo. Despite 
this initial scepticism, anti-discrimination claims are mainly deployed through the means 
of law. The logic of consistency and equality that accompanies legal orders is prone to 
accommodating the demands of discriminated groups, who move between claims for 
consistent equal treatment (formal equality), and claims that attempt to challenge 
substantive standards that inform the formalities of law (substantive equality).  
 
                                               
132 Abramovich (n 129) 17. 
133 IACHR, ‘Principal Guidelines for a Comprehensive Reparations Policy’. See also IACtHR, Myrna 
Mack Chang v Guatemala (2003) paras 236-7; Case of the Caracazo v. Venezuela (Reparations 2002) paras 
77-8.  
134 A Huneeus, ‘Reforming the State from Afar: Structural Reform Litigation at the Human Rights Courts’ 
(2015) 40 The Yale Journal of International Law 1, 25-31. 
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This principle’s starting point is the fact that ADL has profoundly empowering effects. 
When approached through the lens of participatory parity, ADL becomes an important 
site for empowering people’s ability to demand legal, social and political accountability. 
As stated in a recent report on the advancement of legal empowerment among rule of law 
promoters: ‘it is about power more than law’.135 In that sense, this principle connects with 
the principle of the political axis of ADL, which will be addressed later, but is 
distinguished in several ways from it: first, it is especially focused on processes of legal 
mobilisation related to anti-discrimination claims, the reasons why groups and individuals 
have to resort to law and justice mechanisms to overcome discrimination; second, while 
the political axis of ADL attempts to address the interimbrications of the political and 
cultural spheres, contribute to the protection of the special character of ‘the political’, and 
enhance political agency, the principle of legal mobilisation/empowerment emerges from 
the simple fact that ADL is used to advance progressive claims and has indirect 
consequences for broader social or political struggles.  
 
People are empowered because of many factors, which derive from the interaction 
between legal, social and political orders. The legal recognition of protected grounds of 
discrimination, which usually coincide with salient social groups, constitutes a factor of 
legal empowerment in itself, triggering people to use law and justice mechanisms to 
advance their interests or fundamental values, or broader processes of political 
empowerment.136 Here, I am concerned with legal/political empowerment that emerges 
from processes of anti-discrimination legal mobilisation, where the ‘focus is on 
articulating a demand or grievance that can be taken up into the formal court system’.137 
The fact that people who are misrecognised use law and justice mechanisms to overcome 
their situation of disadvantage can result in processes of legal or political empowerment 
whereby they ‘gain new resources (psychological, social, material, or political) and, 
through these, the ability to make and enact strategic life choices’.138 For example, legal 
mobilisation can empower people by leading to 
                                               
135 S Golub, ‘The Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor: One Big Step Forward and a Few Steps 
Back for Development Policy and Practice’ (2009) 1 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 101, 108. 
136 see 6.3.4  
137  P Domingo and T O’Neill, ‘The Politics of Legal Empowerment’ (2014) UK Department for 
International Development, 22.  
138 ibid. As I use it here, persons are legally empowered when they have legal agency, that is, when they 
incorporate law’s normativity in their daily lives, without the need to actually resort to courts or other legal 
procedures. It is precisely this feature that explains why legal empowerment constitutes a crucial element 
to define ADL as a non-reformist reform. D Brinks and S Botero, ‘The Social and Institutional Bases of the 
Rule of Law’, in Brinks and others (eds), Reflections on Uneven Democracies: The Legacy of Guillermo 
O’Donnell (Johns Hopkins University Press 2014) 218.  
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a change in capabilities and an awareness of self, even in the absence 
of more tangible outcomes – for instance, the process of using the law 
can change a person’s consciousness of their situation (…) and their 
interactions with their family, their community and wider society. It 
can also, under some social and political conditions, result in a 
different perception of the role of, and relationships with, public 
authority.139 
 
In general, then, this principle starts from the fact that law’s content and procedures have 
been always considered as sites of contestation that are continually reshaped by the 
actions of individuals and groups. ADL constitutes a special fracture point or site of 
contestation, which can be viewed from Fraser’s account of the political critique of the 
force of law. Furthermore, this principle claims to be a central part of non-reformist 
reforms, as legal mobilisation processes with an impact on legal/political empowerment 
are part of ‘incremental and piecemeal processes of change in social and political 
conditions and relations’, even beyond the affected parties in a certain case.140  
 
6.4.1 The Political Critique of the Force of Law 
In the previous chapter, the reconstruction of Fraser’s legal thought allowed me to present 
her political critique of the force of law in a new light, as a framework to ‘render visible 
forms of masked, structural violence that permeate, and infect’ law and legal judgment: 
the point is ‘not to identify forms of “violence” that are “necessary for any possible 
justice”, but to identify forms of violence that are precisely not necessary.’141  This 
critique assumes that legal orders have their own channels through which to resist 
precisely those forms of legal violence that are not necessary, are generally ‘masked and 
structural’, and frequently generate massive harms.142 In this way, Fraser’s work can 
dialogue with certain theories of law and social mobilisation, or with current approaches 
to responsive law as a model of relation between legal and social/political orders. 
 
One of the main concerns of Fraser’s political critique of the force of law is the centrality 
of certain constitutional principles, such as the right to private property, and its impact in 
                                               
139 Domingo and O’Neill (n 137) 13-4. 
140 ibid 16. 
141 Fraser (n 74) 1328. 
142 Remember that Fraser does not commit her framework to a state free of power relations, but free of 
subordination, domination or oppression. See 5.3. 
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constraining legal interpretation upon the overall legal system.143 In that way, as soon as 
we attempt to constitutionalise our struggles, we are bound to take into account certain 
constitutional principles that may not favour our position. Moreover, the ‘bounded nature 
of constitutional rights claims exclude more creative and normatively ambitious forms of 
social activism’.144 Although legal channels represent an opportunity to focus and situate 
certain issues that compels the state to give an answer through principled reasoning, the 
bounded character of legal discourse has been criticised as constraining the viability and 
utility of resorting to law for emancipation.145 To complement the political critique of the 
force of law in this dimension, we could stress the bounded/unbounded nature of anti-
discrimination claims, which operate either to enforce the formalities of law (formal 
equality), or to open up lines of fracture in the status quo by putting into question the 
background standards and criteria upon which a certain treatment is challenged as 
discriminatory.146 In this way, a transformative approach to ADL relies on the potential 
destabilisation effects that are prompted by anti-discrimination claims, which take place 
not only in public law litigation.147  
In this scenario, contemporary anti-discrimination regimes can also be approached from 
the model of responsive law. According to this model, the integrity of law (its 
independent, autonomous and distinctive character) needs to be balanced with the broader 
purposes or legal ends, and thus pushes towards openness, which makes law more prone 
to challenge and disarray. As Nonet and Selznick put it, ‘[t]o be responsive, the system 
should be open to challenge at many points, should encourage participation, and should 
expect new social interests to make themselves known in troublesome ways’.148 Instead 
of portraying law as a closed system that acquires legitimacy only through procedural 
fairness, the model of responsive law is concerned with substantive justice, where legal 
and political aspirations are blended to the point at which legal knowledge needs to open 
up its boundaries, and where legitimacy is obtained to the extent that the legal system is 
able to be ‘more responsive to social needs’.149 In this regard, models of responsive law 
accommodate processes of legal mobilisation that seek a certain legal or policy reform, 
and also broader political mobilisations that attempt to create alternative interpretive 
                                               
143 Fraser (n 74) 1328.  
144 J King, Judging Social Rights (CUP 2012) 64.  
145 ibid 60-3. 
146 see 5.3.3.  
147 C Sabel and W Simon, ‘Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds’ (2004) 117 
Harvard Law Review 1015, 107; see also Mangabeira Unger (n 13) 530.  
148 P Nonet and P Selznick, Law and Society in Transition (Transaction 2001) 6. 
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communities that ‘change the wind’ under which the law flows, and understand them as 
opportunities for legal evolution.150 In the words of Phillippe Nonet: 
One of the peculiar characteristics of the legal order is that it provides 
its own built-in criticisms, and through those its own sources of 
elaboration and change. It is for this reason that law is competent at 
the same time to affirm the authority of policies, and yet to expose 
this authority to challenge and open policies to change. Policies 
become more binding, but also less settled; concepts are sharpened, 
but their contours become more ambiguous.151 
 
Furthermore, within Fraser’s framework, and in contrast to ‘cases where the parties are 
identifiable individuals and the alleged harm is the result of a breach of contract or other 
definite assignable obligation’, anti-discrimination claims have the capacity to address 
harms that ‘are rather a result of more impersonal systemic processes and of structural 
relations among differentially advantaged social groups’, which are at odds with the ‘legal 
grammar of individualism’.152 For Sandra Fredman, the recent expansion of standing 
rules entails a ‘recognition that discrimination is not just a question of individual 
justice.’153 Fraser’s concerns have been at the forefront of reform processes that attempt 
to change the legal opportunity structure of anti-discrimination legal regimes, by 
expanding rules of standing, creating special equality bodies that can intervene even in 
the absence of identified victims, or asserting the power of courts to open up spaces of 
participation through hearings or monitoring implementation mechanisms. As I will 
explain below, this is precisely the case of the emergent practice of Latin American ADL.  
 
6.4.2 Legal empowerment/mobilisation in Latin America 
In a previous chapter, I described the ways in which the re-emergence of substantive 
equality and non-discrimination in Latin America was in part the consequence of 
processes of legal and political mobilisation.154 The ‘third wave’ of democracy in the 
region entailed a profound reform of the political and legal opportunity structures that 
had impacts on the ability of ‘new social movements’ to resort to law and justice 
mechanisms to advance their claims. 
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One of the central features of transformative constitutionalism, as has been vernacularised 
in Latin America, is the capacity of disadvantaged individuals and groups to achieve 
through legal means what they have not been able to through political means.155 Indeed, 
for von Bogdandy, a shared transformative dimension of legal mobilisation is one of the 
central characteristics of what he calls the Ius Constitutionale Commune of Latin 
America, which is evidenced in several judicial victories of discriminated groups.156 A 
recent report on legal empowerment in the Global South states that ‘there is evidence to 
suggest that disadvantaged people invoking the law and mobilising through different 
justice mechanisms to advance their interests and entitlements has increasingly become a 
more relevant feature of social action’. 157  The new political and legal opportunity 
structure in Latin America has activated an intense legal mobilisation around ADL, 
shaping the articulation of manifold social and political movements, even before the 
consolidation of bigger political projects, which entail broader compromises and 
collective action problems 158 The incremental character of the attempts to achieve social 
and cultural change through the means of law constitutes another core feature of Ius 
Constitutionale Commune, and a reason to see the inclusion of legal 
mobilisation/empowerment as crucial to label ADL as a case of non-reformist reform.  
 
There are several conditions that explain processes of legal mobilisation around ADL in 
Latin America, which can be approached through some of the main theoretical 
explanations of the ‘law and social movement scholarship’: ‘legal/political opportunity 
structure’, ‘framing and discourse analysis’, and ‘resource theory’. 159  Within the 
postulates of resource theory, legal mobilisation in Latin America has been enhanced by 
several factors, the most important of which is the networks and co-operative schemes 
between different actors. Human rights or public interest clinics have been at the forefront 
in the fight against discrimination, especially by developing strategies of impact 
                                               
155 Nevertheless, as has been repeatedly argued, law is not only an instrument at the service of social causes; 
it is better considered as both a source of normativity and a complex/fragmented scheme that is 
pragmatically and strategically assessed by claimants striving for social change. 
156 A von Bogdandy, ‘Ius Constitutionale Commune: una mirada a un constitucionalismo transformador’ 
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157 Domingo and O’Neil (n 137) 12.    
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litigation.160 National and international NGOs with expertise in legal advocacy have also 
proved essential for legal mobilisation around ADL, by providing support to social 
movements or small communities when they lack legal expertise.161 In several cases, 
NGOs from developed countries have provided technical support in complex cases 
involving structural discrimination, through either reporting, building statistical evidence, 
or endorsing impact litigation in domestic higher courts or before the IAHRS.162 Both law 
schools’ clinics and NGOs have created regional networks of co-operation to share best 
practices and make regional/transnational activism more efficient, before the IAHRS, the 
UN Human Rights Monitoring Systems, or domestic jurisdictions. 163  Finally, it is 
important to stress the role of public institutions in redressing discrimination, both those 
with a constitutional or legal guarantee of autonomy (NHRIs and ombudsmen), and those 
that form part of the executive power (such as special anti-discrimination committees). 
Although some of them have the power to deal with and adjudicate complaints, they also 
provide important resources of support for legal mobilisation in judicial venues.164 
 
Newly available resources and a different political opportunity structure have allowed 
some social movements to achieve important victories. For several observers, the rights 
revolution for sexual minorities in Latin America has been the outcome of social, political 
and legal processes from below rather than gratuitous concession from political elites.165 
Apart from arguments related to the development of LGBT-friendly policies in high-
income countries, or to broader changes in the political opportunity structure, concrete 
instances of legal mobilisation have been crucial to explain the ‘Gay Rights Revolution’ 
in Latin America.166 Building broad coalitions among ‘L’, ‘G’, ‘B’ and ‘T’ groups, and 
even outside those groups, including expert communities, these movements have 
                                               
160 Unlike human rights clinics in law schools in the US, Latin American clinics place an emphasis on 
litigation. A Carrillo, N Espejo, ‘Re-Imagining Human Rights Law Clinics’ (2011) 26 Maryland Journal of 
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achieved concrete judicial and administrative victories that have facilitated further legal 
reforms, with indirect consequences for movement building and political agency.167  
 
Regarding justice mechanisms, which constitute the core of legal opportunity structures, 
the ‘third wave’ of Latin American democracies radically improved the possibility of 
taking grievances through legal channels, before national or regional court systems, 
quasi-judicial venues, or other instances that derive from processes of legal pluralism, 
like dispute-resolution mechanisms from indigenous law.168 Newly created or amended 
constitutions reinforced judicial independence, creating the conditions for more assertive 
courts, willing to play a role as veto players, to act as guarantors of checks and balances, 
or as protectors of constitutional rights. Although judicial reforms were initially modelled 
to provide legal stability and protection for commercial transactions and private property, 
from the beginning of this period disadvantaged individuals and social movements started 
using courts as venues for rights discourse.169 Also, (newly created or amended) courts in 
search of legitimacy were willing to advance progressive causes that contradicted the elite 
consensus around issues such as sexual minority rights or social rights.170  
 
Along with the creation or reinforcement of more independent and assertive courts, 
longstanding legal remedies were given new strength, expanding the possibility of direct 
access to constitutional justice, and creating new and concrete anti-discrimination actions. 
As a result of judicial powers to accumulate several individual petitions that entail 
structural discriminatory harms (eg, the case of the Colombian tutela), constitutional or 
legislative provisions that created new mechanisms (eg, Bolivian action of 
unconstitutionality; Chilean action of non-arbitrary discrimination), or the re-
interpretation of old judicial writs (eg, the case of the Mexican amparo after the 
constitutional amendments of 2011), victims of discrimination now have a wide range of 
formal justice mechanisms. In the six chosen jurisdictions, access to justice for victims 
of discrimination has been dramatically enlarged. Easy, fast, cheap and informal judicial 
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actions have allowed victims of discrimination to resort directly or indirectly to high 
courts or constitutional courts in order to seek redress for discriminatory acts against 
public or private defendants.171 Furthermore, in several cases, collective (the power to 
resort to constitutional justice in the name of a collective or a group), public (the power 
of public entities to trigger judicial actions against discrimination) or popular actions 
(action taken by any individual, in the name of the protection of rights of the citizenry) 
have been created to tackle situations where discrimination compromised the public 
interest.172 In this way, an emergent and uniform practice of a ‘Latin American Law of 
amparo’ has started to attract attention from comparative lawyers.173 However, these 
actions usually have several limitations: ‘amparo judgments are of purely injunctive 
nature [and] amparo injunctions are limited to order the defendant to do, or to refrain 
from doing, certain acts and expressly foreclose the possibility of awarding monetary 
damages for the petitioner’.174 Moreover, judgments of amparo have no erga omnes 
effects, constraining the use of these writs as channels of impact litigation.175 Overall, and 
considering the power asymmetries that constrain legal agency, the availability of 
constitutional writs has not implied a structural rights revolution.176 However, this has 
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actions entail ‘socially salient rights’ or ‘traditionally disadvantaged or weakly protected groups’, the 
procedural requirements for these actions should be waived and compensations allowed, creating an 
exception that allows judges discretion to deal with structural discrimination cases. PADEC c/ Swiss 
Medical s/ Nulidad de cláusulas contractuales (2013).  
175 In Mexico, since the constitutional amendments of 2011, there is a procedure through which a binding 
precedent of the Supreme Court can have erga omnes effect, including cases of amparo where a norm has 
been declared incompatible with the constitution. Constitution of Mexico, art 107.II. In the case of 
Argentina, amparo judgments have inter partes effect (Constitution of Argentina, art 43.1). However, the 
Argentinian Supreme Court has decided that in some cases, considering the possible infringements of the 
right to equality before the law or the integrity of the Argentinian legal system, amparo judgments have 
erga omnes effect. Halabi Ernesto c/ Poder Ejecutivo Nacional (2009). 
176 Brinks and Botero (n 138). 
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been an important route for the most egregious cases of discrimination, such as those of 
migrants in Argentina or people living with HIV in Chile.177 
 
Several anti-discrimination statutes have created special judicial remedies to redress 
discrimination (Argentina and Chile). In the case of Argentina, the judicial action created 
by law 23.592 (1992) has more than two decades of case law, having been applied in first-
tier courts all around the country.178 The creation of the INADI in 1995 provided an 
impulse for the administrative implementation of this law, including alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms, so the effective judicial implementation of this law is still an on-
going challenge.179 Regarding the CHIADL (2012), statistics and qualitative assessments 
show that claimants are faced with several obstacles in trying to achieve successful 
judicial outcomes.180 Indeed, they still prefer constitutional remedies, because they tend 
to be cheaper, informal and faster, or judicial actions before employment tribunals, which 
observe weaker standards of proof.181 However, there have been some important victories 
for Chilean victims of discrimination, and some cases show the possibility of using the 
non-arbitrary discrimination action as a case of impact litigation.182 In both countries, 
judicial actions have been affected by the usual obstacles that in Latin America constrain 
wider and better access to justice, such as the prohibition of contingency-fee 
arrangements, the lack of legal aid and representation, and the prevalence of the loser-
pays-all rule regarding lawyers’ fees.183  
 
What is remarkable here is the innovative action taken by some tribunals, with the help 
of legal activists and other organisations, which have created ad-hoc collective 
complaints mechanisms even in the absence of any specific legislation, allowing ‘judicial 
                                               
177  see the current collective amparo against a new decree issued by the Argentinian government for 
regulating the expulsion of migrants (Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales y otros c/ EN – DNM s/ Amparo 
Ley 16.986, Expte. N° 3061/2017); J Contesse, D Lovera, ‘Acceso a tratamiento médico para personas 
viviendo con VIH/SIDA: éxitos sin victoria en Chile’ (2008) 5 Sur 150.  
178 U Basset and others, ‘The Enforcement and Effectiveness of Anti-Discrimination Law in Argentina’, in 
M Mercat-Bruns and D Oppenheimer (eds), The Enforcement and Effectiveness of Anti-Discrimination Law 
(Springer, forthcoming). 
179 Email from INADI to author (12 September 2017). The doctrinal evolution of Argentinian ADL is 
developed by the constitutional case law on amparos rather than through the administrative or judicial 
implementation of the ADLARG. 
180 F Muñoz, ‘La Ley Zamudio en acción: sentencias de primera instancia sobre acción antidiscriminación 
emitidas entre diciembre de 2012 y marzo de 2015’ (2015) 6 Anuario de Derecho Público 172. 
181 Muñoz (n 123). 
182 A Coddou, ‘Sobre la recepción del Derecho Antidiscriminación en Chile y su potencial emancipatorio’, 
RedSeca <http://www.redseca.cl/un-dialogo-con-fernando-munoz-sobre-la-recepcion-del-derecho-
antidiscriminacion-en-chile-y-su-potencial-emancipatorio/> accessed 20 August 2017. 
183 Centro de Estudios de Justicia para las Américas, Derecho de Acceso a la justicia: Aportes para la 
construcción de un acervo latinoamericano (CEJA-GTZ 2017). 
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protection against collective harms through mechanisms not originally intended for 
dealing with mass claims’.184 In most of the cases were the Colombian Constitutional 
Court has decided to aggregate individual tutelas under a single process, ADL has been 
a crucial tool to highlight the structural discrimination suffered by individual 
petitioners.185 Furthermore, four of the six selected countries have adopted legislation 
enabling class actions and other forms of aggregate legislation, opening up judicial 
possibilities for victims of collective harms of discrimination  (Argentina, Chile, 
Colombia and Mexico).186 However, only in Argentina has there been intense activity 
among the so-called collective amparos (amparo de intereses colectivos), which receive 
constitutional support, in regard to the protection of the right to equality and non-
discrimination.187 Taking into account the possibility of diffuse constitutionality control, 
which allows claimants to raise a constitutional issue before any judge of the country, the 
collective amparos in Argentina have been prone to receiving complaints of structural 
discrimination, for example, regarding access to public or private services.188 Indeed, in 
these cases, the collective amparo does not need to name or identify every individual 
affected by discrimination, and the action can be raised, beyond those directly affected, 
by the Public Defender or officially registered NGOs.189  
 
For some observers, there is ‘a familiarity with collective claims’ in Latin America that 
allows the IAHRS to attempt to consolidate these practices by creating a new collective 
complaints mechanism before the IACHR for the violation of the rights included in the 
ACHR or in the recently created Inter-American Convention against all forms of 
Discrimination and Intolerance.190 Although the IACtHR still requires that individual 
petitioners be at least identifiable, there are trends pushing towards the recognition of 
public and popular actions that can protect the public interest when it is affected by cases 
of structural or institutional discrimination.191 In this way, the IAHRS can follow an 
emergent practice both within the ECtHR, where there is no need to identify each and 
                                               
184 Gomez (n 171) 483.  
185 D Landau, ‘The promise of aminimum core approach: the Colombian model for judicial review of 
austerity measures’, in A Nolan (ed), Economic and Social Rights after the Global Financial Crisis (CUP 
2014) 285-6. 
186 Gómez (n 171) 493. 
187 Constitution of Argentina, art 43.1. 
188 see 8.4.3. 
189 Constitution of Argentina, art 43.2. 
190 A Depper, ‘Collective Complaints and the Draft Inter-American Convention Against Racism and All 
Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance’ (2008) Programa Justicia Global UAndes- Human Rights Clinics, 
UTexas at Austin. See also Inter-American Convention against all forms of Discrimination and Intolerance 
(A-69) art 15.i. 
191 ibid. 
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every individual of a certain group that is the victim of a systematic, structural or 
institutional form of discrimination, and the European Committee of Social and 
Economic Rights, where the collective complaints mechanism allows actions 
representing unidentified individuals or in favour of a certain group.192 
 
Beyond that, the creation or bolstering of administrative agencies in charge of tackling 
discrimination offers new possibilities, such as quasi-judicial mechanisms to receive 
complaints of discrimination, and in some cases with specific litigation powers to act 
strategically with individual cases. In five of the six selected countries, special 
administrative agencies with the power to receive, deal with and solve discrimination 
complaints have been  created or reinforced during the last two decades (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Mexico).193 Some of them qualify as Equality Bodies, according 
to EU Law, and all of these countries have an A status accredited NHRI.194 In these 
countries, an administrative implementation of ADL allows victims to contribute in the 
design of sustainable transformative reparations.  
 
In accordance with the model of responsive law, which conceives of the legal process ‘as 
an alternative mode of political participation’, several courts in the region have opened 
up instances of participation either during a certain procedure, or within the monitoring 
process of compliance with structural remedies for discrimination.195 In cases of public 
interest, several courts have opened up public hearings to allow individuals and civil 
society organisations to present their arguments about a case, including amicus curiae.196 
In cases where courts have created structural remedies that affect parties not directly 
involved with the case, disadvantaged groups and individuals have taken part in the 
monitoring process set up under the supervision of judicial venues.197 When dealing with 
structural discrimination, the IACtHR has issued a list of orders that demands a complex 
scheme of compliance, taking into account the lack of police authority, resources, and 
political support from the OAS. Moreover, and considering that this court operates in 
                                               
192 Besson (n 94) 147-180.  
193 see appendix (table 2). 
194  Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions, Sub-committee on Accreditation < 
http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/GANHRIAccreditation/Pages/default.aspx> accessed 4 September 
2017. 
195 Nonet and Selznick (n 148) 96. 
196 The leading court in this practice is the Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (Argentina). JS Elias, 
‘Supreme Court of Argentina’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law (2017) 
<http://oxcon.ouplaw.com.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/view/10.1093/law-mpeccol/law-mpeccol-
e519?rskey=jtDHS7&result=1&prd=MPECCOL> accessed 22 September 2017. 
197 C Rodriguez-Garavito and D Rodriguez Franco, Radical Deprivation on Trial (CUP 2015). 
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countries with a poor record in regard to the rule of law, opening up monitoring processes 
to different stakeholders increases the viability of structural compliance.198  
 
6.5    Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have presented the character, sources, and functions of the principles 
that I claim constitute the transformative approach to ADL I defend here. These immanent 
legal principles are built on the practice of the jurisdictions considered in the database, 
when viewed through the lens of a critical framework. According to the critical theory of 
Nancy Fraser, in the previous chapter, I defined ADL as an anti-misrecognition device, 
considering the need to place ADL within broader progressive political projects. In that 
regard, these principles provide examples that expand the knowledge of what a 
transformative approach to ADL would look like. In other words, the principles provide 
a privileged illustration of immanent critique and, moreover, provide a normative 
standard of critique that orientates current debates and reforms within Latin American 
ADL.   
 
In the last sections, I explained three different principles that required a brief explanation 
(state intervention, group dimensions, legal empowerment/mobilisation). In the following 
chapters, I will deal separately with three other principles that have a prominent place 
within the transformative approach I defend here. The challenging stance, a socio-
economic lens, and the political axis of ADL coincide with the folk paradigms of justice 
and with the analytical perspectives that Nancy Fraser considers fundamental to clarify 
the struggles of our era.  
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Chapter 7 The Challenging Stance 
7.1 Introduction 
This principle starts from the basic premise that ADL is inevitably linked to an ‘ordinary’ 
conception of culture, but further states that ADL would not be transformative if it did 
not provide opportunities to challenge dominant or hegemonic cultural ideas that 
constitute the background for the allocation of legal entitlements.1 As I claim here, ADL 
inevitably ends up addressing these ideas, especially in an era that Fraser has 
characterised as ‘denormalization’, where ‘justice claims immediately run up against 
counterclaims whose underlying assumptions they do not share’. 2  Moreover, in 
multicultural societies, as Terry Lovell states, ‘there no longer exists any single all-
powerful and legitimate value system’, because ‘cultural capital in modern society is held 
in diverse currencies’.3 With the resurgence of populist right-wing movements in the 
Western world, cultural values that mark boundaries of ‘otherness’ are seen as decisive 
political issues to be addressed, to the detriment of economic factors, and thus the 
principle of the challenging stance becomes an important issue to analyse.4 
 
In this chapter, I will first draw on some ideas developed by Nancy Fraser that constitute 
the groundings of this principle and describe the latter main problems or limits. Finally, I 
will explain how this principle is articulated in the practice of Latin American ADL.  
 
7.2 Fraser’s insights 
7.2.1 Status model of recognition 
If ADL is considered an anti-misrecognition device, which provides remedies against 
injustices grounded mainly in the cultural sphere, we need to understand the complex 
relationship between ADL and different conceptions of culture. The identity model of 
recognition, according to Fraser, considers culture as either a ‘free-floating’ sphere, from 
which cultural harms are derived, which is isolated from the economy; or, on the other 
hand, as the exclusive source of injustices, from which side effects are derived, like 
                                               
1 An ordinary conception of culture assumes that it is something we all have or carry, whether consciously 
or not, an attribute of all societies. A Phillips, Gender & Culture (Polity Press 2010) 57. 
2 N Fraser, ‘Abnormal Justice’ (2008) 34 Critical Inquiry 393, 396.  
3  T Lovell, ‘Nancy Fraser´s Integrated Theory of Justice’ (2007) 1 Law Social Justice and Global 
Development Journal.  
4 R Inglehart and P Norris, ‘Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural 
Backlash’ (2016) Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University RWP16-026.  
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maldistribution.5 In both cases, these ‘culturalist proponents of identity politics simply 
reverse the claims of an earlier form of vulgar economicism’.6 In contrast, Fraser’s ‘status 
model of recognition’ considers culture as an (analytically) independent sphere, which is 
interimbricated with the sphere of the economy and ‘the political’. Within this model, 
culture is addressed as a justice issue insofar as it institutionalises value patterns that 
impede participatory parity. To combat cultural harms, Fraser originally proposed 
transformative remedies, aimed at deconstructing binary oppositions (eg, black/white), 
‘acknowledging the complexity and multiplicity of identifications’.7 For Anne Phillips, 
this proposal looked like any other ‘assimilationist project’, but in this case one ‘that 
ultimately expects all barriers and divisions to dissolve’.8 Transformative remedies bear 
the responsibility of being constantly challenging cultural categories, and might end up 
creating ‘a cultural “melting-pot” out of which new- but then no longer cultural- identities 
will be forged’.9 The danger or risks associated with the creation of a new (queer?) norm, 
and her later endorsement of a more pragmatic approach towards remedies, led Fraser to 
reconsider the contribution of affirmative recognition remedies.10  
 
Of the three most common forms of misrecognition described by Fraser, cultural 
domination, constitutes the most important challenge for contemporary politics of 
recognition and, thus, for the legal regulation of discrimination, beyond instances of pure 
disrespect or total non-recognition (invisibility).11 Cultural domination implies ‘being 
subjected to patterns of interpretation and communication that are associated with another 
culture and are alien and/or hostile to one’s own’.12 The critique of assimilation has 
shown both the strengths and limits of ADL in tackling cultural domination. According 
to Kenyi Yoshino, the critique of assimilation and the aim of human (not cultural) 
authenticity should be the main purpose of ADL.13 Indeed, it could be considered the 
                                               
5 N Fraser, ‘Rethinking Recognition’, in K Olson and N Fraser (eds), Adding Insult to Injury: Nancy Fraser 
Debates her Critics (Verso 2008) 132.  
6 ibid. 
7 N Fraser, ‘Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation’, 
in N Fraser and A Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?: A political-philosophical exchange (Verso 
2003) 77. 
8 A Phillips, ‘From Inequality to Difference’, in Olson and Fraser (n 5) 124.  
9 ibid. 
10  For the possibility of queerness becoming a new conventional normativity, see N Giffney, 
‘Denormatizing queer theory’ (2004) 5 Feminist Theory 73.  
11 N Fraser, ‘Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics’ (1996) The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 
Stanford University, 7. One could think that pure instances of disrespect could be addressed through 
individual torts or hate crimes, and that non-recognition constitutes the paradigmatic case of 
misrepresentation, a broader political injustice.    
12 ibid. 
13 K Yoshino, Covering: The Hidden Assault on Our Civil Rights (Random House 2006).  
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biggest contribution of LGBT movements, because of their expertise in the art of 
‘covering’, which consists in toning down ‘a disfavored identity to fit in the 
mainstream’.14 Blacks and women do not face conversion and passing, because it is 
difficult to hide their salient traits, but they face covering, as all civil rights groups do: 
blacks are forced to dress and ‘comb white’ or to abandon street talk; and women are 
forced to display manly management skills to be promoted, or to show their masculine 
strength to fight on the frontline of their national armies. For Yoshino, the current doctrine 
of US ADL does not protect against the pressure to cover: 
Courts have often interpreted these laws to protect statuses but not 
behaviors, being but not doing. For this reason, courts will often not 
protect individuals against covering demands, which target the 
behavioral aspects of identity- speaking a language, having a child, 
holding a same-sex commitment ceremony, wearing a religious 
garb.15  
In other words, courts tend to judge in favour of members of protected groups insofar as 
they keep their behaviours assimilated to dominant cultural paradigms, because they 
adjudicate on the basis of personal choice: if you are gay, be discrete, or keep it private, 
and you will be protected; be notorious or flagrant, and the court will probably say that 
insofar as you choose to act like that, you will not have the protection of the law.16 In this 
way, we can understand the claim that US ADL protects members of minority groups, 
insofar as they assimilate, but not minority cultures themselves.  
 
Finally, the status model of recognition provides a way to address some of the main 
philosophical questions around multi-culturalism, for example, whether we can presume 
that all cultures are of equal value or (in)commensurable, or the problems associated with 
culture as a justification for certain practices.17 Fraser’s commitment to liberalism leads 
her to question multi-cultural scholars who find something particular in cultural issues 
that has significance for the moral evaluation of human behaviours.18 Her social justice 
approach to recognition allows processes of identity formation to happen within cultural 
spheres but without pre-judging a claim around the presumptively equal value of cultural 
practices or world-visions, and without the need for esteem or evaluations of the worth 
                                               
14 ibid ix. 
15 ibid 24. 
16 ibid 93-101. 
17 B Barry, Culture & Equality (Harvard University Press 2002) ch7.  
18 N Fraser, ‘Multiculturalism, Antiessentialism, and Radical Democracy: A Genealogy of the Current 
Impasse in Feminist Theory’, in Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the ‘Post-Socialist’ Condition 
(Routledge 1997) 187.  
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of cultural practices.19 In that sense, Brian Barry’s critique of Fraser is misguided when 
he claims that the remedy for misrecognition requires meddling with cultural valuations 
tout court.20 What concerns liberals such as Barry, like the problems associated with 
state-sponsored campaigns for cultural valuations, has an answer within Fraser’s work, 
which meddles with cultural value patterns only insofar as they infringe on participatory 
parity.   
 
7.2.2 Hegemony 
For Fraser, injustices associated with culture are not mainly about the lack of access to 
cultural goods, or the ability of individuals to participate in cultural practices, but 
constitute unequal access to the practices and goods that establish norms across diverse 
cultural spheres, that is, access to the ‘socio-cultural means of interpretation and 
communication’ (hereafter, ‘MICs’). 21  Her commitment to discourse theory and its 
contribution to the analysis of social struggles led her, like many others, to the study of 
the Gramscian idea of hegemony. Discourse theory, then, is not only important for the 
formation of individual/social identities, but also to understand ‘how the cultural 
hegemony of dominant groups in society is secured and contested’, and finally to ‘shed 
light on the prospects for emancipatory social change and political practice’. 22 
Hegemony, for Fraser, is the ‘discursive face of power’, the ability to establish the 
‘common sense’ (doxa), and ‘includes the power to establish authoritative definitions of 
social situations and social needs, the power to define the universe of legitimate 
disagreement, and the power to shape the political agenda’.23  Gramsci’s concept of 
hegemony, originally focused on class domination, was later re-interpreted by post-
modern and post-structural versions as discursive mechanisms that marginalised 
                                               
19 A Phillips, ‘Recognition and the Struggles for Political Voice’, in B Hobson (ed), Recognition Struggles 
and Social Movements (CUP 2003). Fraser’s approach stands in contrast to that of IM Young, for whom 
‘[g]roups cannot be socially equal unless their specific experience, culture, and social contributions are 
publicly affirmed and recognized’ Justice and the Politics of Difference (2nd edn, OUP 2001) 174.  
20 Barry (n 17) 274-9. Moreover, he claims that Fraser puts into parentheses the demands for legal equality 
of culturally disvalued groups. This is far from what Fraser recognises in several parts of her work. See 
5.3.3.  
21  Considered as ‘historically and culturally specific ensemble of discursive resources’, these include 
‘officially recognized idioms’, ‘concrete vocabularies available for making claims in these recognized 
idioms’, ‘paradigms of argumentation accepted as authoritative in adjudicating conflicting claims’, 
‘narrative conventions available for constructing the individual and collective stories’, and finally ‘the 
modes of subjectification’, that is, ‘the ways in which discourses positions interlocutors as specific sorts of 
subjects endowed with specific sorts of capacities for action’. N Fraser, ‘What’s Critical About Critical 
Theory?’, in Fortunes of Feminism (Verso 2013) 57. 
22 N Fraser, ‘Against Symbolicism: The Uses and Abuses of Lacanianism for Feminist Politics’, in Fraser 
(n 21) 140.  
23 ibid 142. 
 197 
subordinated groups along several different traits.24 In a post-modern condition, we are 
left ‘without any large-scale (meta-narrative) solution to the various types of 
marginalisation to which we are subject’, so we ‘should therefore simply try to be aware 
of the omnipresent possibility of exclusion and marginalization and should work at the 
limits of the institutions and practices’ in which we find ourselves.25 With no necessary 
connection between different forms of oppression, the possibility of building a single 
revolutionary coalition also becomes more difficult. 
 
Law, in this scenario, has no power other than to work at these margins, within dominant 
and abstract rationalities, in an attempt to subvert or challenge ‘hegemonies’ rather than 
a single and discrete dominant idea of hegemony held by a ruling or dominant class.26 
With the increasing decentralisation of the radical enterprise (from a focus on class to a 
focus on gender or race), law has gained attention as a tool of critique ‘at the margins’. 
Thus, the legal lesson one can learn from Laclau and Mouffe’s pluralist approach to 
domination is that legal mobilisation by subaltern groups will be necessarily fragmented 
(waged in different battlefields); 27 committed to a radical critique of power within liberal 
arrangements; and against consensus, providing ‘radical moments of conflictual 
disruption where those previously outside the remit of the “human” speak’.28 In the words 
of Sally Engle Merry,  
Instead of an overarching hegemony, there are hegemonies: parts of 
law that are more fundamental and unquestioned, parts which are 
becoming challenged, parts which authorize the dominant culture, 
parts which offer liberation to the subordinate. Law cannot be viewed 
as hegemonic or not as a whole, but instead as incorporating 
contradictory discourses about equality, justice, and persons.29 
 
                                               
24 C Mouffe and E Laclau, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (Verso 1985). 
25 D Litowitz, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony, and the law’ (2000) 2 Brigham Young University Law Review 515, 
535. 
26 For Gramsci, law is located at the intersection of state and civil society, where the concept of hegemony 
plays its most important role, to generate ‘the “spontaneous consent” given by the great mass of population’ 
to dominant groups’ ideas. Therefore, law is not only about force or repression, but also about legitimising 
domination, either through persuasion or pedagogy, but more importantly through a constitutive process of 
social ontology. Q Hoare and G Nowell (eds), Selection from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci 
(Lawrence & Wishart 1971) 12, 246-7. 
27 Mouffe and Laclau (n 24) 159. 
28 K McNeilly, ‘After the Critique of Rights: For a Radical Democratic Theory and Practice of Human 
Rights’ (2016) 27 Law Critique 269, 277. 
29 S Engle Merry, ‘Courts as Performances: Domestic Violence Hearings in Hawai’i Family Court’, in M 
Lazarus-Black and S Hirsch (eds), Contested States: Law, Hegemony and Resistance (Routledge 1994) 54.  
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Although Fraser’s endorsement of the idea of non-reformist reforms suggests that it 
would be better to start from micro-level instances of resistance to ‘hegemonies’ and see 
where they can lead us, she never neglects the importance of ‘Hegemony’ as a structural 
idea. In other words, law plays an important part in reinforcing an overarching idea of 
hegemony,30 but legal counter-hegemonies, as described by Gramsci and others, can be 
important for opening up avenues of emancipation.31 For Fraser, we can approach this 
problem with the help of Foucault: law is constitutive of social ontologies and, at the 
same time, is inherently immersed within relations and structures of power.32 Law is 
there, already playing its part, selecting behaviours, expressing moral condemnation for 
certain activities and not others, or simply being applied in the hands of individuals that 
cannot be easily detached from their socio-cultural contexts. However, what we need, as 
Fraser states, is a normative framework to distinguish those sites that can accommodate 
critique from those that seem to be closed or that do not open up any form of contestation 
or counter-hegemony.33   
 
On this account, the challenging stance stands in a paradoxical relation to legal 
mobilisation: although the latter risks being disadvantaged and co-opted by the logic of 
dominant MICs, it is at times a fundamental strategy to challenge cultural presuppositions 
that constitute legal discourse and determine the outcomes of legal systems. Hegemony 
as a cultural code is considered as the closure, the self-referring nature of legal systems;34 
however, hegemonies, and, specifically, counter-hegemonies, can be considered as sites 
of contestation, which open up lines of fracture, reveal silences, or heighten 
contradictions.35 Not all the cultural assumptions behind legal discourses are directly at 
issue in a given dispute, but, as Bordieu would say, a trial is a ‘symbolic struggle’ where 
different worldviews are at issue, each attempting to become legitimised in the language 
of law.36 The degree of reproduction and reinforcement of legal hegemonic codes, which 
                                               
30 Kimberlé Crenshaw summarises this sceptical view of law: ‘If law functions to reinforce a world view 
that things should be the way they are, then law cannot provide an effective means to challenge the present 
order’. ‘Race, Reform and Retrenchment’ (1988) 101 Harvard Law Review 1331, 1352. 
31 A Hunt, ‘Rights and Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies’ (1990) 17 Journal of Law and 
Society 309. 
32 A Allen, ‘Emancipation Without Utopia: Subjection, Modernity, and the Normative Claims of Feminist 
Critical Theory’ (2015) 30 Hypathia 513. 
33 N Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions’ (1981) 3 PRAXIS 
International 272.  
34 Litowitz (n 25) 540. 
35 The double nature of legal orders as both affirming the authority of law and exposing it to challenge is 
also one of the central concerns of the model of responsive law. P Nonet and P Selznick, Law and Society 
in Transition (Transaction 2001). 
36 P Bordieu, ‘The Force of Law’ (1977) 38 Hastings Law Journal 805.  
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serves in itself to reproduce dominant ideologies, is something to debate. For many, like 
Bordieu and Derrida, an overarching concept of hegemony, violence or domination will 
be unavoidably present in any legal instance;37 for Fraser, in contrast, it is possible to 
enact a political critique of the force of law where not every contact with legal discourse 
implies a negation of emancipatory alternatives.38  
 
From Fraser’s work, the main issue is the quest for a normative framework to wage these 
battles along different strands of domination and challenge dominant or hegemonic 
culture(s) without blaming a single class or attempting to build or constitute a single 
revolutionary actor that will end with domination once and for all.39 The idea of counter-
hegemony, conceived of not as an oppositional project that is just an alternative totality 
to the dominant hegemony, but instead as a more practical disposition of critique, 
reworking or refashioning the elements of hegemony, can be associated with ‘non-
reformist reforms’ (a Gramscian ‘war of position’). For Gramsci, counter-hegemonic 
movements must start from ‘where people are at’, from the materials at hand, in order to 
supplement what is already there, a process that can open up hegemony’s silences.40 In 
the words of Hunt, these movements imply ‘the putting into place of discourses, which, 
whilst still building on the elements of the hegemonic discourses, introduce elements 
which transcend that discourse’.41 
 
                                               
37 J Derrida, ‘Force of law: the metaphysical foundation of authority’, in D Cornell and others (eds), 
Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (Routeldge 1992).  
38 N Fraser, ‘The Force of Law: Metaphysical or Political’ (1991-1992) 13 Cardozo Law Review 1325. 
39 G Gutting and N Fraser, ‘A Feminism Where “Lean In” Means Leaning On Others’ (New York Times, 
15 October 2015) <https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/10/15/a-feminism-where-leaning-in-
means-leaning-on-others/?mcubz=1> accessed 15 November 2016.  
40 Hunt (n 31) 314.  
41 ibid. See also Crenshaw above (n 30) 1367. These counter-movements have the potential to go beyond 
merely internal critiques. See 6.1.1. For Laclau, the struggles different groups wage in contemporary 
societies stem in part from the battle for a universal empty signifier (the battle for hegemony): ‘politically 
speaking, the right of particular groups of agents –ethnic, national or sexual minorities, for instance- can be 
formulated only as universal rights. The appeal to universal is unavoidably once, on the one hand, no agent 
can claim to speak directly for the “totality” while, on the other, reference to the latter remains an essential 
component of the hegemonico-discursive operation. The universal is an empty place, a void which can be 
filled only by the particular, but which, through its very emptiness, produces a series of crucial effects in 
the structuration/destructuration of social relations.’ As is clear from the last part of the quote, for Laclau, 
these struggles are also crucial for social identities, as it is precisely this emptiness (or the attempt to fill 
that emptiness) that is constitutive, for example, of group identities. ‘Identity and Hegemony: The Role of 
Universality in the Constitution of Political Logics’, in J Butler and others, Contingency, Hegemony, and 
Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (Verso 2000) 58. 
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7.2.3 Feminism 
Fraser’s insights into the principle of the challenging stance also derive from her feminist 
positions, such as the critique of the male norm, which has been thoroughly developed by 
legal scholars such as Catharine Mackinnon. In terms of the latter, the two dominant 
pathways of sex discrimination law (sameness and difference), which roughly coincide 
with first and second wave feminisms, conceal ‘the substantive way in which man has 
become the measure of all things’: 
Under the sameness standard, women are measured according to our 
correspondence with man, our equality judged by our proximity to his 
measure. Under the difference standard, we are measured according 
to our lack of correspondence from him, our womanhood judged by 
our distance from his measure. Gender-neutrality is thus simply the 
male standard, and the special protection rule is simply the female 
standard, but do not be deceived: manhood is the referent for both.42 
Foundational (and dominant) ideas of culture, as many feminists have tirelessly argued, 
‘precondition the allocation of basic legal entitlements’.43 Not only when ADL requires 
evidence of similarly situated comparators, but also when it relies on distinctions in order 
to establish positive duties of accommodation, foundational ideas of culture, like the male 
norm, are operating behind.44  If ADL is nothing more than the guarantee of equal 
treatment, with the addition of certain suspect grounds of classification, which at times 
can be used as a basis for ameliorative policies, then nothing prevents regulations from  
being designed, interpreted and applied according to dominant cultural paradigms, which 
frequently go unchallenged.45 If we approach the study of ADL merely through a focus 
on distributive paradigms, some of which extend to the distribution of non-material goods 
(eg, rights or opportunities), we also ‘fail to bring social structures and institutional 
contexts under evaluation’.46 The principle I am explaining here, in contrast, derives from 
accounts of ADL that are closer to social or relational egalitarianism.47 In a way, through 
its challenging stance, ADL brings social processes that constitute difference as 
disadvantage into question, rather than focusing on end-state processes. That is why ADL 
                                               
42 C Mackinnon, ‘Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination’, in Feminism Unmodified (Harvard 
University Press 1987) 34.  
43 J Butler, ‘Sexual politics, torture, and secular time’ (2008) 59 British Journal of Sociology 1, 8.  
44  D Reaume, ‘Dignity, Equality and Comparison’, in D Hellman and S Moreau (eds), Philosophical 
Foundations of Discrimination Law (OUP 2013) 7. 
45 In the US context, even if anti-discrimination case law has allowed for the emergence of ‘multiple 
femeninities’, it has continued to reinforce the dominant paradigm of masculinity. T Smith and M Kimmel, 
‘The Hidden Discourse of Masculinity in Gender Discrimination Law’ (2005) 30 Signs 1827, 1830.  
46 Young (n 19) 20. 
47 E Anderson, ‘What Is the Point of Equality?’ (1999) 109 Ethics 287. 
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achieves something, most of the time, even without the help of precise distributive 
patterns, and evaluates the way in which social processes ‘enable or constrain individuals 
in relevant situations’.48 In other words, even when reduced to the anti-classification 
principle, where the equal protection or anti-discrimination clauses force claimants to 
invoke a comparator, there is an opportunity to challenge the dominant norm that 
allegedly imposes a pre-determined comparator.49 Hence, the ideological tension of ADL 
(whether or not it challenges dominant cultural paradigms) is present even when reduced 
to the anti-classification principle, which can expose the limits of ADL in challenging the 
dominant or hegemonic norms. 
 
ADL sceptics, such as Alexander Somek, tend to underestimate the ability of ADL to 
bring foundational ideas of culture into question. Even if equality and non-discrimination 
clauses seem to provide no explanatory norm, that is, no substantive standard in itself to 
assess statutory purposes or determine distributions of rights and benefits, in the hands of 
social movements they have been used to bring cultural paradigms into question. The 
conception of equality and non-discrimination and its evolution within a certain society, 
as argued by Sandra Fredman, is not an issue of logic, ‘but of values or policy’.50 We 
could say that ADL evolves through challenges to the ‘norm’ that serves as the standard 
for comparison or as the criteria of likeness/unlikeness in discrimination law.51 That is, 
even without changing the content of laws, ADL’s challenging stance provides an avenue 
for (constitutional) redemption, for challenging paradigms that seem to prevent equal 
treatment clauses from displaying their normative power.52  
 
Finally, another significant aspect of Fraser’s feminism, which is also central for feminist 
jurisprudence, allows us to conceive of ADL as a way to challenge the alleged sanctity of 
                                               
48 Young (n 19) 26. 
49 Unless adjudicators are not willing to even start the analysis of whether discrimination has occurred in 
the absence of real (not hypothetical) comparators. This tendency is now in retreat in several jurisdictions. 
S Goldberg, ‘Discrimination by Comparison’ (2011) 120 The Yale Law Journal 728, 803-811. 
50 S Fredman, Discrimination Law (2nd ed, OUP 2011) 2.  
51 Habermas claims that ideas contributed by radical feminism have been crucial for updating the system 
of rights, within a dialectic tension between de jure and de facto equality, which has brought into the 
political public sphere the ‘fundamental level of a society’s cultural self-understanding’, like the sexual 
division of labour or ‘gender-dependent differences’. Acknowledging feminist contributions to discourse 
theory, and tacitly evoking Fraser’s critiques, he recognises that ‘[f]eminism (…) is directed against a 
dominant culture that interprets the relationship of the sexes in an asymmetrical manner that excludes equal 
rights’. Hence, ‘[t]he scale of values of the society as a whole is up for discussion: the consequences of this 
problematization extend into core private areas and affect the established boundaries between the private 
and public spheres as well’. J Habermas, ‘Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic State’, Inclusion of 
the Other (MIT Press 1998) 209-211.  
52 J Balkin, Constitutional Redemption (OUP 2011) 6; See 2.3 fn19 (Honneth’s ‘structural openness’). 
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spheres like the family or education, where interactions allegedly depend on idealised 
processes of communicative action. In a way, ADL may be an example of ‘proper 
juridification’, where the law intervenes in communicative spheres only to restore 
equality of communicative power.53 Indeed, sexual harassment law has been used by 
feminist movements as a way to challenge the purported ‘sanctity of the bedroom’, 
questioning the authority to draw a moral line between what constitutes ‘socially 
integrated action contexts’ and ‘system-integrated action contexts’.54 In What’s Critical 
about Critical Theory, Nancy Fraser argued for the need to restore participatory parity at 
all levels, equalising communicative powers within spheres that are crucial for processes 
of identity formation.55  
 
7.2.4 The political critique of the force of law and the public sphere(s) 
As I explained previously, despite her critics, Fraser considers law as a ‘central locus of 
transformative recognition struggles’.56 However, those who are misrecognised start with 
a structural disadvantage: 
Background assumptions (…) constitute the inescapable horizon of 
any judgment. Yet, in a society that is stratified by gender, color, and 
class, many of the most culturally authoritative and widely held 
assumptions about such things work to the disadvantage of 
subordinated social groups (…) When they serve as elements of the 
tacit backdrop against which foreground legal judgments are made, 
they, too, become part of ‘the force of law.’57 
Her political critique of the force of law allows for conceiving of ADL as an instance of 
discursive contestation between different ethical positions that function as pre-conditions 
for the allocation of legal entitlements, and for improving access to the MICs to subjects 
who are structurally disadvantaged within dominant forms of discourse. Although legal 
discourses do imply processes of discursive assimilation, they may be less dominant and 
structurally disadvantaging than other sites of the formal/informal political public sphere.  
 
                                               
53 J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Polity Press 1996) s 9.2. 
54 N Fraser, ‘Sex, Lies, and the Public Sphere: Reflections on the Confirmation of Clarence Thomas’, in J 
Landes (ed), Feminism, the Public and the Private (OUP 1998). 
55 Fraser (n 21).  
56 C McBride, ‘Demanding Recognition: Equality, Respect, and Esteem’ (2009) 8 European Journal of 
Political Theory 96, 102. 
57 Fraser (n 38) 1329-30.  
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In a way, Fraser’s political critique of the force of law attempts to challenge the dominant 
cultural background of legal grammars and supplement them with what they occlude or 
cannot see. It is a critique both against liberal grammars, which assume that legal 
categories protect fixed or endogenous individual preferences or interests, and republican 
grammars, which rely on the ability of law to ‘contain the politics of civil society and 
exhaust what these politics are about’.58 The challenging stance, through the lens of 
Fraser’s critical account of republican progressive narratives of the public sphere, favours 
the creation of subaltern counterpublics that challenge not only the content of public 
discussions, but also second-order issues that shape what those discussions are about, 
who can participate, and how they are carried out. Along with the group dimension, which 
favours the creation of collective ‘spaces of withdrawal and realignment’, where 
members of subordinated groups can discuss their ‘needs, objective and strategies’ 
without the ‘supervision of dominant groups’, subaltern counterpublics expand the 
discursive scope of an allegedly neutral public sphere, which creates the image of subjects 
discussing issues of public concern, bracketing their unequal economic and social status, 
‘as if’ they were equal peers; challenges ‘discursive assimilation’ as a ‘condition for 
participation in public debate’; and questions dominant cultural paradigms that draw a 
line between what is public and thus a matter of debate, and what is private and thus a 
matter not for discussion. 59  Culture itself is a subject of common concern through 
discursive contestation, so even questions about who counts as a member of a subaltern 
group is put into question, decreasing the dangers of balkanisation.60  
 
Considering Fraser’s political critique of the force of law and her critical account of the 
public sphere, we can return to her distinction between affirmative and transformative 
remedies against misrecognition. According to the former, those who are misrecognised 
may opt for revaluing their ‘unjustly devalued group identities, while leaving intact both 
the content of those identities and the group differentiations that underlie them’.61 Even 
if these remedies are vulnerable to the reification of collective identities and ‘tend to 
pressure individuals to conform to a group type, discouraging dissidence and 
                                               
58 E Christodoulidis, Law and Reflexive Politics (Kluwer 1998) xiv. 
59  N Fraser, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing 
Democracies’, in C Calhoun (ed), Habermas and the Public Sphere (MIT Press 1992) 126. See 6.3. 
60 ibid 123-4.  
61 Fraser (n 7) 75. 
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experimentation’, they are sometimes an important catalyst for the challenging stance of 
ADL.62 In the words of Cillian McBride,  
Where marginalized groups internalize the dominant group’s view of 
themselves as worthless or at least of little value, the first step in the 
process of igniting a struggle for justice is that members of the group 
concerned re-evaluate themselves. This is an internal process of 
revaluation and recognition which addresses the problem that 
internalizing dominant judgements gives rise to the formation of 
adaptive preferences, which must first be revised if a struggle for 
equal rights is to be commenced.63  
The danger with demanding esteem within marginalised or oppressed social groups lies 
at the point where it is transformed into another kind of hierarchy, when a ‘reasonable 
concern with amor propre’ turns ‘into an unreasonable compulsion to hierarchically 
distinguish ourselves from others’.64 
 
Transformative remedies against misrecognition, for their part, ‘destabilize invidious 
status distinctions’ 65  or, more frequently, challenge the underlying social structures, 
articulated in ‘structural accommodations’, that is, the ‘policies, practices and physical 
structures that tacitly accommodate the dominant group’s needs at the expense of less 
privileged groups’.66 A good example comes from the way in which public buildings and 
places have been designed to ‘accommodate the needs of people who are able-bodied and 
who fit into conventional gender categories’ and the possible role that ADL may play in 
challenging these structural accommodations.67 For Sophia Moreau,  
We have only recently begun to understand the many ways in which 
these spaces and institutions privilege some people’s needs at the 
expense of others. There has, then, been a constant series of 
accommodations given to many of us, accommodations that give us 
deliberative freedoms. Most of the time, these accommodations 
remain invisible.68  
Structural accommodation, then, only comes to our attention through anti-discrimination 
claims, through a failure to include or accommodate the victims because of their 
possession of some (normatively) extraneous trait. 
                                               
62 ibid 76-7. 
63 Mc Bride (n 56) 105; A Sayer, ‘Class, Moral Worth and Recognition’ (2005) 39 Sociology 947, 955. 
64 McBride (n 56) 107. 
65 Fraser (n 7) 77. 
66 S Moreau, ‘Discrimination and Subordination’, in The Many Faces of Equality (forthcoming).  
67 S Moreau, ‘What is Discrimination?’ (2010) 38 Philosophy & Public Affairs 143, 151. 
68  ibid 149. See also S Fredman, ‘Substantive Equality Revisited’ (2016) 14 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 712, 734. 
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7.2.5 The limits of the challenging stance  
First, the challenging stance of ADL encounters problems as with any project of legal 
reform that places culture as its main target. As put by Young, ‘[o]ur society enacts the 
oppression of cultural imperialism to a large degree through feelings and reactions, and 
in that respect oppression is beyond the reach of law and policy to remedy’.69  The 
challenge for ADL is, thus, addressing discrimination through traditional models of legal 
accountability, like the attribution of responsibility. The problem is that the usual victims 
of discrimination 
are oppressed by structures of cultural imperialism that mark them as 
the Others, as different, [and] thus not only suffer humiliation of 
aversive, avoiding or condescending behaviour, but must usually 
experience that behaviour in silence, unable to check their perceptions 
against those of others.70 
At the point that ADL has come to help individuals that attempt to challenge these 
oppressive structures, they are usually already willing to break their silence, and check 
their perception against dominant valuations. So, if ADL is to be understood as directed 
towards a ‘cultural revolution’, as a ‘transformative project of culture’, it seems that it 
needs to expand towards other areas, or explore alternative legal tools to redress 
‘everyday discrimination’.71 These features explain the structural turn in ADL, where 
legal devices have been shaped in order to address cognitive biases, distinguished 
between legal processes of blaming and attributing responsibility, or definitively turned 
to reflexive regulation or soft legal remedies.72 For Yoshino, this project may seem too 
ambitious for law, and calls for anti-discrimination projects ‘to look outside the law’: 
‘[m]any covering demands occur at such an intimate and daily level that they are not 
susceptible to legal correction’, and ‘are better redressed through appeals to our individual 
faculties of conscience and compassion’.73  
 
Secondly, an obvious structural limit of the challenging stance of ADL derives from 
broader limits that affect law as an institutional practice. Allegedly, the challenging stance 
                                               
69 Young (n 19) 124. 
70 ibid 134 
71 A Koppelman, Anti-Discrimination and Social Equality (Yale University Press 1996) 2.  
72 S Bagenstos, ‘The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law’ (2006) 94 California Law 
Review 1. 
73 Yoshino (n 13) 24.  
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cannot transform law into an unstable institution, so expanding the limits of law to what 
it cannot see or address seems overdemanding.74 Indeed, this is a particular challenge for 
equality law, which at points seems to be a valve to challenge the alleged closure of the 
legal system. However, its structural limitations seem obvious: ‘[b]oth law and the 
theories of equality that law articulates are Janus-faced. They are liminal. They define 
guarantees of equality while defining what is not even a question of equality.’75 Hence, 
in order to understand the structural limits of the challenging stance of ADL, we need to 
understand what law does not do, ‘what law leaves unoccupied, unrecognized, and 
untouched’ for the preservation of its institutional character.76 
 
Finally, once we attempt to challenge dominant or hegemonic oppressive cultural harms 
through law, we may end up replacing ‘the diffuseness of cultural debate’ with ‘the 
concreteness and definitiveness of legal proceedings’.77 That may pose serious problems 
for group identities, something I explained earlier in this work.78 However, as has been 
recognised by Nancy Fraser, the breaking point is where legal institutions, with all of 
their categorical reasoning (eg, you either belong or do not belong to an indigenous 
people), may end up promoting ‘participatory parity’ and democratising access to the 
means of interpretation and communication, thus keeping alive that cultural diffuseness, 
without elevating that diffuseness into a new melting-pot ‘norm’; in other words, keeping 
alive the individual quest for cultural authenticity without denying the existence of social 
groups or identities that provide the materials, values and practices for individual 
identities.  
 
7.3 The Challenging Stance of ADL in Latin America 
The case for the challenging stance in Latin America starts from those instances in which 
ADL has been used to address some of the most visible and dominant cultural paradigms 
                                               
74 Robert Post, interviewed in M Mercat-Bruns, Discrimination at Work: Comparing European, French, 
and America Law (UC Press 2016) 86. 
75 Balkin (n 52) 172. 
76 ibid. We could refer to the ways in which the lack of racial or ethnic recogntion in France helps to 
reproduce social inequalities that ADL is prevented from addressing, for the sake of the republican character 
of law. J Gilbert and D Keane, ‘Equality versus fraternity? Rethinking France and its minorities’ (2016) 14 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 883; E Bruce-Jones, ‘Race, Space, and the Nation State: Racial 
Recognition and the Prospects for Substantive Equality under Anti-Discrimination Law in France and 
Germany’ (2008) 39 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 423, 437-9.  
77 S Choudhry, ‘Distribution vs. Recognition: the case of anti-discrimination laws’ (2000) 9 George Mason 
Law Review 145, 175.  
78 see 6.3.3.  
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in the region.79 For several decades, these cultural paradigms have allowed scholars to 
speak, in a rather loose way, about a regional scope for the study of phenomena like law 
or political systems.80 However, the challenge against these paradigms also confers us the 
possibility of studying transnational regional networks of social/legal mobilisation. The 
use of ADL has been crucial to render this area of law a dangerous weapon from the point 
of view of those who benefit from the dominant cultural paradigms.81 As put by the 
IACtHR in Atala, ‘the law and the State must help to promote social progress; otherwise 
there is a grave risk of legitimizing and consolidating different forms of discrimination 
that violate human rights’.82 In a way, it is a call for the states and their anti-discrimination 
regulations to tackle dominant cultural paradigms that violate human rights, instead of 
waiting for social change to emerge from the ‘spontaneous orders’ of Latin American 
societies. In this section, I will describe different articulations of the challenging stance 
of ADL in Latin America. 
 
The first group of examples derive from feminist struggles at both the regional and 
domestic levels. In general, and despite their different social origins (indigenous, 
religious or liberal), feminist movements are bound together by their opposition to 
patriarchal relations of power and the so-called macho culture, which is claimed to be 
entrenched in Latin American societies. As stated recently in The Economist: ‘Raw 
statistics tell a story of female advancement; machista culture has yet to catch up’.83 The 
recent advancement of women in decision-making positions has been associated with 
cultural ideas of strong and caring matriarchs, the perfect mixture of decision-making 
convictions and ‘altruism, affectivity and moral virtuousness’, which also shapes some 
of the most successful social policies in the region that operate through female households 
heads. 84  Tackling macho cultures and the advancement of multiple femininities 
constitutes the most important challenge for Latin American sex discrimination law.  
 
                                               
79 In the next chapter, I will address law’s relationship with a dominant paradigm of neoliberal ‘cultures’. 
80 For Gongora-Mera, for example, historical racial hierarchies have shaped the ‘consequent tradition of 
unequal application of law according to the addressees of the norm’. ‘Transnational Articulations of Law 
and Race in Latin America: A Legal Genealogy of Inequality’ (2012) Working Paper 18 Desigualdades.net.  
81  For conservative positions, ADL in Latin America serves as the channel of ‘gender ideologoies’, 
destabilising settled natural distinctions, ‘attempting to provoke the transformation of societies according 
to plans of engineers of the new “sex”’. J Alvear, ‘La sentencia de la CIDH en el caso Atala: Una iniciativa 
para el adoctrinamiento en ideologías radicales’ (2012) 26 Actualidad Jurídica 577, 582.  
82 IACtHR, Atala Riffo and daughters v. Chile (2012) para 120 
83 The Economist, ‘Wonder women and macho men’ (London, 22 August 2015) 17.  
84 M Molyneux, ‘Mothers at the Service of the New Poverty Agenda: Progresa/Oportunidades, Mexico's 
Conditional Transfer Programme’ (2006) 40 Social Policy and Administration 425.  
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In abortion cases, equality and non-discrimination rights have been used to illustrate that 
regulations end up affecting women in particular, due to stereotypes about their social 
roles, and most clearly to address widespread cultures of sexism and patriarchy.85 In a 
landmark ruling, the Constitutional Tribunal of Bolivia assessed the constitutionality of 
several statutory regulations regarding women’s rights, and declared that there is a 
constitutional duty of the state, through all its agencies, to implement the principle of 
gender equality (article 8), to tackle exploitation, colonisation and patriarchal cultures.86 
In blunt terms, it stated the need to rebuild the state, but now under the principles of 
gender equality and de-patriarchalisation, naming the specific social evil to be tackled:  
Gender inequality has been a characteristic problem affecting 
Bolivian society, mainly because of the endorsement of sexist 
behavioural schemes bequeathed from the past, systematic discourses 
and practices that reduced women’s rights and that contributed to a 
precarious and colonial logic of distinction based on the dichotomy 
between masculine and feminine. (…) [T]here is a long road ahead 
towards a truly and effective realization of the principle of equality 
and non-discrimination.’87 
This judgment echoed a regional landmark case adjudicated by the IACtHR, the so-called 
Cotton Field case, which addressed the structural situation of subordination suffered by 
women in Ciudad Juarez (Mexico), where the criminal patterns against them revealed a 
broader ‘culture of gender-based discrimination’ by both private and public actors.88 In 
another famous case, the Colombian Constitutional Court addressed the structural 
(institutional and social) subordination of women caused by the human rights violations 
of internally displaced people by the guerrilla.89 In a special enforcement ruling (auto de 
cumplimiento), the court acknowledged the limits of judicial tools in challenging the 
cultural paradigms of gender inferiority that amplified the broader human rights 
violations generated by the conflict, and stressed the need for structural political tools to 
come up with permanent solutions.90  
 
In cases of employment discrimination, feminist movements have been able to use ADL 
in certain areas of the labour market that are disproportionately occupied by men. The 
Argentinian higher courts can be labelled the champions in this area, due to their attempts 
                                               
85 P Bergallo and A Ramón, ‘Constitutional Developments in Latin American Abortion Law’ (2016) 135 
International Journal of Gynecology and Obstetrics 226.  
86 Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal of Bolivia, 0206 (2014).  
87 ibid s III.3. 
88 IACtHR, González et al (“Cotton Field”), v. Mexico (2009) paras 132, 399. 
89 Corte Constitucional de Colombia, T-025/2004. 
90 Corte Constitucional de Colombia, Auto de Cumplimiento 092/2008.  
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to develop structural remedies against gender discrimination. Two cases are remarkable 
here: Freddo and Sisnero. In Freddo, a feminist NGO triggered a class action procedure 
for gender discrimination against a popular ice-cream company that employed almost no 
women in its different job positions, especially in the stores themselves. This was one of 
the first instances in which the collective and diffuse interests standings clause of the 
Argentinian Constitution (article 43) had been applied in a discrimination case. Here, the 
Appellate Chamber on Federal and Civil Law issues ruled against the company, declaring 
a structural situation of discrimination against women, based on the idea that ‘suspect 
clauses’ like sex should be treated with extreme caution, because those criteria are 
precisely the ones that perpetuate discrimination. In that vein, it denied the defendant’s 
justifications that ‘women’ were not strong enough to ‘carry the boxes filled with ice-
cream’ or perform other important physical tasks. Moreover, it argued that the whole 
point of anti-discrimination legislation is directed at challenging the traditional ‘practices 
and customs’ that have a discriminatory effect on women.91 In Sisnero, the Argentinian 
Supreme Court ruled against a public transportation company in the province of Salta, for 
its infringement of the right to non-discrimination on the basis of gender. The claimants 
(a woman who had tried to apply several times to be a driver of public buses and a local 
feminist NGO) argued that a pervasive culture of gender subordination prevented women 
from applying for these kinds of jobs. The provincial court initially denied the individual 
claims, but granted the judicial action because it attempted to challenge a ‘widespread 
presence of discriminatory symptoms in society that is illustrated by the total absence of 
women in the position of bus drivers’.92 This is interesting because even in the absence 
of a similarly situated comparator raised by the claimant (another female driver), and 
faced with problems of evidence regarding the intention of the discriminator, it addressed 
broader questions around the pervasive culture of discrimination. Later, the Supreme 
Court remanded the case, arguing that a widespread cultural practice that affected the 
rights of women was sufficient evidence of a prima facie case of discrimination.93 Finally, 
in the remanded judgment, the provincial court of Salta elaborated several distributive 
patterns for the companies that run the local public transportation service, requiring that 
                                               
91 Cámara de Apelaciones en lo Civil Federal, “Fundación Mujeres en Igualdad y otro c/ Freddo S.A. 
s/amparo (2009).  
92 Corte de Justicia de Salta, Sisnero, Mirtha Graciela; Caliva, Lía Verónica Vs. Ahynarca S.A. – Tadelva 
S.A. y otros – Amparo – Recurso de apelación (2010).  
93 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (Argentina), Sisneros, Mirtha Graciela y otros c/ Taldelva SERL 
y otros s/amparo, Recurso de hecho (2014).  
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30% all positions be filled by women, forcing the hiring of two women for every man 
hired after the ruling.94  
 
What is interesting about these two cases is that the courts, instead of requiring proof of 
statistical discrimination on the broader situation of women in these work sectors, relied 
mainly on the ‘notorious fact’ of widespread cultural practices that prevented women 
from having access to these kinds of jobs. On the other hand, they did not require the 
claimant’s proof of intention or proof of bad faith on the side of the discriminators, but 
instead focused on institutional (not necessarily formal) patterns of cultural domination 
that impinged on women’s participatory parity. This reasoning seems closer to the law of 
sexual harassment than that of indirect discrimination, where the tort of discrimination is 
attributable to a ‘hostile working environment’. 95  Despite the fact that indirect 
discrimination is virtually prohibited in every Latin American anti-discrimination regime, 
what these judgments articulate is a concern with structures of discrimination that 
reproduce dominant cultural paradigms that end up affecting members of particular 
vulnerable groups.96 
 
ADL has also been actively deployed in pregnancy discrimination cases against students, 
challenging educational projects based on religious ideas around motherhood and sexual 
autonomy prevalent in the region. For the Colombian Constitutional Court, the autonomy 
of educational centres must not be used to ‘stigmatize, separate, or discriminate against a 
pregnant student with respect to the benefits derived from the right to education’.97 This 
has also been the line of judgements in Chile, through the writ of protection and quasi-
judicial administrative organs;98 and in Peru, especially through the cases decided by the 
INDECOPI tribunals.99 
 
                                               
94 Corte de Justicia de Salta, Sisnero, Mirtha Graciela; Caliva, Lía Verónica Vs. Ahynarca S.A. – Tadelva 
S.A. y otros – Amparo – Recurso de apelación (2015).  
95 For a general overview on the law of sexual harassment in Latin America see N Gherardi, Otras formas 
de violencia contra las mujeres que reconocer, nombrar y visibilizar (CEPAL 2016) 36-ff.  
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97 Corte Constitucional de Colombia, T-656/1998. 
98 G Gomez, Derechos Fundamentales y Recurso de Protección (UDP 2005) 409-411.    
99 The jurisprudence of INDECOPI tribunals in Peru is illustrative, because it challenges ways of denying 
access to goods or services that rely on dominant cultural paradigms that stigmatise or marginalise members 
of protected groups. Although this institution has been criticised for not relaxing the standard of proof for 
discrimination claimants, and for its lack of expertise in constitutional and human rights issues, it has been 
a privileged avenue for the development of Peruvian ADL. 
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Regarding sexual orientation, several instances have shown the need for the state to put 
human rights regulation before the prevalent social morality. LGBT movements are 
probably the most frequent legal activists in the region, using different mobilisation 
strategies depending on the social and political opportunity structures.100 Indeed, they 
have built alliances and networks across the entire social/political spectrum with different 
state branches and agencies. In the case of Chile, LGBT groups triggered the first 
judgment of the recently enacted ADL, regarding a lesbian couple that was denied 
admission to a short-term rental motel based on customers’ prejudices.101 In this case, the 
judge recognised that the whole point of having anti-discrimination legislation is to tackle 
prejudices and stereotypes held by ‘common sense’ reasoning.102  In Argentina, in a 
landmark case regarding same-sex couples’ adoption and maternity benefits, a district 
court followed the reasoning of Atala and considered that ADL is at the service of those 
who want to tackle dominant cultural paradigms.103 In all of the jurisdictions studied here, 
sexual orientation is considered as an explicit ground of protection by recently enacted 
legislation. 104  Moreover, before the recognition of sexual orientation as a protected 
ground, processes of legal mobilisation used the avenue of sex discrimination or the 
principle of free development of personality to challenge dominant ways of being men 
(exhibiting manly behaviour, strength, and heterosexuality) or women (being feminine, 
weak, domestic, and supportive of the male partner). 105  There is no evidence of a 
sophisticated treatment of stereotypes by Latin American ADL case law (eg, the 
distinction between ascriptive and prescriptive stereotypes), but the doctrinal 
developments of the law of sexual/labour harassment are pioneering due to their challenge 
to unique and dominant ways of being a male or a female worker.106 Only during recent 
years, within the so-called ‘Gay Rights Revolution’ in Latin America, has the challenging 
stance of ADL addressed issues that deal particularly with the problems suffered by the 
LGBT community.107  The rapid development of same-sex marriage and the current 
waves of gender identity bills place the LGBT community at the forefront of the 
challenging stance. 
 
                                               
100 C Gianella and B Wilson, ‘LGBTI Rights’, in J Gonzalez-Bertomeu and R Gargarella (eds), The Latin 
American Casebook: Courts, constitutions, and rights (Routledge 2016).   
101 Tercer Juzgado Civil de Santiago (Chile), Zapata con Sociedad Comercial Marín Limitada (2012).  
102 ibid s 19.  
103 Juzgado de Familia 5º Mar del Plata (Argentina), MP-11313 (2015). 
104 see appendix (table 1).  
105 J Lemaitre, ‘El Amor en Tiempos de Cólera: Derechos LGBT en Colombia’ (2009) 6 SUR 79, 81-83.  
106 Gianella and Wilson (n 100).  
107 O Encarnacion, Out in the Periphery: Latin America's Gay Rights Revolution (OUP 2016).   
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Indigenous peoples in Latin America have increasingly been recognised as crucial 
political actors, through both organising parties and creating strong social movements.108 
They have used international human rights law and domestic laws to advance their claims, 
which are mainly based around the rights to land/natural resources, and political 
autonomy (specifically, the right to previous consultation).109 In this scenario, they have 
used ADL as an indirect tool to advance their demands, or as part of a broader strategy of 
legal mobilisation.110 The domestic application of the ILO Convention 169, considered 
as a quasi-Latin American international treaty, is a clear example of this broader strategy 
that includes both economic and political claims.111 ADL, within this broader project of 
legal reform, may play a small, although not irrelevant, part. Nevertheless, as one might 
expect, almost every case regarding indigenous peoples implies addressing issues of 
structural discrimination in Latin America.112  Indeed, when considering the broader 
social context of a case, courts are compelled to address the dominant cultural paradigms 
that end up burdening the rights of indigenous peoples, even if anti-discrimination rights 
are not the main cause of action before judicial arenas.113  
 
In general, indigenous peoples’ claims end up challenging the idea of a single nation, the 
dominant narrative since early republican times. 114  The ‘third wave’ of democracy 
brought with it the constitutional recognition of indigenous peoples and a commitment to 
                                               
108 D Lee Van Cott, From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics (CUP 
2005). 
109 C Rodríguez-Garavito, ‘Ethnicity.gov: Global Governance, Indigenous Peoples, and the Right to Prior 
Consultation in Social Minefields’ (2010) 18 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 263; A Skjævestad, 
‘The Mapuche People’s Battle for Indigenous Land: Litigation as a Strategy to Defend Indigenous Land 
Rights’, in J Couso et. al (eds), Cultures of Legality: judicialization and political activism in Latin America 
(CUP 2010).  
110 The individual emphasis of ADL does not seem at first hand a good tool for the special collective 
character of indigenous people’s claims, which are mobilised mainly through other political rights. That 
may be one reason why LGBT and feminist movements in Argentina and Chile, and Afro-descendants in 
Peru and Colombia, respectively, have been the main lobbyists for the recent creation of anti-discrimination 
legislation. A Coddou and others, ‘La ley antidiscriminación: avances e insuficiencias en la protección de 
la igualdad y la no discriminación en Chile’, in Informe Anual Sobre Derechos Humanos en Chile (UDP 
2013); C Parra, ‘Estatutos Antidiscriminación y su Desarrollo en Colombia’ (2007) 27 Revista de Derecho 
134, 147-8.  
111 International Labour Organization, Application of Convention No. 169 by domestic and international 
courts in Latin America (2009).  
112  This may be explained by the fact that for every social indicator, indigenous people are 
disproportionately represented as the most disadvantaged population. See the latest report of the World 
Bank, Indigenous Latin America in the Twenty-First Century (2015).  
113 The IACtHR has considered the principle of equality and non-discrimination as both a structural and 
interpretive principle of cases where indigenous populations suffer from extreme deprivation, generating 
strong state duties. The social and cultural context of deprivation played an important part in the reasoning 
of these cases. IACtHR. Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (2005) paras 161-169, 172, 175; 
Sawhoyamaxa Indian Community v. Paraguay (2006) paras 152-178. 
114 R Stavenhagen, ‘Indigenous Peoples and the State in Latin America: An Ongoing Debate’, in R Sieder 
(ed), Multiculturalism in Latin America (Palgrave 2002) 25.  
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the rapid development of international human rights law in this area. However, as stated 
previously, the incorporation of multi-cultural provisions in several Latin American 
constitutions at the beginning of the 1990s, and the implementation of the ILO 
Convention 169 were eroded by simultaneous processes of liberalisation and 
privatisation, which granted private property rights and clauses of ‘legitimate 
expectations’ for private (and, specially, foreign) investors. This first stage was 
characterised by a version of multiculturalism as a case of recognition without either 
redistribution or representation, illustrated by the Colombian Constitution of 1991 
(merely symbolic).115 For some sceptics, this version of multi-culturalism, coupled with 
the fact that cultural relativism has found a fertile soil in Latin America, deprived the 
region of normative guidelines to address its complex cultural realities, and called into 
question ‘the historically unfulfilled objective of achieving equality before the law and to 
subject all citizens, including the most powerful of them, to a single body of norms’.116 
However, instances where the right to cultural identity has been considered as a 
justification for the infringement of the equality and anti-discrimination rights of other 
vulnerable groups (eg, women or children), which feed the latter scepticism, have been 
quite exceptional in the region.117  
 
More problematic in recent times has been the quest of other vulnerable minorities, like 
Afro-descendants, who were forced to indigenise their claims, to be seen as culturally 
distinct in order to have access to the special rights and benefits of indigenous peoples.118 
                                               
115  J Lucero, ‘Ambivalent Multiculturalisms’, in T Eisendstadt and others (eds), Latin America's 
Multicultural Movements (OUP 2013).  
116 J Aguilar, ‘Multiculturalism and Constitutionalism in Latin America’ (2014) 4 Notre Dame Journal of 
International & Comparative Law 19, 33. 
117 These cases are on the public agenda thanks to the leadership of women, who mobilise not only to 
demand their women rights, but also attempt to redefine ‘indigenous law from their own cultural frames of 
reference’, addressing ‘the impunity, gender violence and discrimination they experience as indigenous 
women, within their communities and in society as a whole’. MT Sierra, ‘Indigenous Women Fight for 
Justice’, in Sieder and McNeish (eds), Gender Justice and Legal Pluralities (Routledge 2013) 56. In a way, 
we now know these cases because they have prompted conflicts within traditional institutional venues, 
where women have adopted a universal discourse of human rights with their own critical/cultural identities, 
where human rights have become ‘vernacularised’. S Engle Merry. Human Rights and Gender Violence: 
Translating international Law into Local Justice (Chicago University Press 2006). Although articles 8-10 
of the ILO Convention 169, regarding the consideration of indigenous peoples’ cultures in the 
implementation of legal orders, raise interesting doctrinal debates on legal pluralism, the conflict between 
indigenous law and feminism or other vulnerable minorities tends to be exaggerated by some 
commentators. Cultural defences have not been significantly considered as a justification for 
accommodations of cultural practices that violate the rights of other vulnerable groups. C Carmona, ‘Hacia 
una comprensión “trágica” de los conflictos multiculturales: acuerdos reparatorios, violencia intrafamiliar 
y derecho propio indígena’ (2015) 42 Revista Chilena de Derecho 975. 
118 J Hooker, ‘Indigenous Inclusion/ Black Exclusion: Race, Ethnicity and Multicultural Citizenship in 
Latin America’ (2005) 37 Journal of Latin American Studies 285. However, these conflicts have not 
prevented their claims from being treated along the lines of indigenous peoples’ claims, as both ‘share a 
past of European domination, as the European colonizers were the ones forcibly who brought [the Afro-
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The latter problem points towards the analysis of the relationship between law and 
culture, which the challenging stance attempts to address. The problem seems obvious: 
ethnical belonging, which is slippery, articulated in socially fragmentary markers, 
context-dependent and relative, must be used by institutions as an objective criterion, just 
like age or income.119 The choice for self-description as the definitive institutional marker 
of ethnical belonging has prompted agitated debates because of the (mis)use of 
indigenous identities for the purpose of obtaining benefits. It is precisely here that the 
challenging stance of ADL shows its normative strength, triggering critical dialogues 
about law’s relationship with culture.  
 
Indeed, anti-discrimination rights in Latin America have been used as a way to demand a 
different or, at least, more plural ontological justification for the principles of 
constitutional government. Several cases regarding discrimination against indigenous 
peoples have challenged the liberal or natural law justifications behind the project of ADL 
as a project of equal and impartial treatment with certain recognition of ethnic/indigenous 
identities.120 Examples of racism and sexism from Bolivia and Peru have illustrated the 
importance of alternative justifications of the project of ADL. These examples may prove 
crucial to avoid a common premise of human rights activism, that is, the existence of a 
single and objective moral order of rights, which creates a fertile ground for a Catholic 
constitutional backlash against the advancement of indigenous or women rights. 121 
Furthermore, they have played an important role in advancing the idea of multiple 
indigenities, challenging the fixed conception of the ‘indio’ as someone who is (entirely) 
determined by his or her culture.122 In other words, ADL has prompted debates about the 
problems of cultural essentialism, even within groups that have raised their ethnic/cultural 
                                               
descendants] to the continent’. Hence, indigenous legislation has been amended to accommodate those 
claims. L Lixinski, ‘Constitutionalism and the Other: Multiculturalism and Indigeneity in Selected Latin 
American Countries’ (2010) 14 Anuario Iberoamericano de Justicia Constitucional 235, 242-3.  
119 D Lehman, ‘Identity, Social Justice and Corporatism: The Resilience of Republican Citizenship’, in M 
Sznajder and others (eds), Shifting Frontiers of Citizenship: The Latin American Experience (Brill 2012) 
103-4. 
120 In the reasoning of the Bolivian Constitutional Court, article 8 of the Constitution entails a duty upon 
every Bolivian authority to apply both republican and indigenous principles, endorsing a plural moral 
justification for the newly created institutional arrangements. 0112 (Amparo, 2012); see also the separate 
votes of judge Ligia Velázquez, where she states that projects of decolonialism and anti-patriarchalism are 
intimately connected with the justification of the right to equality and non-discrimination. 0206 (2014). 
121 J Lemaitre, ‘Catholic Constitutionalism on Sex, Women, and the Beginning of Life’, R Cook and others 
(eds), Abortion Law in Transnational Perspective (University of Pennsylvania Press 2014). (highlighting 
the importance of addressing Catholic constitutionalism on its own terms, as attempts to justify the 
existence of an objective morality that could be accepted by those who do not share the Christian faith).  
122 J Stöbele-Gregor, ‘Movimientos Indígenas- ¿motor de la democratización de sociedades indígenas’, in 
S Kron and others (eds), Democracia y Reconfiguraciones Contemporáneas del Derecho en América 
Latina (Iberoamericana-Vervuert 2012) 278. 
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identities as markers of mobilisation.123 In cases of racism in the workplace or the media 
in Peru and Bolivia, public opinion has been challenged, not only in regard to obvious 
instances of disrespect, but to consider the indígena or the ‘afro-descendent’ as someone 
who displays multiple identities.124   
 
Furthermore, the challenging stance has been used even against Latin American 
progressive narratives of inclusion such as mestizaje, which develops the idea of single 
nations that grew out of the mixture of races. Despite its progressive strand, the 
challenging stance of ADL has opened up avenues through which to defy this narrative 
by unmasking ‘much physical or skin colour variation and thus distinct racialized 
experiences’, questioning the absolute and all encompassing character of mestizaje.125 In 
contrast with the challenges to the prevalent models of assimilation of indigenous peoples 
into national projects of development (dominant until the end of military dictatorships in 
the region), in this case, ADL has been used to highlight multiple identities within the 
oppressed groups. The use of ADL by afro-descendants against indigenous communities, 
or by indigenous populations against other vulnerable classes has highlighted the 
determinant character of skin colour or bodily appearance, sometimes described as ‘a 
better predictor of ethno-racial inequality than the traditional ethno-racial categories’.126 
The cases of Peru and Bolivia are somehow symptomatic of these trends. In Bolivia, an 
initial evaluation of the administrative complaints mechanism established in 2014 
concluded that appearance was the most important ground of discrimination, including 
cases where skin colour was the determinant factor.127  The cases dealt with by the 
CONACOD and INDECOPI, in Peru, show a similar pattern. In many of these cases, 
what we see is ‘brown-coloured’ people stigmatising or directly disrespecting members 
                                               
123 In a way, ADL has served to question the dominant narratives that were brought with the constitutional 
recognition of ethnic identities, which created the image of indigenous people as having a more intense 
cultural identity than the rest of the population. This was considered as the main cultural background behind 
the efforts to create the ILO Convention 169 at the end of the 1980s, and it is illustrated in the reports of 
the then Special Commissioner Martínez del Cobo.  
124 see, for example, the multiple complaints triggered by the popular Peruvian TV program La Paisana 
Jacinta, which depicted an indigenous woman who worked as a domestic worker, and who continually 
discriminated against other vulnerable minorities, like Afro-Peruvians or homosexuals. One of the 
arguments of these complaints was the exclusion or occlusion of the different positive roles that indigenous 
women play in Peruvian society. S de Los Heros, ‘Humor étnico y discriminación en La paisana Jacinta’ 
(2016) 4 Pragmática Sociocultural 74. In the case of Bolivia, the Law against Racism and Discrimination 
has obliged the media to implement several legal provisions in order to tackle discrimination and show the 
diversity of Bolivian society, especially of groups that are discriminated against (see the provisions in art 
6.III).  
125 E Telles, Pigmentocracies: Ethnicity, Race, and Color in Latin America (UNC Press 2014) 11.  
126 ibid 12.  
127 Comité Nacional contra el Racismo y la Discriminación (Bolivia), Cuatro años de la aplicación de la 
ley Contra el Racismo y Toda Forma de Discriminación (2014).  
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of indigenous peoples or from the Afro-Bolivian community. 128  Indeed, as these 
examples show, we could explain discrimination socially through the range of different 
skin colours within a common palette.  
 
These trends risk balkanisation, but the ‘corporatist tradition of the Latin American state’ 
prevents this kind of recognition politics from creating instances of ‘cultural isolation’, 
which are prevalent in European models of multi-culturalism.129 For David Lehman, in 
Latin American societies ‘republican citizenship is so deeply rooted that even policies 
which deploy large-scale racial or ethnic preferences end up being included within a 
universality architecture of citizenship’.130 A compromise between a renovated version 
of mestizaje and the recognition of indigenous and black identities constrains the 
possibility of the challenging stance developing into a real right to opt-out of the state’s 
institutional arrangements.  
 
7.4 Conclusions 
The challenging stance constitutes an unavoidable character of anti-discrimination 
regimes in Latin America. However, the degree to which these regimes open up 
opportunities for challenging the dominant or hegemonic ideas that disadvantage 
members of certain groups depends on the development of a political critique of the force 
of law. In this scenario, Nancy Fraser’s ideas illuminate the analysis of several struggles 
that are taking place in Latin America. Although in a different form, this part of the world 
is witnessing its own ‘culture wars’, and Latin American ADL observes particular 
features that favour a transformative approach to studying its recent developments. 
                                               
128  M Benavides and others, ‘Pobreza, Discriminación Social E Identidad: El Caso De La Población 
Afrodescendiente En El Perú’, in J Stubbs and H Reyes (eds), Más allá de los promedios: 
Afrodescendientes en América Latina (World Bank 2006) 56-7. 
129  That is, the idea that multi-culturalism entails the possibility of opting-out of state/institutional 
arrangements. In contrast, Latin American societies prefer to use the term inter-culturalism to give an 
account of political practices based on dialogues between cultures. Inter-culturalism, indeed, is the term 
used by several recently created constitutions, and constitutes the favourite term for indigenous groups 
themselves. D Lehman, The Crisis of Multiculturalism in Latin America (Palgrave 2016); see also A 
Solano-Campos, ‘Bringing Latin America’s ‘Interculturalidad’ into the Conversation’ (2013) 34 Journal of 
Intercultural Studies 620. 
130 Lehman (n 119) 102.  
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Chapter 8 The Socio-Economic Lens 
8.1 Introduction 
For Bob Hepple, ‘a truly comprehensive and transformative approach to equality 
obviously does not mean that all aspects of socio-economic disadvantage have to be dealt 
by a single duty or in a single statute’.1  Moreover, he remained sceptical about the 
possibility of directly addressing distributive issues through equality laws.2 The principle 
of the socio-economic lens accepts the challenge of describing which ‘aspects of socio-
economic disadvantage’ can be addressed by ADL, even if this is not in the form of ‘a 
single duty or in a single statute’. 3 The metaphor of a lens, for its part, is particularly 
important for accounts of ADL that, among other things, challenge the ‘itemization of 
grounds’ and propose a more integrated approach to discrimination.4 The basic premise, 
borrowed from Nancy Fraser’s work, is that ADL, characterised as an anti-misrecognition 
device, is nevertheless deeply interimbricated with the economy. Recent attempts to 
include ‘social condition’ as a protected ground in the Canadian Human Rights Act 
illustrate well the potential contribution of adding a socio-economic lens to ADL: in order 
to render visible the ‘heretofore invisible dynamic of real people’s experiences of 
discrimination’, we need to understand how culture and economy are interimbricated.5  
 
Although anti-discrimination legislation has undeniable distributive implications, the 
principle of the socio-economic lens places an additional burden upon this field of law. 
ADL is not only about fair treatment, affecting distributive outcomes of the basic structure 
of societies, but challenges the way in which these structures are linked to discrimination.6 
Nancy Fraser’s work allows us to develop a framework to address the ways in which the 
different spheres (economy, culture, politics) are interimbricated, and hence propose 
specific remedies once these interimbrications are articulated. Within this framework, 
ADL could play a relevant part in the struggles for redistribution that are taking place 
within neoliberal/capitalist arrangements. In particular, this principle argues that ADL 
could play a humble but not unimportant role in addressing poverty and economic 
                                               
1 B Hepple, Equality: The Legal Framework (Hart 2014) 227. 
2 ibid 228.   
3 I use the term ‘socio-economic’ to go beyond economic inequalities, which creates problems in itself, but 
is closer to accounts of the social conception of class, where different kinds of capital (social, cultural, 
economic and symbolic) interact to create advantages and disadvantages for individuals and groups. 
4  D Reaume, ‘Of pigeonholes and principles: A Reconsideration of Discrimination Law’ (2002) 40 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 114, 132.  
5 W MacKay and N Kim, ‘Adding Social Condition to the Canadian Human Rights Act’ (Canadian Human 
Rights Commission 2009) 81.  
6 see 5.1.  
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inequality; also, connected with the principle of the challenging stance, the socio-
economic lens questions neoliberal cultures of work or social behaviour.  
 
In this chapter, I will explain the basic tenets of Fraser’s ideas around the interimbrication 
between culture and the economy, which I claim have utmost importance in exploring the 
transformative potential of ADL. Finally, I will provide the reader with an overview of 
the ways in which ADL could be interimbricated with the struggles for redistribution and 
challenges to neo-liberalism in Latin America.  
 
8.2 Interimbrication with the economic sphere 
To address the problem of ‘displacement’, that is, the rapid advancement of ‘identity 
politics’ to the detriment of traditional struggles for redistribution, Nancy Fraser analyses 
the precise manner in which non-class forms of oppression are articulated with class in 
contemporary capitalism. Although I defined ADL as an anti-misrecognition device, it 
has an ability to address the ‘thorough interimbrication’ between the economic and 
cultural spheres. The socio-economic lens attempts to bring the analytical perspective (the 
lens) of redistribution into the societal domains that we associate with discrimination. 
Hence the target of the socio-economic lens of ADL is not culture as a separate entity, 
but the way in which harms grounded in one sphere may generate injustices associated 
with other spheres; thus, the centrality of the concept of interimbrication.   
 
To understand this concept, it is important to characterise Fraser’s distinction between 
economy and culture, which constitutes a response to the on-going debate between neo-
Marxists currents around the material/cultural division.7 For Butler and other ‘cultural 
feminists’, who raise deconstructive arguments against upholding this distinction, those 
who attempt to separate the material from the cultural are relying on an unjustifiable 
ontological distinction; in particular, Fraser’s perspectival dualism is accused of reducing 
this distinction to a ‘theoretical anachronism’.8 In contrast, for Fraser, the real divide is 
between economy and culture (not the material/cultural distinction), which has no 
ontological grounding and relies better on an approach to social theory she calls 
‘historicization’. She clearly states that misrecognition harms ‘are just as material as 
injustices of maldistribution’, because ‘norms, significations, and constructions of 
                                               
7 R Williams, Culture and Society (Random House 2015). 
8 J Butler, ‘Merely Cultural’ (1998) 227 New Left Review 33, 36; see also A Sayer, The Moral Significance 
of Class (CUP 2005) 88. 
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personhood that impede women, racialized peoples, and gays and lesbians from parity of 
participation in social life are materially instantiated’ in concrete and historical forms.9 
In her later works, she stresses the need to distinguish between different historical 
versions of capitalist social formations to help in understanding the interimbrication of 
the different spheres.10 Responding to Judith Butler’s critique, she claims that:  
With a historically specific, differentiated view of contemporary 
capitalist society, we can locate the gaps, the nonismorphisms of 
status and class, the multiple contradictory interpellations of social 
subjects, and the multiple complex moral imperatives that motivate 
struggles for social justice.11 
In current capitalist social formations, a pragmatic approach to social struggles would 
initially suggest affirmative or transformative remedies of redistribution: if injustices are 
grounded in the economic sphere, we should craft specific remedies against 
maldistribution. 12  However, if we ignore the misrecognition harms generated by 
capitalism, we may not be able to understand what is at stake in current social struggles; 
furthermore, Fraser’s approach invites us to ‘locate the gaps’, where misrecognitions are 
not a mere epiphenomenon of economic injustices. In this way, for example, a fight 
against heterosexism is not necessarily a fight against capitalism.13  
 
Fraser’s (analytical) distinction between the different spheres, which is also the product 
of the historicisation of current capitalist social formations, provides a space for 
addressing the ways in which an economy that is now isolated from society can be 
articulated through economic discourses that move fluidly within cultural backgrounds, 
producing ‘new’ types of harms. How, for example, can gay identity politics be put to 
work at the service of capitalist accumulation (eg, pinkwashing)? How can feminism 
foster the commodification of care and precarious jobs? Fraser’s recent critique of what 
she labels ‘progressive neo-liberalism’ could be integrated with broader studies of 
‘cultural economy’, a perspective that ‘can illuminate the ways in which markets, 
                                               
9 N Fraser, ‘Heterosexism, Capitalism and Misrecognition: A response to Judith Butler’ (1997) 52/53 Social 
Text 279, 287. 
10 N Fraser, ‘Contradictions of Capital and Care’ (2016) 100 New Left Review 99. 
11 Fraser (n 9) 287. 
12 This position is endorsed by Wolfgang Streeck, for whom feminist complaints against unpaid domestic 
work and in favour of paid work are merely a cultural instrument with a powerful economic motivation 
behind: ‘to enlist women as allies in a fight for deregulation of employment (…) to push for “flexible” labor 
markets allowing “outsiders,” typically female, to compete with typically male “insiders”’. ‘How to study 
contemporary capitalism’ (2012) 53 European Journal of Sociology 1, 18. Therefore, equal pay clauses or 
other anti-discrimination devices are just instruments of newly crafted ‘cultural political economies’.  
13 This is in contrast with the arguments of Butler (n 8); A Smith, ‘Missing Poststructuralism, Missing 
Foucault: Butler and Fraser on Capitalism and the Regulation of Sexuality’ (2001) 19 Social Text 103, 112.  
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property rights, work and consumption produce distinctive identities and affects, not as 
side-effects or as false consciousness, but as integral components of how they operate.’14 
To analyse this, Fraser’s account of different struggles and their possible remedies looks 
particularly valuable, especially because redistribution struggles seem flawed if not raised 
‘in combination with’ recognition struggles.15 Pushing my characterisation of ADL even 
further, we could say that it is an anti-misrecognition device that in contemporary social 
formations of capitalism attempts not only to impact on the misrecognition effects of 
maldistribution (or vice versa), but also on the ‘cultural political economy’ we associate 
with neo-liberalism. This context invites us to be reflexive, to be aware that the remedies 
or strategies we might pursue might produce new harms or reproduce old ones across all 
spheres of social interaction.16  
 
Overall, the idea of ‘interimbrication’ suggests that we need to understand the way in 
which culture and economy interact and produce particular types of harm that seem to fit 
in uneasy ways with legal categories.17  As said before, for the case of discrimination, 
Fraser’s pragmatic approach to remedies may suggest either affirmative or transformative 
remedies against misrecognition that could be combined with the struggles for 
redistribution.18 In some contexts, however, we may resort to what Fraser calls ‘cross-
redressing’, that is, ‘using measures associated with one dimension of justice to remedy 
inequities associated with the other’ (‘using distributive measures to redress 
misrecognition and recognition measures to redress maldistribution’).19 She suggests that 
we should not use cross-redressing across the board, but on a limited scale, and that we 
should be aware of how can we best address the imbrication of class and status.20 
                                               
14 W Davies, The Limits of Neo-liberalism (revised edn, Sage 2016); N Fraser, ‘The End of Progressive 
Neoliberalism’ (2017) 64 Dissent 130.  
15 N Fraser, ‘Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics’ (1996) The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 
Stanford University, 35.  
16 N Fraser, ‘Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation’, 
in N Fraser and A Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?: A political-philosophical exchange (Verso 
2003) 64-7. 
17 To fully understand the transformative potential of ADL in its relationship with current capitalist social 
formations, we need to first explore a sociological account of the cultural processes that produce and 
reproduce social inequality. Michele Lamont, among others, has built on Fraser’s theory in order to 
understand how culture and economy produce and reproduce harms associated with phenomena like the 
feminisation of poverty or the racialisation of structures of status and worth. M Lamont and others, ‘What 
is Missing? Cultural Process and Causal Pathways to Inequality’ (2014) 12 Socio-Economic Review 573, 
574. A complete sociological account, however, requires a separate research project.  
18 see 5.3.3.  
19  Fraser (n 16) 83. Increasing female market participation enhances their bargaining position in 
households, the usual sites for the reproduction of misrecognition harms. 
20 ibid. The challenging question is whether, in certain contexts, ADL can work as a ‘cross-redressing’ 
posture.  
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The most obvious interimbrication between the economic and cultural perspectives 
within a single societal domain is revealed when ‘cultural harms that originated as by-
products of economic structure may have developed a life of their own’, such as 
depictions of welfare-recipients as ‘scroungers’.21 To mobilise against these forms of 
class misrecognition, we may want to promote recognition remedies that can help those 
who lack the material resources to overcome their situation. Discourses of empowerment 
of the ‘poor’, micro-credit’s portrait of ‘poor entrepreneurs’, and other development 
strategies work as affirmative recognition remedies that do not challenge ‘“culture-of-
poverty” ideologies that suggest that the poor deserve what they get.’22 Indeed, these 
remedies may work as mere attempts at ‘social inclusion’ of the poor within economic 
arrangements based on the direct association of merit and reward, arrangements that do 
not challenge stereotypes or prejudices around the laziness of people that lack enough 
income to support themselves. Moreover, these cultural remedies are at the same time 
affirmative remedies for redistribution that do not challenge the way in which economic 
arrangements distribute outcomes. However, even in this scenario, as Fraser states,  
poor and working people may need a counter- ‘identity politics’ to 
support their struggles for economic justice; they may need (…) to 
build class communities and cultures in order to neutralize the hidden 
injuries of class and forge the confidence to stand up for themselves. 
Thus, a politics of class recognition may be needed both in itself and 
to get a politics of redistribution off the ground.23 
 
Within Fraser’s work, affirmative remedies (revaluing despised identities, and reclaiming 
self-worth) against forms of class misrecognition may constitute strategies of ‘withdrawal 
and realignment’, where members of disadvantaged groups have a ‘safe space’ to 
articulate their goals.24 Furthermore, these remedies may work as a catalyst for broader 
and more robust struggles for redistribution. One may think of adding ‘poverty’ or ‘class’ 
as grounds of discrimination to either reject negative stereotypical judgments or, 
alternatively, create spaces of institutional recognition of this condition that facilitate the 
articulation of their claims as a ‘social group’. Thus, we may want to underscore how 
‘class, too, functions at the level of identity politics’, or, alternatively, how the 
interimbrication can be addressed through intersectionality, highlighting the idea that 
                                               
21 Fraser (n 15) 19. 
22 ibid 20.  
23 ibid. 
24 see 6.3.4.  
 222 
contemporary ‘class struggles’ do not take part in ‘some sort of race and gender neutral 
terrain’.25  
 
Transformative remedies against misrecognition, that is, those that attempt to challenge 
the cultural processes and distinctions that produce certain value patterns that impede 
parity of participation, can also be combined with struggles for redistribution. The clearest 
examples involve phenomena such as the racialisation of structures of status and worth, 
which (in)directly affect distributive outcomes that harm people on the grounds of their 
race, colour or ethnicity. For example, how can we make sense of the fact that despite the 
increasing protection from race discrimination, blacks still face major obstacles to 
accessing high-level jobs? One way to redress these harms is to target the cultural 
processes, such as stereotypes of blacks’ indiscipline, which produce and reproduce ideas 
that impede some people from having access to these jobs on the grounds of normatively 
extraneous traits, such as race or skin colour. In many cases, black professionals prefer 
colour-blind schemes, demand to be ‘unburdened of excessive ascribed or constructive 
distinctiveness’, and eschew any claims to special treatment.26 However, without any 
concern for transformative redistributive solutions, these remedies seem to be available 
only to those members of discriminated groups that claim a right to be treated as 
individuals, according to their merit or their ‘net marginal productivity’, or that can easily 
set aside the mark of their despised identities.27  
 
Nevertheless, in the form of transformative remedies against misrecognition, anti-
discrimination claims may work, indirectly, as transformative remedies for redistribution. 
For example, as it currently operates in disability law, the law of accommodation 
challenges the abled norm and, furthermore, throws ‘unresolved distributive questions’ 
into scrutiny, with the potential to become a decommodifying device, making ‘people’s 
lives more independent from market forces’.28 In these cases, beyond the legal question 
                                               
25 R Kelley, ‘Identity Politics & Class Struggle’ (1997) 6 New Politics 84. This locates Fraser’s work 
against ‘those who decry “identity” politics, and insist on the unifying and universalizing qualities of class.’ 
P Frase, ‘Stay Classy’ (Jacobin 26 June 2016) <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/06/stay-classy> 
accessed 8 December 2016.  
26 Fraser (n 15) 35.  
27 Fraser (n 14). 
28 A Somek, Engineering Equality: An Essay on European Anti-Discrimination Law (OUP 2011) 183. The 
law of accommodation includes those instances where the right to be free from discrimination entails 
‘accommodating’ the particular needs or interests of the victim, sometimes rearranging the standards or 
paradigms that were used as models for the policy or practice in question. In that sense, it challenges 
structural accommodations, which for Sophia Moreau are ‘policies, practices and physical structures that 
tacitly accommodate the dominant’s group needs at the expense of less privileged groups’, in this case, the 
able-bodied. ‘Discrimination and Subordination’, in The Many Faces of Equality (forthcoming). 
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itself, decision-makers have to address broader questions of ‘why employers –and not 
taxpayers at large- need to bear the costs for reversing the general ill of excluding people 
with disability from participation in society at large’.29 In a way, this illustrates the way 
in which ADL has created instances to challenge market rationality, forcing employers to 
bear the costs of changing their recruitment or promotion practices, adapt the architecture 
of workplaces, or even promote a new assessment of productivity.30 Instead of solely 
adopting affirmative remedies that rely on the value of individuals (eg, that people with 
disabilities can contribute to productive activities), the law of accommodation extends to 
transformative remedies that challenge workplace cultural norms that constitute the 
standards of productivity and merit.31 Indeed, in these cases the law of accommodation 
attempts to grant ‘access to processes with which a society can shape the structures giving 
rise to patterns of distribution’, and thus goes against social inclusion approaches to 
ADL.32   
 
Although these instances may not be close to altering the broader economic arrangements, 
even for sceptical accounts of ADL, like Somek’s, the only hope for ADL in terms of it 
not becoming an ancillary policy of neoliberalism lies in the law of accommodation.33 
We can even attempt to extend the ‘emancipatory model’ of the law of accommodation 
to ADL at large: if all the work accommodation duties do is to raise distributive questions, 
challenging the adaptive gravitational force of market rationality, then why can ADL not 
play a similar role? As I pointed out in a previous chapter, if we locate the wrongness of 
discrimination in the violation of an individual interest, namely, the interest that our 
deliberative freedoms remain protected, ‘insulated from the pressures or burdens caused 
by certain extraneous traits of ours’, we might provide ADL with the kind of hope that 
                                               
29 Somek (n 28) 183.  
30  see, for example, American with Disabilities Act (US) s 12111(9). From this decommodifying 
perspective, Mladenov has attempted to challenge different expressions of neoliberalisation in disability 
employment policies. T Mladenov, ‘Postsocialist Disability Matrix’ (2017) 19 Scandinavian Journal of 
Disability Research 104, 110.  
31  This is the standard interpretation of the ‘social model’ of disability. However, the obsession with 
creating a barrier-free world with full equal access to participation could even be dangerous for people with 
disabilities themselves, through neglecting their different experiences of impairment. T Shakespeare, 
Disability Rights and Wrongs (Routledge 2009) ch4. 
32 H Collins, ‘Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion’ (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 16. As put by 
Somek, ‘[i]nclusion represents an application of the equality principle that does not extend to the self-
reflexive political concern with the basic structure. Rather, it takes existing distributive structures for 
granted.’ A Somek, ‘The preoccupation with rights and the embrace of inclusion: A critique’, (2013) 
University of Iowa (Legal Studies Research Paper 13-11) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2205299> accessed 
10 June 2015; C O’Cinneide, ‘Fumbling Towards Coherence: The Slow Evolution of Equality and Anti-
Discrimination Law in Britain’ (2005) 57 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 57, 62-3; A McColgan, 
Discrimination, Equality and the Law (Hart 2014) 36-7. 
33 Somek (n 28) ch8. 
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Somek expects from the work of accommodation.34 Indeed, even when ADL is grounded 
on liberal values (the protection of deliberative freedoms), it can challenge adaptive 
pressures, functioning like decommodification counterforces, and asking ‘what 
businesses may legitimately expect from people given whatever else is important to their 
life’.35  When crafted to protect deliberative freedoms, ADL can challenge structural 
accommodations that disadvantage those who deviate from the usual, normal or dominant 
patterns.36  
 
To summarise, according to Fraser’s account, remedies against misrecognition should be 
combined with struggles for redistribution in a pragmatic way, to either (re)affirm 
despised or devalued identities ‘to get a politics of redistribution off the ground’, or 
challenge the cultural processes that impact on redistribution. Through Fraser’s 
framework, we can also give an account of ADL that is aware of reproducing old harms 
or creating new ones, and of its limits as a device for redistribution. In this way, we can 
avoid an uncritical approach to ADL as an all-encompassing device for both redistribution 
and recognition, even if in some cases it can work as a ‘cross-redressing strategy’. Indeed, 
those who defend substantive equality as the foundational value of ADL, relating 
protections from unequal treatment to broader aims of tackling disadvantage, do not 
explain how maldistribution and misrecognition can be articulated to create adequate 
remedies. 37  For example, and drawing partly on Fraser’s ideas, Sandra Fredman’s 
approach to ADL as grounded in a multi-dimensional conception of substantive equality 
does not explain how the different elements of her theory should be articulated.38 She 
rests too much on a ‘holistic human rights framework’, calling for legal intervention to 
be effective, capable of addressing the interaction between the different factors that, for 
example, weigh on the feminisation of poverty.39 General calls for ADL to be grounded 
on a broader notion of substantive equality, able to redress social disadvantage, should 
                                               
34 S Moreau, ‘What is Discrimination?’ (2010) 38 Philosophy & Public Affairs 143, 149. 
35 Somek (n 28) 182.  
36 For Moreau, ‘[t]hese freedoms are so much a part of the fabric of most of our everyday lives that we 
rarely reflect on how fundamental they are. (…) We enjoy these freedoms and can afford to take them for 
granted, however, only because businesses and associations tend to arrange their affairs and their physical 
premises in a way that tacitly accommodates the needs and abilities of their usual employees or clients.’ 
Moreau (n 34) 150-151. 
37 S Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (OUP 2008) 176; MJ Añon, 
‘Principio Antidiscriminación y Determinación de la Desventaja’ (2013) 39 Isonomia 127.  
38 S Fredman, Discrimination Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 25-33.  
39 S Fredman, ‘Woman and Poverty: Human Rights Approach’ (2016) 24 African Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 494, 504.  
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not bypass the need to understand the way in which the different factors that explain 
disadvantage may help us in crafting adequate remedies. 
 
8.3 The Socio-Economic Lens in comparative ADL 
How does the operation of concrete equality and anti-discrimination regimes understand 
this interimbrication? On the one hand, ADL can be considered fundamental for the 
operation of market economies, so the alleged interimbrication between the economic and 
cultural spheres is put to work for the correction of ‘market failures’. Misrecognition is 
particularly harmful to the effective operative conditions of market economies, which 
attempt to measure the economic value of an individual’s engagement with productive 
activities, either as a worker or as a consumer. In other words, market economies can use 
ADL to tackle misrecognition as a particular harm that prevents proper cost-benefits 
analysis, as distortions of ‘economic value’ that prevent economic actors from creating 
the public goods that derive from market arrangements. However, as the reader might 
guess, the existing market systems have produced and reproduced some of the most 
discriminatory practices (eg, relying on customer prejudices to hire only attractive blonde 
women for restaurants), and some employment or commercial decisions usually rely on 
a ‘generalization or stereotypes that, although quite overboard and from one point of view 
invidious, provide an economically rational basis’ for the latter practices.40 In these cases, 
discrimination does not constitute a ‘market failure’, and any attempt to correct or legally 
intervene may be seen as an efficiency loss. 
 
On the other hand, however, ADL can work at times to prevent the economisation of 
certain human activities or interests, tackling pressure from market forces. ADL is 
sometimes put at the service of the protection of the dignity of workers against market 
practices that threaten the former or, in some cases, allocates distributive duties to certain 
actors even when they have not contributed directly to the wrong of discrimination. 
Moreover, in recent times, ADL has put into question the colonisation of the lifeworld, 
the economisation of human activities which are necessary for productive activities, such 
as care, education or human socialization.41 Overall, we can claim, there is no one-way 
                                               
40 C Sunstein, ‘Why Markets Don’t Stop Discrimination’ (1989) 8 Social Philosophy & Policy 22, 26.  
41 In developed regimes of ADL, the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of ‘family status’ and 
‘family responsibilities’ is increasingly putting into question the impact of employment practices on the 
conditions that are necessary for productive activities. M Mercat-Bruns, Discrimination at Work: 
Comparing European, French, and American Law (UC Press 2016) 180. In Fraser’s view, these kinds of 
conflicts highlight the social contradictions of financialised capitalism, articulated in ‘boundary struggles’: 
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relation between ADL and current capitalist social formations: sometimes, it is put at the 
service of market economies, creating effective markets where previously there were only 
hierarchical relations of status or correcting ‘price distortions’, ‘market failures’ or ‘unfair 
competitive advantages’ created by discrimination; or, alternatively, ADL serves to tame 
market forces, or even forces distributive outcomes at odds with market premises.  
 
A good way to understand these tensions is to analyse the different readings of EU 
Equality Law. The first anti-discrimination provision to be enacted within the European 
Economic Community, an equal pay gender clause, was born to prevent unfair 
competitive advantages in the development of a common market, which still influences 
doctrinal developments. 42  For several scholars, the only collective goal that renders 
European social policies successful is the need to create a single market through the 
protection of the four fundamental freedoms (the free movement of goods, capital, 
services, and labour), constraining the radical potential of policies such as ADL.43 For 
Somek, ADL 
is not primarily directed at decommodification (…) it is different from 
a type of social legislation that aims at backing up the provision of 
goods with some market-defying or market-bypassing distributive 
mechanism. Indeed, the very point of anti-discrimination law is to 
facilitate market access and not to exempt a certain sphere from the 
operation of the market.44  
Moreover, by prohibiting the use of immutable characteristics outside of the control of 
the person, ADL ‘indirectly endorses mutability, adaptability, flexibility as the core 
virtues of market participants’.45  
 
                                               
‘capitalism’s institutional divisions often become foci of conflict, as actors mobilize to challenge or defend 
the established boundaries separating economy from polity, production from reproduction, human from 
non-human nature’. N Fraser, ‘Behind Marx’s Hidden Abode’ (2014) 86 New Left Review 55, 68. 
42 see the opinion of Advocate General Gand in the Case 15/69, Württembergische Milchverwertung-
Südmilch-AG v. Salvatore Ugliola [1969] ECR 363, 371; J Suk, ‘Disparate Impact Abroad’, in E Katz and 
S Bagenstos (eds) A Nation of Widening Opportunities: The Civil Rights Act at 50 (University of Michigan 
2015) 301-2.  
43 W Streeck, ‘Competitive Solidarity: Rethinking the "European Social Model"’ (MPIfG Working Paper 
8, 1999). However, even the protection of the principle of free movement of workers (discrimination on 
the grounds of nationality) is suffering serious legal and judicial setbacks that compromise European 
integration. C O’Brian, ‘Civis Capitalist Sum: Class as the New Guiding Principle of EU Free Movement 
Rights’ (2016) 53 Common Market Law Review 937, 937-9.  
44 Somek (n 28) 83. 
45  A Somek, ‘Anti-Discrimination and Decommodification’ (2005) University of Iowa (Legal Studies 
Research Paper 13-11) < https://ssrn.com/abstract=651441> accessed 27 June 2015.  
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Even progressive developments like the prohibition of indirect discrimination, which 
pursue distributive justice ‘at the cost of insinuating that a distributive agent [eg 
employer] has engaged in some kind of reprehensible conduct, even if that has evidently 
not been the case’, suffer from a normative deficiency that ends up falling prey to 
moralism, which leaves ADL in an indeterminate state.46 With its obsession with finding 
a central or auxiliary discriminatory premise in the decision-making process of the 
distributive agent, EU ADL ends up being trumped by cost-benefit analysis, without 
undermining market-rationality (eg, how to address the case of a work sector that, without 
the intention of the employer, ends up being filled only by men, without the help of a 
distributive pattern that commands how many women that sector should observe).47 
That’s why Somek considers that ‘Anti-discrimination law is the darling of the neoliberal 
left’.48 
 
Nevertheless, this ‘brute’ economic aim has been somehow eroded by a broader social or 
human rights aim, and both the CJEU and several scholars consider that EU Equality Law 
‘has also become a method to deliver social policies’, 49  or an expression of the 
fundamental principle of equal treatment, which goes beyond a narrow protection of the 
single market freedoms.50 For example, the case of EU gender equality law arguably 
constitutes the single most significant achievement of the Union in the field of social 
policy: it has played a key role in transforming European society and breaking down the 
barriers that previously reduced women to second-class citizens in both economic and 
social terms.51 Therefore, despite the widespread critiques of the emancipatory potential 
of EU Equality Law, centred on ‘how it can reinforce the dominant market orientation of 
contemporary European economic and social policy’ (the so called leftist critique of 
ADL), there are numerous reasons to be optimistic.52  
                                               
46 ibid.  
47  ibid. In his words, ‘[t]he pursuit of distributive objectives is relegated to the application of the 
deontological idiom of the law’ (n 28) 131. He criticizes John Gardner’s account of the wrongfulness of 
discrimination (his concern to look for tainted motives in operative premises of the discriminators), 
specially in cases of indirect discrimination, where the analysis of the case law of the CJEU leads him to 
observe ‘how quickly moral zeal evaporates into thin air with a cost-benefit analysis’. The work, in the end, 
is done by the principle of proportionality.  
48 Somek (n 28) 97. 
49 C McCrudden and S Prechal, The Concepts of Equality and Non-Discrimination in Europe: A practical 
approach (European Network of Legal Experts in the field of Gender Equality 2009) 6. 
50 Case C-303/06, Coleman v Attridge Law [2008] ECR I-5603, paras 47-48. 
51 C O’ Cinneide, ‘Completing the Picture – The Complex Relationship between EU Antidiscrimination 
Law and “Social Europe”’, in N Countouris and M Freedland (eds), Resocialising Europe (OUP 2013) 123. 
52 ibid 125; R Xenidis, ‘Shaking the normative foundations of EU equality law’ (2017) European University 
Institute (Working Paper 04).  
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8.4 The Socio-Economic Lens in Latin America  
How do the economic and cultural spheres get interimbricated in the practice of ADL in 
Latin America? In what way can ADL, understood as an anti-misrecognition device, end 
up addressing issues of redistribution? How can we make sense of the context in which 
the most recent anti-discrimination reforms operate and how this affects their potential 
and limits in addressing redistribution? Almost one in three Latin American individuals 
are currently living in poverty or indigence and, according to the GINI index, this region 
is the most unequal in the world.53 Throughout the continent, this reality inevitably has 
an effect on the legitimacy and authority of law. 54 Legal institutions not directly crafted 
to address socio-economic issues end up being affected by the above-mentioned realities. 
Addressing socio-economic issues in the design or the practice of ADL seems 
unavoidable: on the one hand, traditional protected grounds are overrepresented among 
the poor; on the other hand, the poor ‘experience many of the elements of discrimination 
experienced by status groups, including lack of recognition, social exclusion and reduced 
political participation.’55 Furthermore, these recent reforms are in harmony with Latin 
American public opinion: on average, the majority view discrimination as having 
structural causes, and think that poverty or a lack of money are the main grounds of 
discrimination, ranking higher than race, ethnicity or gender.56  
 
There is a consensus in international human rights law that ADL should be inextricably 
linked with ‘economic and social situation’, and both the IAHRS and different Latin 
American jurisdictions have taken this challenge seriously. 57  Anti-discrimination 
provisions in Latin America have included, as protected grounds, ‘economic condition’,58 
                                               
53 CEPAL, Panorama Social (2014). 
54 O Vilhena Vieira, ‘Inequality and the Subversion of the Rule of Law’, in C Rodríguez-Garavito (ed), 
Law and Society in Latin America: A New Map (Routledge 2014).  
55 S Fredman, ‘The potential and limits of an equal rights paradigm in addressing poverty’ (2011) 22 
Stellenbosch Law Review 566, 567.  
56 Latinobarómetro, Informe Anual (2001) <http://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp> accessed 12 
August 2015; this trend has been confirmed by domestic surveys in Chile, Argentina and Mexico. INDH 
(Chile), Encuesta Nacional de Derechos Humanos, 2015; INADI (Argentina), Mapa Nacional de la 
Discriminación, 2013; CONAPRED (Mexico), Encuesta Nacional sobre la discriminación en Mexico, 
2010. 
57 CESCR, General Comment no.20 (UN 2009). 
58 ADLARG, art 1.2; Constitution of Peru art 37. 
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‘social condition’,59 ‘socioeconomic situation’,60 or ‘social origin’.61 Moreover, although 
the prohibition of indirect discrimination and duties of accommodation are not of 
heightened concern, socio-economic issues pop up in every instance where legal regimes 
attempt to deal with them.62 The most recent anti-discrimination provision is based on the 
idea that ADL should do something more to address these issues.63 Those who draft anti-
discrimination legislation in Latin America should presuppose that socio-economic issues 
are a necessary consequence of recognising social condition, poverty or class as protected 
grounds, or of enacting prohibitions of indirect discrimination or accommodation 
duties.64 In what follows, I will explore the possibility of developing the socio-economic 
lens through an alternative account of ADL, which appears to be the dominant discourse 
on the foundations of social policies in Latin America.  
 
8.4.1 An alternative narrative of ADL: Neostructuralism 
In the context of Latin America, the socio-economic lens of a transformative approach to 
ADL stands against the alternative of placing recent legal reforms under the 
developmental narrative of neostructuralism, which presents itself as a via media between 
structuralism and neoliberalism.65 To begin with, it was understood as a reaction to the 
failure of neoliberal policies of structural adjustment during the 1980s and 1990s.66 
Nowadays, it influences policy discourses that shape the region’s approach to 
                                               
59 ADLBOL art 5.a; Criminal Code (Peru) art 323. 
60 ADLCHI Chile art 2; Inter-American Convention against all forms of discrimination and intolerance (A-
69) art 1. 
61 ADLMEX (Mexico) art 1.III; ACHR, art 1.1.   
62 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (Argentina), Sisnero, Mirtha Graeiela y FEM c. el Taldelva SRL 
y otros, s/ amparo (2014); Corte Suprema (Chile), rol 1637-2014 (recurso de protección) (accommodation 
duties to improve prison conditions of inmates with disabilities); Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación 
(México), 19/2014 (amparo) (the different regulation for marriage and co-habitation agreements regarding 
duties of support once these contracts have ended indirectly discriminates against sexual minorities). 
63 see the different reports of the Secretary of Legal Affairs of the OAS, in preparation for the Inter-
American Convention against racism and all forms of discrimination and intolerance (A-69).  
64 In the legislative proceedings of the Chilean (Historia de la ley 20.609), Argentinian (Historia de la ley 
23.592), and Bolivian (Memoria de la ley Boliviana contra el Racismo y Toda Forma de Discriminacion) 
ADLs, there was no debate around these issues. However, in a recent Argentinian anti-discrimination bill 
(Expediente 9064-15), there is an explicit acknowledgment of the ‘socio-economic perspective’, defined 
as the ‘acknowledgment of poverty and social exclusion as multipliers of vulnerabilities and common to all 
protected grounds, and that fosters the creation of the the adequate conditions for equal opportunities’. 
65  Parts of this section were developed in A Coddou, ‘Addressing Poverty through a Transformative 
Approach to Anti-Discrimination Law in Latin America’, in L Boratti and others (eds), Law and Policy in 
Latin America (Palgrave 2017).  
66 O Sunkel and E Zulueta, ‘Neo-structuralism versus Neo-liberalism in the 1990s’ (1990) 42 CEPAL 
Review 35. 
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development, and is considered ‘the most influential paradigm of political economy that 
lies behind the social-democratic current within the region’.67  
 
Neostructuralism has been the development narrative of the ECLAC since the beginning 
of the 1990s, and it has fostered anti-discrimination reforms as a way to trigger the 
required social integration to enhance international competitiveness. 68  Indeed, 
neostructuralism could consider ADL as a crucial policy to balance the change in 
production patterns with social equity and, probably, as the main social policy within the 
path to development.69 Alongside economic policies (fiscal reform and a structure of 
incentives), ADL is considered crucial for the way in which excluded groups are 
incorporated into an economic system of cooperation: vulnerable groups are now 
available for the job market, which should be blind to considerations other than job skills, 
or have the potential to be entrepreneurs themselves.70 Furthermore, neostructuralism 
does not represent a challenge to the free operation of market forces, but a reinforcement 
of its premises: if the market is to function effectively, non-market based forms of 
coordination, beyond those offered by market forces alone, should complement it.71 
Considering the globalisation of local economies and processes of production, the basic 
neostructural premise is that global competition is shaped not only by the transaction of 
commodities but through a value or credit enhancing race that balances different factors, 
like foreign investment regimes, research and educational institutions, infrastructure, and, 
in some cases, the respect of equality and non-discrimination.72  
 
                                               
67 J Webber, ‘Neostructuralism, Neoliberalism, and Latin America’s Resurgent Left’ (2010) 18 Historical 
Materialism 208, 210. 
68 see the conclusions of the report Changing production patterns with social equity (1992) and the parallel 
developments in gender or racial equality that made reference to that developmental narrative 
(ECLAC/CDCC 1995).  
69 For David Trubek, an active social policy focused on social cohesion, combined with a flexible ‘new 
industrial policy’ is crucial for what he terms ‘new developmentalism’, a variant of neostructuralism. Law, 
State, and the New Developmentalism: An Introduction, in D Trubek and others (eds), Law and the New 
Developmental State (CUP 2013) 10.  
70  For Hernando De Soto, the informal economy in Latin America offers a wide range of ‘free and 
spontaneous’ market interactions, yet without institutional protections for property rights or a structure to 
legally enforce transactions. The Mystery of Capital (Basic Books 2003). De Soto and his supporters 
advocated the mere extension of economic freedoms to the poor (to incorporate them, without 
discrimination, into the formal market), but were harshly criticised for having a narrow approach to anti-
poverty strategies of legal empowerment. D Banik, ‘Legal Empowerment as a Conceptual and Operational 
Tool in Fighting Poverty’ (2009) 1 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 117, 119. 
71 F Leiva, ‘Towards a Critique of Latin American Neostructuralism’ (2008) 50 Latin American Politics 
and Society 1, 6. However, in recent years ECLAC ‘has developed the social and labour market dimensions 
of its neo-structuralist discourse, moving from a limited concern with ‘equity’ to embrace a rights-based, 
universalist conception of social protection’. R Mahon, ‘Integrating the Social into CEPAL’s Neo-
structuralist Discourse’ (2015) 15 Global Social Policy 3, 13. 
72 Webber (n 67) 216. 
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Hence, economic policies remain untouched under this new developmental framework, 
as it ‘displaces the center of gravity in policy intervention from economics to the realm 
of subjectivity, symbolic politics, and the cultural dimension’.73 The role of the state and 
the regulatory apparatus should be redirected at the symbolic dimension, through which 
historically excluded sectors are incorporated with new types of expectations or new ideas 
of understanding citizenship.74 For Webber, under neostructural narratives, the state’s 
role ‘is to build civil society-state relationships, public-private partnerships, and an 
overall social, political, and ideological consensus across social classes behind the drive 
for export-led capitalist growth’.75 In other words, neostructuralism is mainly a change in 
the working environment rather than a radical transformation of the economic 
institutional arrangements, a new cultural and social mindset under which market forces 
should lead us towards development. In this project, one would think, ADL becomes a 
crucial tool of economic development, both in practical and symbolic terms.  
 
8.4.2 A Grounding Narrative for the Socio-Economic Lens in Latin America  
Instead of appealing to a neostructural narrative, a transformative approach to ADL starts 
by acknowledging its role in a region with structural problems like socio-economic 
inequality and poverty. Moreover, in contrast with the European approach, Latin 
American ADL has emerged in an era of profound changes that have shaped its particular 
socio-economic lens.  
 
In general, we may start the development of the principle of the socio-economic lens from 
the following fact: Latin American ADL was not borne out of concerns about unfair 
advantages in the regulation of a common market or the efficiency or productivity rates 
of the workforce, but out of a constitutional narrative that gives coherence to recognition 
and redistribution, both of which are understood to be dimensions of the right to equality 
and non-discrimination. Under every current of Latin American constitutionalism, 
poverty and socio-economic inequalities become fundamental constitutional problems.76 
Although not all the constitutional texts considered here explicitly name the problems to 
be tackled, poverty and economic inequality are part of the constitutional challenges that 
                                               
73 Leiva (n 71) 8. 
74 ibid 
75 Webber (n 67) 216. 
76 see 4.1. 
 232 
should be addressed by governments: eradicating poverty and addressing inequalities are 
not only desirable policy orientations; they are constitutional imperatives.77  
 
 Moreover, we must consider the political context: democratisation and social provisions 
emerged in the early 1990s, simultaneously with economic liberalisation and 
privatisation.78 Despite having a century-old tradition of social constitutionalism, dating 
back to the Mexican Constitution (1917) and other populist constitutional reforms (1940s-
50s), ‘social constitutionalism truly became the dominant pattern in Latin America as the 
region began to return to democracy in the 1980s’.79  However, at this stage, social 
constitutionalism had to deal with development pressures, negotiating with powerful 
economic actors that pushed towards privatisation and de-regulation of the activities 
involved in the realisation of social rights. This tension has influenced the development 
of constitutional provisions: indeed, many progressive provisions, like those recognising 
substantive equality, stand against the protection of private property or constraints against 
state involvement in the economy.80 The latter ended up compromising the normative 
strength of social rights provisions, and its advocates had to find ways to make social 
rights justiciable. A paradigmatic example is the Constitution of Colombia (1991), which 
considered social rights in a different chapter to ‘fundamental rights’, which were the 
only rights covered by ordinary constitutional writs.81 The Constitution of Peru (1994), 
despite having a weaker commitment to social rights, also shows this ambiguity between 
the need to foster social protection and pressures towards neoliberal reforms.82  The 
Argentinian constitutional amendment of 1994 is also an acute expression of these 
contradictions, recognising the full list of social rights included in the International 
Covenant Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, while establishing the basis for the 
neoliberal reforms that resulted in the crisis of early 2000s. 83  In general, these 
                                               
77 When describing development plans, the Colombian Constitution uses the term ‘fight against poverty’ 
(article 339); the Constitution of Bolivia, for its part, speaks of the need to reduce inequalities and eradicate 
poverty (arts 312 and 313).  
78 J Grugel and P Riggirozzi, ‘Post-neoliberalism in Latin America: Rebuilding and Reclaiming the State 
after Crisis’ (2012) 43 Development and Change 1, 6.  
79 D Brinks and W Forbath, ‘The Role of Courts and Constitutions in the New Politics of Welfare’, in 
Randall Peerenboom and Tom Ginsburgs (eds), Law and Development of Middle-Income Countries (CUP 
2014), 224-5. 
80 C Rodríguez-Garavito, ‘Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on Socioeconomic 
Rights in Latin America’ (2011) 89 Texas Law Review 7. 
81 Brinks and Forbath (n 79) 224-5.  
82 C Landa Arroyo, ‘Del Tribunal de Garantías al Tribunal Constitucional: el caso peruano’ (1995) 2 
Pensamiento Constitutional 73. 
83 L Clérico and M Aldao, ‘La igualdad “des-enmarcada”: a veinte años de la reforma Constitucional 
argentina de 1994’ (2014) 13 Revista Electrónica del Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales 
“Ambrosio Lucas, Gioja” 7, 12. 
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contradictions placed social rights under a somewhat lower legal pedigree, forcing social 
movements to find strategies to circumvent institutional obstacles or to make them 
justiciable through procedural claims and/or teleological or systematic interpretations.84 
Within these contradictions, and in the hands of social movements, constitutional and 
legal equality clauses have been used to reframe the place and meaning of equality in 
public discourse.85  
 
The political context has also influenced the emergence of ‘new social movements’, 
which replaced, but never broke, with the traditional leftist groups that early in the century 
forged socialism and later fought dictatorships. At the beginning of the 1990s, ‘new social 
movements’ conjoined previous demands, and forged coalitions that accommodated both 
demands for recognition and redistribution. 86  This reality challenges the assumed 
incompatibility between class and other grounds of protection as tools of emancipation.87 
Once democracy was re-established, for example, feminist movements that had fought 
against dictatorships started to address newer issues like the feminisation of indigenous 
or ethnic discrimination and poverty, and serious socio-economic problems concerning 
reproductive rights.88 In a nutshell, the particular dynamics of recent Latin American 
history suggest that problems such as ‘displacement’ (the hollowing out of ‘class 
struggles’ by ‘identity politics’) or ‘reification’ (the fixation of collective identities that 
‘encourage separatism, intolerance and chauvinism, patriarchalism and 
authoritarianism’) 89  need to be articulated in ‘actually existing—historicized and 
culturally distinct—forms of capitalism’.90  
 
Regarding a third common feature of Latin American ADL, legal operators have to work 
in societies with structural inequalities and social segregation, with important parts of the 
population living under poverty or indigence. If we add the fact that legal operators have 
to do their work with scarce resources and weak political support, we can understand the 
way in which they conceive of their role in implementing anti-discrimination 
                                               
84 O Parra-Vera, ‘The Protection of Social Rights’, in J Gonzalez Bertomeu and R Gargarella (eds), The 
Latin American Casebook: Courts, constitutions, and rights (Routledge 2016). 
85 L Clérico and others, ‘Towards a Reconstruction of Equality Case-Law Trends in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: On Non-Discrimination, Anti-Subordination, Redistribution and Recognition’ (2013) 9 Revista 
Direito GV 115. 
86 S Warren, ‘Latin American Identity Politics: Redefining Citizenship’ (2012) 6 Sociology Compass 833. 
87 V Schild, ‘Feminism and Neoliberalism in Latin America’ (2015) 96 New Left Review 59. 
88 ibid.  
89 N Fraser, ‘Rethinking Recognition’, in N Fraser and K Olson (eds), Adding Insult to Injury: Nancy Fraser 
Debates Her Critics (Verso 2008) 130. 
90 Schild (n 86) 59. 
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provisions.91 In this context, it seems ingenuous to narrow equality to the protection of 
regulatory consistency, or to prevent legal operators from expand the understanding of 
equality clauses to issues of redistribution or structural discrimination. For example, the 
IACtHR understands that the scope of its institutional role is very broad and complex, 
and is aware that the right to equality refers both to claims of recognition and 
redistribution, and that its judgments provide guidelines for the development of more 
detailed protections for rights.92 Moreover, at the level of reparations, legal operators 
understand that the role of human rights courts is to effectively apply the guarantee of 
non-repetition, promoting structural changes in order to tackle causes that lie under the 
surface, which requires addressing complex issues of both recognition and 
redistribution.93 
 
8.4.3 Articulations of the socio-economic lens 
In what follows, I will explain the way in which ADL, characterised as an anti-
misrecognition device, addresses issues of poverty or economic inequality, and 
challenges the dominant cultural paradigms associated with neo-liberalism in Latin 
America. Several legal practices and broader processes of legal mobilisation within Latin 
American ADL show how the above-mentioned interimbrication is taking place in this 
part of the world. 
 
8.4.3.1 ADL and Social Rights 
A good way to start exploring these connections is to study the relationship between ADL 
and social rights, which is articulated mainly through the legal mobilisation strategies of 
economic and social rights advocates. 94 First, in its most basic version, formal equality, 
the basic guarantee from which ADL derives, entails regulatory consistency. In this 
regard, equality laws have been useful in claiming a ‘ratchet effect’ upon economic and 
social rights, especially for groups that cling to modest advances in social protection to 
                                               
91 see 6.4.3.  
92 R Uprimny and L Sánchez, ‘Artículo 24. Igualdad ante la ley’ in C Steiner and P Uribe (eds), Convención 
Americana de Derechos Humanos: Comentario (Fundación Konrad Adenauer 2014) 586-7. 
93 S García, ‘The Relationship between Inter-American Jurisdiction and States (National Systems): Some 
Pertinent Questions’ (2014) <https://humanrights.nd.edu/assets/134035/garciaramireziaeng.pdf>  accessed 
20 March 2015. 
94 Different articulations between social rights and ADL have been explored by the Equal Rights Trust, A 
litigator´s Guide to Using Equality and Non-discrimination Strategies to Advance Economic and Social 
Rights (ERT 2014).  
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extend the scope of its beneficiaries. Every time the state has made available the objects 
of social rights to some of its citizens, equality clauses have been used to argue that the 
state must extend the same benefits to others. In these cases, the formal equality 
dimension of anti-discrimination clauses is used as the direct cause of action, as a proper 
affirmative remedy for redistribution. This is the way in which gay couples have obtained 
access to social security benefits from which they were excluded;95 it is also the way in 
which afro-descendants have claimed state protection in Colombia and Peru, arguing 
before legal and political venues that they are in an equivalent position to indigenous 
peoples.96 The logic behind equal pay clauses also presupposes this kind of strategy, an 
issue that is under or poorly litigated in Latin America.97 As these examples show, formal 
equality claims do not entail placing the schemes for redistribution under scrutiny, but 
subject its outcomes to consistency tests.  
 
Second, economic and social rights advocates have used ADL to support or strengthen 
their demands, or even to advance their claims in the absence of justiciable social rights. 
Beyond appealing to social rights, these advocates tend to use the right to equality and 
non-discrimination as a way to universalise their demands, placing the material 
conditions of (social) citizenship on the agenda of political powers.98 Through the lens of 
constitutional equality clauses, social movements have used judicial venues to 
‘compensate, in some measure, for deficits in responsiveness and accountability toward 
the mass of poor and vulnerable citizens on the part of bureaucrats, elected officials, and 
party elites’. 99  Even in the absence of justiciable social rights, equality and anti-
discrimination clauses have supported social rights’ advocates before courts, in order to 
demand ‘equal concern and respect’, or the bigger implications of what (social) 
citizenship entails for poor and vulnerable citizens.100 If unequal access to social rights 
(or its objects) affects equality and non-discrimination commitments, then it is obviously 
                                               
95 IACtHR, Duque v Colombia (2016) para 103. Some gay movements have pushed forward the strategy 
of decoupling social benefits from heterosexual marriage, instead of pushing for a more demanding 
mobilisaation for same-sex marriage. Fraser (n 89) 136. 
96 T Paschel, ‘The Right to Difference: Explaining Colombia’s Shift from Color Blindness to the Law of 
Black Communities’ (2010) 116 American Journal of Sociology 729. 
97 The enforcement of these clauses faces several obstacles, like the lack of statistical analyses, an under-
developed doctrine of indirect discrimination, pay secrecy, unequal access to justice and poor legal aid. P 
Bergallo and N Gherardi, ‘Trabajo’, in C Motta and M Saez (eds), Género en la Jurisprudencia 
latinoamericana: la mirada de los jueces (Siglo del Hombre editores 2008) 148-62. 
98 Parra-Vera (n 84) 154.  
99 Brinks and Forbath (n 79) 221. 
100 Corte Constitucional de Colombia, T-406/92 (the lack of attention to sewage in the poorest zones of 
Cartagena, Colombia, constituted a violation the duty of the state to protect those citizens less able to protect 
themselves, derived from article 13.2 of the Constitution).  
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a constitutional problem that should be addressed by courts. Furthermore, although many 
jurisdictions recognise the binding character of social rights, they do not include a judicial 
remedy to redress their violation. Thus, litigants have no alternative but to claim the right 
to equality in connection with other social clauses, or on its own, under a broad 
understanding of what equality entails. In the case of Chile, where the writ of protection 
does not cover social rights, the right to equality and non-discrimination has worked as a 
way to make social rights justiciable, especially when access to the social provision 
depends on a segregated system of public and private provision.101 In addition, when 
coupled with social rights, the principle of equality and non-discrimination emphasises 
the former’s collective dimension, which is manifest in the assessment of the 
infringement in question or in the proposal of structural remedies.102 In this way, it warns 
of the dangers of using litigation as an individual and fragmented way of enforcing social 
rights commitments.103 Moreover, equality clauses may be used to emphasise the lack of 
coverage of social provisions, the unequal or discriminatory access to the object of the 
rights in question, 104 or the extension of benefits to groups or individuals beyond the 
plaintiff.105  
 
ADL has also been coupled with the ‘minimum core’ approach to social rights, 
constituting one of the elements that ground the –somehow urgent- state duty to act. In 
these cases, faced with scarce resources, the right to equality and non-discrimination has 
proved useful in arguing for the need to prioritise the needs of the most vulnerable 
populations, and the urgency to intervene effectively to change their condition.106 In these 
                                               
101 J Contesse and D Lovera, ‘Acceso a tratamiento médico para personas viviendo con VIH/Sida: Éxitos 
sin Victoria’ (2008) 8 Sur 149. 
102 Parra-Vera (n 84) 157, 158-165; IACtHR, Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic (2005) para 240 
(there is a need to understand the social structures that place certain social group at disadvantage); Latin 
American courts have been using equality clauses to understand that ‘discrimination does not arise in 
relation to a single feature’, or out of a discrete act of discrimination, ‘but rather from a plurality of factors’, 
or a social context that needs be addressed integrally. L Clericó, L Ronconi, and M Aldao, ‘Equal 
Protection’, in Gargarella and González-Bertomeu (n 84) 3.  
103 O Motta Ferraz, ‘Harming the poor through social rights litigation: lessons from Brazil’ (2010) 89 Texas 
Law Review 1643. 
104 Tribunal Constitucional (Chile), 976-07 (Inaplicability for Inconstitutionality) (distinguishing on the 
basis of sex to determine that the premium of private health insurance is incompatible with the right to 
equality).    
105 This has been the usual reasoning behind the reparations of different judgments dealing with structural 
discrimination in Latin America, such as prison conditions in Colombia. J González Bertomeu, ‘Prisons 
and prisoners’ rights’, in Gargarella and González-Bertomeu (n 84). See also the reparations in other 
judgments of the Colombian Constitutional Court, which created structural remedies out of individual 
complaints: T-447/2005 (discrimination against children living in rural areas); T-595/2002 (discrimination 
against disabled persons in regard to access to the public transportation system).  
106  IACtHR, Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (2005) para 162 (State duties towards 
indigenous communities need to prioritise the rights and interests of those who are most in need within 
those communities); Ximenes Lopes v Brazil (2006) para 103. 
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contexts, ADL can work even when poverty is not considered as a protected ground, or, 
again, even in the absence of justiciable social rights.   
 
A good way to summarise the different articulations between ADL and social rights is to 
analyse cases of structural discrimination against certain groups of the population, due to 
longstanding institutional failures. The massive accumulation of tutelas raised by 
internally displaced people (hereafter, ‘IDP’) before the Colombian Constitutional Court, 
due to the conflict between the Colombian State and different guerillas, is considered one 
of the landmark cases of Latin American social constitutionalism.107 In it, the Court 
interpreted civil and social rights within a general interpretive framework created by the 
rights to a vital minimum, to equality and non-discrimination, and the principle of the 
social state of law. 108  Anti-discrimination clauses, specifically article 13.2 of the 
Colombian Constitution, addressed the lack of attention to these people’s urgent demands 
as a violation of the right to equal concern and consideration by state institutions; 
moreover, the Court insisted that the right to equality and non-discrimination should be 
considered as an ancillary principle that articulates the different manifestations of the 
principle of the social state of law; it acknowledged that IDP had been discriminated 
against not only because of the fact of being displaced, which is not a prohibited ground 
of discrimination in itself, but specifically because of political opinions not always 
consciously held;109 it considered that the fact of being displaced was the main cause of 
their defencelessness and inability to change their social condition; finally, these clauses 
were used to assess the disproportionately negative impact that internal displacement had 
had on some of the most vulnerable members of IDP (namely, women, the elderly and 
children), and to impose special protection measures in favour of them.110 Hence, the 
right to equality and non-discrimination was considered crucial to providing an overall 
assessment of the situation.  
 
Additionally, the Colombian Constitutional Court declared that the way in which the 
Colombian State had dealt with the situation of IDP constituted an ‘unconstitutional state 
                                               
107 Corte Constitucional de Colombia, T-25/2004; C Rodriguez-Garavito and D Rodriguez-Franco, Radical 
Deprivation on Trial (CUP 2015).   
108 D Landau, ‘The promise of a minimum core approach: the Colombian model for judicial review of 
austerity measures’, in A Nolan (ed), Economic and Social Rights after the Global Financial Crisis (CUP 
2014) 285-7.  
109 Internally displaced persons were discriminated against on the basis of political opinions not necessarily 
held by them, but due to their association with the political ideologies that guerrillas claim to sustain 
(ascribed stereotypes).  
110 Corte Constitucional de Colombia (n 106) s 5.2.  
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of affairs’, whose resolution required a combination of transformative remedies against 
both misrecognition and maldistribution.111 In the first place, IDP was not a homogenous 
social group, and the impact had been felt disproportionately among the most vulnerable 
people within that group; moreover, there was no single despised identity to reaffirm 
before public opinion at large, but a need to challenge the hegemonic cultural patterns 
that crafted harms of disrespect and marginalisation through a long ‘cultural process’ by 
which urban populations saw IDP as associated with the evils of guerrillas. Regarding 
transformative redistributive remedies, the Colombian Constitutional Court highlighted 
the need to change the social policy approach to the issue, which was clearly not working. 
Instead of demanding more resources from the social programme already set up by the 
state, the judgment insisted on the need to revise the ways in which discrimination 
patterns were associated with the specific arrangements of the programme created by the 
Colombian government up until that point.112 
In another landmark case, the Colombian Constitutional Court attempted to provide a 
structural solution to an explosion of tutelas demanding compliance with the social right 
to health.113 The claimants were mainly from a contributory system that covers workers 
of the formal sector, although they represent a small minority of the Colombians, who are 
instead overwhelmingly protected by a subsidized system. Although both groups of 
people should receive the same package of benefits (called POS) according to Colombian 
health law, in practice that has never happened, and the subsidised POS for the poor are 
inferior to those in the contributory system. Acknowledging that the current separate 
schemes of provision of POS disadvantages people with lower incomes, the Colombian 
Constitutional Court declared that income should not be a discriminatory factor in regard 
to access to a good so fundamental to the exercise of citizenship as health.114 Moreover, 
it established that  
[t]he progressive nature of a right does not justify standing still nor 
much less forgetting the mandate to unify beneficiary plans in order 
to avoid subjecting persons with low incomes to inferior 
constitutional protection, which is openly inadmissible in a social 
state of law.115 
 
                                               
111 In the section regarding structural reparations, however, the use of equality clauses to extend the scope 
of beneficiaries of the judgment was not explicit.  
112 ibid s 5.2. 
113 Corte Constitucional de Colombia, T-60/2008). 
114 ibid s 4.4.3. 
115 ibid s 6.1.2.1.1. 
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Some scholars have claimed that social rights, especially when viewed from a minimum 
core approach, are compatible with radical forms of inequality, because their realisation 
does not entail a redistribution of resources from those that are well-off to those that are 
worst-off.116 Nevertheless, as we have seen in this judgment, the right to equality and 
non-discrimination can be used to extend the protection of social rights beyond a 
‘minimum core’, entailing a transformation or re-arrangement of the ways in which the 
objects of social rights are provided, or a demand for equal treatment with ‘those within 
the state’s jurisdiction who enjoy the highest standards of economic and social rights’.117  
 
In recent times, ADL has increasingly been used as a legal tool to analyse the 
discriminatory impacts of social spending cuts, and austerity or emergency measures 
adopted after economic crises. Here, anti-discrimination clauses act as a reactive defence, 
working akin to egalitarian guarantees of creditors during processes of bankruptcy: there 
is a public interest in protecting the way in which spending cuts are to be carried out, 
according to the principle of equality and non-discrimination.118  For the former UN 
Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Magdalena Sepulveda, even in 
the absence of justiciable social rights, and 
[b]efore implementing a budget cut or any other policy measure, 
States must comprehensively assess its social impact, including from 
an equality and gender perspective, and should only adopt policies 
that are compatible with their international human rights obligations, 
including their non-discrimination obligations.119 
In the European context, social constitutionalism, in association with the principle of 
equality and non-discrimination, has been the basis of broader defences of the pillars of 
the welfare state.120  
 
In Latin America, the scenario is markedly different, mainly because there are no robust 
universal social protections that need to be defended in times of crisis.121 Nevertheless, 
                                               
116 S Moyn, ‘Human Rights and the Age of Inequality’, in D Lettinga and L van Troost (eds) Can Human 
Rights Bring Social Justice? (Amnesty International 2015). 
117 Equal Rights Trust (n 94) IV. 
118  F Atria, Derechos Sociales y Educación: un nuevo paradigma de lo público (LOM 2014) 56-61 
(explaining social rights as an alternative way to deal with scarcity). 
119 M Sepulveda Carmona, ‘Alternatives to austerity: a human rights framework for economic recovery’, 
in Nolan (n 108).   
120  C O’Cinneide, ‘European Social Constitutionalism’ (2017) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2921173> 
accessed 20 May 2017.  
121 L Lavinas, ‘Latin America: Anty-Poverty Schemes Instead of Social Protection’ (2015) 7 Contemporary 
Readings in Law and Social Justice 112.  
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periodic economic crises and the present ending phase of the ‘golden decade’, 
characterised by high prices of commodities, endanger the precarious social benefits that 
allow countries to keep people out of the crudest poverty. The Argentinian economic 
crisis of 2001-2002 represents a good case study to inquire into the relationship between 
courts, social rights and social protection.122 After several millions were pushed below 
the poverty line, Argentinian courts around the country had to deal with legal claims from 
numerous middle class individuals that were under economic distress regarding their 
health provisions or social security, or some of the most acute forms of poverty or 
deprivation, related to basic guarantees of adequate nutrition and housing/shelter. 
Although Argentinian constitutional law has protected social rights for a long time, ADL 
has played an important supporting role. In several cases regarding the widespread social 
consequences of the economic crisis, equality and non-discrimination clauses were used 
by the courts in order to bring a socio-economic dimension to individual claims 
requesting that the state provide adequate resources for the provision of social benefits. 
In an individual case on the right to housing raised by a homeless mother and her disabled 
son against the City of Buenos Aires, equality and non-discrimination was brought to the 
fore in order to challenge the lack of adequate institutional arrangements and rules for 
priorities in the administrative decrees that dealt with emergency housing subsidies.123  
 
The Colombian Constitutional Court offers another interesting way of addressing 
budgetary restrictions that could impact disproportionately on lower-income earners. 
According to this Court, the principle of the social state of law should be read in the light 
of the right to equality (art 13), with a special consideration of those who are in most 
need. In that regard, it upheld a budget law (2002) that included a measure that capped 
only the increase in salaries of middle and higher income public officers, and did not 
affect lower income officers. 124  The social state of law, considered as ‘a complex 
principle of institutional design’, allows the government, when faced with budgetary 
restrictions, to articulate different salary increases without affecting those who are in 
danger of falling below the ‘minimum core’.125  
 
                                               
122 E Nino and G Maurino, ‘Economic and Social Rights and the Supreme Court of Argentina’, in A Nolan 
(n 108). 
123  Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (Argentina), Q. C., S. Y. c/ Gobierno de la Ciudad de 
BuenosAires s/ amparo (2014).  
124 Corte Constitucional de Colombia, C-1064/2001.   
125 Landau (n 108) 272.  
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Overall, in all of these cases where ADL has addressed complex budgetary restrictions or 
situations of economic crisis, the recognition that harms grounded in the economic sphere 
may have detrimental effects on those who may have less power to redress their situation, 
or that may result in vicious circles such as the ‘poverty trap’, becomes crucial. The 
interimbrication between the spheres of the economy and culture does not seem to be 
explicit in the reasoning of these examples, which are grounded mainly on the principles 
of human dignity, solidarity or the social state of law. However, the fact that the human 
consequences of economic harms constitute an important part of the decision-making 
processes suggests that the interimbrication between the economy and culture plays an 
important role in the motivation of adjudicators. They all start from the basic fact that in 
difficult economic times, countries need basic social solidarity schemes to prevent the 
emergence of cultural discourses that segregate citizens according to their income, 
threaten social cohesion, or blame the victims for their lack of adaptability to these new 
harsh conditions.   
 
8.4.3.2 ADL and Poverty 
Finally, specifically on the issue of poverty, the anti-discrimination laws of the region 
have been relevant to highlight aspects related to social exclusion, marginalisation and 
vulnerability, which let us dig more deeply into the legal articulation of the concept of 
interimbrication.126 Challenging the dominant idea that equality laws are of use mainly 
for those who are part of the ‘traditional working class’, Latin American ADL has been 
keen to address pressing social issues affecting a ‘disorganized underclass’ that is 
generally ‘unstably employed in unskilled, dead-end, and temporary jobs’, and more 
importantly ‘least able to enlist the legal and rhetorical strategies of antidiscrimination in 
its own defense’.127 In general, ADL addresses poverty in four fundamental ways: first, 
by incorporating ‘poverty’ (or other related indicator or proxy) as a ground of 
protection;128 second, by bridging the gap between universal and means-tested policies, 
incorporating the latter into comprehensive social protection frameworks;129 third, by 
drawing links between poverty and other protected grounds through indirect 
                                               
126 For Sandra Fredman, the interconnection between equality laws and poverty allows us not only to make 
a ‘valuable contribution to aspects of poverty based on mis-recognition and social and political exclusion’, 
but also to ‘address distributive inequalities in its own right’. (n 55) 588.   
127 R Mangabeira Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become? (Verso 1996) 91; in Latin America, we 
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128 Fredman (n 55). 
129 M Sepulveda Carmona, ‘The rights-based approach to social protection in Latin America’ (ECLAC 
2014) 20-2.  
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discrimination or intersectionality;130 and, finally, by crafting positive duties that pay due 
regard to socio-economic disadvantages, with a special concern for those who are most 
in need.131 Here, I will address what are probably the clearest instances of the socio-
economic lens of ADL in Latin America, where ‘poverty’, ‘social condition’, ‘income’ 
or ‘social origin’ are considered protected grounds by legal decision-makers, 
acknowledging the misrecognition effects of harms derived mainly from the economic 
sphere. The role of legal decision-makers connecting poverty with ADL does not consist 
in enforcing a target of income included in statutory law, such as the Child Poverty Act 
of the UK (2015).132 In contrast, it entails addressing poverty from an integral perspective, 
including both an objective element, comprising ‘economic rank, or social standing based 
on factors such as income, occupation or level of education’, and a subjective one, which 
involves ‘the value attributed to an individual based on social perceptions or stereotypes 
associated with [objective] factors’.133  
 
In Latin America, ADL has been used to challenge the lack of access to ‘basic’ services 
on the grounds of ‘poverty’, ‘social condition’ or ‘economic situation’. Specifically, it 
has been raised to enforce compliance with state duties to warrant equality of access to 
these services, and address structural problems in the functioning of markets in Latin 
America (market access). However, equality laws have also been used to challenge the 
stereotyping effects of anti-poverty policies, in an attempt to break the continuities 
between distributive problems (a lack of sufficient material resources) and status 
inequalities (class misrecognition). Additionally, they have been used to extend the scope 
of social policies that were originally crafted as means-tested (eg, conditional cash 
transfers) or emergency measures. Within this second dimension, ADL has been related 
to concerns that go beyond the mere expansion of market access, and are closer to 
transformative redistributive remedies that challenge the way in which market 
arrangements address poverty. Let us take a look at the practice of Latin American ADL.  
 
The first group of cases concerns situations in which deprived urban areas were lacking 
access to basic services. The reason behind these anti-discrimination claims was to 
                                               
130 Clericó and others (n 85). 
131 eg, Equality Act 2010 s 149 
132 D Barrett, ‘The importance of equality law and human rights in addressing socio-economic inequality’, 
in D Cuypers and J Vrielink (eds), Equal is not Enough (Intersentia 2016) 11.  
133 MacKay and Kim (n 5) 22. This definition of poverty has been endorsed by the IACHR. O Parra-Vera, 
‘Derechos humanos y pobreza en el Sistema Interamericano’ (2012) 56 Revista IIDH 272, 281-8. 
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enforce compliance with market commitments, especially regarding services that were 
previously provided by state-owned enterprises, like water or telecommunications. A 
remarkable case was initiated by the INADI, and later decided by the quasi-adjudicatory 
powers of the Ombudsman of the City of Buenos Aires.134 In this case, an old lady living 
in an economically deprived area of the city of Mar del Plata made a complaint against a 
telephone service provider because they had refused to install an Internet service, 
claiming that the area was considered a ‘risk zone’. The procedure was initiated before 
the INADI, and later a new complaint was triggered before the local ombudsman, which 
referred the case to the ombudsman of Buenos Aires. The resolution issued by the 
Defensoría de Buenos Aires integrated the reading of the prohibition of discrimination 
within the administrative regime of public services and the rights of users and consumers: 
even when dealing with ‘improper services’ (that is, those not directly provided by the 
state), the public regime is entrusted to guarantee the permanent, general and egalitarian 
provision of services that were once the exclusive domain of the state. Moreover, the 
resolution related the ground of ‘social position’ included in the ARGADL with the 
concept of ‘social category’, and then concluded that the company had arbitrarily 
distinguished and imposed a disadvantage upon the claimant.135 Similar cases concern 
consumers and users’ associations using collective actions to address these problems from 
a structural point of view, specifically considering poverty and deprivation within an 
urban context.136 Based on Article 75.23 of the Constitution of Argentina, which speaks 
of ‘positive action’ and ‘real equality of opportunity’, and gives examples of ‘vulnerable 
groups’, one of the Federal Courts concluded that ‘the role of the judiciary is to make a 
careful balance in the exercise of rights and protect the weakest’.137 This line of reasoning 
was partially based on the harmful effects of a lack of access to telephone or Internet 
services, which diminishes the ‘market competitiveness’ of people living in areas 
considered as ‘risk zones’ and reproduces the conditions of poverty.138  
                                               
134 Decision 26 (2013).  
135 A similar reasoning was reproduced in a case triggered by the Defensor Nacional and decided by the 
National Chamber for Civil and Commercial Appeals, Rodriguez, Olga Liliana y otros con Telefónica De 
Argentina SA, S/Incidente De Medida Cautelar (2015). This higher court remanded the case and ordered 
INADI to provide an overall assessment of the issue, which affected many people living in Rivadavia, one 
of the poorest neighbourhoods in Buenos Aires.  
136 A landmark collective action against Transportes de Buenos Aires constitutes an interesting example 
regarding the unequal conditions of train lanes depending on socioeconomic backgrounds: for middle-upper 
classes areas, the Mitre line provided amenities suitable for a trip like air conditioners, TV screens, and 
reasonable density during peak hours; for lower classes, the Sarmiento line did not have minimum safety 
conditions, had no windows, and was persistently overcrowded. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación 
(Argentina), Unión de Usuarios y Consumidores v Sec. Transporte, 104/01 (2014).    
137 Federal Civil and Commercial Court (Argentina), n10 101 (2012) 2.b. 
138 ibid. 5.a.3; for other similar cases, see dossier 13787 (2006) of the same court.   
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In a Chilean case, a group of families living in slums (pobladores) in the metropolitan 
area applied for government subsidies to buy a piece of land where they could find a 
definitive solution to their housing problems. The last stage of this process required an 
authorisation from the local government (municipality), in charge of zoning plans, when 
a land transaction exceeds a certain amount of money. The administrative decision of the 
mayor and the local council was tainted by several press statements and opinions: 
pressured by people living in a newly developed private housing condo nearby, they 
claimed that they did not want to bring ‘drug-dealers or criminals’ close to their 
neighbourhoods. With the help of an NGO, the pobladores challenged the administrative 
decision on the basis that it was tainted with discriminatory motives on the grounds of 
their ‘socioeconomic situation’, a trait included in the recently created CHIADL (art 1.2). 
Although formally issued within the legal requirements of the Organic Law of 
Municipalities, the administrative decision was claimed to be discriminatory against the 
pobladores because of their socio-economic condition, and, in order to assess the way in 
which these decisions end up disadvantaging poor people, the judicial procedure has been 
forced to address broader problems of poverty in Santiago’s slums.139 The remarkable 
feature of this case is that the right to housing is not recognised in the Chilean 
Constitution, and social rights are not justiciable under ordinary constitutional writs (writ 
of protection).140 The final outcome of this case will shape the legal opportunity structure 
and potentially enhance the ability of the CHIADL to address the interimbrication 
between maldistribution and misrecognition.  
 
Sociological studies on cultural processes of stigmatisation have been useful in 
understanding the interimbrication between economy and culture when applied to social 
movements emerging from people living in precarious social housing or slums. 141 
Without an understanding of how socio-economic inequality is produced and reproduced 
at all levels of interaction, we will not be able to develop concrete remedies to address 
the problems of urban segregation. In the case of people living in slums, who are generally 
not incorporated into the formal economy (who have a minimum coverage for health and 
mostly live on social assistance), and who lack ‘traditional’ class consciousness (an 
                                               
139 2º Juzgado Civil Santiago (Chile), Comité de Allegados La Isla / Ilustre Municipalidad de Maipu (2016).  
140 J Couso and others, Constitutional Law: Chile (Kluwer 2011) 126-30. 
141 The literature on social mobilisation has struggled to give an account of housing movements. A Cortes, 
‘El movimiento de pobladores chilenos y la población La Victoria: ejemplaridad, movimientos sociales y 
el derecho a la ciudad’ (2014) 40 EURE 239, 251-5. 
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understanding of themselves as a different class, as they are outside formal relations of 
production), how do we understand the interimbrication between economy and culture? 
At first, one may expect their situation to be addressed mainly through remedies of 
redistribution: as their lack of material resources derives from economic processes, 
affirmative and transformative remedies for redistribution could tackle the direct source 
of injustice. However, understanding cultural processes that impact on poverty suggests 
different alternatives, closer to transformative or affirmative remedies against 
misrecognition, or even transformative remedies of representation.142 In the context of 
weak welfare regimes, with no universal social protection, these people may first opt to 
revalue their despised identities, the typical affirmative remedy against misrecognition. 
Beyond socio-psychological insights, which reveal individual or social strategies of 
resistance against discrimination by resorting to in-group reference, cultural sociology 
also ‘considers cultural repertoires (…), as well as the conditions that make it more likely 
that members of groups will draw on some rather than other strategies available in their 
cultural toolkits in formulating their responses’.143 In Argentina, during the economic 
crisis of the early 2000s, social movements that included the most socio-economically 
deprived groups began to emerge as a resistance to the austerity measures.144 Either called 
piqueteros, because of their distinctive method of social protest, or villeros, because of 
the informal settlements that emerged in urban areas, these movements started to identify 
themselves around socio-economic conditions like the lack of housing or access to basic 
income. Beyond that, these people found an identity in the shared experience of poverty, 
and the Argentinian Congress recognised this by establishing October 7th as the Day of 
the Villero Identity.145 How are cultural processes that devalue certain individual or social 
identities (people living in slums) produced and reproduced at all levels of interaction 
(formal/informal)? How can we design legal strategies to redress the injustices they 
suffer? If we approach this phenomenon through the cultural processes that have a 
direct/indirect impact on their situation, we may provide a space for ADL to tackle the 
causal pathways that are operating in these situations.146 
 
                                               
142 E Nino, ‘Some reflections on the election of representatives in the ghettos of Buenos Aires’ (SELA 
2015, Yale University, Brazil, June 2015) (enhancing local political participation as a remedy for urban 
ghettos). 
143 M Lamont and N Mizrachi, ‘Ordinary People Doing Extraordinary Things: Responses to Stigmatization 
in Comparative Perspective’ (2012) 35 Ethnic and Racial Studies 365, 368.  
144 M Svampa, ‘Movimientos Sociales y Nuevo Escenario Regional. Las Inflexiones del Paradigma Liberal 
en América Latina’ in Cambio de época. Movimientos Sociales y Poder Político (Siglo XXI 2008). 
145 Law 27.095 (2014).  
146 Lamont and others (n 17).  
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Anti-discrimination legal provisions have also been used to challenge anti-poverty 
policies that are considered discriminatory either because of their stereotyping premises 
or effects, or because they do not function as decommodifying devices, that is, they are 
not able to sustain the exercise of citizenship for people with little or almost no (formal) 
market participation. In these cases, the main point is to abandon the consideration of 
poverty as a purely economic issue (measured only with objective factors, such as 
income, illiteracy, educational qualifications, etc.), and bring forward multi-dimensional 
accounts that can trigger a structural discrimination approach to the issue. 147  Here, 
poverty is considered not as the violation of the content of a specific social or economic 
right (eg, ‘vital minimum’), or as an unlawful objective condition (eg, lack of certain 
income), but as an integral and complex problem that is difficult to grasp through legal 
categories. 148  Thus, the emphasis is placed neither on the unequal treatment of 
economically deprived people compared with other citizens nor on the reasons behind 
pro-poor policies, but on the social context surrounding a certain extended practice.149 An 
illustrative case was decided by a first instance court of the Autonomous City of Buenos 
Aires, regarding the establishment of emergency measures to deal with the lack of school 
vacancies for inhabitants of villas de emergencia (emergency slums). In 2002, when the 
effects of the Argentinian economic crisis were at their peak, the Government of Buenos 
Aires started to set up ‘modular classrooms’ to deal with the lack of vacancies for children 
living in poverty. Although they were originally established as emergency measures, in 
2005 there was still no institutional plan for replacement or reallocation of these children 
in the educational system. Those classrooms were popularly known as ‘container 
classrooms’ and associated with children that lived in villas de emergencia/villas miseria 
(slums of misery). The case started with a collective action triggered by an NGO, and was 
based on anti-discrimination provisions at different levels (both the Federal Constitution 
and the Constitution of the City of Buenos Aires). The government of Buenos Aires 
replied that these emergency measures were considered as positive actions in favour of 
economically deprived people, so they could not be considered as infringing fundamental 
rights. The final judgment concluded that the process should not be focused on analysing 
the government’s motives that justify the public policy, or on the administrative measure 
                                               
147 Unlike the common protected grounds of ADL, which work according to a logic of duality (men/women; 
disabled/not disabled), ‘social condition’ brings into consideration a multi-dimensional approach. MacKay 
and Kim (n 5) 38. 
148 E Nino, ‘La Discriminación Menos Comentada’ in R Gargarella (ed), La Constitución en 2020 (Siglo 
Veintiuno 2011). 
149 Parra-Vera (n 84). This is the reason why some jurisdictions prefer the ground ‘social condition’ over 
‘poverty’: the later ‘may not sufficiently protect individuals based on complex socio-economic factors’. 
MacKay and N Kim (n 5) 38. 
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under scrutiny, but rather on the systemic discriminatory effects produced by the 
educational system and the broader context of urban segregation. 150  Furthermore, it 
ordered the government to provide a permanent solution, and stressed the importance of 
budget planning and long-term strategies in the ‘war’ against poverty, in order to pay due 
regard to the principle of equality and non-discrimination.151 
 
These cases illustrate the contradictions of neoliberalism in Latin America, considered 
along Foucaldian lines, as ‘a specific and normative mode of reason’ that produces 
particular subjectivities in different idioms or instantiations. 152  The instantiations of 
neoliberalism in Latin America have peculiar dynamics, where harms and remedies for 
redistribution and recognition do not necessarily follow the patterns in the Global 
North.153 Therefore, we need to have a broader picture of the particular interimbrication 
between culture and economy, the ways in which harms derived mainly from the capitalist 
system of production generates status misrecognition, and the spaces where neoliberal 
normativities move fluidly across different spheres, using struggles for recognition as 
catalysts for their project (the nonismorphisms of class and status in particular idioms of 
neoliberalism). On the one hand, these cases illustrate how the promises of neoliberalism, 
that competition secures moral and social progress, pushing people to make entrepreneurs 
out of themselves, have failed in particular ways in Latin America:154 in many of these 
cases, what was in play was precisely the access to the means that could allow those left 
behind to compete and thrive in market arrangements. Access to telephone, mobile 
phones, the Internet, electricity and transport is considered an invaluable asset on which 
economic production relies. ADL has been used to enforce the promises of market 
capitalism even in zones considered ‘too risky’ for private companies, expanding the 
realm of the market through the ‘force of law’, the paradigm of neoliberal legalities, 
where legal change is used for the project of re-making society and its subjects according 
                                               
150 If equality tests entail a comparison, it is a very special kind of comparison, which entails analysing not 
only the context of the law or measure under scrutiny, but the place of the disadvantaged group in the 
broader social, political and legal fabric of our society.   
151 Administrative Court of the City of Buenos Aires, n11 (2006).  
152 W Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution (Verso 2015) 48.  
153 Schild (n 87). 
154 Rather than affecting homo oeconomics, who pursue their individual interests in the market realm, 
neoliberalism has reshaped labour as human capital: ‘every subject is rendered as entrepreneurial, no matter 
how small, impoverished, or without resources, and every aspect of human existence is produced as an 
entrepreneurial one’. Brown (n 152) 65. Paraphrasing one of the judgments analysed before: imagine if we 
deny people living in slums access to mobile phones, how are they going to receive a call for a job that 
might require them to present themselves immediately for a job interview? (n 137). Currently, the need for 
mobile phones is an important tool for our own capital appreciation, where (individual) human capital is 
better understood as ‘a portfolio of investments’ through social media, leisure time, consumption, etc.  
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to the principle of competition.155 In this way, ADL could be used to enforce the promise 
of capitalist development, which, to put it in De Soto’s terms, is to incorporate everyone, 
especially those living in slums in the big metropolis of Latin America, under the scope 
of formal markets.156 However, and more importantly, these cases also suggest something 
deeper about neoliberal governmentality. Indeed, in several instances we witness ADL 
and its implicit promise to achieve a society of equals challenging a neoliberal way of 
addressing public problems. Increasingly, as subaltern counterpublics proliferate and 
provide spaces for reflecting on status misrecognition, we will see how ADL could 
become a potential avenue for beneficiaries themselves to challenge anti-poverty social 
policies. The combination of these struggles for recognition with broader coalitions based 
on struggles for redistribution have indeed been crucial in the development of innovative 
transformative remedies that challenge the way in which production is arranged. To see 
the role that ADL could have in these coalitions, we will have to wait for more interesting 
developments, for more case law bringing ‘social condition’ forward, deploying its ability 
to grasp people’s real suffering due to discrimination. 
 
8.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has developed the way in which the socio-economic lens of ADL is 
unfolding in Latin America. Fraser’s concept of interimbrication allows us to understand 
the ways in which the culture and the economy couple/uncouple to generate distinct types 
of harms. Fraser’s insights seem to promise interesting avenues for ADL, previously 
characterised as an anti-misrecognition device, to act in combination with redistributive 
struggles, whether affirmative or transformative. Moreover, they seem to provide the 
basis for articulating an emancipatory role for ADL in an era where neoliberalism could 
easily collide with identity politics. However, when Fraser’s framework is translated to 
Latin American particularities, it becomes somehow puzzled. In the most unequal region 
in the world, and with almost one in three Latin Americans living below the poverty 
threshold, the socio-economic lens will inevitably taint the practice of ADL in Latin 
America. Within this scenario, as we have seen, ADL constitutes a usual support in 
processes of legal mobilisation for social rights and plays a complex role within the ‘war’ 
against poverty. More importantly, part of the emergent practice of Latin American ADL 
                                               
155 As Honor Brabazon puts it, ‘neoliberalism should be understood as a particularly “juridical” phase of 
capitalism, in which it is understood (consciously or not) that capitalism should be structured by, and 
expanded through, the juridical relations of the legal form’. ‘Introduction’, in H Brabazon (ed), Neoliberal 
Legality: Understanding the Role of Law in the neoliberal project (Routledge 2017) 16. 
156 De Soto (n 70).  
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highlights the peculiar ways in which harms and remedies are linked to the above-
mentioned interimbrication. All in all, a transformative approach to ADL is not ‘merely 
cultural’ but, rather, seeks to address how cultural processes are materially instantiated in 
the basic structures of societies, generating injustices linked to both maldistribution and 
malrecognition. Certainly, as stated by Bob Hepple, ADL will not be the main tool within 
the struggles of redistribution, but Latin America shows that its role will be more 
important than what sceptics claim.  
 250 
  
 251 
Chapter 9 The Political Axis of ADL 
9.1 Introduction 
Several theories have attempted to model the surface structure of anti-discrimination laws 
on the basis of tort law: a tort, attributed to another person or institution through a judicial 
procedure launched by an individual cause of action. Within this framework, ADL can 
be portrayed as entailing merely private conflicts. Even if there is a public interest in 
preventing harm, the broader political or social goals of ADL are not essential to give an 
account of this field of law, and constitute ancillary goals that we can decide to include 
within ADL through democratic means. For other theories, though, ADL should be 
restricted to the public realm, to the protection of political equality, a guarantee for the 
constitution of the political community, where we stand as equals. From this strict 
separation between the ‘private/social’ and the ‘political’, theories of ADL have emerged 
that narrow its scope to the political realm.  
 
Between these theories, I draw on Nancy Fraser’s work to develop the political axis of 
ADL. This principle argues that ADL stands on a political axis, even if at times it appears 
to be concerned with non-fundamental choices (eg, different routes to my workplace), 
access to trivial goods (eg, a birthday cake), or with dealings that could be deemed private 
or merely social (eg, who I want to hire as an assistant). Moreover, as I have explained in 
a previous chapter, a broader constitutional conception of ADL has hollowed out accounts 
restricted to the relationship between citizens and the state or employment-based 
conceptions, posing questions that lie at the core of what constitutes us as a community.1 
In this chapter I argue that ADL, defined as an anti-misrecognition device, is connected 
with struggles for political voice or with the activation of political agency and, moreover, 
constitutes a crucial element for the protection of the special character of political 
communities.  
 
In what way does ADL stand on a political axis? How can we claim this precisely in an 
era of ‘post-democracy’ or ‘de-democratisation’? First, I attempt to answer these 
questions by resorting to Fraser’s critique of the bourgeois conception of the public sphere 
and to her critical stance on the search for the political. Second, I will highlight the ways 
in which Latin American ADL has endorsed a political axis of ADL, even when dealing 
with issues not directly concerned with the political domain.  
                                               
1 see 2.2.   
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9.2 Fraser’s insights 
9.2.1 A critical account of the bourgeois public sphere  
Nancy Fraser is one of the most important critics of the conception of the public sphere 
developed by Jurgen Habermas.2 Articulated first as a ‘feminist and radical critique of 
the late welfare-state capitalist democracies’, it has now been expanded to a critique of 
the political domain of justice in a Post-Westphalian world, something I will pursue 
briefly below.3 Let us focus on the importance of the ‘feminist and radical critique’ of the 
public sphere for the development of the principle addressed in this chapter.  
 
When the seminal work of Habermas was translated to English, Fraser was one of the 
first scholars to critically address the emancipatory potential of the theory of the public 
sphere. I have already noted the importance of this critical account for the principle of the 
group dimension, where ADL provides spaces of ‘withdrawal and regroupment’ for 
‘subaltern counterpublics’, which are considered fundamental for the recognition 
struggles of social groups, claims that are nonetheless political in a sense I will clarify 
later. Here, I want to focus on the most fundamental critique of the ‘bourgeois public 
sphere’, which stresses that social equality is a necessary condition for political 
democracy, that private issues and concerns are sometimes political matters to be debated 
within the public sphere, and, more broadly, that ‘[t]he meaning and boundaries of 
publicity depend at every point on who has the power to draw the line between public and 
private’.4 These critiques do not break with one of Habermas’ main contributions to the 
theory of democracy, the so-called co-originality of private and public autonomy of 
citizens in a political community, but strengthen its ability to theorise the ‘limits of 
actually existing democracies’.5 When Habermas later developed his theory of law, he 
recognised that a critical account of the public sphere contributes to solving ‘the 
paradoxical emergence of legitimacy out of legality’, which must be ‘explained by means 
                                               
2 J Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Polity 1989). N Fraser, ‘Rethinking the 
Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy’, in C Calhoun (ed), 
Habermas and the Public Sphere (MIT Press 1992). 
3 S Benhabib, ‘Feminist Theory and Hannah Arendt’s concept of Public Space’ (1993) 6 History of the 
Human Sciences 97, 109; N Fraser, ‘Transnationalizing the Public Sphere: On the Legitimacy and Efficacy 
of Public Opinion in a Post-Westphalian World’ (2007) 24 Theory, Culture and Society 7. 
4 N Fraser, ‘Sex, Lies, and the Public Sphere: Reflections on the Confirmation of Clarence Thomas’, in J 
Landes (ed), Feminism, the Public and the Private (OUP 1998) 314. 
5 Fraser (n 2) 111. 
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of the rights that secure for citizens the exercise of their political autonomy.’6  The 
Habermasian reconciliation between liberalism and republicanism, between private and 
public autonomy, or between human rights and popular sovereignty, depends on a system 
of rights that ‘states precisely the conditions under which the forms of communication 
necessary for the genesis of legitimate law can be legally institutionalized’.7 Among these 
rights, we reserve a special place (‘a privileged position’ for Habermas) for the right to 
equality and non-discrimination, which could be considered a ‘communicative and 
participatory right’ that is ‘constitutive for democratic opinion and will-formation’.8 In 
what follows, I will explain Fraser’s critiques, and articulate the potential insight for the 
political axis of a transformative approach to ADL.  
 
The bourgeois conception of the public sphere demanded bracketing our inequalities in 
terms of status, so the ‘theatre for debating and deliberating’ required us to act as if we 
were ‘social and economic peers’.9 Moreover, this sphere of interaction dealt with matters 
of common concern, so private interests were left behind a theatre that was not for ‘buying 
and selling’, but for us as private persons for discussing and deliberating on what matters 
to everyone.10 To this conception of the public sphere, which is supposed to contribute a 
normative and critical stance to the theory of contemporary democracies, Fraser applies 
a revisionist historiography that shakes its main assumptions. 11  Her principle of 
participatory parity, when applied to the classical examples of the bourgeois conception 
of the public sphere in the nineteenth century, highlights the impossibility of bracketing 
economic or status inequalities.12 Thus, informal impediments to participatory parity, like 
dominant modes of discourse, usually disadvantage those who are socially deviant, those 
who are not used to training themselves in these (discursive) skills, or that simply lack 
the time to rehearse their script for the theatre of the public sphere.13 In our times, we still 
                                               
6 J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Polity Press 1996) 83.  
7 ibid 104.   
8 ibid 264.  
9 Fraser (n 2) 111, 118.  
10 ibid 111.  
11 Fraser has been criticised for not using an ideal theory that could eschew the particular experience of 
‘Western modernity in general, and the fate of liberal-capitalist welfare states in the latter part of the 20th 
century in particular’. K Hutchings, ‘Whose History? Whose Justice?’ (2007) 24 Theory, Culture and 
Society 59, 62. 
12 Fraser (n 2) 118-121; J Landes, Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution 
(Cornell University Press 1989). 
13 Even the linguistic turn, which for critical legal studies emphasised the power of discourse as knowledge, 
ends up disadvantaging women, as Robin West pointed out: ‘So long as silence rather than discourse 
remains the primary product of modern patriarchy (…), the social theorist’s focus on discourse and speech 
is an entirely misguided entry into the study of women’s lives’. ‘Feminism, Critical Social Theory and 
Law’ (1989) 1 University of Chicago Legal Forum 59, 66.   
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face pressures to constitute public spheres as ‘spaces of zero degree culture’, where those 
who can easily dispose of their ‘culture’, or those who think that culture is something that 
constitutes the identity of those who are disadvantaged, but not of the privileged, can 
easily adapt and manage processes of discursive assimilation. 14  Moreover, Fraser’s 
contribution to the radical potential of the public sphere depends on an issue that I have 
already addressed, that is, the challenge to the appropriate boundaries of what is private, 
of what pertains to individual interests, and therefore is not a matter of discussion within 
public spheres.15  Even progressive conceptions of the public sphere, like republican 
accounts of deliberative democracy, tend to assume that private, domestic and sexual 
issues are at most ‘prepolitical starting points of deliberation, to be transformed and 
transcended in the course of debate’, for what matters is the public spirit, the single 
collective subject that we will constitute within deliberation processes. 16  For Fraser, 
instead, ‘[o]nly participants themselves can decide what is and what is not of common 
concern to them’, because ‘there are no naturally given, a priori boundaries here’.17  
 
For the discourse theory of democracy, where deliberative politics comprises regulated 
democratic procedures and ‘informal processes of opinion-formation in the public 
sphere’, the need for an ‘anarchic’ public sphere, which resists organisation as a whole, 
and provides spaces of ‘unrestricted communication’, constitutes a crucial source of 
legitimacy in complex societies. 18  However, this ‘anarchic structure’, according to 
Habermas (in an implicit wink to Fraser’s critique), suggests that the ‘general public 
sphere is (…) more vulnerable to the repressive and exclusionary effects of unequally 
distributed social power, structural violence, and systematically distorted communication 
than are the institutionalized public spheres of parliamentary bodies’.19 Where and how 
does ADL enter into this picture, which is drawn by Habermas and Fraser as a sketch of 
contemporary and complex democracies, where ‘weak publics’ influence and, at times, 
                                               
14 Fraser (n 2) 126. For a critical account of the distinction between those who have ‘moral values’ and 
those who are allegedly ‘determined by their traditional culture’, see Anne Phillips, Gender and Culture 
(Polity Press 2010) ch4. 
15 see 6.2; ch7.  
16 Fraser (n 2) 129-130. As Habermas, Fraser is critical of republican theories of democracy that ‘view the 
citizenry as a collective actor that reflects the whole and acts for it’, where ‘the citizens’ practice of self-
determination’ is ascribed to ‘a macro-social subject’. Habermas (n 6) 299. 
17 Fraser (n 2) 129. She gives the example of how domestic violence shifted from a purely domestic issue, 
to being bracketed in public discussions, to a matter of common concern, suitable for political contestation 
and debate.     
18 Habermas (n 6) 307.  
19 ibid 307-8. 
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constrain ‘strong publics’?20 Furthermore, if the co-originality between private and public 
autonomy is to be honoured, how are we to understand ADL? If I characterise ADL as an 
anti-misrecognition device, how does it get interimbricated with the political domain?  
 
9.2.1.1 Misrecognition and political voice 
Misrecogntion constitutes a pervasive harm with profound political impacts.21 Indeed, the 
endorsement of recognitive justice by social movements has almost never meant leaving 
the political claims aside, but has been fundamentally an attempt to challenge the formal 
terms and conditions of citizenship. For example, the widespread literature on sexual 
citizenship breaks with exclusively state-centred conceptions, and directs our attention to 
‘the multiple ways in which multiple forms of legal regulation intersect with other non-
legal, non-state forms of governance’.22 This has triggered an interest in substantive 
conceptions of citizenship, where issues that are traditionally concerned with social and 
cultural practices are brought into the public sphere, shifting our conception of citizenship 
towards processes of belonging, of membership and inclusion in a certain polity.23  
 
Therefore, recognition not only requires us to grant access to the means of interpretation 
and communication that constitute cultural value patterns across several domains (eg, the 
house, the neighbourhood, the market), but indirectly allows us to challenge the 
arrangements that taint political institutions with social inequality. Struggles for 
recognition, when strained through the standard of participatory parity, are not only about 
revaluing despised identities, enhancing cultural diversity, or the wholesale 
transformation of societal patterns that shape our current identities, but also about 
‘political voice’ or ‘political agency’. 24  For Anne Phillips, Fraser’s emphasis on 
                                               
20 Strong publics have the power to discuss public issues and take binding decisions; weak publics discuss 
these issues, but have no power to directly influence the final decision. As explained by Bonham, ‘in a 
complex society, as Habermas asserts, “public opinion does not rule” but rather points administrative power 
in particular directions; (…) members of the public do not control social processes; qua members of a 
public, they may exercise influence through particular institutionalized mechanisms and channels of 
communication’. J Bonham, ‘Critical Theory’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2005) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/critical-theory/> accessed 8 March 2015.  
21 A Phillips, Which Equalities Matter? (Polity Press 1999) 79-80 (‘Whether each has equal access to 
political influence (…) [is] just the tip of the iceberg. What really threatens the Titanic of liberal democracy 
is the profound lack of social recognition.’). 
22  B Cossman, Sexual Citizens: The Legal and Cultural Regulation of Sex and Belonging (Stanford 
University Press 2007) 17; M Kaplan, Sexual Justice: Democratic Citizenship and the Politics of Desire 
(Routledge 1997). 
23 N Bamforth, ‘Sexuality and citizenship in contemporary constitutional argument’ (2012) 10 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 477.  
24 A Phillips, ‘Recognition and the Struggle for Political Voice’, in B Hobson (ed), Recognition Struggles 
and Social Movements (CUP 2017).  
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individuals’ participatory parity, in order to avoid the dangers of reification or separatism 
that infuse identity models of recognition, ended up diminishing the need for current 
political struggles to recognise a strong assertion of group agency. 25  Nevertheless, 
nothing in Fraser’s work suggests that processes of identity formation have no connection 
with political voice or agency (either of individuals or of groups, as I explained 
previously), or that recognition struggles entail a demand for equal moral worth in cultural 
spheres with no impact on political domains. 
 
 As Fraser points out, ‘[o]f course, distribution and recognition are themselves political 
in the sense of being contested and power-laden; and they have usually been seen as 
requiring adjudication by the state’.26 However, both recognition and redistribution are 
interimbricated with a third dimension of justice (representation), which establishes 
criteria of social belonging, and thus determines ‘who counts as a member’, specifying 
the reach of the other dimensions: ‘it tells us who is included in, and who excluded, from 
the circle of those entitled to a just distribution and reciprocal recognition’, and ‘sets the 
procedures for staging and resolving contests in both the economic and the cultural 
dimensions: it tells us not only who can make claims for redistribution and recognition, 
but also how such claims are to be mooted and adjudicated’.27 If both recognition and 
redistribution assume a Keynesian-Westphalian frame, current globalisation processes 
have prompted us to look at this third dimension of justice, where issues of membership 
and procedure are at the centre of the debate.28 However, if representation is, in one way, 
‘a matter of social belonging’, recognition and redistribution have been always 
interimbricated with political issues at the national/territorial level: ‘[j]ust as the ability 
to make claims for distribution and recognition depends on relations of representation, so 
the ability to exercise one’s political voice depends on the relations of class and status’.29  
 
9.2.1.2 Social Equality in an era of ‘de-democratisation’ 
The right to equality and non-discrimination, both in the private and public spheres, then, 
is a necessary condition to achieve political equality. In the current state of declining 
democratic participation, however, we can imagine a society that lives without serious 
                                               
25 ibid 272. 
26 Fraser, ‘Reframing Justice in a Globalized World’ (2005) 36 New Left Review 69, 74-5.  
27 ibid 75.  
28 If processes taking place in a borderless world are increasingly shaping our destinies, how can we draw 
the boundaries between the communities affected by phenomena such as climate change?  
29 Fraser (n 26) 75, 79.  
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problems of discrimination, where everyone relates to one another as social equals but 
with almost no common or shared interests other than maintaining basic respect in terms 
of access to recognition.30 Hence, the question is whether ADL can do something to 
revive the culture, the spirit, the necessary desire to make democracy thrive, or whether 
it is concomitant to current de-democratisation waves. Several anti-discrimination 
projects have been criticised for their market-expanding thrust, highlighting the 
‘politicisation’ of consumption or the workplace. However, this kind of politicisation 
promoted by ADL, according to its critics, is doing nothing but interfering with consumer 
sovereignty or freedom of contract, where ‘the costs of prejudice are shifted from the 
victim to whomever anti-discrimination law designates to be the distributive agent’.31 In 
a perfect state of social equality, where everyone can present in the market as a ‘social 
equal’, we can imagine ADL being non-alienating, where ‘consumers are no longer in the 
position to avoid having to deal with persons whom they would have shunned 
otherwise’.32  
 
Discrimination may be functional in certain capitalist systems – because it caters to the 
discriminatory ‘tastes’ of third parties, because it may be statistically efficient to 
discriminate, or simply because ‘preferences are endogenous to current laws and 
practices’, so ‘[o]nce those laws and practices are entrenched, there are special obstacles 
to bringing about change through market ordering’. 33  But it is not functional for 
‘neoliberalism’, considered as a governing rationality that attempts to instil competition 
and (economic) inequality as virtues that should prevail in every social domain 
(education, health, environment, and even democracy itself), not only in economics. 
Hence, ideally, discrimination constitutes a wrong, as long as it prevents real cost-benefit 
analyses, growth or competitiveness.34  
 
Moreover, this normative order of reason is ‘always mediated through law’: by 
adjudicating disputes about ‘the nature of the personal liberty and equality that basic 
constitutional protections enshrine’, the politicisation of market encounters is put at the 
                                               
30 I am thinking about a thin conception of democracy, such as one grounded in Ian Carter’s empirical range 
property of ‘opacity respect’. ‘Respect and the Basis of Equality’ (2011) 121 Ethics 538, 559-60. 
31 A Somek, Engineering Equality: An Essay on European Anti-Discrimination Law (OUP 2011) 137.  
32 ibid.  
33 C Sunstein, ‘Why Markets Don't Stop Discrimination’ (1989) 8 Social Philosophy & Policy 22, 31. 
34 W Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism Stealth’s Revolution (Verso 2015) 25.  
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service of capitalist accumulation.35 In this way, ADL steers the not-so-taken-for-granted 
spontaneity of the social order, to put it in Hayekian terms. Thus, instead of leaving the 
market to reign freely and waiting for market agents to realise that discrimination is not 
economically efficient, at least when one wants to participate, survive and increase market 
share, ADL is placed at the service not merely of market-correction, but of market 
expansion.36 In this sense, it runs against Richard Epstein’s dream of no regulation of the 
prohibition of discrimination whatsoever: governments are required to eliminate 
discrimination to enhance market virtues.37  
 
At this point, we can start to imagine ‘progressive’ workplaces, without any cultural 
hierarchies, full of Muslims, Christians and Atheists, straights, lesbians, and queers, with 
no dress-codes at all, and where the different slangs or ways of speaking English are 
considered as assets for companies, but with no unions, and no spaces for political 
contestation. 38  The question is, then, can we imagine a society where no-one is 
discriminated against, in the sense of being culturally misrecognised, but where there is 
little interest in political democracy? How can we understand the simultaneous rise of 
anti-discrimination protections and the decline of political participation? Is ADL merely 
the progressive face of neoliberalism, delaying the emergence of the ‘political 
contradictions of financialized capitalism’, which would reveal how neoliberalism is 
undoing the demos?39 The challenge, at this point, is to pose a normative limit to ADL, 
capable of protecting the special character of the political community and, thus, 
preventing the impoverishment of public life. 40  Nancy Fraser’s project of radical 
democracy would be incomplete if it were restricted to a critique of liberal legality and 
did not attempt to protect the special character of the political.  
                                               
35 D Singh and J Purdy, ‘Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism’ (2014) 77 Law and Contemporary Problems 
1, 9; H Brabazon, ‘Introduction’, in Neoliberal Legality: Understanding the Role of Law in the Neoliberal 
Project (Routledge 2017).  
36 That is why discrimination cases usually target small businesses, like bed and breakfasts, bakeries or 
photography companies, who are most likely to ignore the efficiency costs of their discriminatory practices. 
37 R Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws (Harvard University 
Press 1995).  
38 People would not need to ‘enclose in their own hearts’, or stay at home waiting for the government to 
provide the basics, but could go outside (to the market!) and give a free reign to what their hearts command. 
The threats posed by the kind of individualism and prevalence of instrumental reason posed by Charles 
Taylor at the beginning of the 1990s are no longer the same. The Ethics of Authenticity (Harvard University 
Press 1991) 9.  
39  While ‘legitimate, efficacious public power is a condition of possibility of sustained capital 
accumulation’, ‘capitalism’s drive to endless accumulation tends to destabilize the very public power on 
which it relies’. N Fraser, ‘Legitimation Crisis? On the Political Contradictions of Financialized Capitalism’ 
(2015) 2 Critical Historical Studies 157, 159; Brown (n 34) 17. 
40 The normative limit entails being critically aware of the potential dangers of expanding the scope of ADL 
without considering redistribution and representation.  
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9.2.2 ADL and Political Communities 
In this section, I draw on some of Fraser’s works to challenge the dystopian possibility of 
full social equality in an era of ‘de-democratization’.41 Specifically, I develop an insight 
into the somehow inevitable political axis of ADL and its role in triggering political 
agency, while preserving the special character of the political community, or what Arendt 
deems as the special character of the ‘public space’, where ‘men act together in concert’, 
and where ‘freedom can appear’.42 What is this ‘special character of the political’ that 
ADL might contribute to enhancing and protecting?  
 
9.2.2.1 The search for the political 
For Fernando Atria, the search for the political implies the recognition of the other as an 
equal, an enquiry that commits us to the relationship between truth and politics in a way 
that is usually avoided by dominant political theories.43 For the latter, either we locate the 
standard of justice outside any political possibility, so that what we decide politically 
might be unjust, or we locate it within our political procedures, so that what is morally 
just is what we decide politically.44 Nevertheless, if the political reserves a ‘constitutive’ 
function for truth, considered as a basic assumption of our political practices, a kind of 
truth that is different from ‘appellative’ instances of truth in politics (eg, when faith is 
used as a way to end political dialogues), then it is possible to understand the special 
character of the political as the sphere where we can resort to the reasons for our beliefs, 
reasons that could be common to all of the interlocutors. The constitutive function of 
truth, objectivity or validity seems to play a special role in defining the political, because 
our way of approaching these issues shapes our political practices in a particular way. As 
truth is never revealed directly, but only through the propositions of other interlocutors, 
it plays a particular role in political practices that rely on the basic assumption that 
everyone has an equal claim to truth, correction or validity. Therefore, ‘what is said to be 
truth or objective are linguistic propositions, and language assumes community’, so the 
political is the space that emerges when we reciprocally recognise each other as agents in 
                                               
41 W Brown, ‘American Nightmare: Neo-liberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-Democratization’ (2006) 
34 Political Theory 690.  
42 Benhabib (n 3) 102.  
43 F Atria, La Forma del Derecho (Marcial Pons 2017) ch17. 
44 ibid 364-6.  
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regard to what is correct, valid or true.45 To honour this reciprocal recognition, which is 
the basic assumption of the search for the political being, an ethics of authenticity appears 
on the horizon of social interactions of all kinds.46 Indeed, to acknowledge the possibility 
that everyone is an equal agent in the search for validity, we would want to enhance an 
ethics of authenticity that eschews pressures for conversion, passing or covering, a 
commitment to human flourishing that grounds radically political lives.47 According to 
this portrait of the quest for the political, is there any role that ADL can play? To start to 
address this question, let us focus on Hannah Arendt’s popular critiques of the role of 
ADL.  
 
For Arendt, the ‘rise of the social’ meant bringing ‘bodily functions’ (like those of 
women) and ‘material concerns’ (like the needs of the poor) into the public sphere, which 
ended up occluding the ‘political’ with the ‘social’. 48  She was explicitly against 
understanding ADL as a programme for challenging fundamentally private decisions, 
where discrimination is the norm, in contrast to political decisions, where equality should 
prevail.49 Within this Arendtian framework, we can understand current accusations of 
ADL as bringing private and social concerns into the public space, as matters open for 
political contestation. Understanding ADL as a programme of private law, that is, to be 
applied horizontally between citizens, ‘threatens the variety of individual shapes, styles 
and forms of life’, disposing with  
pluralism in which the most diverse human preferences or 
reservations, and sympathies or antipathies, especially their desire for 
closeness or distance, for sociability or solitude, can develop 
peacefully and to the fullest extent, because precisely such a pluralism 
balances these opposites as in a market.50 
                                               
45 ibid 377. 
46 However, this ‘ethics of authenticity’ should not be based on the notion of self-fulfilment advanced by 
post-modernism or relativism, which defended impartiality, state neutrality and the equal treatment of all 
citizens’ preferences. Taylor (n 38) 13-23. On the contrary, the moral force of the idea of being true to 
oneself seems to play a renovated role in the account of the political argued by authors such as Fernando 
Atria.  
47 K Yoshino, Covering: The Hidden Assault On Our Civil Rights (Random House 2006) 21-2. For gay 
men, conversion meant changing their sexual orientation (therapy); passing - ignoring their true sexual 
orientation and acting as if nothing had happened (‘don’t ask, don’t tell’); covering entails a more complex 
form of assimilation, and consists of toning down ‘a disfavored identity to fit in the mainstream’, such as 
acting straight (ix). 
48 Arendt, The Human Condition (University of Chicago Press 1958) pt II.  
49 In the private realm, ‘uniqueness’ is the norm. H Arendt, ‘Reflections on Little Rock’ (1959) 6 Dissent 
45.  
50 E Picker, ‘Anti-discrimination as a Program of Private Law?’ (2003) 4 German Law Journal 771, 774.  
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This quote, included in a critique against the implementation of the EU Equality 
Directives in Germany, resembles Arendt’s critique of civil rights litigation that sought 
to enforce desegregation in schools, and thus to eliminate plurality, for her, the condition 
of all political life: ‘without discrimination of some sort, society would simply cease to 
exist and very important possibilities of free association and group formation would 
disappear’. 51  In contemporary politics, there is an allegedly ‘inviolable premise of 
functional differentiation’ that reinterprets Arendt in order to argue in favour of 
spontaneous orders (both in the market and in social spheres), which thwarts any 
intervention in an extraneous sphere, each with its own ‘logic’, preventing ‘injustices that 
appear in one sphere from spilling over into another’.52 For Fraser, instead, a multi-
dimensional theory of justice, which in the current conditions is turning increasingly 
towards ‘boundary struggles’ - struggles ‘over the boundaries delimiting “economy” from 
“society”, “production from reproduction”, and “work” from family’-,53 promotes ‘the 
kinds of links and overlaps that make public life and social justice meaningful’, for 
example, ‘in allowing the political pursuit of economic objectives possible in the name 
of social goals’.54 
 
9.2.2.2 ‘The personal is political’ 
A good way to explore the issues presented before is to explore what Nancy Fraser’s 
conception of this second wave feminist motto would be.55 Actually, the concept of 
participatory parity, which is extended to the access to the means of interpretation and 
communication even in domestic spheres, has obvious political subtexts, as exemplified 
by the slogan of ‘democracy in the country, in the household, and in bed’.56 The struggle 
‘to redistribute and democratize the access to and control over the means of interpretation 
                                               
51 Arendt (n 49) 51.  
52 On the Right, the paradigmatic example is the inner logic of the market’s spontaneity; on the Left, the 
example is articulated by the idea of ‘spheres of justice’. E Christodoulidis, ‘De-Politicising Poverty: 
Arendt in South Africa’ (2011) 22 Stellenbosch Law Review 501, 518.  
53 N Fraser, ‘Contradictions of Capital and Care’ (2016) 100 New Left Review 99, 103. 
54  Christodoulidis (n 52) 518. He erroneously considers Fraser’s work as aligning with the Right, 
understanding it as an ontological or functional differentiation of spheres. On the contrary, Sandra 
Liebenberg has correctly applied Fraser’s ‘perspectival trialism’ to social rights struggles: although 
judicialisation exhibits ‘depoliticizing tendencies’, it can ‘also serve to enhance participatory politics’. 
‘Needs, rights and transformation: The adjudication of social rights in South Africa’, in T Lovell (ed), 
(Mis)Recognition, Social Inequality and Social Justice: Nancy Fraser and Pierre Bourdieu (Routledge 
2007) 187.   
55  C Hanisch, ‘The Personal Is Political’ (January 2006) 
<http://www.carolhanisch.org/CHwritings/PIP.html> accessed 15 March 2016. ‘Political’, here, not as 
electorial politics, but refering broadly to power relationships. 
56 Attributed to Julieta Kirkwood and Margarita Pisano.  
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and communication’, is, indeed, a struggle ‘for women’s autonomy: a measure of 
collective control over the means of interpretation and communication sufficient to permit 
us to participate on a par with men in all types of social interaction, including deliberation 
and decision-making’.57 To be able to speak in one’s voice, or even bring silences, to 
bring bodies to face-to-face discussions, or to lodge/dislodge from cultural relative 
standing in order to appear in the public realm, are all matters that Fraser attempted to 
address with the standard of participatory parity. 
 
Nevertheless, the standard of participatory parity, as derived from a radical democratic 
interpretation of the liberal principle of equal moral worth, does not mean that everything 
is political, that everything is already a matter of common concern. Here, Fraser coincides 
with Habermas’s position on the grounding of the constitutional right to privacy (private 
autonomy), where ‘[l]egally granted liberties entitle one to drop out of communicative 
action, to refuse illocutionary obligations; they ground a privacy freed from the burden 
of reciprocally acknowledged and mutually expected communicative freedoms’.58 It is 
precisely her respect for the co-originality of private and public autonomy that allows us 
to understand the character of the political axis of ADL: it is for individuals to decide 
whether to go public (or, to the public realm) with their mixed/multiple - whether chosen 
or not - identities, and that is protected by a right to equality and non-discrimination, 
tackling pressures of assimilation (or, as we have seen, covering). Some feminist theories 
emphasise the need for women to bring their sexuality into the public sphere, breaking 
the traditional private/public divide, but they nonetheless argue that the ‘sexual citizen’ 
is a ‘hybrid being’, who has multiple civic identities, and it is for them to decide how to 
transit from their private to the public sphere.59 In this sense, the political axis of ADL 
can be coupled either with the right to privacy, protecting the transition from private to 
public spheres;60 or, on the other hand, with the right to fundamental freedoms in the 
public sphere, such as access to fundamental institutions like marriage.61 On this account, 
for example, sexual citizenship ‘articulates sexuality in the public sphere through claims 
for rights and participation, while also cultivating (and claiming a right to) separate spaces 
for subcultural life.’62  From this Fraserian approach, we get close to freedom-based 
                                               
57 N Fraser, ‘What’s Critical About Critical Theory?’, in Fortunes of Feminism (Verso 2015) 48.  
58 Habermas (n 6) 120. 
59 J Weeks, ‘The Sexual Citizen’ (1998) 15 Theory, Culture & Society 35. 
60 Morris Kaplan’s account of sexual citizenship argues for the importance of intimacy for social and 
political equality (n 22). 
61 J Díez, The Politics of Gay Marriage in Latin America (CUP 2015) 43-7. 
62 C Stychin, Governing Sexuality: the changing politics of citizenship and law reform (Hart 2003) 17; 
quoted in Bamforth (n 23) 489.  
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accounts of ADL, where individuals are entitled to an equal set of deliberative freedoms, 
which insulates them from considering normatively extraneous traits as costs in their 
decisions, whether fundamental (like considering one’s sexual orientation in regard to 
getting married) or trivial (like considering one’s mobility impairments in regard to 
choosing public transportation).63 In the end, it is for individuals to exercise and act upon 
their deliberative freedoms.  
 
In this scenario, Fraser’s approach protects the special character of the political 
community by providing a safe transition from private to public spheres in a particular 
way. As I said before, ADL politicises social relations, such as market transactions, but 
how do we understand ADL’s broader objective of ‘politicisation’? Even if anti-
discrimination claims are frequently not overtly political, they stand on a political axis as 
soon as they emphasise that questions of relative cultural standing are different from mere 
market choices, challenging liberal theories of democracy.64 In this way, ADL provides 
a safe transition from the private to the public realm, where individuals have deliberative 
freedoms to decide for themselves, and consequently act upon them, but at the same time 
posits an important challenge to projects pursuing social equality in an era of de-
democratisation. Indeed, by stressing that market choices are fundamentally different 
from the freedoms associated with the development of our own identities, even if the 
latter could result in trivial decisions in the market realm, ADL accommodates the roots 
of resistance against de-democratisation pressures.65 Even if ADL seems at times to be 
concerned with trivial domestic or market decisions, it hosts the seeds of democratisation 
processes that emphasise the need for citizens to consider their identities not just as pre-
political starting points of deliberation or negotiation (or, worst, mere aggregation), but 
as potential issues for political debate, as issues of common concern to be discussed in 
                                               
63 S Moreau, ‘What is Discrimination?’ (2010) 38 Philosophy & Public Affairs 143.  
64 This is another point of contact between Fraser and Habermas. By emphasising that ADL does not protect 
mere preferences or pre-political liberties, where ‘human rights all but impose themselves on our moral 
insight as something given, anchored in a fictive state of nature’, but rather protects privately reflected and 
socially instantiated identities, the political axis honours the co-originality of private and public autonomy, 
or the mutual dependence between rights and popular sovereignty. Habermas (n 6) 301. In sum, issues of 
relative cultural standing are neither just limits on what politics can do, nor starting points or individual 
interests that should be aggregated within a collective decision-making process.   
65 My argument contrasts with the potential role that ADL could play in societies that observe advanced 
patterns of consumption, where ‘sociation by consumption’, the preferred mode of social integration, can 
accommodate the choices and identities we could associate with progressive readings of ADL (a queer 
theory of consumption?). Indeed, compared to more traditional modes of social integration (eg kinship), 
‘consumer choice appears more voluntary, resulting in social bonds that are less restrictive’, and ‘provides 
a mechanism that allows people to conceive an act of purchase (…) as an act of self-determination and self-
presentation, one that sets the individual apart from social groups while uniting him or her with others’. For 
Wolfgang Streeck, these loose ties threaten the strong ties required for political communities to flourish. 
‘Citizens as Customers’ (2012) 76 New left Review 27, 35. 
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the public sphere even if they are not directly associated with our discursive or 
justificatory capacities. If I have to consider my skin colour as a cost when deciding which 
shop to enter, what is the implication of that curtailed freedom for my standing as a 
political equal, as a citizen?66 As has been repeatedly argued in the field of consumption 
discrimination, where the most frequent instances of discrimination are related with skin 
colour, bodily appearance, or visual traits, these cases are never only about discrimination 
against our status as consumers.67 Understood as standing on a political axis, ADL also 
helps us to protect the special character of the political by preventing negative 
competition between groups. If what matters is justice as participatory parity, struggles 
for recognition are not about a certain amount of positive recognition for a despised 
group; they are mainly about addressing the lack of political agency or enhancing political 
voice.68 In this way, the political axis of a transformative approach to ADL avoids the 
distinction between first- and second-class protected groups, challenging a ‘hierarchy of 
grounds’ that may depend on who the market considers as non-threatening, who mobilises 
more or the sympathies some groups could generate in decision-makers.69 
 
At this point, then, we can ask where can we draw the boundaries between the political 
axis of ADL and the political sphere that Fraser considers as an analytically different 
dimension of justice? How can we understand that everything is somehow political 
without reducing ADL to the political order? In opposition to Rainer Forst, who argues 
that the political is the master dimension of social justice, and that power is the ‘hyper-
good whose distribution determines that of all other goods’, Fraser claims that we should 
not fall prey to ‘politicism’, ‘the view that the social relations of representation determine 
                                               
66 For Lizabeth Cohen, this connection was explicit in civil rights movements. A Consumer’s Republic: The 
Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America (Knopf 2003).  
67 D Kennedy, ‘Consumer Discrimination: The Limitations of Federal Civil Rights Protection’ (2001) 66 
Missouri Law Journal 275, 281.  
68 If the remedy is merely a certain amount of recognition for despised or marginalised identities, nothing 
prevents ADL from being co-opted by discourses of neoliberalism. If neoliberalism considers both 
corporations and citizens as human capital, -which ‘like all other capitals, are constrained by markets in 
both inputs and outputs to comport themselves in ways that will outperform the competition and to align 
themselves with good assessments about where those markets may be going’- then nothing prevents the co-
optation of social struggles such as LGBT mobilisation (‘pinkwashing’). Brown (n 34) 177. If being 
homophobic threatens our market appreciation, markets could be seen as causes of progress. However, if 
market shares do indeed depreciate with commitments to the protection of other identities (eg indigenous), 
nothing prevents markets from instilling competition among groups, in order to cater for marketable 
preferences, and create a different ‘hierarchy of grounds’. 
69 P Neuvonen, ‘“Inequality in equality” in the European Union equality directives: A friend or foe of more 
systematized relationship between the protected grounds?’ (2015) 14 International Journal of 
Discrimination and the Law 222, 234. 
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those of distribution and recognition’.70 As power asymmetries are everywhere, in every 
order, we should not restrict ourselves to struggles for representation, because it will not 
always be sufficient to overcome maldistribution or misrecognition. Moreover, instead of 
depicting ‘persons as givers and receivers of justifications’, Fraser’s account of the 
political conception of the person portrays them ‘as co-participants in an indeterminate 
multiplicity of social practices, which emerge and disappear in a historically open-ended 
process, [which] cannot be specified once and for all’.71 In her view, ‘persons are socially 
situated but potentially autonomous fellow actors, whose (equal) autonomy depends on 
their ability to interact with one another as peers-not only in political reasoning, but in all 
the major arenas and practices that constitute their form of life’.72 In that sense, Fraser’s 
conception of the political stands against radical democratic theories that rely on a 
philosophy of politics or a political ontology ‘whose fundamental task is, in the first 
instance, to isolate and capture the very essence of political being’.73 A critique is also 
targeted at liberal political theories, which assume ‘that it is possible to organize a 
democratic form of political life on the basis of socio-economic and socio-sexual 
structures that generate systemic inequalities’.74 Overall, Fraser’s account of the political 
realm is not detached from its social conditions of possibility and from the everyday 
practices that sustain and renew those conditions, and so broadens her approach to issues 
of empowerment and participation that prevent individuals from being the agents of their 
own interests. Indeed, in contrast to theories of democracy that rely ‘on abstract notions 
of political community and the nature of public reason, where individuals are assumed to 
be more or less equal and political participation is assured’, Fraser embraces the challenge 
of what Olson calls the ‘paradox of participation’, that is, the problem of how to trigger 
participatory parity as the driver for social change when those most in need of it are not 
willing or interested in participating.75 It is precisely here that ADL can again play a 
humble but not unimportant role: it may not be the cornerstone of resistance against de-
democratisation pressures, but, as put by O’Cinneide, it helps ‘to break down the barriers 
                                               
70 N Fraser, ‘Prioritizing Justice as Participatory Parity’, in N Fraser and K Olson (eds), Adding Insult to 
Injury: Nancy Fraser Debates her Critics (Verso 2008) 342, 343; see also, in the same book, R Forst, ‘First 
Things First Redistribution, Recognition and Justification’.  
71 Fraser (n 70) 344. 
72 ibid. 
73 L McNay, The Misguided Search for the Political (Polity Press 2014) 2.  
74 N Fraser, Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the “Postsocialist” Condition (Routledge 1997) 79. 
75 McNay (n 73) 38; ‘The participatory ideal is thus circular. It depends on exactly the same processes it is 
designed to safeguard’: ‘equal political and cultural agency’ K Olson, Reflexive Democracy (MIT Press 
2006) 112. 
 266 
to participation that prevent many marginalised social groups (…) from playing an active 
role in the shaping of their society’.76 
  
ADL, then, is not mainly about the syntax of propositions raised in political domains, but 
is crafted to address power differentials in social relations. In this way, Fraser’s approach 
enriches Fernando Atria’s conception of the political, which assumes equal/reciprocal 
recognition of ‘linguistic’ agents.77 In other words, ADL is not restricted to practices of 
justification, but applies to wider social practices/arenas of social interaction. Although 
ADL prepares individuals for political practices, it is not directed at the many different 
justificatory issues that usually arise in the context of political debates, such as the rules 
of justification, evidence or the need to discuss fundamental issues before deciding with 
binding authority. In that way, the multi-dimensional theory of social justice developed 
by Fraser is able to distinguish the political order, which creates problems of its own, 
from the socio-cultural order, but without ignoring the ‘relations of mutual entwinement 
and reciprocal influence’ between these dimensions. 78  These different orders are 
scrutinised by the principle of participatory parity, which is not a purely procedural 
standard, but also a substantive test to be applied against procedurally fair processes, 
which asks whether the outcomes of decisions ‘will really enhance the fairness of future 
encounters by reducing disparities of participation’.79 In that way, Fraser’s stance against 
politicism considers justification as a principle requiring a threshold of acceptability for 
claims of justice that frequently ignores ‘entrenched asymmetries of power between 
democratic interlocutors’, which usually reside outside political arenas.80 Even if the right 
and duty of justification, as advocated by Rainer Forst, represents an opportunity for 
marginalised groups (their ‘day in Parliament’), we need to complement this approach by 
allowing ‘oppressed subjects to explain their experiences in their own terms and thereby 
hopefully generate enhanced understanding of their normative stance as well as shedding 
light on connections and commonalities with the position of others’. 81  Within this 
                                               
76 C O’Cinneide, ‘Completing the picture: the complex relationship between EU anti-discrimination law 
and “Social Europe”, in N Contouris and  M Freedland (eds), Resocialising Europe in a Time of Crisis 
(CUP 2013) 119.  
77 see 9.2.2.1.  
78 Fraser (n 26) 79.  
79 Fraser (n 70) 340. We can apply this perspective to argue against practices such as the ‘burkini ban’: by 
creating obstacles to Muslim women’s access to public accommodation, we are preventing them from 
‘participating’ in daily ‘arenas’ of social life, and thus curtailing their development as social equals, even 
if there is no justificatory skill at conflict.  
80 L McNay, ‘The limits of justification: Critique, disclosure, and reflexivity’ (2016) European Journal of 
Political Theory (forthcoming).  
81 ibid. 
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account, ADL should not demand that its victims transform their ‘experiences of 
disrespect and exclusion’ into ‘generally and reciprocally justifiable claims to legal, 
political or social inclusion’,82 as claimed by Forst, but ‘demand a recalibration of the 
burden of the conversation about justice, so that it falls more heavily on privileged than 
vulnerable interlocutors’.83 Shifting the burden of proof, or allowing judges to appreciate 
evidence within qualified approaches in favour of the victims, are devices that can help 
us to ‘politicize’ the embodied agencies of disadvantaged groups.84 In this way, we can 
acknowledge that everyday discrimination, like consumption discrimination, 
compromises embodied agency, which is focused on the  
negative experiences of subordination within hierarchical relations 
and the repercussions these have on the capacity of individuals to act 
as autonomous political agents. For many individuals, a consequence 
of the lived reality of oppression is that they may acquire a deep-
seated dispositional reluctance to act as agents of their own interests.85  
 
Therefore, everything, even the personal, is political in the sense that it shapes and 
determines our relative social standing in regard to participating as peers in social life, 
and not everything is political in the sense that addressing power asymmetries is not 
restricted to ‘the practice of demanding and receiving political justifications’, as argued 
by some theories of justice. 86  By politicising social relations, then, ADL not only 
promotes equal autonomy, but attempts to strike down barriers to participatory parity as 
impediments to full membership in society, and avoids the ‘alienation from one one’s 
society and fellow actors’.87 For example, by tackling discrimination on the ground of 
visible traits, ADL brings into question ‘certain types of structural oppression [that] are 
rendered politically invisible by being internalized as corporeal dispositions’ and 
expressed as reluctance to participate as peers in social and political life.88 In this way, 
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from Fraser’s approach, ADL gets immersed with the paradox of participation, and helps 
to ‘envision a transition to more just social arrangements via political processes that occur 
by definition in unjust circumstances’.89  
 
The political axis of ADL suggests that even if its case law seems to be concerned with a 
non-political dimension of participation, these are precisely the instances where political 
agency is activated. In the more serious cases, ADL engages with everyday interactions 
that are sometimes symptomatic of political marginalisation. Let us think of the Roma 
communities, which are almost politically invisible, the optimal case study for the 
paradox of enablement. Even in cases where social policies benefit members of the Roma 
population, they usually lack any voice in the design of those policies. One would think 
that giving them political presence, or what Olson calls the remedy of inclusion, would 
be the preferred remedy. 90  However, we could also think of instances of everyday 
discrimination and exclusion of the Roma population from shops, restaurants or other 
accommodation as addressed with the familiar devices of ADL: consumption or 
workplace discrimination, rather than bigger or more ambitious proposals for giving them 
political presence that are subject to paternalism. The political axis, then, suggests that to 
trigger political agency, ADL may be used as a tactical and strategic decision to ignite 
the capacities of the Roma population to be the agents of their own interests.  
 
9.2.2.3 The character of political communities 
Overall, Fraser’s interpretation of the statement ‘the personal is political’ provides an 
interesting opportunity for ADL, understood as compromising communicative rights that 
mediate between private and public spheres, to play a humble but not unimportant role in 
political struggles. By emphasising that personal choices are not the same as market 
choices, and by keeping the boundaries with the political realm, ADL contributes to the 
protection of the special character of the political community. In that way, it is difficult 
to keep sustaining the idea that ADL could work as a pure recognition device, an idea that 
has been accused of being complicit with current neo-liberal discourses that undo the 
demos. As Streeck puts it:  
Political communities are republics that cannot by their very nature 
be turned into markets, or not without depriving them of some of their 
central qualities. Unlike the highly flexible communities of choice 
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that emerge in societies governed by advanced patterns of 
consumption, political communities are basically communities of 
fate. (…) [T]hey ask their members not to insist on their separate 
individuality but to accept a collectively shared identity, integrating 
the former into the latter.91  
Even if Streeck’s definition of political communities is normatively too demanding and 
empirically untenable, insofar as it neglects the possibility of multiple and shifting 
loyalties within a polity, it articulates the fundamental political question for this chapter.92 
The question, then, is how to integrate separate individualities, which are nevertheless 
socially instantiated, into collectively shared identities, the basis of political communities. 
The features of political relations described by Streeck point towards the need to foster 
relations based on identities that are not akin to market preferences, and that constitute a 
pre-condition of sincere and authentic political dialogues. The political axis of ADL, then, 
will not make things easier, but will enhance a conception of deliberative democracy 
where ‘[d]ifferently situated actors create democratic publicity by acknowledging that 
they are together and that they must work together to try to solve collective problems’.93 
Integrating separate individualities into collectively shared identities  
may not bring about agreed-on solutions so much as reveal the 
structural conflicts of interest that would be obscured by discussion 
which successfully claimed that at bottom we have common interest. 
If in fact a society is structurally divided in this way, then deliberative 
processes ought to aim to reveal and confront such division, rather 
than exhort those who may have morally legitimate grievances to 
suppress them for the sake of some people’s definition of a common 
good.94 
 
By politicising interpersonal relations, ADL should be put at the service not of capitalist 
accumulation or neoliberal rationalities, but of a particular understanding of the barriers 
to participation that usually remain hidden in liberal or radical theories of democracy. 
Furthermore, as proposed by the discourse theory of democracy, ADL constitutes a 
crucial element of the system of rights included in contemporary constitutions, which 
‘ensure that collective identities can be formed which are not detached – like national 
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identities- from the plural normative basis of the life-world’.95 Complemented with a 
critical social theory, such as the one that Fraser develops, which addresses the ‘paradox 
of participation’ (or better, ‘of enablement’), ‘the public sphere can act once again as a 
radical-progressive force for social change, between economy and the state’.96 
 
9.3 The political axis of Latin American ADL 
The history of democracy is the history of the expansion of the scope of civil, political 
and social rights. In this way, as has been argued before in this work, the right to equality 
and non-discrimination is intimately connected with the political order. The overview of 
the history of ADL in Latin America described the processes by which waves of rights 
were granted to Latin Americans, a non-linear progress, which emerges from the 
application of T.H. Marshall’s approach to different social realities.97 Nowadays, with 
almost universal coverage of rights for all adults, citizenship studies in the region have 
shifted their focus towards the impact of these rights in the face of poverty, social and 
economic inequality, criminality and the (un)rule of law.98 Within this framework, the 
study of the political axis of ADL should start from the interimbrication between the 
political and cultural spheres and address the most acute forms of misrepresentation or 
misrecognition. Regarding representation, we could point to the relationship between 
ADL and strong publics, or to the impact of discrimination on processes of democratic 
consolidation, two of the most important issues on the agenda of regional organisations 
and domestic publics.   
 
For an empirical perspective, the connection between experiences of everyday 
discrimination in Latin America and the political attitudes held by the victims (eg, support 
for democracy or party systems, political trust, external political efficacy) is fragmentary 
and sometimes contradictory.99 As Levitt puts it, it is not clear ‘[w]hat causal processes 
might link the experience of discrimination with changes in one’s orientation toward 
one’s political system’.100 Therefore, it is quite difficult to enquire into whether legally 
tackling discrimination is positively associated with interpersonal trust between fellow 
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citizens, support for the institutions of representative democracy (courts, parties, the 
executive, congress, etc.), or general support for democracy. For some, redressing 
everyday discrimination in private or social settings is crucial, as it is what matters for 
measures of broader interpersonal and, hence, political trust;101 for others, it is sufficient 
to prevent discrimination in the relations between citizens and public institutions, which 
is positively associated with political support for the institutions of representative 
democracy (eg, experiencing low levels of discrimination in dealings with local courts 
might enhance support for political institutions).102 Although multiple dimensions shape 
political attitudes (economic inequality, level of development, corruption, etc.), what is 
clear is that discrimination across different domains (private, social or public settings) is 
negatively correlated with processes of democratisation. In this scenario, how are we to 
understand the interimbrication between the political and cultural dimensions in the 
practice of Latin American ADL? Although several legal venues in the region consider 
discrimination an issue of public interest, the interimbrication between the political and 
the cultural dimensions of discrimination is not always articulated. Acknowledging the 
puzzling questions posed by political scientists, in what follows, I will describe instances 
of Latin American ADL that highlight the political axis of ADL and its transformative 
potential, that is, the capacity to alter the terrain upon which futures struggles will be 
waged.  
 
The most basic association between ADL and strong publics (political decision-makers) 
in Latin America has been triggered by the rapid enactment of gender quotas or 
indigenous/ethnic reservations for positions of political power. Indeed, almost every 
country in Latin America has some form of gender quota, and those countries with an 
important indigenous population have advanced positive actions regarding political 
representation at the local and national levels.103  Alternatively, some countries have 
amended their electoral laws to improve representativeness and include marginalised 
groups. In Fraserian jargon, these cases represent either remedies for representation, with 
recognition subtexts (‘no representation without recognition’), which attempt to correct 
the ordinary-political representation of disadvantaged groups in decision-making venues 
(eg, shifting to proportional systems that tend to improve gender representation), or 
affirmative remedies within struggles for recognition, with political subtexts (‘no 
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recognition without representation’), which are represented by the formal enactment and 
proper implementation of gender quotas or ethnic reservations. Several of the legislative 
proposals for gender quotas have been scrutinised in judicial review processes and, in 
general, have been declared compatible with the constitutional right to equality and non-
discrimination. 104  However, when ADL is closely connected with an expanded 
understanding of what political equality entails, we could instead resort to broader 
constitutional guarantees regarding electoral principles, or to devices crafted to protect 
the guarantee of political equality.105 In other words, even if the source of injustice relies 
in cultural value patterns that infringe upon participatory parity (eg, the fact that political 
party meetings that decide the list of candidates take place in the evening is based on the 
assumption that women are not willing to undertake a political candidacy, or do not have 
the capacity to be available at all times to address party issues), the enactment of gender 
quotas or ethnic reservation represents a clear political remedy, in Fraser’s terms, an 
example of cross-redressing.106 This is exemplified by the introduction of gender quotas 
in electoral laws, or in the chapters of constitutional texts that deal with legislative or 
administrative powers rather than in sections that articulate a catalogue of rights.107  
 
Nevertheless, as I explained in previous sections, the political axis of ADL has added 
value as an anti-misrecognition device when focused in the broader social realm. For 
example, by providing spaces of ‘withdrawal and regroupment’, affirmative remedies of 
misrecognition, where despised or devalued identities acquire a new status, have an 
impact on political mobilisation. The increasing presence of indigenous/ethnic 
movements in political processes was, in part, triggered by previous processes of soft-
multiculturalism, which implied the recognition of indigenous/ethnic identities as 
protected grounds of discrimination.108 Even if ADL looked innocent at the beginning, as 
a merely symbolic recognition of previously demeaned identities, in the long-term it was 
part of the factors that ignited the subsequent ethnic and  indigenous mobilisation.109 
Struggles for recognition, as described within the principle of the group dimension, were 
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mainly about the political voice or political agency of social or collective agents.110 In 
what follows, though, I want to focus on cases of Latin American ADL that highlight 
Fraser’s insights, presented before, that is, the politicisation of private and social 
encounters, and the protection of the special features of the political.  
 
The most recent regional human rights treaty is focused on discrimination and 
intolerance, and starts by stating that the principles of equality and non-discrimination are 
‘dynamic democratic principles’ that grant ‘equal protection against every form of 
discrimination and intolerance in any ambit of private or public life’.111  This is the 
consolidation of a consensus that has been emerging among experts on the issue, which 
points to the fact that the groups that are most heavily discriminated against are usually 
those who do not have access to political participation (or are not interested), and that 
without political presence, these groups will not be able to overcome their situation.112 
This consensus represents an interesting approach to overcoming obstacles for political 
participation that do not have their source in a certain political ontology, but, rather, in 
the depoliticising effects of domination and oppression, or in the lack of subjective 
political agency. Let us explore some instances of the political axis of ADL in Latin 
America. 
 
The first group of cases concerns the rights of LGBT individuals, who resort to strategies 
of legal mobilisation based on their right to equality and non-discrimination, on the 
grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. Paradigmatic in this sense is the case 
of Karen Atala, a Chilean lesbian judge who was discriminated against on the grounds of 
her sexual orientation within a child custody process; this was the first case regarding this 
issue to be adjudicated by the IACtHR.113 The IACtHR’s reasoning was based in the ius 
cogens status of the right to equality and non-discrimination, and it followed the ECtHR 
in confirming that a dynamic interpretation of the ACHR could include other grounds of 
protection that the original drafters did not explicitly consider.114 The significance of 
Atala relies on the duty to consider sexual orientation and gender identity as protected 
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grounds, an authoritative interpretation that will prove highly influential across all fields 
of law.   
 
For the political axis of ADL, this innovative jurisprudence is important for breaking 
down barriers of participation that usually remain hidden in the social and private spheres. 
Indeed, the Atala case assumes that in order for individuals to participate in the political 
community, they should be able to present themselves as they are, with the life choices 
they have made individually and collectively: ‘the right to non-discrimination due to 
sexual orientation is not limited to the fact of being a homosexual per se, but includes its 
expression and the ensuing consequences in a person’s life project’.115 In other words, 
LGBT individuals should be able to have privacy and intimacy, and to act upon decisions 
and identities developed in the transition from the private/social to social/public 
realms.116 Concomitant with other domestic courts that understood homosexuality as an 
‘essential and intimate part of an individual’s identity’, which is to be read within a 
framework that combines the rights to privacy, to full and free development of 
personality, and to equality and non-discrimination, the Atala case highlights the political 
significance of LGBT rights.117 In this way, as Lucy Taylor writes in analysing Latin 
America’s citizenship studies, ‘a sense of identity as a political being (a politico-cultural) 
element’ complements and combines with the ‘tools and framework of citizenship 
(formalised legal rights and responsibilities)’.118 Being the first case to adjudicate on 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, the Atala case ‘went beyond the 
protection of people facing a situation of psychical and psychological abuse’,119 and 
advanced the idea of a public understanding of liberty rights, like privacy, which can shed 
light on the need to challenge the obstacles to political participation that occur when 
‘objective inequalities are taken into the body and naturalized as subjective 
dispositions’.120 Atala, thus, makes the case for protecting both identities and agencies, 
the case for protecting not only normative spaces for the exercise of deliberative 
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freedoms, usually related to intimacy, privacy or the household, but the (bodily) 
behaviours displayed in the social and public realms. 
 
Another obvious kind of struggle to seek the basis of the political axis of ADL is feminist 
mobilisation in the region. In the first half of the past century, even before achieving the 
right to vote, women used legal channels to demand their status as full members of the 
community. In a famous judgment in 1921, the Argentinian Supreme Court 
acknowledged that citizenship is not restricted to vote, and is based on a broader notion 
of belonging, granting women access to public positions.121 A similar reasoning was 
advanced in Mexico, regarding the citizenship of women and their right to abortion in 
certain cases (1936), almost two decades before they were able to vote (1953). 122 
Although these cases were not representative of the dominant legal thinking of their time, 
they are considered the precedents of current developments in Latin American ADL, 
which stress the political consequences of advancing gender equality within the social 
realm. In Argentina, for example, the Supreme Court declared the constitutional validity 
of a high-profile public school that changed its male-only admission policy to incorporate 
women. In the reasoning, the court declared that by denying women the possibility of 
being educated among men in an excellent school, the state was ‘denying women’s 
participation and contribution to social development according to their capacities and 
talents’. 123  The judgment, which moves between an anti-classification and anti-
subordination framework, is considered to be a landmark case that underlines a shift from 
state neutrality regarding the social realm (education, family, household) to the political 
consideration of enhancing the participation of women across several societal domains.124 
More explicit was the landmark ruling of the Bolivian Plurinational Constitutional Court, 
in reviewing the constitutionality of several pre-constitutional legal arrangements that 
were declared incompatible with the new commitments to gender equality, de-
colonisation and de-patriarchalisation of the Constitution of 2009.125 In an individual 
opinion, Judge Ligia Velázquez argued that these guiding principles entailed enhancing 
the participation of women, in its different forms, in all political, economic and social 
domains, and thus their status as full members of the political community. According to 
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her, rights such as abortion should be understood under this political axis and not through 
the right to privacy or the individual interests of the woman.126  
 
Another important group of gender equality cases concerns the reasons to include women 
(sex) as a protected group, stressing that what matters is not only a history of subjugation, 
social exclusion or marginalisation, but the fact that they are generally politically 
powerless.127 Even if women have become presidents of Latin American countries and 
currently have a historical presence in decision-making venues, there are many barriers 
to political participation that remain widespread in many different domains. The ‘paradox 
of political powerlessness’, then, has still not reached the level of some developed 
countries, and women can still plausibly present themselves as powerless in order to get 
protection from the law.128 For the Peruvian Supreme Court, classification on the grounds 
of sex is considered to be presumptively unconstitutional especially because women are 
not generally ‘part of the dominant groups that participate, debate and create the legal 
norms’.129 Therefore, an anti-classification approach is complemented by the political 
consideration of the incorporation of women as a protected group of ADL, especially in 
those jurisdictions that have embraced some form of the ‘suspect clauses/tiers of scrutiny’ 
approach, such as Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.130  
 
Moving on to the right to abortion or broader reproductive rights, as Bergallo and Michel 
put it, even  
the more progressive courts still find it strikingly difficult to point 
conclusively to the criminalization of abortion as a form of gender-
based discrimination to account for the burden of unwanted 
pregnancy in its physical and social dimension, and to articulate the 
idea of equality in difference.131  
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Thus, appeals to equality, autonomy or the principle of the ‘free development of 
personality’ have only appeared in individual opinions or dissenting votes, where 
reproductive rights are explicitly connected to women’s full membership in the political 
community.132  In the famous ruling on the right to abortion until the 12th week of 
pregnancy in Mexico City, the individual opinion of Judge Genaro Góngora started from 
the doubts that the Mexican Supreme Court expressed when addressing the status of the 
embryo before 12 weeks of gestation. In contrast, he declared his certainty that ‘women 
are persons, human beings with a name that require real recognition of their status as 
citizens responsible of decisions that concern directly with their bodies and life projects, 
without being punished for that’.133 This statement, which is much celebrated by feminist 
movements in Mexico, showed an understanding of the struggle for reproductive rights 
as the consolidation of a longstanding history of struggles for citizenship, dating back to 
the 1930s.134 
 
Lastly, as advanced at the beginning of the chapter, consumer discrimination in Latin 
America has provided a viable alternative for redressing everyday discrimination, 
triggering successive processes of political empowerment, as has happened with some 
Afro-descendant communities, who were not originally covered by the legal recognition 
of ethnic and indigenous identities or territorial autonomies.135 In Peru, INDECOPI is one 
of the leading public institutions in redressing discrimination, endorsing an active stance 
against discriminatory practices or behaviours that take place in the ‘messiness and 
fluidity of everyday commercial transactions’. 136  Acknowledging widespread 
discrimination on the grounds of skin colour and appearance in Peruvian nightclubs, the 
INDECOPI promoted the incorporation of protection from discrimination in the case of 
consumption (1998), highlighting that the consumer is nothing but the ‘economic 
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dimension of citizenship’.137 Therefore, the public interest in non-discrimination within 
consumption exchanges relies not only on the protection of market virtues, but on the 
protection of spaces of citizenship formation.138 A similar reasoning backed the Chilean 
incorporation of consumption discrimination, and its later development with the 
enactment of law 20.609 (CHIADL), where legal intervention was understood as going 
beyond merely patrimonial protection. 139  The administrative agency for consumer 
protection (SERNAC) has now launched a campaign, ‘Become yourself a SERNAC 
citizen’ and, moreover, has adopted an active stance against sexist advertisements, despite 
not having special legal powers to tackle this issue.140 
  
Current approaches to theories of citizenship in Latin America suggest that ‘citizenship 
as consumption’ constitutes a new model that is explained by ‘the provision of universal 
political rights in the absence of universal civil rights and declining social rights.’141 On 
this account, citizens can exercise their right to vote but have restricted channels for 
political/legal accountability and for autonomous spaces of self-organisation (what 
Guillermo O’Donnell calls ‘delegative democracies’), which are further curtailed by 
poverty and economic inequality.142 Moreover, identities can have symbolic importance 
for the status of citizens as consumers, but are immediately repressed when they become 
politicised and act as catalysts for political mobilisation.143 Nevertheless, as the cases here 
show, consumption discrimination provides spaces for political deliberation, for focusing 
on injustices that predate the quest for the true political being. The political axis, thus, 
becomes a crucial device to analyse discriminatory practices that take place in 
consumption transactions and that in the long term become entrenched as corporeal or 
psychological dispositions, which are expressed as reluctance to become political agents 
due to a lack of social recognition.144   
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9.4 Conclusion  
Drawing on Nancy Fraser’s theory, I argued that the political axis of ADL helps us in 
overcoming the problems of the ‘misguided search for the political’. To address the 
‘paradox of participation’, ADL attempts to locate specific injustices or barriers to 
participation that are mainly grounded in the cultural sphere and have serious impacts on 
individuals and groups’ capacities to be the agents of their own interests. In this way, 
Fraser’s approach is directed against some theories of radical democracy that are gaining 
rapid ground in Latin America, which eschew an analysis of the causes and conditions 
that prevent marginalised or disadvantaged individuals and groups from acting politically. 
For Contreras, 
the central purpose of a renewed critical theory is to direct our gaze 
toward the potentials of the rebellion, transformation, and rupture 
carried out by antisystemic movements and to boost their obstructed 
capacities in order to establish the conditions of possibility for 
democratic, socialist, and plural processes of individual and collective 
self-determination.145 
Despite his radical commitments, he does not explain how he plans to boost ‘their 
obstructed capacities’, and seems to take for granted the agency and moral authority of 
‘antisystemic movements’. The ‘political axis’, instead, suggests going one step before, 
and inquiring into the conditions for political agency that may be encouraged by ADL. 
Rather than addressing claims against the system as a whole, this principle is attentive to 
the political agencies inscribed in the daily claims of indigenous and LGBT persons of 
being treated as equals and without discrimination. While some radical theories of 
democracy are looking for the conditions of rebellion and revolution, the political axis 
attempts to ‘boost’ the agency of those who may not even be in the mood for joining 
‘antisystemic movements’. As pointed out by Sandra Fredman, instead of being merely a 
constraint of what politics can do, ADL is fundamental for an adequate functioning of 
democracy because it creates proper arenas for deliberation.146 What I have done in this 
chapter is to explain in which way ADL enriches a critical theory of the public sphere, 
while enhancing the special character of political communities. Therefore, the political 
axis of ADL contributes to its consideration as a special case of ‘non-reformist reform’. 
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Concluding Remarks 
10.1 Overview 
This thesis has developed the basis of what I have called a transformative approach to 
ADL in Latin America and the place of this emergent field of law in progressive political 
projects. In the first part, I provided an account of what we have, a vast repertoire of anti-
discrimination provisions, which are the outcome of recent constitutional transformations 
in the region. Although this part relied mainly on a description of recent constitutional 
transformations regarding the right to equality and non-discrimination, I never abandoned 
a normative stance about what should guide the commitments to this right, which far from 
desirable social policies, entail proper constitutional imperatives. According to different 
reasons that support a constitutional conception of ADL, and current debates in Latin 
American constitutional scholarship, I argued that EDC offers the best account of these 
constitutional transformations, and provides an avenue for effectively implementing the 
constitutional duties to tackle discrimination. Indeed, this current of Latin American 
constitutionalism honours the double commitment to political self-determination and 
individual autonomy, characteristic of the republican tradition in Latin America, while 
developing an approach to constitutions, understood as a set of institutional choices.  
 
In particular, through the lens of EDC, Latin American ADL entails a commitment to 
legal reforms that can enforce the already generous anti-discrimination provisions, going 
beyond the mere enforcement of liberal standards of equal, fair or impartial treatment. As 
explained at the end of the first part, EDC’s concern with entering into the ‘engine rooms’ 
is an attempt to articulate constitutional duties into concrete decision-making processes, 
providing a narrative from which to elaborate on a constitutional conception of ADL that 
acknowledges the synergic relation between law and social change, on the one hand, and 
law and democratic consolidation, on the other. Through the lens of EDC, we can 
approach the study of recent institutional innovations in the field of ADL, as the cases of 
Mexico and Argentina illustrated. Bridging the gap between strong constitutional 
aspirations, which motivate an intense regional debate, and their realisation on the 
ground, do not simply depend on a naked devolution of rules from human beings to legal 
structures (the ideal of a ‘government of laws, not of men’); on the contrary, as advocated 
by EDC, bridging this gap depends on strengthening the foundational double commitment 
to collective self-determination and individual autonomy, and to institutions that can 
trigger the behaviours and attitudes necessary to sustain the rule of law. In this project, 
ADL seems to occupy a central place.  
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In the second part, this work provided the reader with the grounds of a critical social 
theory of ADL in Latin America, identifying six principles that constitute the 
transformative approach I defended here. As I said in the introduction, the two parts are 
joined by the method that Nicola Lacey calls ‘normative reconstruction’.1 I argued that 
without a critical social theory of ADL, with the ability to address the perils and 
possibilities of this emergent field of law, the constitutional conception of ADL is doomed 
to fail. Indeed, without a clear understanding of the ways in which ADL can work as a 
‘disclosing critique’, that is, in unmasking the different forms of law and legal discourse 
as ‘ideological domination’, where symbolic forms ‘are used to naturalize and legitimize 
exploitative and unequal social relations and, above all, to manufacture political 
quiescence’, the constitutional conception of ADL will remain unable to understand the 
place of ADL within progressive political projects.2 With the help of Nancy Fraser’s 
social theory, I defined ADL mainly as an anti-misrecognition device (culture), though 
thoroughly interimbricated with the other spheres (the political and the economic), which 
allows us to imbue our critical theory with some ‘reflexivity’, warning against the dangers 
of ‘ideology critique’ becoming ‘yet another ideological mode of thinking’, and 
reproducing ‘prejudicial beliefs that themselves reinforce or mystify unjust social 
hierarchies’.3 Consequently, I warned of those instances where ADL risks becoming an 
all-encompassing device, able to frame social struggles against any possible harm, in 
every domain of justice, constraining our limited capacities to wage these struggles. In 
the current state of financialised capitalism, moreover, ADL risks becoming a device for 
‘legal neoliberalism’, instilling market rationality in every sphere, in places where it was 
previously absent, or an instrument that bypasses the special character of the political 
community. In any case, a critical social theory of ADL urges us to be aware of the 
dangers of using the wrong remedy, creating new harms, or reviving older ones, or of 
bypassing the need to address social realities before crafting strategies for social 
mobilisation. Although critical legal theories are always aware of the importance of 
reflexivity, especially regarding the perils of rights-talk or the strategies of rights-
mobilisation, there is a gap in the literature in terms of the possibility of critically 
addressing a single field of law in a certain context, and practically reshaping it towards 
                                               
1 N Lacey, ‘Normative Reconstruction in Socio-Legal Theory’ (1996) 5 Social & Legal Studies 131. 
2 L McNay, ‘Contemporary Critical Theory’, in M Freeden and M Stears (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Political Ideologies (OUP 2013) 140. 
3 ibid. 
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emancipation.4 In a way, this thesis attempted to develop a critical social theory of ADL 
that is capable of both disclosure and reflexivity, but also with an interest in practical 
emancipation, starting from the current unequal social conditions in which individuals 
are situated, that is, with a minimum of perspicacity: the ability to say something 
insightful and practical to our current struggles, to the justice claims of our age.  
 
With the help of Nancy Fraser’s theory of social justice, again, I was able to look at the 
practice of Latin American ADL to elaborate on the six principles explained in the second 
part. In particular, these principles play an important part in the tasks of ‘normative 
reconstruction’, through which ADL can be approached and articulated as a critical legal 
project in itself. Through these principles, we can view ADL in Latin America as entailing 
a ‘critique of existing legal and social arrangements’; moreover, with the help of these 
principles, we can imagine ‘different ethical values, relationships, and institutions’, and 
design ‘political strategies which seek to change current legal-institutional arrangements’, 
providing a roadmap for the legal reforms needed for the definitive consolidation and 
effective enforcement of ADL in the region (in brief, ADL as a paradigmatic example of 
a ‘nonreformist reform’).5  
 
The practice of Latin American ADL shows this emergent field of law as calling upon 
people’s individual and collective identities within existing legal frameworks/grammars 
of recognition, while also setting in motion ‘a trajectory of change in which more radical 
reforms become practicable over time’.6 The different principles developed in the last 
part show how ADL goes way beyond the mere liberal protection of the principle of 
equality before the law, ‘changing incentive structures and political opportunity 
structures’, while expanding ‘the set of feasible options for future reforms’.7 To put it in 
different terms, rather than merely affirming the authority of law, its universal character 
and consistency requirements, the practice of Latin American ADL exposes the contested 
character of its application, accommodating the roots for a broader movement of 
progressive social change, without prejudging the ultimate aim of emancipation. In other 
words, as a ‘non-reformist reform’, ADL does not articulate the moment when we will 
                                               
4 C Douzinas and C Gearty (eds), The Meanings of Rights: The Philosophy and Social Theory of Human 
Rights (CUP 2014) 7. 
5 Lacey (n 1) 131. 
6 N Fraser, ‘Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation’, 
in Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?: A political-philosophical exchange (Verso 2003) 
79. 
7 ibid. 
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achieve emancipation, but constitutes a movement for ‘conceiving and pursuing reforms 
that deliver real, present-day results while also opening paths for more radical struggles, 
more structural change in the future’. 
 
Considering the arguments summarised above, I can conclude by stating that ‘normative 
reconstruction’ should start from a well-developed constitutional conception of ADL that 
makes sense of recent constitutional transformations. Rather than starting from zero, or 
transplanting/importing foreign equality law regimes, the project of normative 
reconstruction, as articulated through the principles developed here, must acknowledge 
that Latin American ADL offers a rich set of provisions and regimes from which to move 
forward. If EDC is concerned with the translation of constitutional commitments into 
concrete decision-making processes, a critical social theory of ADL helps us in 
understanding the way in which this translation can take place. In that way, for example, 
the principle of state intervention acknowledges that there is no space for the Latin 
American state to bypass the need to address social and cultural changes and intervene 
even against a moral or social consensus that affects discriminated groups. In that regard, 
any process of legal reform in the area of ADL needs to put the state and its institutions 
at the frontline against discrimination, acknowledging the potential transformative 
capacities vis-à-vis spontaneous social change. To advance another example, the 
principle of legal empowerment/mobilisation should prompt wider access to justice, 
either to traditional judicial venues, or to newer instances of administrative justice. Hence, 
collective or class actions, public interest litigation, and the development of a relaxed 
burden of proof, are crucial to recognising the unequal social conditions in which victims 
of discrimination currently stand, especially in a region where the democratic channels 
are still difficult for disadvantaged groups. The socio-economic lens, for its part, makes 
us conscious of the inevitable socio-economic dimension of the principle of equality and 
non-discrimination on a continent with alarming social indicators. In particular, it 
prompts ADL to address poverty and socio-economic inequality in connection with the 
development of social rights, aware of those aspects of socio-economic disadvantage that 
can be addressed by equality law. 
 
10.2 Contributions of the thesis to the existing literature 
There are four main contributions that this dissertation has attempted to achieve. As I 
noticed in different parts, the literature on ADL in Latin America is scarce, and does not 
reflect beyond the recent progress in both domestic constitutional schemes and within the 
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IAHRS. Indeed, there is no textbook or handbook on the issue, either from a national or 
regional perspective, and this emergent field does not seem to motivate a scholarly 
analysis on its doctrinal boundaries or guiding principles. At a domestic level, there are 
studies that focus on one protected ground of discrimination, or that address 
discrimination within a discrete area of law, such as employment discrimination. 8 
However, there are no general accounts of ADL as it emerges in every legal debate in 
Latin America, occupying a central place of what legal commitments entail for 
discriminated groups. At the regional level, moreover, despite the lack of institutional 
integration in Latin America, an emergent doctrine on the status of equality and non-
discrimination within Latin American Human Rights law has not moved away from 
general statements, granting this right the status of ius cogens. In this scenario, this 
dissertation constitutes the first overview of the current status and future possibilities of 
anti-discrimination legal projects in Latin America. At the same time, however, this 
general account of Latin American ADL starts from recent constitutional transformations, 
which generate processes of convergence between different jurisdictions and common 
discourses around law, such as the place of Latin American ADL within the trinitarian 
mantra of the constitutionalist faith, that is, within the principles of democracy, the rule 
of law, and human rights. In that regard, this general contribution to the scarce literature 
on the issue is not detached from processes of convergence that are currently taking place 
in the region, and that allows us to develop a common approach to Latin American ADL.   
 
Secondly, the thesis contributes with a critical legal approach that is sidelined by 
mainstream anti-discrimination legal scholarship. Although many of the scholars I quoted 
in this work are aware of the transformative potential of ADL, they have neither addressed 
the particular place that ADL may occupy within broader progressive political projects 
nor the possibility that ADL may be a critical legal project in itself. Indeed, many anti-
discrimination legal scholars rely on Fraser’s multi-dimensional theory of social justice 
to develop the normative underpinnings of ADL, or to explain the the different 
dimensions or the scope of anti-discrimination legal provisions.9 However, they seem to 
underestimate the potential of critical social theories, and of Nancy Fraser’s theory in 
particular, to provide a ‘self-clarification of the struggles and wishes of our age’, among 
                                               
8 E Vela, La Discriminación en el Empleo en México (Instituto Belisario Domínguez 2017). 
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them, the struggles we deploy in the name, or through the means of ADL.10 In the current 
state of post-socialist conditions, where processes of modernisation push towards 
social/political disintegration and systemic/market integration, ADL may be presented as 
nothing more than a balsam against more structural problems and therefore drained from 
its transformative potential. In this scenario, a critical legal framework to analyse the 
strengths and limits of anti-discrimination legal projects, which are becoming a common 
currency in many jurisdictions, becomes urgent. This could be particularly interesting to 
critically address the alleged success of equality regimes such as the one developed within 
the EU.  
 
Moreover, as I advanced in some parts of the research, Nancy Fraser’s theory of social 
justice has been criticised for neglecting the analysis of law as a separate sphere, 
bypassing the centrality of law and rights for current political and social struggles. 
However, as I explained at the beginning of the second part, her ‘comprehensive theory 
of social justice’ offers the materials from which to reconstruct her legal thoughts, 
elaborating an idea of law as being both constitutive and instrumental for the struggles of 
our age. In this way, this thesis constitutes an attempt to answer Fraser’s critics by 
deploying her theory of social justice for the concrete struggles of our age, such as those 
waged within ADL, and in that sense makes a contribution to the multiple ramifications 
of Fraser’s comprehensive/multi-dimensional theory.   
 
Finally, throughout this work, I have avoided the image of the ‘Failed Law of Latin 
America’, which places Latin American law as a secondary source for comparative or 
transnational legal debates. An indirect effect of the image of a ‘Failed Law’, which is 
crucial for comparative anti-discrimination law, entails discrediting the possibility that 
Latin American ADL can have a say in broader debates.11 Indeed, this is what happened 
to Latin American labour law in the face of neo-liberal reforms, which considered labour 
rights as mere rigidities to be displaced by a new labour market facilitating movements 
of labour assets.12 The Latin American tradition of labour rights, which dates back to the 
Mexican struggles of the beginning of the twentieth century, was a common reference for 
early comparative studies on labour rights, but this is no longer the case. In this thesis, I 
                                               
10 N Fraser, ‘What’s Critical About Critical Theory?’, in Fortunes of Feminism (Verso 2013) 19. 
11 J Esquirol, ‘Legal Latin Americanism’ (2013) 16 Yale Human Rights & Development Journal 145, 158-
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have explored the possibility that Latin American ADL can make a contribution to the 
emancipatory potential of this field of law for comparative legal debates. Although, in 
itself, that would require a separate research project, my thesis constitutes a basis from 
which that contribution can draw its support. Indeed, Latin American ADL has a specific 
constitutional grounding that departs from the origins of ADL in other jurisdictions, 
where concerns with market expansion or unfair competitive advantages were crucial for 
the early development of equality clauses, and from those constitutional groundings 
develop a place for ADL as central for aspirational or transformative constitutionalism. 
Or, the particular class awareness of Latin American ADL in recent legal practices, as I 
have described here, may constitute an interesting innovation that needs to be addressed 
by comparative equality law.  
 
10.3 Implications and future research 
At first glance, one of the possible objections against my work is the lack of a theoretical 
account of anti-discrimination regimes as they currently exist in several jurisdictions in 
Latin America. Nevertheless, as I advanced in the introductory chapter, the aim of this 
work did not rely on a complete doctrinal reconstruction or on a theoretical account of 
ADL as it is, but rather on an enquiry into a transformative approach to this field of law 
that could start from recent constitutional transformations. In that regard, it endorsed a 
general account of Latin American ADL that could orient the reader towards the 
emancipatory potential that ADL exhibits in the chosen dataset. Latin America has still 
to consolidate anti-discrimination legal regimes that could trigger doctrinal 
reconstructions that present ADL as a distinct field of law. Therefore, one of the future 
research questions that emerges from this thesis is whether a more detailed analysis of 
concrete anti-discrimination regimes could accommodate the transformative approach to 
ADL defended here. In this way, maybe a complete doctrinal reconstruction of a concrete 
anti-discrimination regime makes the approach defended here untenable, and better suits 
traditional liberal interpretations of the right to equality and non-discrimination or other 
normative accounts.  
 
Another question relates to the particular roles that the principles of a transformative 
approach can play in the last task of normative reconstruction, that is, the design of 
‘political strategies which seek to change current legal-institutional arrangements’ and 
the imagination of alternative institutional choices for the advancement of human 
freedom in all its forms. In connection with the institutional concerns of EDC, these 
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principles could prompt detailed studies on the concrete institutional alternatives that may 
be available for the design of anti-discrimination regimes. For example, by resorting to 
the principle of the challenging stance, we may want to loosen rules of evidence, allowing 
victims of discrimination to resort to the social context in order to understand the 
expressive meaning of certain discriminatory practices. Or, by studyng the different ways 
in which Latin American ADL observes a socio-economic lens, we may develop a more 
detailed account of the ways in which class, poverty, or other social conditions could be 
incorporated as grounds of protection, or to understand better the possibility of 
implementing public sector equality duties to address socio-economic issues.  
 
A third question that emerges at the end of this theoretical enterprise is whether recent 
critical theories that engage with ‘legalistic theories of justice or “constitutional theory”’ 
reduce critical social analysis to a mere scholarly specialisation that ‘has lost the attempt 
to think about the social totality’.13 This is one of the questions that I have tried to address, 
although indirectly, through my discussion of the complementary nature of a critical 
social theory of ADL and the advancements made by recent Latin American 
constitutional scholarship, which is very much focused on the power of law and legalism 
for progressive social change. A deeper theoretical reflection on the recent scepticism 
about modern law’s legalism, allegedly drawn from leading figures in the Frankfurt 
School tradition, would require a broader analysis that has been left out of this work. 
Moreover, future research questions that emerge from this dissertation point to the 
possibility of using different dimensions of the concept of ‘juridification’ to address both 
the dangers and strengths of the recent boom in ADL in Latin America.14 Hence, rather 
than extending Fraser’s account to the study of legal institutions, we could explore the 
possibility of directly addressing ADL from the perspective of the vast critical scholarship 
that derives from the work of first and second generation Frankfurt scholars, such as Franz 
Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer, and Jürgen Habermas, all of whom addressed law from a 
multi-dimensional perspective.15
                                               
13 W Scheuerman, ‘Recent Frankfurt Critical Theory: Down on Law?’ (2017) 24 Constellations 113. 
14 L Blichner and A Molander, ‘Mapping Juridification’ (2008) 14 European Law Journal 36.  
15 Scheuerman (n 13) 11.  
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Appendix  
Table 1  
Anti-discrimination provisions in six Latin American countries 
 
 
Country 
 
Constitutional Level Legislation 
Argentina  Constitution of 1853 (major amendments in 1994) 
 
Equal pay (art 14bis): “Labor in its diverse forms shall enjoy 
the protection of the law, which shall ensure to workers (…) 
equal pay for equal work”. 
 
Equality before the law (art 16): "The Argentine Nation 
admits neither blood or birth prerogatives: there are neither 
privileges [to special rules or courts] nor titles of nobility. All 
its inhabitants are equal before the law, and admissible to 
employment without any other requirement their ability. 
Equality is the basis of taxation and public burdens”. 
 
Equality between citizens and foreigners (art 20): 
“Foreigners enjoy within the territory all the civil rights of a 
citizen”. 
 
Gender equality quotas for Congress, article 37.  
 
Amparo (discrimination) (art 43): “Any person may file an 
expeditious and swift action of amparo, whenever no other 
more appropriate judicial means exists, against any act or 
omission by public authorities or by private individuals, that 
presently or imminently harms, restricts, alters or threatens, 
in an arbitrary or manifestly illegal manner, the rights and 
guarantees recognized by this Constitution, by a treaty, or by 
a law. As appropriate, the judge may declare the norm upon 
Law 23.592 of 1988, Anti-Discrimination Law: It establishes hate crimes and a 
special judicial remedy against arbitrarily/discriminatory behaviour that impedes, 
obstructs or in some way diminishes the full exercise of fundamental rights. It considers 
especially discriminatory those acts or omissions based on grounds such as race, 
religion, nationality, ideology, political opinion, union affiliation, sex, economic 
position, social condition of physical characters.  
 
Law 25.013 of 1998: it establishes a special clause against discriminatory dismissal.  
 
Code of Ethics in Public Functions, adopted by decree n41 of 1999: “Public officials 
shall not carry out discriminatory in their dealings with the public or with other 
government officials. They must grant every person equal treatment in all comparable 
situations. Equality of situations is understood to exist where there are no differences 
which, in accordance with current legislation in force, should be deemed to establish a 
priority. This principle also applies to the dealings which the public official maintains 
with their subordinates.”  
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which the harmful act or omission is founded 
unconstitutional. 
 
[When] this action complains of any form of discrimination, 
or regards the rights that protect the environment, 
competition, the user, the consumer, or rights of a collective 
nature in general, it may be brought by the affected party, the 
Defender of the People, and the associations that support 
these ends that are registered as required by a law that shall 
determine the requirements and forms of their organization.” 
 
Equality as an objective of education (art 75.19): “the 
promotion of democratic values and the equality of 
opportunities and means without any discrimination 
whatsoever.” 
 
Constitutional Hierarchy of Human Rights Treaties (art 
75.19): including, among others, the main international 
human rights treaties with special equality and non-
discrimination provisions for disadvantaged groups.  
 
Positive duties (social policies and affirmative action (art 
75.23): “The Congress shall have power: (…) To legislate and 
promote proactive measures that guarantee true equality of 
opportunity and treatment, and the full enjoyment and 
exercise of the rights recognized by this Constitution and by 
current international treaties on human rights, in particular 
with respect to children, women, the elderly and people with 
disabilities.” 
 
Bolivia Constitution of 2009 
 
Foundational values (art 8.II): " The State is based on the 
values of unity, equality, inclusion, dignity, liberty, solidarity, 
reciprocity, respect, interdependence, harmony, transparency, 
equilibrium, equality of opportunity, social and gender 
Law 45 of 2010, Law against Racism and every form of Discrimination. 
 
“Article 1.ii The purpose of this Act is to establish mechanisms and procedures for the 
prevention and punishment of acts of racism and all forms of discrimination within the 
scope of the Political Constitution of the State and international human rights treaties; 
ii. The aims of this Act are to eliminate racist conduct and all forms of discrimination 
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equality in participation, common welfare, responsibility, 
social justice, distribution and redistribution of the social 
wealth and assets for well being.". 
 
“Essential purposes and functions of the State” (art  9): 
(…) 1) To construct a just and harmonious society, built on 
decolonization, without discrimination or exploitation, with 
full social justice, in order to strengthen the Pluri-National 
identities; 2) To guarantee the welfare, development, security 
and protection, and equal dignity of individuals, nations, 
peoples, and communities, and to promote mutual respect and 
intra-cultural, inter-cultural and plural language dialogue; 5) 
To guarantee access of all people to education, health and 
work”.  
 
Prohibition of Discrimination against individual and 
collectives (art 14): “ii) The state prohibits and punishes all 
forms of discrimination based on sex, color, age, sexual 
orientation, gender identity, origin, culture, nationality, 
citizenship, language, religious belief, ideology, political 
affiliation or philosophy, civil status, economic or social 
condition, type of occupation, disability, pregnancy, and any 
other discrimination that attempts to or results in the 
annulment of or harm to the equal recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise of the rights of all people; iii) the State guarantees 
everyone and all collectives, without discrimination, the free 
and effective exercise of the rights established in this 
Constitution, the laws and international human rights 
treaties”. 
 
Access to health without discrimination (art 18.II): “The 
State guarantees the inclusion and access to health for all 
persons, without any exclusion or discrimination.”  
 
Right to/of work without discrimination (art 46.I): “To 
dignified work, with industrial and occupational health and 
and to consolidate public policies in the area of protection and prevention of crimes of 
racism and all forms of discrimination”.   
 
article 5.a) The term ‘discrimination’ shall be used to signify all forms of distinction, 
exclusion, restriction or preference based on the grounds of sex, color, age, sexual 
orientation and gender identity, origin, culture, nationality, citizenship, language, 
religious belief, ideology, political or philosophical affiliation, marital status, 
economic, social or health status, profession, occupation or trade, level of training, 
differing abilities and/or physical, intellectual or sensory disability, pregnancy, origin, 
physical  appearance, attire, surname or other grounds whose purpose or result is the 
annulment or diminishment of the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, under equal 
conditions, of the human rights and liberties recognized by the Political Constitution of 
the State and international law. Affirmative action measures shall not be considered as 
discrimination”.  
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safety, without discrimination, and with a fair, equitable and 
satisfactory remuneration or salary that assures a dignified 
existence for the worker and his or her family.”  
 
A new ground of protection (art 59.III): “Every child and 
adolescent, without regard to origin, has equal rights and 
duties with respect to his or her parents. Discrimination 
among offspring on the part of parents shall be punished by 
law.” 
 
Protection of discrimination against the elderly (art 68.II): 
“II. All forms of mistreatment, abandonment, violence and 
discrimination against elderly persons is prohibited and 
punished.” 
 
Protection of Disabled Persons (art 71.I-II): “I. Any kind of 
discrimination, mistreatment, violence and exploitation of 
anyone who is disabled shall be prohibited and punished; II. 
The State shall adopt measures of affirmative action to 
promote the effective integration of disabled persons into the 
productive, economic, political, social, and cultural sphere, 
without any discrimination whatsoever.”  
Chile Constitution of 1980 
 
Bases of Institutionality (art 1): “Persons are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights (…) It is the duty of the State (…) 
to promote the harmonized integration of all the sectors of the 
Nation and to assure the right of the persons to participate 
with equal opportunities in the national life.” 
 
Equality before the law (art 19.2): “Equality before the law. 
In Chile there are no privilege persons or groups. In Chile 
there are no slaves, and any that sets foot on its territory will 
become free. Men and women are equal before the law. 
Neither the law nor any authority whatsoever may establish 
arbitrary differences.” 
Law 20.609 of 2012, that establishes measures against discrimination: 
 
Purpose of this law (art 1): “establish a judicial remedy to restore the rule of law 
against a discriminatory act. 
 
Every organ of the administration, within its powers, should elaborate and implement 
policies to guarantee every person, without arbitrary discrimination, the entitlement and 
exercise of its rights and freedoms recognized in the Constitution, laws and 
international treaties.” 
 
Definition of discrimination (art 2): “all distinction, exclusion or restriction that lacks 
reasonable justification, committed by the State or individuals, and that causes 
privation, perturbation or threat on the legitimate exercise of the fundamental rights 
(…) in particular when these are grounded in motives such as race or ethnicity, 
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Prohibition of discrimination in employment (art 19.16): “ 
Any discrimination that is not based on personal skills or 
capability is forbidden, notwithstanding that the law may 
require Chilean citizenship or age limits in certain cases.” 
nationality, socio-economic condition, language, ideology or political opinion, religion 
or belief, union membership or participation or non participation in other associations, 
sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, civil status, age, personal appearance, illness or 
disability.” 
Colombia Constitution of 1991 
 
General clause (art 5): “The State recognizes, without any 
discrimination whatsoever, the primacy of the inalienable 
rights of the individual and protects the family as the basic 
institution of society.” 
 
General equality clause (art 13): " All individuals are born 
free and equal before the law, shall receive equal protection 
and treatment from the authorities, and shall enjoy the same 
rights, freedoms, and opportunities without any 
discrimination on account of gender, race, national or family 
origin, language, religion, political opinion, or philosophy. 
 
The State shall promote the conditions so that equality may 
be real and effective and shall adopt measures in favor of 
groups that are discriminated against or marginalized. 
 
The State shall especially protect those individuals who on 
account of their economic, physical, or mental condition are 
in obviously vulnerable circumstances and shall sanction the 
abuses or ill-treatment perpetrated against them.". 
 
Equality of Family members (art 42): “Family relations are 
based on the equality of rights and duties of the couple and on 
the reciprocal respect of all its members.” 
 
Constitutional grounds of the labor statute (art 53): 
“Equality of opportunity for workers”.  
 
Law 1482 of 2011, Anti-Discrimination Law: it only establishes criminal penalties 
for discriminatory acts and speeches.  
 
The Colombian labour code includes a general right of equality before the law of all 
employees (2011, article 10).  
 
Other laws, such as 823 of 2003, establishes sectorial clauses for the protection and 
promotion of equality of opportunities for several disadvantaged groups.  
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Equality and dignity (art 70): “Culture in its diverse 
manifestations is the basis of nationality. The State recognizes 
the equality and dignity of all those who live together in the 
country.” 
 
Basis of the administrative function (art 209): “The 
administrative function is at the service of the general interest 
and is developed on the basis of the principles of equality.” 
 
Equality as grounding of fiscal oversight (art 267): 
“Oversight of the fiscal management of the State includes 
exercising financial control, management, and performance, 
based on efficiency, economy, equality, and appraising the 
environmental costs.” 
Mexico  Constitution of 1917; major amendment in 2011 
 
Prohibition of discrimination (art 1): “Any form of 
discrimination, based on ethnic or national origin, gender, 
age, disabilities, social status, medical conditions, religion, 
opinions, sexual orientation, marital status, or any other form, 
which violates the human dignity or seeks to annul or 
diminish the rights and freedoms of the people, is prohibited.” 
 
Equality of opportunities for indigenous people (art 2.B): 
“In order to promote equal opportunities for indigenous 
people and to eliminate discriminatory practices, the 
Federation, the Federal District, the States and the local 
councils shall establish the necessary institutions and policies 
to guarantee indigenous people’s rights and comprehensive 
development of indigenous communities. Such institutions 
and policies shall be designed and operated together with 
them.” 
 
Social equality as an ideal in education (art 3.IX.C). 
 
Federal Law to Prevent and Eliminate Discrimination of 1992 (major amendments 
in 2011):  
 
Definition of discrimination (art 4): "every distinction, exclusion or restriction based 
on ethnic or national origin, sex, age, disability, social or economic status, health, 
pregnancy, language, religion, opinion, sexual preferences, civil status or any other, 
impedes recognition or enjoyment or rights and real equality in terms of opportunities 
for people". 
 
Different forms of behaviour that are considered discrimination (art 9): "among 
others (…) impeding access to public or private education (…) prohibiting free choice 
of employment, restricting access, permanency or promotion in employment (…) deny 
or restrict information on reproductive rights (…) deny or condition medical services 
(…) impede participation in civil, political or any other kind of organizations (…) to 
impede the exercise of property rights (…) to offend, ridicule or promote violence 
through messages and images displayed in communications media (…) to impede 
access to social security and its benefits (…) to impede access to any public service or 
private institution providing services to the public, as well as limiting access and 
freedom of movement in public spaces (…) to exploit or treat in an abusive or degrading 
way (…) to restrict participation in sports, recreation or cultural activities (…) 
incitement to hatred, violence, rejection, ridicule, defamation, slander, persecution or 
exclusion (…) promote or indulge in physical or psychological abuse based on physical 
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Gender Equality as a principle of broadcasting and 
telecommunication (art 6.B.5) 
appearance or dress, talk, mannerisms or for openly acknowledging one's sexual 
preference or any other ground of discrimination”. 
Peru Constitution of 1993 
 
Human Dignity as the essential objective of the State (art 
1).  
 
Equality before the Law (art 2.2): “Every person has the 
right: (…) to equality before the law. No person shall be 
discriminated on the basis of origin, race, sex, language, 
religion, opinion, economic situation or any other reason.” 
 
Equality in labor relationships (art 26): “Equal opportunity 
without discrimination.” 
Hate crimes and aggravating circumstances (arts 46 and 323 of the Criminal Code): 
(discrimination may constitute a crime).  
 
There are several sectorial regulations that prohibit discrimination, such as the Law of 
Equality of Opportunities between men and women (Law 28983 of 2007). However, 
the Peruvian legislation does not include any general prohibition of discrimination on 
an open list of grounds 
 
 
Table 2  
Anti-discrimination entities or organs in six Latin American countries  
 
Country Name(s) Character: NHRIs, 
Equality Bodies, 
ombudsmen? 
Powers: report and 
advocacy 
Powers: litigation Powers: receive 
complaints 
Coordination with other 
mechanisms/institutions 
Argentina Instituto Nacional 
contra la 
Discriminación, la 
Xenofobia, y el 
Racismo (law 
24.515 of 1995) 
Equality Body (non-
autonomous), which 
depends on the 
Ministry of Justice 
and Human Rights  
General advisory and 
reporting powers; 
organize campaigns for 
the promotion of non-
discrimination; propose 
public policies; in charge 
of implementing the 
National Plan against 
discrimination (decree 
1086/05) 
No standing for litigation Handles complaints on 
violations of the 
Argentinian anti-
discrimination law, 
committed either by the 
Administration or 
individuals, but has no 
powers to sanction. It has 
also conciliatory and 
mediation powers 
Defer cases to other 
institutions (eg, to the 
Defensorias provinciales or to 
the federal Ombudsmen); also 
participates in the design of 
the National Human Rights 
Plan with the supervising 
authority of the Ministry of 
Justice and Human Rights  
 Defensoria del 
Pueblo de la Nacion 
(law 24.284 of 1993, 
National Human 
Rights Institution 
(Constitution of 
Argentina, art 86; *A 
It has a general reporting 
powers, with an 
institutional priority for 
disadvantaged groups. 
General standing for 
litigation, “the capacity 
to be a party in a lawsuit” 
(Constitution, art 86). 
It has general fact-finding 
and investigative powers, 
but no power to sanction. It 
can act by request or 
Acts in coordination with 
defensorias provinciales, 
which are grouped under a 
common association.  
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Country Name(s) Character: NHRIs, 
Equality Bodies, 
ombudsmen? 
Powers: report and 
advocacy 
Powers: litigation Powers: receive 
complaints 
Coordination with other 
mechanisms/institutions 
and art 86 of the 
Constitution) 
Status): “an 
independent 
authority (…) with 
full autonomy and 
without receiving 
instructions from any 
other authority. The 
mission (…) is the 
defense and 
protection of human 
rights and other 
rights, guarantees 
and interests 
sheltered under this 
Constitution and the 
laws, in the face of 
deeds, acts or 
omissions of the 
Administration; as 
well as the control of 
public administrative 
functions.” 
Also, power to trigger 
amparos (Constitution, 
art 43), and support 
individual or group 
litigants. 
thorugh self-standing 
initiative. It has powers to 
conciliate or mediate 
between the parties 
involved in a complaint.  
Bolivia Comité contra el 
Racismo y la no  
Discriminación 
(law 045 of 2010).  
 
A non-autonomous 
Equality body, which 
depends on the 
Ministry of Cultures, 
through the De-
Colonization Vice-
Ministry. It is made 
up of two 
commissions: the 
Anti-Racism 
Commission and the 
Elaborate and propose 
public policies; 
coordinate state action; 
implements law 045; 
hold a registry and 
systematization of 
judicial and 
administrative anti-
discrimination 
complaints  
No litigation powers. It 
has an official duty to 
denunciate 
discrimination acts that 
could constitute a crime.   
Cannot receive complaints 
(every complaint should 
be directed against the 
authority in question; it 
follows and supervises the 
evolution of these 
complaints). No 
investigation or sanction 
powers. However, it has 
soft powers to make 
Elaborates a national Plan to 
coordinate all state action 
against discrimination.  
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Country Name(s) Character: NHRIs, 
Equality Bodies, 
ombudsmen? 
Powers: report and 
advocacy 
Powers: litigation Powers: receive 
complaints 
Coordination with other 
mechanisms/institutions 
Anti-Discrimination 
Commission. 
recommendation on 
certain cases.   
Defensoría del 
Pueblo (law 870 of 
2016) 
Constitutional 
autonomy 
(Constitution of 
Bolivia, art. 218; *A 
Status): “operational, 
financial and 
administrative 
autonomy, in 
accordance with the 
law”. 
 
 
General reporting 
powers (promotion, 
dissemination of and 
compliance with human 
rights, both individual 
and collective, that are 
established in the 
Constitution, laws and 
international 
instruments); can also 
propose bills and 
amendments.  
General standing to 
litigate and file any kind 
of actions. This power 
extends to the 
administrative activity of 
the entire public sector 
and the activity of 
private institutions that 
provide public services 
General investigative, but 
no sanction powers.  
Can refer cases to any public 
institution.  
Chile Instituto Nacional 
de Derechos 
Humanos (law 
20.405 of 2009) 
 
National Human 
Rights Institution 
(Legislative 
autonomy; *A 
Class). 
General reporting and 
advisory powers 
Public Interest Litigation 
(crimes against 
humanity, torture, forced 
disappearances; 
constitutional writs of 
protection and habeas 
corpus) 
No enquiry or complaint-
handling powers 
Coordinates with the under-
secretary of Human Rights 
Colombia Defensoría del 
Pueblo 
(Constitution of 
Colombia, art 118 
and 281). Special 
law of 1992.   
 
 
 
Constitutional 
autonomy (*A 
Status). Part of the 
Public Ministry 
(Constitution of 
Colombia, art 281), 
which has the 
responsibility “to 
defend and promote 
human rights, to 
protect the public 
interest, and to 
Non-binding guidelines 
for private entities 
 
Constitution of 
Colombia (art 282): 
general powers of the 
ombudsman.  
It can initiate 
Public Interest Litigation 
before ay judicial venue  
Mediate collective 
complaints of 
organizations of the civil 
society against public 
administration 
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Country Name(s) Character: NHRIs, 
Equality Bodies, 
ombudsmen? 
Powers: report and 
advocacy 
Powers: litigation Powers: receive 
complaints 
Coordination with other 
mechanisms/institutions 
oversee the official 
conduct of those who 
perform public 
functions.” 
Mexico Consejo Nacional 
para Prevenir la 
Discriminación 
(CONAPRED), 
created by the 
Federal law to 
prevent and 
eliminate 
discrimination, of 
2003.  
 
 
A non-autonomous, 
decentralized organ 
that depends on the 
Secretaria de la 
Gobernancion. It has 
technical and 
management 
autonomy.    
General consultative and 
reporting powers. Active 
promotion and design of 
public policies against 
discrimination.  
No power to litigate  Handles complaints 
triggered by individuals or 
collective organizations 
against public or private 
actors; counselling of 
complainants; the power to 
issue binding 
administrative sanctions, 
with different reparation 
measures (restitution, 
compensation, public 
sanction, public pardon, 
and the warranty of non- 
repetition). In case of non-
compliance, it can send the 
case to judicial authorities.   
If a complaint against a public 
authority is made before the 
National Commission, the 
Council is precluded from 
acting (Federal Law to Prevent 
and Eliminate Discrimination, 
art 63). CONAPRED also 
elaborates National Plan 
Against Discrimination *4 
years.  
 Comisión Nacional 
de Derechos 
Hmanos (CNDH), 
created in 1992 by a 
special law.  
Constitutional 
autonomy (art 102.B; 
*A Status). It 
subjects to scrutiny 
only public 
authorities  
Make autonomous 
investigations or by 
petition of the 
government or other 
public authorities 
(Constitution of Mexico, 
art 102); make general 
recommendations on 
issues), and general 
consultative and 
promotion powers  
Trigger actions of 
unconstitutionality 
(Constitution of Mexico, 
art 105.g) (abstract 
constitutional review) 
Handles complaints but 
can only issue non-binding 
recommendations; can 
also trigger complaints 
before respective 
authorities; promotes 
conciliation between the 
complainants and public 
authorities (article 6 law of 
the Commission).  
Can present actions of 
unconstitutionality and has a 
priority of jurisdiction before 
CONAPRED in cases where 
victims from discrimination 
chose the National 
Commission. 
Peru Defensoría del 
Pueblo (Office of 
It is the National 
Human Rights 
General reporting 
powers, and a special 
It can trigger the 
constitutional remedies 
General investigative and 
fact-finding powers, but 
Special units for vulnerable 
groups. After the investigation 
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Country Name(s) Character: NHRIs, 
Equality Bodies, 
ombudsmen? 
Powers: report and 
advocacy 
Powers: litigation Powers: receive 
complaints 
Coordination with other 
mechanisms/institutions 
the Ombudsman), 
created by law 
26.520 of 1995 
 
Institution, with 
constitutional 
autonomy (arts 161-
162; *A Status) 
power to initiate 
legislation and 
recommend measures 
(Constitution of Peru, art 
162) 
before the Constitutional 
Court and intervene in 
habeas corpus 
procedures for the 
protection of 
fundamental rights 
issues non-binding 
recommendations 
of complaints, in can refer 
cases to the General 
Comptroller of the Republic, 
who can issue binding 
decisions 
 Comisión Nacional 
contra la 
Discriminación 
(CONACOD), 
created by an 
Executive Decree 
015 of 2003 
Non-autonomous 
body, which depends 
on the Ministry of 
Justice and Human 
Rights; a multi-
sectorial entity, in 
charge of 
monitoring, 
supervising and 
advising the 
executive power in 
issues of equality and 
non-discrimination.  
Inter-ministerial body 
that designs a National 
Human Rights Plan and 
presents an annual 
report. Elaborates and 
proposes public policies 
at all state levels.  
No litigation role. 
However, it includes a 
technical team that 
supports the citizen in 
their anti-discrimination 
claims, including the 
possibility of strategic 
litigation before the 
higher tribunals and the 
Constitutional Court 
It creates a ‘single-
window’ system for anti-
discrimination complaints. 
It issues binding decisions 
for the different sectorial 
bodies subjected to it.  
 
Coordinates with the 
Defensoría del Pueblo.  
 
* Status within the Sub-Committee on Accreditation of National Human Rights Institutions
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